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
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RECORD PRESS.

Admiral Sir John Rushworth Jellicoe, KCB, KCVO
Commander in Chief of the Grand Fleet.

PRESENTED WITH THE "MANCHESTER GUARDIAN" HISTORY OF THE WAR.

THE
“Manchester Guardian”
HISTORY
OF THE
WAR.

.. 1914 ..

JOHN HEYWOOD LTD.,
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PREFACE.

THIS History of the War aims at being a plain and simple narrative of fact. History, in its higher and truer sense of a reasoned judgment on human affairs, cannot be written while the events that are its subject are still unfinished, and in this war the forces are so tremendous, and all but a few main issues so difficult and complicated, that we may have to wait many years before a completely impartial and just judgment can be passed upon them. The generation that makes history is rarely the one that can write it.

But even while the war is still in progress there is, it is hoped, some utility and advantage in an attempt to sift its multitudinous detail, to distinguish its main outlines, and to exhibit them in the form of a continuous and ordered narrative. Such an attempt, if honestly made, may have a permanent as well as a current value, since it will display, as no later narrative can, the impression made by the events as they occurred on contemporary observers, and the hopes and fears of those who lived through the conflict.

That is the task that the writers of this History have set themselves.

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[Central News.]

A General View of Serajevo where the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife were murdered.

HISTORY OF THE WAR.

CHAPTER I.

HOW THE WAR BEGAN.

ON June 28th, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were killed by bombs in the streets of Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia. The victims of this atrocious crime were not well known in Europe, for the Archduke's love-marriage was not recognised by the old bad rules of the Viennese Court, but what little was known was wholly honourable. They had been received at the English Court, and the Archduke, who cared more for gardening than for politics, had liked our English country life. His wife belonged to an old Bohemian noble family, and he is credited with an idea—encouraged no doubt by his wife—that a solution of some of Austria's troubles might be found in the conversion of the Austrian Empire from a Dual to a Triple Monarchy, with Slavs as the subjects of the third kingdom. There was therefore injustice, as well as cruelty, in the crime. But most of all were people grieved that the aged Emperor Francis Joseph, who had tasted sorrow

so often, should have the cup filled up again. His brother, Maximilian of Mexico, had been shot by rebels there after a most unhappy reign. His wife, the beautiful and eccentric Elizabeth, was murdered by a lunatic. His son, Rudolf, shot himself in circumstances of dishonour. His cousin, the Archduke John, shortly after the death of Rudolf, renounced his royal rights, went to sea in a sailing ship, and has never been seen since. It seemed that there was to be no end to the sorrows of this House. No one thought then that this last tragedy of the Hapsburg family was soon to overshadow almost every family in Europe.

It was evident from the first that the crime was the work not of a single fanatic but of an organised conspiracy. The inquiry that was held showed that the headquarters of the conspiracy were in Servia. The bombs had come from the Servian army factory, Servian army officers had instructed some of the conspirators in their use, and Servian frontier officials had arranged for their transportation into



The murdered Archduke Francis Ferdinand with his wife and children.

[Record Press.]

Bosnia. All these officers and officials had belonged to a Servian society known as the Narodna Odbrana, which conducted a propaganda for the union of the Serbs of Bosnia with their brothers in Servia. The organisation of this society followed approved Balkan models. As the Bulgarian Comitajis kept Macedonia in a ferment while Bulgaria remained at peace with Turkey, the Servian society carried on its work while the relations of Austria and Servia remained outwardly friendly. The murder of the Archduke was the final act of a conspiracy against the integrity of the Austrian Empire, and Austria determined to humble Servia.

Austria's position in Bosnia was a curious one. For many years it had been not unlike our own in Egypt, inasmuch as though she ruled the country she had no legal sovereignty over it. It was an old Turkish province, given her to administer by the Powers at the Congress of Berlin. In order to discharge this mandate Austria

had to fight a long war in Bosnia, and she had undoubtedly produced a very great improvement in the material condition of the country. People no more expected her to leave Bosnia than they expected England to leave Egypt. In 1908 she took the grave step—sometimes urged on us

in Egypt—of annexing the country. Her motives were intelligible enough. The confusion of the Young Turk revolution gave her an opportunity which she reflected might not recur. And, moreover, she was beginning to be apprehensive of Servia. The Obrenovitches, the old Royal House of Servia, had been pro-Austrian, and the new regicide dynasty of Karageorgevitch inclined towards Russia. But whatever excuse there was for the annexation, the manner of it was bad. Russia protes-



The arrest of the murderer.

[Central News.]

ted, and Sir Edward Grey argued that only the Concert of the Powers could change the rights that the Concert had conferred and proposed a conference Austria successfully resisted.

Austria owed her success at that time to Germany, who stood by her ally "in shining armour." It had been a maxim of Bismarck's policy never to quarrel with Russia; to him nothing in the Balkans was worth the bones of a single Pomeranian Grenadier. His successors drew away from Russia, and closer to Austria. When Austria annexed Bosnia, and Russia, still weak from the war with Japan, objected, Germany threw her sword into the scale. "I made it quite clear," says von Buelow, the Imperial Chancellor at the time, in his book on "Imperial Germany," "that Germany was resolved to preserve her alliance with Austria at all costs;" and he goes on to express his opinion that Germany's action at that time had made an end of the policy of isolating her in Europe. "By means of our strength as a Continental Power we tore the web that encompassed us." This support of Austria in her annexation of Serbia was no mere incident of German policy, but a deliberate challenge to Russia's claim to be the champion of the Balkan Slavs. And Russia never forgot it, as the war now raging proves. It was then that the Greater Serbia agitation which has ended in setting Europe by the ears began to be troublesome. In 1909, in consequence of the protests of Austria, Serbia undertook to modify her policy, and to be a good neighbour of the Dual Monarchy in the future. Then came the remarkable Servian successes in the war with Turkey, and with them a new and inflamed sense of national pride. In maintaining relations of official friendship with Austria, and at the same time encouraging the Greater Serbia agitation, Serbia may only have been doing what the England of Elizabeth did towards Spain and what Bulgaria did towards Turkey, but as she was willing to profit by the actions of her filibusters if they were successful, she was also bound to take the penalties of their failure. Undoubtedly she deserved punishment. The only question was what form that punishment should take, whether or not it should carry with it any infraction of her independence, and whether it was to raise the larger issue of the Teuton as against the Slav in the determination of the future of the old Turkish Empire in Europe.


So far the sympathy of most impartial observers had been in the main with Austria. But the terms of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, when they were published, alienated much of that sympathy, for they

seemed to show that Austria was determined on raising larger issues than the settlement of her quarrel with

Servia. Austria was justified in insisting that Servia should disown an agitation that threatened the integrity of her Empire, should punish her subjects who had been concerned in a crime of particular atrocity, and should give adequate guarantees that such things should not recur in the future. But her demands went further. One of them was that Servia should "accept the collaboration of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the suppression of the subversive movement against the territorial integrity" of Austria. Faced by this direct threat against her rights as an independent nation, Servia appealed to Russia. What Russia's answer was is not known, but Servia's reply was a complete acceptance of all the Austrian demands except those which denied her rights as an independent sovereign State to set her own house in order. Austria took this reply as a rejection of her ultimatum, and on July 28th declared war. Two days before Russia had warned Austria that she could not be "indifferent" to the fate of Servia.

Austria's policy is intelligible as the expression of a bitter indignation against the nation which had in some degree been an accomplice of a foul assassination, but why did Germany support her so unreservedly? Why, when a word would have saved Europe from the terrible dangers which now began to threaten did she leave it unsaid? The answer is that she was now as in 1908 anxious to defeat Russia's claim to appear as the champion of the Balkan Slavs. The clearest statement of Germany's policy in the matter is given in a confidential circular of the Imperial Chancellor to the Federal Governments, issued on July 28th, and published in the German White Book. "There are certain Russian voices who hold that it is a self-evident right of Russia to intervene actively on Servia's behalf in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia. If Russia believes it must intervene, its right is no doubt good, so far as that goes. But in doing so it must know that it thereby takes over as its own all Servia's endeavours to undermine the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that on it will rest the sole responsibility if the Austro-Servian business, which all the other great Powers desire to localise, leads to a European war. . . .

The final goal of the agitation carried on by the Pan-Slavists against Austria is by breaking down the Danube



[Stanley's Press Agency.]

The Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria.



[Stanley's Press Agency.]

The Archduke Charles Francis, nephew of the murdered Archduke, and present heir to the Austrian throne.



[Topical Press Agency.]

M. Viviani, French Premier and Foreign Minister at the time the war began.



[Halftones Limited.]

Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary.



[Central News.]

M. Sazonof, the Russian Foreign Secretary.

Monarchy, to burst or weaken the Triple Alliance, and subsequently to isolate the German Empire completely. Our own interest therefore calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary." The passage seems to make it quite clear that the key to Germany's policy was the desire to challenge, as she had successfully done in 1908, the position of Russia as the head and protectress of the Balkan Slavs. So far the psychology of her policy was not unlike that of England under Beaconsfield during the Balkan crisis of the 'seventies. Austria was to Germany what Turkey was to Beaconsfield, the bulwark against Russian domination in the East.


But when collision threatened between England and Russia in the Russo-Turkish War, England avoided war

by a European conference. On July 26th, two days before the declaration of war in Servia, Sir Edward Grey invited Austria to do the same in his proposal for a conference at London of the four Powers not directly interested. Germany's attitude to this proposal was very ambiguous. Count Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in London, told Sir Edward Grey on July 27th that the German Government accepted the proposal "in principle," but on the same day Sir. E. Goschen, our Ambassador in Berlin, reported that in the opinion of the Government the suggested conference would practically amount to a court of arbitration, and could not therefore be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. But if



[Central News.]

Count Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Secretary.



[Central News.]

Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, German Imperial Chancellor.




[Topical Press Agency.]


Herr von Jagow, Imperial Secretary to the German Foreign Office.



[News Illustrations Company.]

Sir Maurice de Bunsen, lately the British Ambassador in Vienna.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

M. Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London.

[News Illustrations Company.]

Sir Edward Goschen, lately the British Ambassador in Berlin.

Germany's objection was not to the substance of the proposal but to its form only, it was certainly her duty to put forward some specific proposals of her own. This she never did, and it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Germany was concerned to deny the authority of the Concert of Europe to arrange a settlement even of a dispute which admittedly threatened calamity to all. On July 28th the German Chancellor told our Ambassador at Berlin that the proposed conference would have the appearance of an Areopagus consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining Powers. But one of the remaining Powers, Russia, had no objection to be thus sat in judgment upon. And, after all, was not the conception of the Concert of Europe as an Areopagus to restrain excess and discipline ambition by the common law of Europe an ideal that ought to be encouraged by every possible means? The plain fact seems to be that by the phrase "isolating the conflict"—which was on everyone's lips at this time—England and Germany meant two very different things. Germany meant the freedom of Austria to do as she liked with Serbia without any effectual interference from Russia. England meant the

regulation of the trouble in accordance with some agreed principles of international policy. These two views were irreconcilable, though if the clash could be postponed, time and compromise might have softened it.

Accordingly, Sir Edward Grey made yet another effort to preserve the peace. Was it not possible, even after the declaration of war on Serbia, if the other Powers held their hands, for a settlement still to be reached? On July 29th Sir Edward Grey suggested that Austria should announce that she would rest content with the occupation of the capital of Serbia, and so give time for the Powers to mediate between her and Russia. "Let her remember," the *Manchester Guardian* had said that morning, "the

great armies that she had to employ for the conquest of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and content herself with the symbolic triumph of the occupation of the capital. If she grasps at more, she will probably retain less." Austria had already declined to negotiate on the basis of Serbia's reply. But what other basis could there be? She had also promised to respect Servian integrity, and Germany, on July 29th, had offered to guarantee the observance of that promise. But it did not meet the difficulty. Territorial



[Central News.]

Prince Lichnowsky, lately the German Ambassador in London.

[Record Press.]

Count Mensdorff, lately the Austrian Ambassador in London.

integrity is quite consistent with the loss of real independence, and Russia was concerned to prevent Serbia from becoming a "vassal state" of Austria. Negotiations, however, continued between Austria and Russia, and by July 31st an agreement was all but reached. On that day the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg—encouraged, apparently by Germany—declared his Government's readiness to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. Another day and everything might have been in good train for settlement. But that very day Germany launched her ultimatum against Russia.

What had happened? With the declaration of war on Serbia, mobilisation—that is the raising of the armies from a peace to a war footing by the embodiment of the Reserves—had begun in Austria. On July 27th our Ambassador in Berlin was informed that if Russia only mobilised in the south (that is against Austria) Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in the north, Germany would have to do so too. On July 30th Russia offered to stop all her military preparations if Austria would eliminate from her ultimatum to Serbia points which violated the principle of Servian sovereignty. On the next day Austria was very conciliatory at St. Petersburg, as we have seen. Not only so, but she had informed the German Government that she was willing to consider Sir Edward Grey's proposal for

mediation between her and Serbia, and Sir Edward Grey later said that by this acceptance he understood that the Austrian military action against Serbia should continue for the present, and was prepared to urge Russia to suspend her mobilisation against Austria. And yet this of all days is the day chosen by Russia for a general mobilisation on land and sea, and by Germany for launching an ultimatum against Russia, which she knew would be rejected. The Germans in their White Paper, and the Kaiser in his telegrams to the Tsar, charge Russia with secretly mobilising against Germany, while all the time she was assuring her that she was making no preparations against her. The charge is not made out

very satisfactorily, for the only specific act directed against Germany by Russia, reported before July 31st, is the proclamation of martial law at Kovno on July 27th. But is the point very important? When Germany presented her ultimatum to Russia on July 31st she demanded that Russia should cease her mobilisation not only against herself but against Austria too. That is to say, she asserted Austria's right to go to war against Serbia, and denied Russia's right to make preparations for defending her position as the protectress of the Balkan Slavs. She was more Austrian than the Austrians. At the very time Austria

was ready to draw back, Germany in effect declared war.

It is a mistake commonly made, and one that is particularly dangerous in countries in which there is no party government in our sense, to suppose that the Government is all of one mind. There is some reason to think that the German Government was not, and that there was a peace party working one way and a war party thwarting its efforts. The German Chancellor almost certainly never saw the terms of the Austrian Note to Serbia before it was sent, but it is credibly said that the German Ambassador at Vienna, who was a violent Russophobe, helped to draft it. Another member of the war party was the German military attaché at the St. Petersburg Embassy, whose telegrams imputed bad faith to the Russians, and

greatly helped the war party at Berlin. The Crown Prince again, by general consent, was strongly for war. What seems to have happened is that, just as the negotiations were taking a turn for the better, the war party got the upper hand and saved their military game by kicking over the board.

At five o'clock in the afternoon on Saturday, August 1st, Germany declared war on Russia.

GERMANY, FRANCE, AND ENGLAND.

The cause of the war between the three Emperors was the rivalry between the Teuton and the Slav for power in the south-east of Europe. Germany was determined to



[Newspaper Illustrations.]

Removing the emblems of Germany from the front of the German Embassy in Carlton House Terrace, London.

repeat her success of 1908, when she defeated Russia's diplomatic objections to the annexation of Bosnia; perhaps she thought that she could repeat that success without war, and that Russia was only "bluffing." But in any case she was prepared to run the risk now, as in 1908. It was the clash of two ambitions, of which it is impossible to say—though we may condemn the recklessness with which they were pursued—that one was right and the other wrong. England would no more have gone to war merely to defeat Germany's ambition and promote Russia's than she did in 1908. It is true that since 1908 we had made certain arrangements with France, especially with regard to the naval defence of the Mediterranean, which would have an effect on our policy. In Sir Edward Grey's declared opinion, however, they did not commit this country to any definite line of action in any particular crisis. And when attempts early in the crisis were made to induce him to declare that he would act with France and Russia in any trouble that might arise with Germany, he refused, and that not once or twice.

He had indeed, on November 22nd, 1912, written a letter to the French Ambassador here in which he agreed that if either Government was threatened by an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or by some danger to the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether the two Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and he interpreted that promise as giving either the right to ask the other what it meant to do when a particular crisis arrived. At the beginning of August, accordingly, he felt that France had a right to know what we should do, and, without waiting for the meeting of Parliament on the Monday, he gave France the assurance that "if the German fleet came into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coast or shipping the British fleet would give all the protection in its power." But even that undertaking, as he explained in his speech in the House of Commons on Monday, August 3rd, was subject to the policy of the Government receiving the support of Parliament—must not be taken as binding the country to do anything until the German fleet had in fact taken the action contemplated. This assurance to France did not necessarily involve us in war, but it made war very likely, and it was probably at this juncture that two members of the Cabinet—Mr. Burns, President of the Board of Trade, and Lord Morley, President of the Council—placed their resignations in Mr. Asquith's hands.

But to give France the assurance that we would act with her under certain conditions was not by any means the same thing as giving a promise to Germany that we should remain neutral except under those conditions. On July 29th the Imperial Chancellor, in a conversation with our Ambassador at Berlin, had made proposals in the hope of securing British neutrality. He denied that Germany would wish to crush France in the event of war, and said that he was prepared to give every assurance that the territorial integrity of France would be respected in the event of a German victory. Asked if he could give the same undertaking with regard to the French colonies, the Chancellor said that he could not. On the same day Sir Edward Grey had a conversation with the German Ambassador in London, Prince Lichnowsky, whose sincere desire for peace left no room for doubt. "If we failed to keep the peace," Sir Edward Grey said, "and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him." On the following day Sir Edward Grey replied to the

account which our Berlin Ambassador had sent of his conversation with the Chancellor. "What he asks from us," he wrote, "is in effect that we should engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies." He characterised such a bargain as a "disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover." "We must," he continued, "preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require." Prince Lichnowsky suggested later that Germany might give an undertaking with regard to the French colonies also, but apparently he had no authority from his Government to make that suggestion.

The position therefore with regard to France was that if the German fleet came out of the North Sea to attack her we were to protect her; otherwise we were free. Had the case of France stood alone we should not have gone to war to aid France, except in the event of a German naval attack, though we might have gone to war later in defence of some distinctively British interest that was threatened.

On August 1st, France, asked by Germany what her intentions were, said that she proposed to consult her own interests.

BELGIUM, GERMANY, AND ENGLAND.

The actual occasion of war between England and Germany was the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. By Article 7 of the Treaty of London, signed in 1839 by England, France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia, it was laid down that Belgium should "form an independent and perpetually neutral state, and be bound to observe such neutrality towards all other states." This was the Treaty which constituted Belgium as a separate kingdom from Holland. In 1870 Bismarck published certain proposals made to him four years before by Benedetti, the French Ambassador at Berlin. Benedetti is said to have suggested that Germany should help France to acquire Belgium as compensation for the Prussian annexation of Schleswig-Holstein, the doctrine of which Napoleon III. was very fond being that the taking by one robber of a man's purse gives another robber the right to some one else's watch. Bismarck published these proposals in order to prejudice feeling in England against France. The result was that on the outbreak of war in 1870 England entered into an identic treaty with France and Prussia, by which she bound herself if either belligerent violated its neutrality to make common cause with the other for the protection of Belgium. That treaty, however, was expressly limited in its duration to the period of the war and a year after, and was therefore not in force last August. But the Treaty of London was and still is. Accordingly, on July 31st, Sir Edward Grey, as representative of one signatory of this Treaty, enquired of both France and Germany whether they would engage to respect the neutrality of Belgium. At the same time he informed Belgium that we assumed that she would maintain her neutrality to the utmost of her power—as indeed she was bound to do under the provisions of the Treaty. From France came the answer that she would respect the Treaty. Belgium returned the same answer, and added that she expected others to do the same. But when our Ambassador at Berlin saw the German Foreign Secretary, he was told that the Emperor and the Chancellor must be consulted before any answer was returned. No reply was ever actually sent.

On August 1st, the German Ambassador in London, acting it would seem on his own responsibility, in the


same conversation to which we have already alluded, in which he had expressed the opinion that Germany might give a general guarantee not to attack French coasts or to take French territory, also suggested that the neutrality of Belgium might be respected if we would undertake to be neutral. But Sir Edward Grey took the line that there could be no bargaining on that question any more than on the assistance that we might or might not give to France. He refused to state any terms on which we would promise to be neutral. We must keep our hands free.

On August 2nd, Luxembourg, a neutral Duchy, with the same international guarantee of neutrality as Belgium, was invaded by Germany. On August 3rd, Germany asked for a free passage through the territory of Belgium, promising to maintain her independence if it was granted, and to treat her as an enemy if it was refused. On August 4th the King of the Belgians appealed to England, and Belgian territory was violated at Gemmenich. England formally protested against the violation of the Treaty of London, and when that protest produced no effect

on German policy it was changed into an ultimatum, and by eleven o'clock on the same night England had declared war on Germany.

As between Russia and Germany, the war arose out of the clash of ambitions between Teuton and Slav in the Balkans. As between Germany and France, the war was the penalty or the privilege—the views in France varied between these two extremes—of the Russian Alliance. But in England—disregarding for the time being the merits of our naval quarrel with Germany and that two century old subject of English political controversy, our concern for the balance of power in Europe, the people fastened on the Belgian issue as the one that mattered before all others. There had been few evidences of deep popular passion in England during the negotiations, but the war became instantly popular as a war for the protection of a small nation, for the sanctity of treaty promises and obligations, and for the defeat of the gospel of force with which German policy had come to be identified.*

* See Appendix for a collection of some of the more important documents illustrative of the subject of this chapter.



Before the War: A great Bavarian Demonstration in support of Austria.

[Record Press.



[Central News.]

General Joffre, the French Commander-in-Chief.**The Grand Duke Nicholas, the Russian Commander-in-Chief.**

[Record Press.]

General von Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff.**Baron Conrad von Hotzendorf, Chief of the Austrian General Staff.**

CHAPTER II.

THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE POWERS AT WAR—RECENT ARMY INCREASES—GERMANY AND AUSTRIA—FRANCE AND RUSSIA—SERVIA AND BELGIUM—THE ENGLISH EXPEDITIONARY ARMY.

THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE POWERS AT WAR.

OTHER things being equal, numbers are decisive in war. Other things, of course, are never equal; there are a thousand and one factors in which armies prove to be unequal when war comes, but since the balance of advantage and disadvantage is incalculable in time of peace, the prudent nation must assume that in the shock of battle the opposing sides will be so evenly matched that in the issue numbers will decide. Given a rough equality in other things this must be so, for numbers means only the rifles, sabres, and guns that can be massed against the enemy.

In a struggle, then, which involves four great European Powers whose army is co-extensive with the manhood of the nation, one must start by glancing at the numbers of population. "Germany," said the Imperial Chancellor in his speech to the Reichstag on the outbreak of war, "will fight to the last breath of man and horse." The words contain this much truth, that a nation whose population gives it the advantage of superior numbers may, if it cannot win victory in the field, at least secure better terms of peace by threatening the victor with the prolonged resistance of masses of reserves whom it would cost him dear in money, men, and time to crush. The following table of population, therefore, has its bearing on the possible course of a war of exhaustion:—


Germany.....	64,925,993	(1910)
Austria-Hungary	49,211,427	(1910)
France.....	39,601,509	(1911)
Russia	171,059,900	(1912)
United Kingdom.....	45,370,530	(1911)
Belgium	7,571,387	(1912)
Servia	2,911,701	(1910)

It is impossible, of course, to draw any complete conclusions from figures of population alone, but in a war waged on the present scale it is necessary to take into account the reserves of untrained men at the disposal of the various Powers. In no country where conscription rules is more than a certain proportion of the men who are

liable to service called to the colours. The rest are exempted as being, perhaps, physically unfit for service, or as the support of parents, or, simply, as not being needed to make up the required peace strength for the year. In every country, then, there is a great reservoir of men who can be trained for use in some capacity or other after all the regular organisations have been put in the field. Thus, Germany could use the Landsturm, or second reserve, on her lines of supply, whether in Germany itself or beyond, or as troops of occupation, in order to free her other forces for the fighting line, and, if necessary, she could pass the Landsturm itself into the front line, filling its place with the old and young and the hitherto untrained, who are all liable for service. Similar use could be made of the vast masses of the Opolchénié, or militia, whom Russia can call to her aid. Russia's army is stationed partly in Europe and partly in Asia. But the Austro-German forces cannot reckon on being confronted only by the European army. If troops of occupation are necessary in Russia's Asiatic Empire, Russia could, at need, withdraw her best trained men from Asia to the European field and fill their places with the numberless recruits whom, according to report, quite early in the war she summoned to their training. Austria, too, if her armies crumble before Russia, could certainly call every able-bodied man to join one arm or other of the service. If nations are determined to fight, in the Chancellor's words, "to the last breath of man and horse," numbers must tell heavily in the end—numbers, that is, for whom their Government can find the rifles, sabres, and guns in time to affect the issue in the field.

RECENT ARMY INCREASES.

Although the Continental Powers have usually enrolled only part of the annual contingent of conscripts, there has been a steady tendency in recent years, by one means or another, to increase the peace strength of their armies. Each, in preparation for the coming war, was seeking to make a little more of the men at its disposal, and to outdo the efforts of its prospective enemies. During the last



TYPICAL TROOPS OF THE VARIOUS ARMIES.

The French Army: Zouaves on the march.
 The Russian Army: Infantry resting after the day's march.—The French Army: A Cyclist Corps on parade.
 The German Army: A detachment of Uhlans.
 The French Army: Cuirassiers on parade.

two or three years this policy had been pushed to an extent which clearly indicated that the time was not far distant when the storm might break. Already in the summer of 1912, before the outbreak of the Balkan War, Russia had increased the number of her possible effectives by reducing the grounds on which exemption might be granted. No move of this kind was likely to go long without a counter-move from Germany, and the triumph of the Balkan States over Turkey, which was widely hailed as a victory of the Slav over the Germanic Powers, probably only confirmed the German Government's determination to strengthen the field army without loss of time. The decision was announced early in 1913, and in July a law was passed which provided for a large increase in the peace strength of the army. A month later the French Government, acting at the instigation of Russia, altered the time of military service from two years to three. Exemptions were now to be limited to those who were too weak or disabled for service, and the plea that dependents had to be supported was no longer to be valid; dependents would receive support from the State, and the conscripts on whom they relied must perform their military service. These changes were embodied in law, but there had not been time to carry them fully into effect before the war broke out.

In comparing the military resources of the great Powers it is usual to speak of their peace strength, their field army or war strength, and the maximum numbers of men whom they have at disposal. Of the first of these it is possible to speak with certainty, and of the second with some confidence, for the field army is made up of the peace strength plus the available contingents of reservists, but the numbers of men who can be employed in the last resort are largely a matter of conjecture; they include all of an age and health to fight, but how large is that proportion, for instance, of the Russian or the German population it is difficult to say. In any case the value of numbers must be checked by a consideration of the task which is set them to perform. Russia has vast armies at disposal, but she has to fight along the eastern frontier of both Germany and Austria; Germany has between four and five million trained or partially trained men, but she has to make front against both France and Russia, and possibly to bear the burden both for herself and Austria as well. Russia's resources are enormous, but so are the spaces of her Empire, and probably she could not arm her able-bodied male population even if she could gather so vast a mass of men together on her western frontiers.

GERMANY AND AUSTRIA.

The German military forces are made up of four armies—the Prussian, the Bavarian, the Saxon, and the Wurtemberg. Among these Prussia occupies a dominating position; of the twenty-five army corps which compose the German army, Bavaria contributes three, Saxony two, and Wurtemberg one, a distribution which corresponds to the predominance of Prussia in the German Confederation.

	Population (1910).
Prussia	40,165,219
Bavaria	6,887,291
Saxony	4,806,661
Wurtemberg	2,437,574

Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurtemberg retain some independent power over their troops in time of peace, though means are taken to keep them in close touch with the rulers of the Prussian army, so that the machine may run smoothly in time of war, when all pass equally under


the command of the headquarters staff. The general principles of organisation apply to the whole army. The citizen is liable to service between the ages of seventeen and forty-five, and his service falls into two periods. The first runs from twenty to thirty-nine years. The recruit serves two or three years—according to the arm—in the active army, and then from four and a half to six and a half in the reserve; he then passes into the Landwehr, serving in the first ban for three or five years, and in the second ban for such years as remain until he reaches the age of thirty-nine. Behind the Landwehr stands the Landsturm. It, again, is divided into a first and a second ban; the first includes all men between the ages of seventeen and thirty-nine who have not gone through the stages already described, while the second ban takes the men who are issuing from the Landwehr at the age of thirty-nine and retains them until they reach the age of forty-five years. The Landsturm are the last class to be called out; they are farthest off from the period of their military training; most of them are heads of families, and campaigning is for them a serious hardship. Even the guarding of communications may be a serious business for a Landsturm if a Belgian army lies in wait for it.

The twenty-five corps of the German army, organised in two divisions each, make up a peace strength of some 800,000 men.

Officers and Sub-Officers.....	146,000
Privates	661,000
Auxiliaries, Volunteers, &c.	28,000
	<hr/>
	835,000

The actual peace strength in 1913 was just under 800,000, which, of course, includes contingents serving their second or third years. At the same time the annual contingent was much larger than the total peace strength; in 1910, for instance, it was over 1,200,000, which includes recruits of previous years who had offered themselves but not been accepted. Of this 1,200,000, about 1,000 were rejected as unworthy to be enrolled, 34,000 were adjudged weak or disabled, 700,000 were "adjourned" till the levy of the next year, and only 450,000 were declared suitable. Small as is the proportion of men actually enrolled to those who are liable to enlistment, it provides an army of between 2,000,000 and 2,500,000 men on the outbreak of war. In a war against France alone Germany would soon make her superiority in numbers felt, but in order to fight the Dual Alliance she is compelled to leave some of her army corps on the eastern frontier. In all, the available fighting strength of Germany is estimated at some 7,000,000 men, of whom between 4,000,000 and 5,000,000 have received some continuous training, but how far and for how long it would be possible to keep the field army up to strength by drafts from the Landsturm and the reserves of untrained men could be settled only by the experience of war. But at the beginning of war it would be small wonder, perhaps, that a General Staff which had such numbers to spend should attach no importance to their losses if the immediate end can be obtained.

The Chief of the Grand General Staff of the German armies is Lieutenant-General Helmut von Moltke, a nephew of Count Moltke, Prussia's famous "organiser of victory." He was born in 1848 in Mecklenburg-Schwerin, took part, as Lieutenant, in the Franco-Prussian War, and lectured from 1877 to 1879 at the Berlin War Academy. In 1881 he entered as Captain the Grand General Staff, and one year later became Adjutant to his uncle. His career, however, continued to be slow, until, in 1891, he became



[Newspaper Illustrations and Central News.]

FEEDING THE GERMAN ARMY IN THE FIELD.

The photographs show a German Transport Train, a Travelling Soup Kitchen, the Serving out of Rations of Bacon, and the Distribution of Fodder.

Adjutant to the young Kaiser. Henceforth his advancement was rapid. In 1896 he became Colonel, in 1899 Major-General, and in 1902 Lieutenant-General, each step in promotion carrying with it a higher command in the Guards. In 1904 he was appointed Quartermaster-General, and on January 1st, 1906, he succeeded Count von Schlieffen as Chief of the Grand General Staff. His appointment was looked upon with certain misgivings by the German military world, which was inclined to regard it as a piece of favouritism. It is said, however, that his conduct of the Imperial manœuvres in the autumn of 1906 was marked by such skill that henceforth all criticism was silenced.

The political system of Austria-Hungary imposes on the army a special organisation. There is, first, the Common Army of the monarchy; then the Landwehr in Austria and the Honvéd in Hungary; lastly, the Landsturm in both countries. The army consists of sixteen army corps, each composed of two divisions of the Common Army and one division of the Landwehr. Service begins from the age of twenty-one years, and lasts for twelve years in the infantry and ten in the cavalry and artillery, after which the soldier passes to the Landsturm. The first ban of the Landsturm includes all those men between the ages of nineteen and thirty-seven who do not belong to the active army or the Landwehr, and the second ban all those between thirty-seven and forty-two.

Austria, with her fifty millions, could conceivably put in the field an army not far short of Germany's in numbers, however inferior it might be in organisation, warlike qualities, and the higher command, to say nothing of the weaknesses inherent in a body made up from many ill-assorted nationalities. The peace strength in 1912 was some 435,000, a figure which swells on mobilisation to

900,000 from the active army and its reserves, and over 300,000 from the Landwehr and Honvéd; behind these lies the Landsturm, the strength of which can only be conjectured—it has been put as high as two millions. The value of the Landsturm, however, is probably less in the case of Austria than of other countries, for while the men of the Landsturm in most countries, being mostly veterans and settled family men, are apt to have no great stomach for war, in Austria-Hungary there are nationalities fighting which care little for the cause of the Dual Alliance. Indeed, the shortest survey of the army would be incomplete which did not include at least a list of the nationalities that make up the Empire and their respective strength. The figures are for 1910.


AUSTRIA.

German	9,950,266
Bohemian, Moravian and Slovak...	6,435,983
Polish	4,967,984
Ruthenian	3,518,854
Slovene	1,252,940
Servian and Croatian	783,334
Italian and Latin	768,422
Roumanian	275,115
Magyar	10,974

HUNGARY.


Magyar	10,050,575
German	2,037,435
Slovak	1,967,970
Roumanian	2,949,032
Ruthenian	472,587
Croatian	1,833,162
Servian	1,106,471
Others	469,255

The Chief of the General Staff of the Austro-Hungarian armies is Field Marshal Baron Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf. He is the real Commander-in-chief of the forces of the Dual Monarchy. Born in 1852, at Penzing, near Vienna, he took part, in 1878, in the occupation of Bosnia, and was afterwards appointed Chief of the General



One of the great German Siege Guns which were used against the Belgian Forts.

[Record Press.]




[Record Press.]

A German High Elevation Gun for use against Aeroplanes and (inset) a German Siege Gun.



[Record Press.]

A German Military Observation Corps.



[Record Press.]

A German Field Gun under Cover.

Staff of a Divisional Command. He then lectured for a number of years at the War School on tactics, and afterwards commanded for some time the First Infantry Regiment at Troppau. During this period he wrote two books on military science, which gained for him a wide fame, not only in his own, but also in foreign countries. He then became Brigadier-General at Trieste and Divisional General at Innsbruck, and greatly distinguished himself in the manoeuvres. In 1906 he was appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Austro-Hungarian army, and remained at this post until the end of 1911. His retirement was due to the insistence of Count von Aehrenthal, then Foreign Secretary of the Dual Monarchy, who did not regard with favour his hostile attitude towards Italy. He received the appointment of an Inspector-General of the Army, but was reinstated at his former post in December, 1912, when the Balkan war cloud threatened to burst over Europe on account of the Scutari question. Baron Conrad was a favourite of the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

FRANCE AND RUSSIA.

From 1889 to 1905 France had enforced a three years' term of service; in 1905 the period was reduced to two years; in 1913 it was again raised to three, and at the same time the former grounds for exemption from service were restricted. In all, the obligation to serve in France lasts for twenty-eight years—three in the active army, eleven with its reserve, seven in the territorial army and seven in its reserve. Short periods of training are exacted from each of the reserve organisations, but in the last line of all, the reserve of the territorial army, it is negligible. The contingent of conscripts in 1910 was over 300,000, of whom just over 200,000 were drafted to the army. The peace strength of the army in 1913 was 545,000; its field strength is some 1,300,000, and the total numbers available have been estimated at four and a half million men. The army is divided into twenty-one army corps, so that if the neutrality of Italy is so securely guaranteed that France need not watch her south-eastern border, the French and German armies facing each other should




[Record Press.]

The veteran General von Haeseler inspecting a German cadet.

be fairly equal, since Germany will leave a large army to face the attack of Russia. With anything like equal numbers, France should have high hopes of victory. The Germans are strong in the patience and method of their organising power, and in regard to the corps of officers and the higher command they are not likely to be inferior; but there is no reason to suppose that if he be well led, and reasonably looked after, the Frenchman is not still the best soldier on the Continent.

The Commander-in-Chief of the French army is General Joffre. Born at Rivesaltes, in the Pyrenees, in 1852, he entered the École Polytechnique when sixteen years of age, and on the outbreak of the war with Prussia joined a battery with the rank of Sub-Lieutenant. He went through the siege of Paris, and on the conclusion of the war completed his education at the École, and then passed into the army, having joined the 2nd Engineers' Regiment. In 1885, with the rank of Captain, he took part in the Tonkin campaign, and received for valour the Cross of the Legion of Honour. Three years later he was working at the head of the engineers at Hanoi, Tonkin, and in 1892 he was supervising the construction of the Senegal-Nigerian railway in the French Sudan. He then led a relief column to the assistance of the famous Bonnier expedition, which, however, was massacred by the Tauregs, and he took part in the bombardment and capture of Timbuctoo. For this he was promoted, in 1894, to the rank of Colonel. It was not until 1905 that he attained the rank of Brigadier-General. Then he was successively military governor of Lille, commander of the Infantry Division at Paris, and lastly commander of the Second Army Corps at Amiens. It was while at this post that he received, in July, 1911, the appointment to the post of Chief of General Staff, which carried with it, in accordance with the new organisation of the Superior Council of War, the prospective Commandership-in-Chief in case of war. His rival candidate to the post was General Pau, and General Joffre carried the day by a small majority of votes of the Cabinet. The most notable incident during his term of office was the dismissal, in October of last year, of five Generals on the charge of incompetency in the course of the grand manoeuvres.



[Newspaper Illustrations.]

The last line of the German Army: the Mobilisation of the Landsturm at Leipzig.

The value of the Russian army is one of the riddles which the war will read. It has had, like the British army, the immeasurable advantage of the experience of a great war, which should have helped it to correct many serious defects, and it possesses an instrument of unequalled endurance in the Russian soldier. Also, it has with it the momentum of vast masses, the great bulk of which are drawn from European Russia.

Liability to service with the Russian army begins at the age of twenty and continues till forty-three. Two years are spent with the active army, and the soldier then goes to the reserve for sixteen years, during which time he is recalled twice for training; then he passes to the *Opolchénié*, or militia, for four years more. Other classes, such as the men who are exempted from service with the active army, are also included in the first ban of the militia, who, under the law of 1911, must be called

times of war, expanding to as much as five and a half millions, with many millions more on which to draw; but there is great doubt as to how many men she will actually put in the field. There is a limit to the provision which she can make for her millions in the way of guns and transport; to the number of men there is, practically, no limit. What is certain is that with her vast spaces she can defy invasion, that the losses of masses of men mean less to her than to any other of the combatants. Russia is still, as in the days of Napoleon, unconquerable by force of arms.

The Russian Supreme Commander-in-Chief is the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicolayevitch. He is the son of the late Grand Duke Nicholas, who was a brother of Alexander II., the grandfather of the present Tsar. He was born in 1856, at Petrograd, and made his military career in the Imperial Guards. He was formerly President of the



{Record Press.

The Russian Army: A Cossack Scout.

out for two periods of training. The second ban consists of the men who can be profitably used in the auxiliary services.

The Cossacks have a separate organisation. Two years of preparation are followed by four with the colours and eight more in the reserve, with short periods of training.

Russia cannot make use of the great numbers which present themselves yearly for enrolment. The annual contingent is about 1,200,000, of whom less than half a million are enrolled in the active army. Those who are not called to the colours are relegated to the militia, and form a great reserve in which, on the outbreak of war, to prepare drafts of men to make good the wastage of the field army, and gradually to take the place of more highly trained troops on the frontiers of the Empire; for while fighting in Europe Russia has still to guard her Asiatic possessions, to watch the Turkish frontier and her borders over against China. Russia has thirty-seven army corps, with a peace strength of 1,400,000, to which she can add almost indefinitely by calling up successive classes of reservists. Two million four hundred thousand is sometimes stated as the strength of her first field armies in



{Topical Press.

The French Army: An Algerian Infantryman.

Russian National Defence Committee, and has, since the death of the Grand Duke Vladimir, been the Commander of the Petrograd military district. He enjoys the full confidence of the Tsar, and has always been regarded as his most intimate adviser.

SERVIA AND BELGIUM.

Servia's importance in the war is not to be measured by the strength of her army. Her peace strength in normal times (five divisions) has been about 40,000 men. Her period of training is from one and a half to two years, after which the men pass through the first, second, and third bans of the reserve. They are liable to serve until fifty years of age. On mobilisation the army becomes more than 300,000 strong, and, in all, Servia can probably put in the field between 400,000 and 500,000 men. Comparatively small as these numbers are in the present war, they weigh the scale heavily against Austria. Servia has the advantage of having just *been* through two hard-fought wars, in which she showed herself not inferior to any of the Balkan States, and the advantage is likely to tell heavily against the Austrian army, which has had no experience of actual warfare for many years. Austria

needs to throw every man that she can muster against Russia. She will be compelled to waste her precious strength in fighting delaying actions against Serbia, and in keeping Bosnia quiet. Just as Germany would be satisfied to deal successive blows at Russia in East Prussia, in order to hold her back on the frontier until France had been disposed of, so Austria's part is to hold Serbia stationary, if she can, with the minimum forces required for the task, while concentrating every possible unit against Russia. But 400,000 Servians, experienced in war and inspired by success, will be formidable enemies, and no force that Austria dare spare may be sufficient to arrest their progress.

Belgium, too, has only a small army, but her rôle is of great importance. The communications of most of the German armies operating against France lie through her territory, and so long as she can maintain an army in the field she will remain a possible danger to the security of the enemy, and an imminent menace should he ever be driven to retreat to his own country.

The war found the army of Belgium, like that of France and Serbia—for Serbia's five new divisions in the conquered territories had not yet been organised—in a state of transition. The law of 1909 had established the principle of general service, but had enacted that not more than one son in a family should serve. The law of 1912 abolished this privilege, and raised the total strength of the army from 180,000 to 340,000—150,000 for the field army, 130,000 for the fortresses, and 60,000 for the reserve and auxiliary services.

THE ENGLISH EXPEDITIONARY ARMY.

Of the army of Great Britain it is only necessary here to make a preliminary mention. The Expeditionary Army, which had been prepared for service abroad, is roughly 150,000 men, but this is only a small part of the armed strength which England can eventually throw into a European war. Her organised military strength at the outbreak of the war may be summarised thus:—


Regular Forces	156,000
Army Reserve	146,000
Special Reserve.....	63,000
British troops in India	78,000
Territorial Army.....	251,000
Others	17,000

To this total of more than 700,000 men should be added the native Indian army. It contains 164,000 men and there are 35,000 reservists. The Expeditionary Army, according to the scheme of 1906, consists of six divisions of infantry, four brigades of cavalry, ten batteries of horse artillery, and sixty-three of field artillery. The extent of the measures which may be taken as the war goes on to strengthen the Expeditionary Force with reservists, with contingents from India, with drafts from the territorial forces, and with troops enlisted for the course of the war would depend on many circumstances which could only be settled by events; but it was generally, and with justice, thought that in a long Continental war the military influence of England would grow steadily greater the longer the struggle were continued.



Belgian Infantry in a Covered-in Trench.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



THE BELGIAN AND LUXEMBOURG FRONTIERS.



[Central News.
General von Emmich, Commander of
the German Army which attacked
Liege.



[Stanley's Press Agency.
King of the Belgians.



[Central News
General Leman, who commanded in
the defence of Liege.

CHAPTER III.

THE INVASION OF BELGIUM—THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE—THE ATTACK ON LIEGE.


THE INVASION OF BELGIUM.

EVER since the conclusion of the Alliance between France and Russia, the German General Staff has been occupied with the problem of how to wage war successfully on two frontiers. Four courses of policy were open to them. They might (with the help of Austria) take the offensive on both frontiers, or remain on the defensive on both. Or, again, they might take the offensive against France and the defensive against Russia, or the offensive against Russia and the defensive against France. Of the first alternatives neither was satisfactory. No offensive against Russia could yield great results if its strength was to be weakened by a simultaneous attack on France, and the defensive on both frontiers, at any rate at the beginning of a war, was out of the question as incompatible with that faith in the virtues of the offensive which is the first article of the German military creed. There was, however, much to be said for both the other alternatives, and though the German General Staff never seems to have doubted that its best policy was to deal with France first and Russia later, the arguments for the other policy of remaining on the defensive against France and attacking Russia first were far stronger than has usually been supposed.

Russia had the numbers, but Germany had the speed ; and there is little doubt that a really vigorous attack on Russia in the first few weeks of the war would have produced very remarkable military results. Russia's position on the outbreak of war on her eastern frontiers was one of very great danger. It was not believed by anyone before the war that she could put a single army completely mobilised in the field under a month. There was no limit to the mischief that Germany and Austria might have done to Russia in that time. Russian Poland projects into German territory like a salient of a fortress. It is overlapped on the north side by East Prussia, and on the south by Galicia, or Austrian Poland. Before the Japanese War the greater part of the Russian army was concentrated in the great fortresses of Warsaw and Ivangorod, in Poland, and behind Warsaw was the Russian Aldershot at Brest Litovsk. After the war the concentration of the main Russian armies was fixed a long way in the rear—on the line of the Dwina and Dnieper rivers. The danger of a sudden German attack cutting up the Russian military strength before it had time to mobilise itself was therefore less great on the outbreak of this war than it would have been before. Still, these safeguards had to be paid for by an almost defenceless Poland. Had Germany thrown



[Central News.
Queen of the Belgians.



[Newspaper Illustrations, Photo Press, and Central News.]

WITH THE BELGIAN FIELD ARMY.

Field Artillery taking up their position. Belgian Cavalry resting in a wood.
Arrival of French Reinforcements: Removing barrier which had been built across a Belgian road to hinder Uhlan raids.

her main strength on her eastern frontiers immediately on the outbreak of war, she would certainly have acquired all Poland before Russia was in any position to resist, and in the prevailing confusion Austria might have struck a deadly blow at Kieff, the heart of Russia. Further, had German policy towards her Poles been as rational as that of Austria to hers, very little would have been needed to win over the whole of Poland to her side. Had the Kaiser under these circumstances issued a Proclamation like that which was in fact issued by the Tsar, reconstituting the ancient kingdom of Poland, his position at the end of the first month of the war would have been an immensely strong one. Would the French, if they had not been invaded, have been so keen to attack the German fortresses of Metz and Strasburg? Would England have been at war if there had been no attack on Belgium or France?

Germany, however, decided to deliver her main attack against France. She calculated that the month's advantage that she had over Russia in the speed of her mobilisation, the further delay that would be caused by the necessity for Russia to clear her flanks in East Prussia and Austrian Poland before she could begin a serious advance on Berlin, and the imposing military strength of Austria, would give her sufficient time to deal with France and then to transfer her armies from the west to the east frontiers before anything very serious had happened there. She hoped to detach France from Russia by the offer of favourable terms—she had had


enough of the troubles of annexing French territory ever to want to repeat the mistake of Alsace-Lorraine—and if the worst came to the worst she would try to bribe Russia into making peace. Those were her calculations.

The decision to attack France first had some grave drawbacks, of which the chief was that it made time the great enemy of Germany. What she did in France she must do quickly. Her whole campaign in the West had to be a race against the clock. That fact involved Germany in a far graver decision. It forced her at the outset of war to commit the crime of invading Belgium. It made the intervention of Great Britain—doubtful up to then—certain, and so prevented Germany from making any use of her fleet to assist the operations of her army. It completely lost to Germany any sympathy that she might have had as a nation fighting against odds. It gave generous minds all over the world cause for bitter resentment against her. It may have done even more. War in a hurry cannot be humane. In undertaking to override

Belgium and to crush France in two months, Germany set herself a task which could not be done decently. Nor was it. The knife, skilfully used, may be humane, but in this war Germany set out with a hatchet.

A glance at the map will show why Germany invaded Luxembourg and Belgium. There are two direct lines of invasion from Germany, one past Metz, by the valley of the Moselle, the other through Alsace by the Gap of Belfort. After the war of 1870 France embarked on a great scheme of fortification on this frontier. The forts were formed in two main groups. The first, running from Verdun to Toul, covered an invasion from Metz; the invasion from Alsace was covered by a second group of forts from Epinal to Belfort. On the north side of Verdun a gap was purposely left, and yet another gap between Toul and Epinal, the idea being to shepherd the invading armies, in one or other direction, to wait with the field armies behind Verdun, in the Argonne Hills or the Meuse valley,

and to fall upon the invader's flank as he emerged. Later, France grew to doubt the wisdom of constructing these enormous forts, which shut up men whom she could ill spare, and she never fortified her northern front to the same extent. But, in spite of the objections to fortifications, they did give France on the eastern frontier an exceedingly strong defensive line. The forcing of these forts would take a great deal of time, if it was not to be expensive, and if it had to be hurried would have dangerously weakened the German army for its encounter with the French armies



The Forts at Liège.


in the field. On her accepted plan of dealing with France first and then turning to meet Russia, Germany was forced to look to the north. Here are the Eiffel hills, covering the whole country between the Moselle and the Meuse, and extending in the other direction from the French end of the Belgian Ardennes almost to the Rhine between Bonn and Coblenz. The Meuse, it will be seen, flows in a great semi-circular curve right round the Eiffel mass of hills. The temptation to seize these hills and to invade France by the Meuse valley was irresistible to the merely military mind, for not only would the left flank of the army advancing by this route be screened from attack on the French side by the Ardennes and by the seizure of Luxembourg, but when it emerged from their cover, it would find itself on the shortest and the easiest road to Paris. For years it had been known that Germany would take this route into France, in spite of the neutrality of Belgium. Germany indeed had taken no trouble to conceal her plan. She had built a double-track railway

from Aix-la-Chapelle alongside the Belgian frontier through a district that was purely agricultural and only supported six slow trains on week-days and five on Sundays. These lines she began to use immediately on the outbreak of war.

THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE.


Once more Belgium was to be the "cockpit of Europe." There is no country in Europe that has seen so much

fighting. Caesar's victory over the Nervii, a tribe of the Belgæ, "bravest of the Gauls," was won at Maubeuge. Caesar, in another campaign, was besieged at Namur, and Cicero's brother, Quintus, the cavalry officer, was besieged at Charleroi. At Bouvines was won a great victory over the Holy Roman Emperor and our King John which made France a nation, and through the discredit put on John gave England the Magna Charta. Belgium later



[Newspaper Illustrations and Central News.]

Two photographs of the Pont des Arches at Liege, which was blown up to hinder the German advance.



A General View of Liege from the Citadel.


passed to the Dukes of Burgundy, through them to Austria, and so to Spain. Then followed the awful wars with Spain, the Spanish "Fury" and the French "Fury" at Antwerp, and the sack of Malines. William the Silent's first campaigns against Alva were fought along the same line that the German invasion of Belgium was to follow. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there was not a general of note who did not fight in Belgium, and the campaigns of Condé, Turenne, Marlborough, William III., Prince Eugene and Marshal Saxe are a Belgian geography book. In some parts of the country every other village is the name of a famous battle. Here began the military successes of the French Revolution, and it was the invasion of Belgium by the French that began England's great war with France which ended at Waterloo. And the tragedy of Belgian history is that nearly all this fighting was in other's quarrels in which she took no side, and as a people had no sympathies.

Although the country has had so long a military history, as a State Belgium is one of the youngest in Europe. It was not until the Treaty of London in 1839

that Belgium came into existence as a separate State from Holland. Victorian England only thought of Belgians as the men who ran away at Waterloo. But after all, at Waterloo, though there were Belgians there was no Belgium. Wellington's or Napoleon's victory

was only the difference between being attached to Holland and to France, and that was hardly worth one to inspire a nation on the battlefield. But of the patriotism of the modern Belgian no one who knew the country could have any doubt. The only doubt before the war was whether this patriotism was a coldly logical affair, limited by considerations of expediency and self-interest, or whether it was the passionate devotion of the lover to his mistress, resenting a slight as a deadly personal injury. Doubtless if the Germans could have foreseen what would happen to them in Belgium they would have thought twice before taking the

risk of violating her neutrality, but wonderfully as the Germans have calculated material forces, they have conspicuously failed where moral or sentimental elements had to be taken into account. The Belgian of their calculations was a mere abstraction, and had no more




The Mountain Barriers and the Gaps.

real existence than the "economic" man, wholly obsessed by considerations of profit and loss, of the early political economists. They imagined the Belgian, confronted with a demand for a passage through his country, arguing to himself something in this vein: "What concern have I with their quarrels? And why should I trouble to resist? If I refuse I shall probably be driven out of house and home, the Government will have to take flight from Brussels to Antwerp, and hundreds and thousands of us will be killed and maimed. If I consent, no doubt my country will be overrun, but I shall have a claim to compensation after the war, and surely I can trust to the jealousy of the Powers to see that my independence is not taken from me." Instead, what the Belgian said was this: "Whether I stand to gain or lose by resisting the passage of German troops through the soil of Belgium is beside the question. The demand is an insult to Belgium's dignity as a nation, and even if it were certain that our independence would be left us at the end of the war, it is beneath my country's dignity to live by submitting to an insult to her rights of sovereignty." Germany has never understood that pride and sentiment are more powerful motives in national affairs than self-interest. It was not self-interest that drove Belgium to resist, nor even the mere instinct of self-preservation, for we do not suppose that she ever got so far as to consider whether Germany would keep her promise to respect Belgian independence after the war, but the necessity of vindicating at whatever cost Belgium's nationhood. The request made by Germany to Belgium at the beginning of the war was

the grossest insult that one nation can put on another, and one for which no compensation later could ever atone.

For some time Belgium had been fully alive to the danger that she was in, and had been taking precautions. The old plan of defence was that in case of invasion the Government should withdraw to Antwerp, and there hold out until some of the Powers came to her assistance. Antwerp was made into one of the strongest fortresses in Europe, though the perimeter of the defences was so extensive that it needed a garrison of at least 70,000 men to man them. This policy of retirement to Antwerp, however, did not satisfy Leopold, and he pressed, often without increasing his popularity, for a sounder system of national defence. The Belgian army was enlisted by ballot, but substitutes were allowed, and any one who was drawn could escape from his obligations if he had money enough. A new Army Bill did away with substitutes, and compelled those on whom the ballot fell to serve in their own persons. That was not all. Under Leopold, the Belgian Government began to fortify the valley of the Meuse; indeed, it was the fortification scheme and the need for better and more defenders that led to the reforms in the Belgian army. The forts at Liège and Namur were designed by General Brialmont, a very distinguished military engineer. More will be said of them later. The law abolishing substitutes in the army was one of the last documents signed by Leopold before his death. The forts were already becoming obsolete when he died, and under the new King, Albert, plans were made for their reconstruction. Great additions, moreover, were



DIAGRAMS OF BRIALMONT'S FORTS.

Figure 3 shows the disappearing type of cupola. "The Cupola," says Clarke on Fortifications, from which these diagrams are reproduced, "is just overbalanced by the counterweight (c). By pulling up the bar (d) the structure is made to descend, and is held by the catch (e). On freeing the catch the cupola ascends. The firer sits on a seat (f)."

Figure 4 shows the oscillating type of cupola. "The cupola is made to oscillate about a horizontal axis (a), the whole weight being transferred from a rounded knife-edge working into an inverted saddle carried upon a turntable (a). In the firing position the cupola is tilted up till the leg (c) rests upon the rail (d). The two guns are independently counterpoised by weights, which allow them to be easily depressed or elevated."


proposed in the strength of the army. These reforms, however, were still unfinished when the war with Germany began.

THE ATTACK ON LIEGE.

Liège is some forty miles from Aix-la-Chapelle, the nearest considerable German town. The railway between the two places passes through the north-east corner of the Belgian Ardennes along the valley of the Vesdre, a tributary of the Meuse. It passes through a country not unlike Derbyshire, with its barren hills and narrow wooded valleys. At Liège the railway suddenly emerges from the hills on to the Belgian plain, and the Meuse, on which the city stands, is like a deep ditch separating two Belguims, the Belgium of the plain, of agriculture and commerce, from the Belgium of the hills and of industrialism. Liège is the capital of the Walloons, a

The difference between the Liégeois and the typical Fleming of the plain is much the same as the difference between an East Anglian and a Cardiff Welshman.

The first coal mined on the Continent was got at Liège, but long before the mines were worked the citizen of Liège was famous as a maker of small arms. To this day the manufacture of weapons of all kinds is still to a great extent a cottage industry—and sometimes a dangerous one in the hands of a choleric people, quick in quarrel. The city had an ancient reputation for turbulence; "ingenious, shrewd, and ready for any kind of daring," is the characterisation of an old Italian historian. But its modern history is one of industrial progress, and the Liège citizen of to-day is distinguished even in a nation of hard workers by his capacity for endurance and steady toil.



[Central News.

Belgian Soldiers with a dog-drawn quick-firer waiting for the order to go into the firing line.

race with a very distinct individuality of its own. The Fleming, who inhabits the district nearer the sea, is Saxon in many of his characteristics, in his stubbornness, his stolidity, his depth of concealed emotion. The Walloon is more volatile, enthusiastic, and passionate. In art his tastes run to music, whereas the Fleming excels in painting and in literature. The Fleming has sometimes been accused—unjustly, for he is a thoroughly loyal Belgian—of undue preference for Germany, but the Walloon speaks a dialect of French, and though clannish and local in his patriotism, such sympathies as he has to spare with the outside world are strongly with France. He shares with all Belgians a love of personal liberty and dislike of excessive State regulations, and though he is often in the industrial districts a Socialist in politics, he has never quite worked out a certain anarchic strain in his blood. He has many points of resemblance to the Welshman.

The fortifications of Liège have been the subject of much controversy, both technical and general in its character. They were designed by General Brialmont, an engineer of genius, in 1886, but not all his ideas, by any means, have been accepted as sound. The illustrations will give some idea of their main features. They are all cupola forts, that is to say, they carry their guns in heavily-armoured domed turrets, made to move up and down and to oscillate on springs, so that after the gun has been fired the port-hole of the cupola dips down under cover and is held there until the gun is ready to be fired again. One of the most famous controversies in the history of the art of fortification was that between Brialmont and the great English authority, Sir George Clarke, now Lord Sydenham. Lord Sydenham did not believe in fixed armoured batteries, except under very exceptional circumstances. The cupola fort could not be concealed. It made

an easy target, and its mechanism was liable to be put out of gear. His ideal was invisibility, with a network of covered communications enabling the position of guns to be frequently changed. The weakness of defence against attack is that it is fixed, whereas the attack is mobile. In order to equalise conditions the defence, he argued, must be given an equal mobility with the attack. Famous as Brialmont was, it is possible that this war will justify the criticisms of the great English expert on his designs. The early accounts of the defence of Liège gave the world an altogether exaggerated idea of the value of the Belgian system of fortifications—an idea that received a rude shock later at Namur, and may possibly have been responsible for some of our early difficulties in the war. It is too early yet to say that Brialmont's designs have not justified themselves, but they are certainly under suspicion, and it is arguable that if the Belgians had spent all the money and pains that went in concrete forts and steel cupolas on organising their army, they might have delayed the German army even longer than they did.

The disposition of the forts at Liège is exceedingly simple. The city is a perfect example of the "ring fortress." There are—not counting the two old forts inside the city—twelve self-contained forts, none more than 7,000 yards distant from its nearest neighbour, and on the average not more than 4,000 yards apart. The distance of the forts from the centre of the city is between three and a half and four miles. At the northern end of the city, looking towards Holland, are the forts of Pontisse and Barchon. These command the flat land down stream towards the little Belgian frontier village of Visé. Towards the highlands, at the back of Liège, are the three forts of Fleron, Evegnée, and Chaudfontaine, commanding the Valley of the Vesdre, by which the railway from Aix-la-Chapelle penetrates the Ardennes. Another river valley, that of the Ourthe, is commanded by the two forts of Embourg and Boncelles. On the left bank of the Meuse, facing the Belgian plain, are five more forts, beginning on the south end with the Flemalle Fort, and working round to the Liers Forts at the north end.*

The German invasion of Belgium began on Tuesday, August 2nd. Three columns of infantry preceded by cavalry crossed the frontier in the course of the day. The small frontier villages were rapidly passed. On Wednesday, Visé was in flames, and the forts at the north end of Liège were already engaged at long range with the Germans. The fire at Visé, it seems, was accidental and not deliberate, but already the Germans were beginning to complain of being fired upon by civilians. Nothing is more likely to have happened, especially at this early stage of the war, before the people realised the danger. The Walloons were justly angry at the invasion, which they regarded as a mere burglarious entry. They were familiar with the use of fire-arms, and that they should use them against the Germans was to their minds the most natural thing in the world. The distinction between soldiers and civilians who had no rights as combatants was not one that would occur to any mind under these circumstances, unless it had been explained beforehand, and the invasion had come so suddenly that there had been little time for the average man to work up the requirements of international law.

Besides the garrison of the forts, which probably did

not number more than fifteen hundred or two thousand men, there were in the neighbourhood of Liège at this time perhaps 20,000 troops with field artillery. Elaborate though hurried preparations had been made to resist attack, and thousands of civilians—the workmen of the town—had assisted the military in making wire entanglements and digging trenches between the forts. Early on Wednesday morning the Germans attacked, on the south-eastern side of the city. Their plan was characteristically bold. They did not engage the forts, and their artillery preparation for the attack was of the slightest. Their idea was to force their way through the intervals between the forts into the town. Perhaps they hoped to effect a surprise, and doubtless they thought that the resistance of the Belgians would be formal only, and that it would break down before a sufficient display of audacity. They afterwards described the attack as a *coup de main* which failed. It was, in fact, a disastrous piece of military bluff, and the causes of the failure were far more moral than military. Had the Germans had any real sense of the nature of the insult which they were offering to Belgium by their invasion, they would never have attacked as they did. It was a proof not, as it turned out, of lack of military skill, but of extraordinary insensibility to the nature of their outrage on Belgian sentiment.

The attack was delivered by the Seventh Army Corps in the spaces on either side of Fort Fleron. The defence was prepared. Not only had the ground between the forts been carefully entrenched, but behind the forts were hidden field and quick-firing guns to take the attackers in flank if they should force their way through. The Belgian accounts of what happened are somewhat highly-coloured by pride in what was a very remarkable success. The Germans advanced in close order, and the Belgians reserved their fire until the enemy were very close. Then all the guns and rifles opened at once. The opening of the battle must have been very like the first volley at Magersfontein, but the Germans were in closer order, and their surprise was not tactical but moral. They persisted in their mistake. Some forced their way through, only to come under the cross-fire from the artillery concealed behind the forts. Long before noon the attack was a disastrous failure. The Belgian estimates of the casualties were grossly exaggerated, but the losses were certainly exceedingly heavy, and the Seventh Army Corps was terribly shaken.

The attack was continued on the next day—Thursday—by the Tenth Army Corps, but on more rational lines. The forts were bombarded by the German field artillery, and the two forts on the north side, Pontisse and Barchon, were put, temporarily at any rate, out of action. Some-time in the course of the morning a party of Uhlans entered the city, and, acting possibly on the information of sympathisers inside, found their way to the headquarters of General Leman, in the heart of the town. Early accounts of what happened said that they were wearing English uniforms, and so escaped arrest. But would not the appearance of an English uniform in the streets of Liège at such a time have been the worst of all stratagems for escaping attention? The attempt of the Uhlans was discovered in time, but General Leman narrowly escaped with his life. The whole story suggests that by Thursday morning the withdrawal of the Belgian field-force from the town had begun, and that Liège was left entirely without defenders except the garrisons in the forts and the so-called Civic Guard, who were little more than special constables. It is a reasonable assumption that the orders to retire had come from Brussels, and that the reason was that

* An excellent general description of the forts and of the geography of the country round Liège is given in "The Siege of Liège," by Dr. Hamelins, the Professor of English at the University.

the Government feared an investment, and not being able to spare a whole Division withdrew it in time before the Germans had worked their way round by the eastern side of the city. On Thursday afternoon, certainly, a large party of Germans had entered the city by one of the gaps near the Fleron Fort, and began to fire on Bressoux, one of the quarters of Liège. There was, however, no fighting that night. The city—not the forts—had already been surrendered. The details of the surrender have not been made known. What seems to have happened is that the civil authorities, recognising that the city was at the mercy of the Germans, made the best terms that they could with the enemy in order to save the buildings from the destruction of bombardment, and to avoid the risk of street fighting and its useless and cruel sacrifice of the lives of non-combatants. The field army had already withdrawn to escape investment, but the forts still held out, and were long to continue to do so. General Leman, the commander, directed their resistance from Fort Loncin, on the far side of the town. General von Emmich, the commander of the German forces, had asked for an armistice to bury his dead, and its refusal by General Leman showed

that the spirit of the defenders of the forts was still high.

The operations at Liège were not understood in England at the time, and some wild inferences were drawn from the early reports as to the condition of the German army and the stupidity of its tactics. These rash generalisations were later destined to be revised. But there is not likely to be any revision of the high opinion which the English people formed of the national spirit in Belgium in those early days of the war. The Belgians destroyed the legend of German invincibility. It is difficult for us, with long military traditions behind us, to put ourselves in their position, when they decided alone—for the Government knew that no help could come for long enough from France or England—to face the first shock of German invasion. The example of their simple faith and pure-souled patriotism fired all England. Belgium had made it certain that England would take part in the war. Liège made it popular. The sufferings of Belgium later hardened passion in England into stern resolution that whatever else happened in the war it was our duty to make sure that she should receive such compensation as it was possible for ultimate victory to give.

Appendix to Chapter I.

The following is a short selection of a few important documents bearing on the negotiations before the war and the issues raised in them :-

1. THE NEUTRALITY OF LUXEMBOURG AND BELGIUM.

(a) "Belgium shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State. It shall be bound to observe such neutrality towards all other States." (*Article 7 of the Treaty of 1831, confirmed in 1839.* The Guaranteeing Powers were Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia.)

(b) "His Majesty the King of Prussia having declared that notwithstanding the hostilities in which the North German Confederation is engaged with France, it is his fixed determination to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as the same shall be respected by France, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland on her part declares that, if during the said hostilities the armies of France should violate that neutrality, she will be prepared to co-operate with His Prussian Majesty for the defence of the same in such manner as may be mutually agreed upon, employing for that purpose her naval and military forces to insure its observance, and to maintain, in conjunction with His Prussian Majesty, then and thereafter, the independence and neutrality of Belgium." (*Article 1 of the Treaty of 1870.* An identical Treaty was concluded with France, and both these 1870 Treaties have now expired.)

(c) "The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, within the . . . : under the guarantee of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, shall henceforth form a perpetually neutral State. It shall be bound to observe the same neutrality towards all other States.

"The High Contracting Parties engage to respect the principle of Neutrality stipulated by the present Article.

"That principle is and remains under the sanction of the collective guarantee of the Powers signing as Parties to the present Treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a neutral State."—(*Article 2 of the Treaty of 1867.*)

(d) "M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxembourg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord

Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a *casus belli*. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point."—(*Sir E. Grey to Sir Francis Bertie, August 2nd.*)

(e) LORD DERBY ON "COLLECTIVE GUARANTEE." "In the event of a violation of neutrality all the Powers who have signed the Treaty may be called upon for their collective action. No one of those Powers is liable to be called upon to act singly or separately. It is a case, so to speak, of limited liability. We are bound in honour—you cannot place a legal construction upon it—to see in concert with others that these arrangements are maintained. But if the other Powers join with us it is certain that there will be no violation of neutrality. If they, situated exactly as we are, decline to join, we are not bound single-handed to make up the deficiency. Such a guarantee has obviously rather the character of a moral sanction to the arrangements which it defends than that of a contingent liability to make war. It would no doubt give a right to make war, but would not necessarily impose the obligation."

2. —THE EASTERN QUESTION.

(a)

THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR TO FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS, JULY 28TH, 1914.

"There are certain Russian voices accordingly who hold that it is a self-evident right and the business of Russia to intervene actively on Serbia's behalf in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. The *Novoye Vremya* actually thinks that the responsibility for the European conflagration that would result from such action on the part of Russia can be thrown upon Germany, in so far as Germany does not cause Austria-Hungary to give way. But here the Russian press is looking at things upside

down. It was not Austria-Hungary which started the conflict with Serbia, but Serbia, which, by its unscrupulous encouragement of Greater Serbian aspirations, even within Austria-Hungary, endangered the very existence of the Monarchy and created a condition of things which finally found expression in the atrocious deed of Sarajevo. If Russia believes it must intervene in the conflict on behalf of Serbia, its right is no doubt good, so far as it goes. But in doing so it must know that it thereby takes over as its own all Serbia's endeavours to undermine the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that on it will rest the sole responsibility if the Austro-Serbian business, which all the other Great Powers desire to localise, leads to a European war. Russia's responsibility is clear, and the heavier in that Count Berchtold has officially informed Russia that there is no intention of territorial acquisition at Serbia's expense, or any tampering with the continued existence of the Serbian kingdom, merely a desire for peace from the Serbian machinations which imperil its existence.

"The attitude of the Imperial Government in this question is clear. The final goal of the agitation carried on by the Pan-Slavists against Austria-Hungary is by breaking down the Danube Monarchy to burst or weaken the Triple Alliance, and subsequently to isolate the German Empire completely. Our own interest therefore calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary. Moreover, the duty of preserving Europe, so far as may be possible, from universal war likewise directs us to support the endeavour to localise the conflict, thereby adhering to that straight line of policy which we have now pursued with success for forty-four years in the interest of the maintenance of European peace. If, however, contrary to what we hope, the interference (*Eingreifen*) of Russia causes an extension of the conflagration, faithful to our alliance, we should have to support the neighbour Monarchy with the whole might of the Empire. Only under compulsion shall we grasp the sword, but if we do it will be with the calm consciousness that we are guiltless of the disaster which a war must bring upon the peoples of Europe."—(*Exhibit 2 in the German White Book.*)

(b)

Belgrade, July 24th.

CROWN PRINCE OF SERBIA TO THE TSAR.

"Yesterday evening the Austrian Government handed a Note to the Servian Government relating to the Serajevo murders. Serbia, in accordance with international custom, on the first day after the terrible murder expressed readiness to open an investigation in her territory if the evidence brought forward by Austria showed the complicity of her subjects. But the demands included in the Austrian Note are not consistent with the maintenance of Servian integrity and aim at her humiliation. Among other things a declaration is demanded from us in the Official Gazette and an Imperial proclamation to the army in which we denounce the hostile spirit against Austria and express regret for our criminal laxity in relation to such intrigues; further, that we agree to the co-operation of Austrian officials in Serbia in the carrying out of the investigations demanded in the Note. They give us 48 hours for complying with all this; if not, Austria withdraws its Ambassador from Belgrade.

"We are ready to accept the demands of Austria which can be reconciled with our independence and integrity, and also those which your Highness advises us to accept, and we are willing to punish severely those who are shown to be implicated in the crime.

"Among the demands are some that will necessitate a change in our legal system, and for this time is indispensable. The time is too short. The Austrian Army is posted along our frontier, and can attack us at any moment. We cannot protect ourselves. Therefore we pray Your Imperial Majesty to give us help as quickly as possible.

"Your Imperial Majesty has given me abundant evidence of your precious goodwill, and we hope that the call will find a response in your Slav heart, which loves its race. I express the feeling of the Servian people, which in this troubled time prays Your Majesty to take an interest in the fate of Serbia.

"ALEXANDER."

—(From the "Russian Orange-Book," translated in "Manchester Guardian.")

(c)

RUSSIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TO RUSSIAN EMBASSIES IN GERMANY,
AUSTRIA, FRANCE, ENGLAND, AND
ITALY.

"St. Petersburg, July 30th.

"The German Ambassador, who has just been with me, has asked whether we cannot be satisfied with a promise which Austria can give, not to destroy the integrity of Serbia and to show by these conditions that we will agree to arrest our mobilisation. I dictated to him for transmission to Berlin the following statement:

"If Austria, recognising that the Austro-Servian question has assumed the character of a European question, declares her willingness to exclude from her ultimatum the points which threaten the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia binds herself to cease military preparations."

"Please telegraph quickly the attitude of the German Government to this new exhibition of our willingness to do all possible for the peaceful solution of this question, since we cannot admit that friendly conversation should serve only as an opportunity for Germany and Austria to make military preparations.

"SAZONOF."

(From the "Russian Orange Book," translated in "Manchester Guardian.")

(d)

SIR F. BERTIE TO SIR EDWARD GREY.

(Telegraphic.)

"Paris, August 1st, 1914.

"President of the Republic has informed me that German Government were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was only after a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation; that,

although the measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a general mobilisation, they are not so designated; that a French general mobilisation will become necessary in self-defence, and that France is already forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German military preparations; that the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds for accusations or provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions on it; that, notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace; that French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war." (No. 134, "British White Book.")

(e)

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR G. BUCHANAN.
(Telegraphic.)

"Foreign Office, August 1st, 1914.

"Information reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Government have informed German Government that though the situation has been changed by the mobilisation of Russia they would in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace be ready to consider favourably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Serbia. The understanding of this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Serbia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilisation of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military counter-measures in Galicia which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilisation.

"You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilisation, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the matter should be discussed with German Government, also by Russian Government." (No. 135, "British White Book.")

(f)

SIR G. BUCHANAN TO SIR E. GREY,
AUGUST 1ST.

"M. Sazonof informed the French Ambassador and myself this morning of his conversation with the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say that during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Serbia. It was clear that Austrian domination of Serbia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austria had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought that she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburg: the former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war. M. Sazonof was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavours he had made to avoid a war. No suggestion held out to him had been refused. He had accepted the proposal for a conference of four, for mediation by

Great Britain and Italy, for direct conversation between Austria and Russia; but Germany and Austria-Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive replies or had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian Government to order mobilisation, and the mobilisation of Germany had created a desperate situation."—(No. 134, "British White Book.")

(a)

3. ENGLAND AND FRANCE.

SIR E. GREY TO FRENCH AMBASSADOR,
NOVEMBER 22ND, 1912.

"My Dear Ambassador,—From time to time in recent years French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not and ought not to be regarded as an engagement which commits either Government to action in a contingency which has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British Fleets respectively at the present moment is not based on an engagement to co-operate in war. You have, however, pointed out that if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power it might become essential to know whether in that event it could depend on the armed assistance of the other. I agree that if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something which threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common."

(b)

SIR E. GREY TO FRENCH AMBASSADOR,
AUGUST 2ND.

"I am authorised to give the assurance that if the German Fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coast or shipping the British Fleet will give all the protection in its power."

(a)

4. ENGLAND AND GERMANY.

SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY.
(Telegraphic.)

"Berlin, July 20th, 1914.

"I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

"He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

"I questioned His Excellency about the French Colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, His Excellency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war

was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

"His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire.

"In reply to His Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action, and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.

"Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated the contents of your telegram of to-day to His Excellency, who expressed his best thanks to you."—(No. 85, "*British White Book*.")

(b)

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN

"Foreign Office, August 1st, 1914.

"Sir,—I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorised to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.

"He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral?

"I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

"The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her Colonies might be guaranteed.

"I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.

"I am, &c.,

E. GREY."

(No. 123, "*White Paper*.")

(c)

SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR E. GREY.

"In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th inst., I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and inquired in the name of H.M. Government whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be 'No,' as in consequence of German troops having crossed the frontier that morning Belgian neutrality had already been violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step—namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was

a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition, entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained for the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences which both he and I would deplore. He replied that for the reasons he had given me it was now impossible for them to draw back."

Sir Edward Goschen then records how he presented the British ultimatum, to which Herr von Jagow replied that he could give no other answer than that which he had given earlier in the day—namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. The report continues:—

"In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then through Great Britain to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done."

Sir Edward subsequently saw the Chancellor. He says:—

"I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree. Just for a word—"neutrality"—a word which in war time had been so often disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which as I knew he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable. It was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen.

"I protested strongly against that statement, and said that in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of life and death for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said: 'But at what price will that compact be kept? Has the British Government thought of that?' I hinted to His Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but His Excellency was so excited, so overcome by the news of our action and so little disposed to hear reason, that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument.

"As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater in that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall

apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid and which, unfortunately, entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

"After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the Embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 p.m. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never despatched. (This telegram never reached the Foreign Office.)"—(From the "*White Paper*" of August 27th.)

5.—GERMANY AND AUSTRIA.


SIR MAURICE DE BUNSEN TO SIR E. GREY.

"The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr von Tschirschky abstained from inviting my co-operation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szápáry (the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Russia) with full powers to continue at St. Petersburg the hopeful conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonof (the Russian Foreign Minister). Count Berchtold refused at the time, but two days later (30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again, in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburg.


"From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was informed by M. Schebeko that Count Szápáry had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the point in the Note to Serbia which seemed incompatible. M. Sazonof, M. Schebeko added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual invasion of Serbia.

"Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st August by Count Mensdorff (the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London) to the effect that Austria had neither 'banged the door' on compromise nor cut off the conversations. M. Schebeko to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach, had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, and M. Schebeko repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise.

"Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer was possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August and on France on the 3rd August. A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history."



THE AREA OF THE WAR.



[Drawn by Frank L. Emanuel.]

RHEIMS CATHEDRAL DURING THE BOMBARDMENT.

CHAPTER IV.

THE OCCUPATION OF BRUSSELS.

THE SIEGE OF THE LIEGE FORTS—THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE GERMAN ARMY OF THE WEST—THE FRENCH COUNTER-ATTACK IN ALSACE—THE GERMAN ADVANCE IN BELGIUM—THE OCCUPATION OF BRUSSELS—THE BELGIAN RETIREMENT TO ANTWERP.


AFTER the surrender of the city of Liège the Germans made no more attempts to carry the forts by storm. They had learned their lesson.

The troops now holding Liège were units who had been hurriedly rushed up from Aix-la-Chapelle before they had been fully mobilised. The excuse made in Germany for the rash attack was that the General Staff knew that there were French officers in Liège instructing the Belgians in the defence of their forts, and that it was necessary to act at once before these officers were followed by the French army. But the real reason was that the Germans, knowing that their army could not be fully mobilised for a week or more, and expecting only a nominal resistance, thought that the period of waiting might be usefully employed in the occupation of the railway junction at Liège and in clearing the country round, so that when the army for the invasion of France was ready there should be no further delay. The occupation of Liège gave the German garrison possession of the railway stations, but, inasmuch as the forts dominated all the lines to and from them, it was unable to make any military use of the city. So confident had the Germans been of carrying the forts by assault and gaining possession of the railway junction at Liège that they seem to have organised no proper system of supplies for their advance troops. The garrison in the town was comfortable enough, but outside it the German movements were hampered by a real scarcity of supplies. The shortage was remedied later, but for the time being it was a serious embarrassment to the invaders.

In Liège the garrison of occupation behaved on the whole well, though even here the Germans showed how little disposed they were to abate any of the rigour of the game out of consideration for Belgian patriotism. Many civilians in Liège had taken part in the fighting—as they had a perfect right to do so long as their territory was not yet “occupied” by the enemy—and there is some reason to think that the early surrender of the town was made under threat of collective punishment for their participation in the fighting. But the actual occupation seems to have been well managed, and that there should have been so little disorder in a populous town in which nearly everyone understood the use of firearms, whose people had just helped the Belgian troops to inflict a severe defeat on the German invaders, and who had in their ears all day the sound of firing from their countrymen in the forts all round, says much for the restraint exercised on both sides. On August 9th, two days after the surrender of the town, the hostages which the Germans had taken for

the good behaviour of the inhabitants were unconditionally released. The German troops were now in occupation of all the public buildings. The shops were open, and the soldiers were buying freely, and paying cash for what they bought. The restaurants were crowded with German officers. The ordinary municipal government went on apparently as usual, though it was subject to the orders of the military authority. Every morning Major von Bayer, the Commander of the German troops occupying the town, sent his orders to the Burgomaster, with a list of the requisitions that he made on the town. These were collected and delivered by the police and the Civic Guard, and paid for in receipts. There was no gas, because the works had run out of coal; all lights had to be out by nine at night, and the streets were so crowded with military wagons and camping soldiers that there was no room for the trams to run along them. But there were few signs of the fighting of the previous days. There were guns on the citadel, but none mounted in the streets. Five houses in the town had been damaged in the bombardment, and the suburb of Bressoux had suffered somewhat. The Bridge of Arches had been destroyed by the Belgian army in its retreat, and another bridge had been burnt, but apart from this damage the city had come off fairly well. There was certainly nothing in its appearance to suggest what was about to happen in other cities of Belgium. It was a model occupation.

The Germans were not idle round Liège. They kept up a steady bombardment of the forts with their light guns, and if their accounts are to be trusted succeeded from time to time in temporarily silencing some of them, probably by injuring the mechanism of the turrets. They requisitioned breakdown gangs from the railway to clear the tunnels which the Belgians had blown up on the line from Aix-la-Chapelle, and they prepared for the advance of the main army by scouring the countryside with Uhlans. It was these cavalry expeditions that gave the war in Belgium the bitter character that it was presently to assume. They were not in sufficient force to overawe the country, still less to occupy it in any military sense; but they claimed all the rights of an army of occupation while discharging none of its duties. Their audacity increased in the minds of the Belgians the resentment at what they regarded as the bitter insult of invasion, and their numerical weakness invited attack. Their lack of regular supplies added to the occasions of conflict between them and the country people. At a later stage great use was made of motor cars in reconnaissance work in Belgium.



THE DEFENCE OF BELGIUM.

**Belgian Troops entrenched near Malines.
Street Barricades on the outskirts of Brussels.
A Belgian Battery in Action.**

[Record Press and Alferi.]

A detailed examination of the excesses of the Germans in their invasion of Belgium may be conveniently deferred to a later chapter, for their worst crimes, perhaps, were committed after the main invasion had swept south into France. But it is important to realise at once the origins of their excesses. No army has ever understood better than the German the importance of a cavalry screen of the movements of the infantry behind, and both this war and that of 1870 abound with examples of this perfectly legitimate employment of cavalry. Audacity, rapidity of movement, ubiquity—these qualities are of the essence of the effective action of cavalry in war. And perhaps it is difficult to distinguish between the military qualities which confuse the generals of a hostile army and those which overawe the people. Certainly, the German Uhlans made no attempt to do so. Even this policy of spreading terror over the countryside is defensible if it is unaccompanied by acts of physical violence to civilians, and if it is the prelude to an effective occupation of the country. Neither of these conditions was observed by the Germans. The terrorising of the people became an end in itself, and, except for the brief period in which their main army of invasion was passing through the country, the Germans at no time had in Belgium a really effective army of occupation. Their whole interest in the country for the time being was in the fact that it was the back door into France. Had they been setting out formally to conquer the country the work could have been done at any rate humanely. It is certain that an army of half a million could have occupied every corner of it. But the moment it became clear that the Belgians would not submit to their country being made a military convenience of, the Germans, pressed as they were for time, were driven to illegitimate means of overawing their resolution. The cruelties of the Germans were not due to passion, or mainly at any rate to the brutality of individuals. They were the policy of intimidation translated into the only language that can be used by an army set to do in a week a job that could only be decently done in a year.

The Germans immediately after, and even before, the occupation of Liège began to complain of the "franc-tireurs," and the treacherous sniping of small isolated bodies of German troops. But the tranquillity of their occupation of Liège showed that where there was sufficient force and regular occupation there was no danger. It was their policy, forced upon them no doubt by the original sin in entering Belgium at all, of scrambling through the country and using it merely as a way of approach to France without undertaking any of the

responsibilities incumbent on an army of occupation, that exposed them to these risks. There was a conference held at Brussels immediately after the Franco-Prussian War, in which an attempt was made to define the rights of the people of a country, as distinguished from its army, in resisting an invader. The discussions revealed a violent divergence of opinion between the great military Powers and the smaller States, such as Belgium and Switzerland, with which England sided, on the limits that should be placed on the rights of unorganised patriotic resistance to an invader, the great Powers being anxious to restrict combatant rights to the regular armies, the smaller Powers to gain as much freedom as possible in his resistance to the enemy for every good citizen. Feeling ran very high at the conference. Of one proposed article the Belgian delegate observed that if citizens were to be sacrificed for having attempted to defend their country at the peril of their lives, at any rate they need not find on the

post at the foot of which they were about to be shot the article of a Treaty, signed by their own Government, which had in advance condemned them to death. Two clauses of the Brussels Declaration are worth setting out as adopted by the first Hague Conference. Articles 1 and 2 of the Hague Convention (1899) on the Laws and Customs of War on Land run as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to the army, but also to the militia and corps of volunteers, fulfilling the conditions—

1. That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
2. That of having a distinctive emblem fixed and recognisable at a distance;
3. That of carrying arms openly; and
4. That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

In countries where militia or corps of volunteers constitute the army, or form part of it, they are included under the denomination "army."

ARTICLE 2.


The population of a territory which has not been occupied who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time to organise themselves in accordance with Article 1, shall be regarded as belligerents if they respect the laws and customs of war.

This second article undeniably recognises the right of, say, villagers who are suddenly surprised by a party



[Central News.]

Field-Marshal von der Goltz, Military Governor of the parts of Belgium occupied by the Germans.



THE CONCENTRATION ON THE FRONTIERS.

of Uhlans to attack them by any reasonable means that suggest themselves. They need not be in uniform, they need not declare their hostility until it suits them to do so, and they need not carry their arms openly. It is only when the enemy is in occupation of a place that the ordinary citizen is obliged to conform to the rules of Section I, and military occupation in such case is like naval blockade, that is, it must be effective to be real. Under these rules, sniping by an un-uniformed peasant would be illegal, and punishable as an act of treachery in a place like Liège, where the enemy was in effective occupation, but perfectly permissible in a village through which a party of cavalry might pass in reconnaissance. It is true that at the next Hague Conference, in 1907, the German delegate secured the insertion of additional words in the second clause which made it necessary—even in territory not occupied by the invader—for the civilian who means to fight to “carry his arms openly,” but these words do not mean that the civilian patriot may not fight from an ambush, or lay an ambush in his own house just as properly as in a wood. For a week or ten days after the outbreak of war the Germans were not in effective occupation of any part of Belgium, with the exception of Liège, and they had therefore no right to complain that the civil population was taking part in the war. The franc-tireur had just as much right to shoot down a Uhlan when he saw one as a member of the Belgian army had. To deny that right is to hand over a population of millions into the power of cavalry raiders who may not number as many thousands.

A week after the outbreak of war a semi-official statement issued in Berlin complained that in the struggles round Liège the civilian population had taken part in the struggle, that German troops had been fired on from ambush, and that the same things had happened in France. “It is possible,” continued the statement, “that France and Belgium are preparing a franc-tireur war against our troops. If this is proved by further facts our adversaries are themselves responsible if the war is extended to the guilty population. The German troops are only accustomed to fight against the armed power of a hostile State, and cannot be blamed if, in self-defence, they do not give quarter.” Thus early in the war, before there was any question of an effective occupation of the country, did the Germans threaten to heap up the crime of burglarious entry with the crimes of arson and murder.

THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE GERMAN ARMIES.

After a week of the war the dispositions of the German armies became tolerably clear. Nineteen army corps were massed in the west, which, with their cavalry divisions, made a Grand Army of 1,200,000 men. Of this force all but four army corps were north of a line drawn through Metz. The following table* (with the accompanying map) shows the peace distribution of the German army, and its distribution about the end of the first week of the war.

The distribution of their troops already at the end of the first week of the war revealed the German plan of invasion. It was to tempt the French as far north as possible, to hold on to them with his left in front of Lorraine and Luxembourg, and, brushing aside the Belgian resistance, with his right to get round on the back of the French, and so repeat Sedan.

* *The Times* of August 12th gave a map showing the position of the German Army Corps, and obviously based on official data, from which some of the information in this table has been adopted.

	Peace Station.	August 8th.
Guards	Berlin	Not yet on the frontier.
1st Army Corps....	Königsberg.....	Königsberg.
2nd Army Corps....	Stettin.....	Stettin.
3rd Army Corps....	Berlin	Belgian Ardennes.
4th Army Corps....	Magdeburg.....	Belgian Ardennes.
5th Army Corps....	Posen	Posen.
6th Army Corps....	Breslau	Breslau.
7th Army Corps....	Münster	Liège.
8th Army Corps ...	Coblenz	Luxembourg.
9th Army Corps....	Hamburg	Liège.
10th Army Corps....	Hanover	Liège.
11th Army Corps....	Cassel	Belgian Ardennes.
12th Army Corps....	Dresden (1st Saxons)...	Luxembourg.
13th Army Corps....	Württemberg.....	Metz.
14th Army Corps....	Karlsruhe	Alsace.
15th Army Corps....	Strasburg.....	Alsace.
16th Army Corps....	Metz	Metz.
17th Army Corps....	Danzig	Danzig.
18th Army Corps....	Frankfurt	Not yet at the front.
19th Army Corps....	Leipzig (2nd Saxons)...	Belgian Ardennes.
20th Army Corps....	Allenstein	East Prussia.
21st Army Corps ...	Saarbrücken (Lorraine)...	Not yet at the front.
1st Bavarian	Würzburg	Metz.
3rd Bavarian	Nürnberg	Luxembourg.

THE DIVERSION IN ALSACE.

Obviously, the German strategy left their extreme left flank in Alsace very weak. Perhaps its weakness was not merely inevitable but designed, in the hope that the French would waste their energy in an attack in Alsace. At any rate, the French found the temptation too strong to resist. On military grounds there was nothing to be said for an invasion of Alsace, unless it had been meant to be pressed very strongly. Had the French been willing to abandon Belgium and their northern frontiers altogether, it is conceivable that an invasion of Alsace in great force might have upset the German plans in the north, and forced the enemy to abandon his design. The risks of such a plan were tremendous, but had they been taken boldly, and remorselessly, success might have led to great results. It was a gamble, but if the stakes had been high enough it might have justified itself. Very wisely, General Joffre refused to play high in Alsace. That decision taken, he should have refused to play at all. Instead, he compromised. He dallied with the notion that by invading Alsace he might embarrass the German concentration in the north, but he refused to take the risk of invading Alsace in such strength as alone would have made the project worth while attempting. It is not impossible that the chief motive of the incursion was political, and that it was thought useful to raise the ardour of the nation by appearing in the province which it had lost. But it was no kindness to the Alsations to appear in sufficient force to induce them to compromise themselves with the French, but in insufficient force to protect them from the risk of punishment by the Germans later. Of all hard fates in war, none is so hard as that of the country which is overrun by both sides in a war and punished impartially by both. That is to complicate international war by the graver disorders of civil war.

On August 7th, the Seventh French Army Corps, with a division of infantry from Belfort, moved through the gap in the Vosges near Belfort, and attacked the Germans at Altkirch. Altkirch is built on the hillside overlooking the river Ill, and the Germans were entrenched in a fairly strong position, though they were weak in numbers. The French attack was characteristically bold, and the trenches were carried by a bayonet charge, always popular with soldiers and public, always prodigal of life. The French losses were not light, and in one regiment the colonel and seven officers were wounded.

There was also fighting at Thann, but there, as at Altkirch, the night came on before the French could inflict much damage on the retreating Germans. The next day the French continued their advance, and, in spite of a strong resistance, occupied Mulhouse, a considerable manufacturing town, where they were enthusiastically welcomed by the population. At Mulhouse a Proclamation to the people of Alsace was published, and read with great eagerness by the crowds. It ran:—

"Children of Alsace.—After forty-four years of sad waiting the French soldiers are treading the fresh soil of your noble country, the first workers in the great work of revenge. What emotion and what pride for them! To complete this work they are ready to sacrifice their lives. The French nation unanimously spurs them forward, and on the folds of their flag are inscribed the magical names of right and liberty. Long live France! Long live Alsace!"

It was a fine rhetorical opening, which deserved a better sequel. On the next day the French at Mulhouse

the operations were designed to have any serious influence on the German concentration to the north, they were certainly not fortunate. They alarmed the Germans, but the danger was met by borrowing an army corps from Austria, and shortly after the arrival of this Austrian corps in Alsace, the French declared war upon Austria. The contrast between the somewhat feeble and irresolute French offensive in Alsace on the German right and the whole-hearted uncompromising concentration of the Germans on their right wing in Belgium is very striking. This war will furnish us with many instances of the weakness of a military policy which ignores sentiment; but this campaign in Alsace, though it was not without its fine passages, illustrated the dangers of allowing sentiment, undisciplined by an ordered and logical plan, to determine the course of operations

THE ADVANCE IN BELGIUM.

Meanwhile, the movement on the German right through Belgium was beginning to develop. The Germans had had some difficulty in the early days of the campaign



[Newspaper Illustrations.]

Refugees from the frontier towns on the way into Brussels during the early days of the German invasion.

were attacked in front by a force from Colmar, and their left at Cernay was so hard pressed that its line of retreat was seriously threatened. Under the circumstances, it was deemed advisable to withdraw the whole force, though Altkirch remained in the occupation of the French. The whole operation was thoughtless and ill-considered.

A week later the operations were renewed, under the command of General Pau, an officer of ability, who had lost an arm in the Franco-Prussian War. His plan was to seize the passes across the Vosges. In the week preceding the outbreak of war the French had withdrawn a distance of five kilometres from the frontier which ran along the crest of the Vosges, and the Germans had not been slow to seize the crests. General Pau, after hard fighting, occupied the principal passes, and beat the Germans at a point between Altkirch and Mulhouse, making some captures of prisoners and artillery. Later, he occupied Colmar, but by that time his services were required elsewhere, as will be seen, and except for the occupation of the crests of the Vosges, the second French invasion of Altkirch was as unfruitful as the first. If

in crossing the Meuse, and at Visé in particular the Belgians gave the bridge-builders much trouble. From the 10th to the 18th of August a number of engagements took place between Belgian troops and detachments of German cavalry, supported by guns and occasionally by infantry. None of them was important except as evidence of the obstinate determination of the Belgians to resist, and the Belgian accounts of the German losses, in what were for the most part no more than cavalry skirmishes, were wildly exaggerated. On the 10th the Germans were at Tongres and at Landen, 24 miles west of Liège. On the next day there was fighting at Haelen, in which the Belgians acquitted themselves with very great credit. Two days later there was more fighting at Eghezée, on the Namur-Tirlemont line, and on the same day—the 14th—the siege guns arrived at Liège. The end of the resistance at the Liège forts came very soon after the siege guns had been got into position, and the criticism of the English experts on Brialmont's theories of fortification was justified. Had all the facts of the siege at Liège been known—even now it is not certain

on what day the last of the forts ceased firing, though it must have been before the 18th—there would have been less astonishment later when the Namur forts fell as the great battle in the north of France was being joined. The cupola turrets of the forts made an ideal mark for the German heavy guns, and the brave defenders had no chance of returning the fire. General Lemane was buried in the ruins of Fort Loncin, and was dragged out unconscious by his German rescuers. He had made a fine resistance, and when, still dazed from the ordeal of his bombardment, he surrendered his sword, General von Emmich gave it back into his hands, and told him that he had earned the right to keep it. His letter to the King of the Belgians from his captivity, expressing his sorrow at his failure to continue the struggle, was singularly touching in its helpless nobility, distracted, but not crushed, by the horrors of the bombardment.


All through these days, as the swarms of German cavalry began to settle more thickly on the country, the state of the Belgian people grew steadily worse. Never have so many human beings so suddenly and so undeservedly been plunged into such misery as now began to spread over Belgium. Nearly half the country was evacuated by the Belgian army the second week of the war, and many of the able-bodied men left behind could not reconcile themselves to submit to the small bodies of marauding cavalry that appeared everywhere. There was much sniping, and even the Belgian women did not neglect opportunities of injuring the enemy. The Germans, who had not expected more than formal resistance from the army, and were in any case not disposed to recognise the irregular warfare of the peasantry, began to make cruel reprisals. Villages were burnt down if a single shot was fired by a peasant in hiding, and the occasional


cruelties of an infuriated peasantry on stragglers were avenged by atrocities that disgraced the German army. The terror of the German name spread. The roads were crowded with refugees who had been burnt out of their homes. In the confusion, parents and children were separated, and to the miseries of homelessness and destitution was added the gnawing anxiety over some one missing. The minds of the people were racked by wild hopes and wilder fears, and everywhere

the questions were asked: "When will the English come?" "Why are the French so long?"

On August 14th, it was announced officially that the French army was in touch with the Belgians, and both in Belgium and in England it was popularly believed that the first great battle of the war would take place in front of Brussels, on the plains near Waterloo. The Belgian army headquarters were at Louvain, and it was thought that their army might be the left wing of a larger French army covering Western Belgium to Namur and the Meuse valley. On August 17th, the Belgian Government was transferred from Brussels to Antwerp, but for a few hours even that was believed to be a measure of precaution only, and not a preliminary to the military abandonment of the capital. But on the following day came two train loads of refugees from Tirlemont, carrying news of the bombardment of their town and of a general advance

of the German army. Up to then Brussels had maintained a cool and even a cheerful demeanour, and even then it did not lose its self-possession for long. Those who could left for Antwerp or Ostend. Those whom duty or necessity kept in the city prepared for the German occupation with what fortitude they had at command. On Thursday, August 20th, the Germans entered Brussels. They swooped down on the city like eagles, walked through it like geese, and presently rose again and flew south.






German Infantry entering Brussels in the rain.

[*Sport and General.*




A view of the Bourse during the passage of the German troops.

[*Central News.*




German Troops drawn up in the Grande Place.

[*Central News.*]



Cavalry entering the City.

[*Sport and General.*]



The Palace of Justice at Brussels, one of the largest buildings in Europe.

[Central News.]

The hardest fighting outside Brussels had taken place at Aerschot, on the day before the occupation, where two Belgian regiments were attacked by an overwhelming German force, and would have been cut off but for an heroic stand made by a detachment under Major Gilson. Of two hundred and eighty-eight men under Gilson's command, only seven returned. But for the most part, with the exception of the first attack on Liège, all the fighting in Belgium before the occupation of Brussels was cavalry skirmishing. The great anxiety of the Belgians at Liège, and later before Brussels, was to preserve their field army intact until the main tide of German invasion had passed south, when it was hoped it could be used to better purpose against the enemy's communications and against the army of occupation.

The inner history of the ten days before the occupation of Brussels cannot be written yet. When Brussels was evacuated, a long argumentative statement was issued to the people explaining that the abandonment of Brussels was in accordance with the old strategic plans for the defence of Belgium. Undoubtedly, the retirement on Antwerp had long been part of the Belgian plans. Yet the Government must have hoped for a time that it would not be necessary to take so grave a step, and too little acknowledgment has even yet been made in England of the loyalty of Belgium to the cause of the Allies. Had Belgium faltered for a moment, it would have been easy for her to have satisfied honour by one pitched battle in front of Brussels and then to have dropped out of the war. After all, she knew that the war would be decided

in the main not by anything that she could do, but by the battles in France and on the plains of Eastern Europe, and if she had thought of winning easy honours she would not have prolonged her part in the war by retiring on Antwerp, but would have drawn her agony, which was greater than that of any other country engaged in the war, to an early close. No doubt, the position of Antwerp lends itself to the war upon communications which Belgium now proposed to begin. But Belgium can have been under no delusions about what that meant. It meant that her own sufferings would be prolonged, not so much for her own interests, or even her own honour—that had already been abundantly satisfied—but out of sheer unselfish loyalty to the cause of her Allies. Several opportunities had been given her of retiring from the war, if only she would grant the free passage through her territory that Germany asked for. But her resolution and her loyalty never wavered for a moment. Unexpectedly good as was the resistance offered by the Belgian troops, their retirements were even finer. The Belgian Government must have been

disappointed at the failure of the Allies to save the capital from occupation, but it never betrayed a sign of its feelings. It held on to what it considered its only honourable policy, well knowing through what awful suffering it was likely to lead the Belgian people.

The great turning movement, in the course of which the Germans occupied Brussels, belongs really to the battle on the Meuse, in which the British army took its part at Mons. Brussels was sacrificed because the line from the Belgian capital along the Meuse to Verdun and Toul was an impossibly long one to hold. The successful retirement of the Belgian Field Army on Antwerp was, however, the first real check to the German strategy in the war. The conception of the great sweep across half Belgium, which was to gather up the Belgian army on the way, and then encircle the French armies before they had time to extricate themselves, was a magnificent one, and it was carried out with great brilliancy and a rapidity of movement which no army of the same size has equalled. It was not however, to succeed. Its first failure was the refusal by the Belgians of their wing, and the successful retirement upon Antwerp. Its second

and greater failure is reserved to be related in another and later chapter.

The terms of the surrender of Brussels were honourable. The Germans were to have a passage through the city, any requisitions that were made were to be paid for in cash, public and private property were to be respected, and the municipal government was to go on as before, free from German control. In this last provision one sees the strong hand of

the Brussels Burgomaster, M. Max, a man of great force of character and diplomatic skill, as was to be proved often in the history of the German occupation of Brussels. The influence of M. Max is also apparent in the wording of the Proclamation published by General Sixtus von Arnim, Commander of the Sixth Army Corps, after the occupation of the city.

"German troops will pass through Brussels to-day and on the following days, and are obliged by circumstances to demand from the city lodging, food, and supplies. All these matters will be regularly arranged through the municipal authorities.

"I expect the population to conform itself without resistance to these necessities of war, and in particular to commit no act of aggression against the safety of the troops, and promptly to furnish the supplies demanded.

"In this case I give every guarantee for the preservation of the city and the safety of its inhabitants.

"If, however, there should be, as there has, unfortunately, been elsewhere, any act of aggression against the soldiers, the burning of buildings, or explosions of any kind, I shall be compelled to take the severest measures.

"THE GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY CORPS."



[Newspaper Illustrations Ltd.]

German Troops quartered in the Palace of Justice, Brussels.



The Town Hall at Antwerp with the Scheldt in the background.
Antwerp: The Avenue Keyser.

[Central News.]


As at Liège, the German occupation of Brussels was managed with extraordinary efficiency. Two hours after their arrival Headquarters had fixed a private telephone between the Town Hall, their place of business, and their hotel, hooking the wire with a long bamboo pole, and hanging it on to the street lamp standards. And for a time the personal relations between the citizens and the army of occupation, which was fixed at 10,000, were not unpleasant. But at Brussels, as at Liège, and afterwards at many towns of importance, the Germans levied large sums of money as a sort of ransom. The contribution imposed on Brussels was no less than £8,000,000, or at the rate of about £60 per family. The invader has in occupied towns often exercised the right of levying contributions in kind for such commodities as his army might require. Moreover, it was a common practice in the Franco-Prussian War to levy fines by way of penalty for misconduct. Thus, Lorraine was made to pay a fine in 1871 of £400,000 for the destruction of a bridge

at Fontenoy. But Brussels had been guilty of no offences against the laws of war, and she had already promised to supply requisition in kind made for the use of the army. This further fine of £8,000,000 bore no sort of relation to the requirements of the army, or to any expenses which the Germans might be held to be incurring by their occupation. It was really a ransom, the price exacted by the Germans for not committing crimes prohibited by international law, and it made a very deep impression on the mind of English people. Simultaneously with the occupation of Brussels and the imposition of this enormous fine, the British and French Governments each advanced to Belgium a loan of £10,000,000, free of interest, so far at any rate as the British loan was concerned.

For the first fortnight in August, Belgium and her sufferings were the war for the majority of Englishmen. It is now time to return to England, and see how the war was affecting her, and what steps she was taking to play a worthy part in it.



The Place Verte and Cathedral, Antwerp.



On the edge of the Belgian Ardennes : Esneux, some miles to the south of Liege. [Central News.
The River Meuse at Huy.



[Topical Press.]

The crowd waiting outside the War Office on the morning before war was declared.

CHAPTER V.

"THE UNITED FRONT."

THE IRISH QUESTION—MR. REDMOND'S DECLARATION—LORD KITCHENER'S APPOINTMENT—A CONTINENTAL CAMPAIGN FOR THE BRITISH ARMY—THE PRESS BUREAU.

ON Monday, July 27th, three days after the delivery of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, the House of Commons was busy discussing the latest phase of the Irish question. Party feeling was at its highest. On the day before, Irish National Volunteers had been shot down while carrying arms to Dublin after a gun-running venture very like that which the Ulster Volunteers, unhampered and unpunished, had already carried out on a much larger scale. Peace in Ireland had long seemed to be hanging on a thread, and at last, it appeared, the thread would snap, unless it were shown without delay that two sets of laws did not in fact exist for the same offence. The House of Commons sat debating who should be held responsible. Notice was given to postpone the consideration of the Home Rule Amending Bill, which was to have come up on the Tuesday; the prospect of a settlement, always slender, seemed to have shrunk to nothing. The Bill was to be taken again on the Thursday. But by Thursday the country had begun to be occupied by other things.

Continental politics do not bulk largely in the mind of the average Englishman, thanks partly to his insular

position, and partly to the practical bent by which he turns to whatever is nearest to his hand. He has no land frontiers and no immediate neighbour, hostile or other, and he is therefore not accustomed to think of himself as bound to the wheel of Continental politics. For this reason, the full meaning of the dispute between Austria and Serbia only began to be recognised as the week went on, although Russia had made it plain, immediately after the delivery of the ultimatum, that she would go to all lengths sooner than let Serbia be crushed. With the end of the week it had become clear that not only was the conflict to involve France and Russia on the one side, and Germany and Austria on the other, but that there was grave fear that England, too, would be drawn in. Luxembourg, whose neutrality had been guaranteed by international instrument, was invaded by Germany, an ultimatum was presented to Belgium, and on Monday, August 3rd, Sir Edward Grey made a statement which clearly foreshadowed the action of the following day, when England declared war on Germany. Mr. Bonar Law pledged the opposition to support the Government: "The Government already know, but I give them now the assurance on behalf of the party of

which I am Leader in this House, that, in whatever steps they think it necessary to take for the honour and security of this country, they can rely on the unhesitating support of the Opposition." But expectation—and not the expectation of England or the British Empire only—turned to Mr. John Redmond, the Nationalist leader. Unreconciled Ireland had not been wont to offer her sympathy or support to England's wars. So long as England refused her the right of self-development according to her own ideals, the wars were England's, and not hers. But the times had changed. No one could doubt that

make the Irish question a consideration which we feel we have now to take into account."

And Mr. Redmond, in words which will be handed down among the historic sayings of those days, replied :—

"In past times, when this Empire has been engaged in these terrible enterprises, it is true—and it would be the utmost affectation and folly on my part to deny it—the sympathies of the Nationalists of Ireland, for reasons to be found deep down in the centuries of history, have been estranged from this country. Allow me to say that what has occurred in recent years has altered the situation completely. . . .



[Topical Press.

Waiting to enter the Guildhall for Mr. Asquith's first great call to arms meeting.

the Home Rule Bill must now become law, and Ireland receive her Parliament, whatever exception might be made in Ulster's favour; nor could it reasonably be denied that the country, as a whole, was anxious to have the question settled permanently and peaceably. The situation, therefore, had changed, and the leaders of the great parties knew that it had changed. So, when Sir Edward Grey was drawing his speech to an end, he said :—


"The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. The general feeling throughout Ireland—and I would like this to be clearly understood—does not

"I say to the Government that they may to-morrow withdraw every one of their troops from Ireland. I say that the coasts of Ireland will be defended from foreign invasion by her armed sons, and for this purpose armed Nationalist Catholics in the South will be only too glad to join arms with the armed Protestants and Ulstermen in the North. Is it too much to hope that out of this situation there may spring a result which will be good, not merely for the Empire, but good for the future welfare and integrity of the Irish nation?"

Thus the enemy was met with an unbroken front. It is said that the news of this unity astonished him,

and that he had even calculated on dissension and civil war in Ireland. It may be so, nor, if it were so, need we be astonished. The phenomenon of a people healing its internal divisions in order to bring its full force to bear upon an enemy is not uncommon; but here were no ordinary divisions. The foreigner could not be expected to understand the Irish character, which has its difficulties even for Ireland's closest neighbours, nor could those who do not believe in the virtues of self-government be expected to believe that the gift of autonomy to Ireland would go so far to remove the wrongs of centuries. But to the British people Mr. Redmond's speech did not come wholly as a surprise. The history of our own country has taught us that for the British race contentment goes with the power of self-government, and discontent with the denial of it. The British had seen the truth of their belief confirmed in the case of the South African Boers. They regarded the Irish question as moving slowly, but

above all, rooted in religious feelings, is not so easily destroyed. No settlement was reached, the session could not be indefinitely prolonged, and the Government had to find their own solution. It had been agreed that the war should not prejudice the position of either party. What, then, was the position? The Home Rule and Welsh Church Bills were already as good as law. The Government had announced that they would put them on the Statute Book before the close of the session. Debate on them had ceased; only formalities remained. On the other hand, the Amending Bill, having passed through the House of Lords, had still to come before the Commons, where it could look forward to but a chilly welcome. The House of Lords had transformed it into such a shape as the majority in the Commons would certainly reject. But it had been the intention of the Government only to present the Home Rule Bill for the Royal assent along with an Amending Bill.



[Press Picture Agency.

Mr. John Redmond, M.P.

now certainly, to its inevitable end. They have the art, and have with some notable exceptions practised it, of "doing the right thing, politically, by a sure creative method"—an art which Prince von Bülow denies to the German people. They would have been disappointed had Ireland stood aloof, still cold and alienated. But Mr. Redmond went beyond what many could have hoped, for he pledged Ireland's support while yet the Home Rule Bill was unconfirmed. Ireland, ever generous, hastened to take her place in the ranks even before the promises made to her had been fulfilled.

What, then, was to be done with the Home Rule and Welsh Church Bills, since a revival of controversy was now impossible, and neither had yet passed its final stages? It was hoped that in the new mind already created by the war Nationalist and Orange might resolve their differences. But a feud so deeply rooted, and,



[J. Russell.

Sir Edward Carson, K.C., M.P.

The proposal of the Opposition was that the Irish and Welsh Bills should be indefinitely shelved. Such a course, so far from prejudicing the position of neither party, would have greatly improved that of the Opposition and impaired that of the Government. It would have cast the two Bills to which the Government had devoted almost the whole of their life since the close of 1910 to the mercies of an obscure and uncertain future. The Government decided that, since their Bills would have become law had there been no war, they ought to become law now. But that the position of Ulster might not be impaired, they proposed and passed a Bill which postponed the operation of the Home Rule Act for twelve months, or, if the war lasted longer, for the duration of the war. It is true that this did not give the Opposition an Amending Bill, but it did not subject Ulster to a Dublin Parliament, and it left her free to resume her



[Topical Press.]

Before England declared War : German Reservists waiting outside the German Consulate in London for instructions as to how to rejoin their regiments.



[Topical Press.]

After England declared War : A large party of German Reservists, who were arrested as they were endeavouring to cross to the Continent, marched through Folkestone on their way to a detention camp.

opposition to Home Rule when the war was over, if no settlement could even then be reached, and she was still in the mood for armed resistance. The true grievance of the Opposition—and from the party point of view it was substantial—was that the hope, which they had never really abandoned, of somehow wrecking the Home Rule Bill was finally snatched from them. But it was a definitely party grievance. It roused no echo in the country, where men's minds, without show or demonstration, were now set entirely on the war.

This was clearly not a question which, when war had once broken out, could be considered merely in the light of party. It was imperative not to chill and antagonise the Irish by disappointing the hopes which they saw so clearly, and with such good reason, near to fruition. To have made the war an excuse for arresting Home Rule on the very threshold of completion would have been hailed not only as a blunder in statesmanship by the whole Empire, but as an act of treachery, as one more signal wrong to Ireland, by every man of Irish nationality in the Dominions and the United States. The demands of honour and political discernment were the same. The Opposition protested violently through the mouth of Mr. Law, but there was no evidence that he was supported in the country. Men were looking not to Mr. Law, but to Mr. Redmond, who sealed his previous declaration with the words that now "Ireland had been transformed from what George Meredith described as 'the broken arm of England' into one of the strongest bulwarks of the Empire," and, a little later, "I say to the people of Great Britain—you have kept faith with Ireland; Ireland will keep faith with you." This was as good as a victory

in the field. But not all of Ireland's new-born interest in an Imperial war could be ascribed to the passage of Home

Rule. Her sympathy with England had been growing in proportion as England had ceased to treat her as an alien people, and the invasion of Belgium was an outrage which appealed at once to her instinctive feeling for a weak and oppressed people.

The operation of the Welsh Church Bill also was suspended for the duration of the war, a decision which the country received with the same placidity with which it had regarded each stage in the progress of this Bill. Meanwhile, three Ministers—Lord Morley, Mr. John Burns, and Mr. G. M. Trevelyan—finding themselves in disagreement with their colleagues, had resigned their offices. The Government forthwith turned to the carrying out of their plans by land and sea.

The mobilisation of the British navy was completed on the morning of August 3rd. The proclamation for the mobilisation of the army was signed on August 4th. On the same day, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe was appointed to the supreme command of the Home Fleets. The Government took over the two battleships building in this country for Turkey, together with two small ships ordered by Chili. The use of wireless telegraphy by merchant vessels in Great Britain was prohibited. The Ministry took control of the railways. The Prime Minister retired from the War Office, of which he had taken charge at the time of the Curragh episode, and Lord Kitchener took his place. This was a remarkable step; the presence of a professional soldier at the War Office showed conclusively how far we had travelled in a few days from the familiar England of the days before the war. Lord Kitchener's appointment was a sound stroke of policy, for his reputation rests most firmly on his qualities as an

organiser, and organising power was likely to be sorely needed in this war. The country had been plunged into



[Elliott and Fry Ltd.]

The Right Hon. Winston Churchill, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.



[Lafayette, London.]

Lord Kitchener, who succeeded Mr. Asquith as War Secretary.

a gigantic Continental struggle which her military system was not intended to meet, and for which it had not been prepared. The Expeditionary Force, indeed, had been carefully organised since 1906, but if the Government decided, and no other decision was possible, that the war could not be carried on under a system of limited liability, then the 150,000 men of the Expeditionary Force were only a beginning, and other national armies, with their transport and equipment, must be gathered, trained, and sent abroad. Here was a field for organising power. Lord Kitchener took office purely as a soldier, without political views, an anomaly indeed in political England, but permissible in what was clearly an interregnum in the march of her political development.

The plan of operations which England was to follow was dictated to her by her situation as a sea-power. She must, in the first instance, assert her command of the sea. If possible, the fleet of the enemy must be met and crushed, for just as a decision in war on land can only be gained by seeking out and defeating the armies of the enemy, so on the sea nothing less than the capture or destruction of the enemy's fleet is likely to be decisive. If the enemy refuses battle, as for a number of good reasons he may decide to do, the command of the sea must equally be established, if by other means. He must be blockaded, or shut up in his harbours, so that the seas remain free to British ships and British trade. The command of the sea has two edges, defensive and offensive. Defensively, the power which holds it gains

immunity for his overseas possessions, comparative security in trade, and protection against invasion. On the offensive side it gives him the power of seizing the colonies of the enemy, destroying his trade, and conveying troops at will to attack, or assist in attacking, the enemy on land. Each of these is, in its degree, a formidable weapon, and the power of transporting troops is, in the large resort, the most formidable of all. For, great as is the influence of sea-power on an enemy, by itself it may not be sufficient to reduce him to submission. He may lose his colonies without feeling the wound, and the stoppage of his maritime trade may waste his strength without bringing him to his knees. When, therefore, an island nation is at war with a great Continental Power, it must consider whether sea-warfare alone is likely to secure

victory, or whether it must not use the additional weapon placed in its hand and drive home on land the advantage first won on the sea. In such a war as the present, when England was fighting in alliance with France and Russia against the two great military powers of Central Europe, the question could be answered only in one way. If the issue on land were decided finally in favour of Austria and Germany, England would still hold the seas, but she would be faced by an interminable struggle, perhaps with the fleet of the enemy still undefeated, and with no prospect of attaining the aims for which she went to war. On the other hand, prompt and active intervention in the land campaign might turn the scale. It would certainly retard the progress of the German armies, and even if it accom-

plished no more than this at the start, a steady stream of reinforcements might prove decisive at the finish. The Government, therefore, had decided forthwith to embark on operations in France, using to the full our superiority at sea, even though a great German fleet lay intact in its North Sea anchorages.

For this course there was good historical precedent. In the first long period of the Napoleonic wars, until three years after the battle of Trafalgar, England was almost entirely content to meet France on the seas. She harried French commerce, while her own went free, except for a two-and-a-half per cent that was captured by French warships or privateers. "Waging war and making money then also," says a German writer, "as always when the English have been engaged in hostilities, went hand in hand." The reproach argues a lack of

humour. The eagerness with which a nation fosters and develops its commerce in time of war to the best of its power is due to an instinct of self-preservation as much as to the trader's habit, and no country which had the power would abstain from seizing every trade opportunity in time of war that came its way. But England's commercial war at the beginning of the nineteenth century did not suffice to give her victory against Napoleon. The destruction of the French fleet, after the long periods of watching from 1803 to 1805, wrecked his hopes of invading England, but left him still the master of the Continent. At last, therefore, in 1808, the British Government decided definitely to take a hand in the Continental war, and sent Wellesley to Portugal. It was in this decision that Trafalgar produced its full results, and



[Russell and Sons.

Prince Louis of Battenberg, First Sea Lord of the Admiralty.

the destruction of Villeneuve's command meant not only the triumph of England in the Colonial and commercial war, but the power to create in the Peninsula that weapon which wounded Napoleon so sorely, and was, in fact, one of the chief causes of his downfall. The long watches before Brest and Rochefort and Toulon, like Nelson's chase of the French fleet to the West Indies and back again to Europe, bore their fruits on the battlefields of Portugal and Spain. What the British Government in 1808 did after years of naval warfare, varied only by inconsiderable adventures on land, the Government of 1914 had resolved to do at once. It was to be the second example in modern history—the Russo-Japanese war had been the first—of the active co-operation of the fleet and army in a war of first-class powers.



[Central News.

Admiral Sir John Jellicoe.

Whether the German fleet chose to fight or to lie inactive in its harbours was, of course, of no account from the military point of view. There was here an interesting similarity to Nelson's campaigns. For the British fleet in 1914, like Nelson in 1804, had every desire to bring the enemy to action, and gave him every opportunity to come out and fight. In each instance, the enemy had a good reason for avoiding combat. In the case of the French, it was that their forces were divided, and that at all cost they must unite before giving battle. With Germany, at the beginning of the war, it was not so much that they were inferior in strength, but that they were under necessity themselves to retain control of the Baltic Sea, lest troops should be thrown on to the German coast and create a diversion in the rear of their armies. Just as Great Britain must command the North Sea as the highroad to England, so Germany must hold the Baltic, lest, if she lost her grip, Russia should invade her from the sea. Germany, no doubt, believed that in a

fleet action she could at least seriously cripple the English fleet, but to what purpose would the English fleet be crippled if the loss of the Baltic were added to other seas already lost? The British fleet, therefore, was destined to the long days of waiting and watching for a diffident enemy which Nelson had experienced, with this difference, that now the British army was to be carried overseas and there supported while the enemy's fleet remained still undefeated. This policy of immediate active intervention on the European battlefield had been virtually decided on by the British Government eight years before.

At the time of the Moroccan crisis, in 1906, Sir Edward Grey had given his sanction to consultations between the military and naval experts of the British and French Governments. It was these experts, we may assume,



[Elliott and Fry Ltd.

Field-Marshal Sir John French.

who drew up the plans of operations on which Great Britain embarked at the outbreak of the war. In his speech of August 3rd, Sir Edward Grey said:—

"That position was accepted by the French Government, but they said to me at the time—and I think very reasonably—'If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish to give it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts.' There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorised those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose."

There is no doubt now that the part to be played by the British Expeditionary Force in a Continental war was settled in these conversations, while the removal

of the French fleet to the Mediterranean, some time later, showed to what quarter France looked for the protection of her northern and western coasts: the British fleet, that is to say, was to account for the control of the North Sea and the Atlantic. Sir Edward Grey's speech, on August 3rd, made this clear by implication:—

"The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the Northern and Western coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet being concentrated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared from us.

"The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries."

Such, then, was the plan—the land campaign for the French, aided by the British Expeditionary Army; the sea campaign for the British fleet, aided by the French fleet in the Mediterranean. The British Admiral, setting out on his mission, received this message from the King:—

"At this grave moment in our national history I send to you, and through you to the officers and men of the fleets of which you have assumed command, the assurance of my confidence that under your direction they will revive and renew the old glories of the Royal Navy, and prove once again the sure shield of Britain and of her Empire in the hour of trial.—GEORGE R.I."

The beginning of the war brought with it a new institution—the Press Bureau. In recent years all Powers had tended to restrict the freedom of the Press in time of war, lest any information should be printed which might be useful to the enemy. Complaint was made against the British Press in the Boer War on that ground.

In the war of 1904-5, the Japanese kept correspondents well behind the front, and supplied them with lectures on past battles and personally conducted tours of battlefields. In the first Balkan War the Bulgarians went further still—they penned the correspondents far in the rear of all warlike operations, and circulated their own too-favourable versions of the fighting. In the present war, not only were correspondents looked on with disfavour, but the Government undertook to supervise the Press at home. It was not made quite clear what the functions of the Press Bureau were to be, nor how they were to be accomplished. The charter of the Bureau appears to be contained in two statements made in Parliament:—

Mr. CHURCHILL: A Press Bureau, under the presidency of Mr. F. E. Smith, would be established, from which information supplied by the War Office and the Admiralty could be given to the Press, which, without endangering military or naval interests, would keep the country truthfully informed of what could be told, and would exclude the growth of irresponsible rumours.

Mr. MCKENNA: A Press Bureau, under the direction of Mr. F. E. Smith, has been formed, and the public have a reasonable right to expect that no news will be published in the Press except such news as is furnished through this Bureau.


The one of these announcements promised, and the other expected, too much. The Press Bureau did not tell the country a great deal that it might have told without the slightest risk of injury to the national interests; it did not prevent the growth of rumour; and it could not be expected that the country would be content with the news published by this Bureau, especially when the Bureau did not publish any news. In practice, the Bureau was only part of the censorship that was set up. Cable

censors were set to work, revising messages coming to and going from this country, and often they exercised



[Record Press.]

Mr. F. E. Smith, K.C., M.P., who became the first Director of the Press Bureau.



[Central News.]

The Offices of the Press Bureau in Whitehall.




[Central News.

The Arrival of the Expeditionary Force : Sir John French (just recognisable over the shoulder of the officer in the centre of the photograph) and Staff land at Boulogne.

their authority with much more zeal than judgment. The military mind has frequently this defect, that it cannot view a question from any except the most narrow military point of view, as though it were not possible to suppress information that might serve the enemy and yet perform a national service by furnishing a stream of news which should tell an eager people something of the fortunes of its sons on sea and land, and stimulate its resolve to carry the war to a successful issue. The Bureau improved, under pressure, as time went on, but its methods were hastily improvised and amateurish; it would have handled its difficult task more easily had it been quicker to seek assistance from the Press. It was a sound proceeding to put this Bureau under the control of a responsible Minister. The Home Secretary took charge of it.

On the whole, the people came well out of the test which the outbreak of the war put to them. Foreign observers praised the calm and steadiness of the nation. The praise was not altogether undeserved, for there was neither jingoism nor panic in any notable degree. But

so vast a catastrophe could hardly have been received so placidly had it not been beyond the power of the imagination to grasp its full significance. In these islands the people have no memories of a great war; no tradition reaches them from earlier generations of the miseries of invasion and the horrors of a hostile occupation. It was easier, therefore, for the English to view the outbreak of the war quietly, and with steady nerves, than for the Frenchman or the Austrian, who has had bitter experience of what it means. In England there was, for a few days, some panic buying of stores, but this fit soon passed. There was, too, a disposition—on the East Coast—to hear the continual sound of battle in the North Sea; but excited imaginations soon began to cool before the evident fact that no battle had taken or was likely to take place. The nation turned to more profitable employment—to organising funds (such as the Prince of Wales's) and relief works for the coming unemployment and distress; to providing hospitals and rest-houses for the wounded, and comforts for the soldiers in the field; and to doing the work that lay to its hand.



[Central News.]

The Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

CHAPTER VI.

THE WAR AND FINANCE.

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS—THE MORATORIUM—EMERGENCY CURRENCY—THE BANK OF ENGLAND—THE STOCK EXCHANGE—
THE NATIONAL FINANCES.

THE financial position in Great Britain was unusually strong when war broke out. It had become clear that the zenith of the trade boom had been passed, and for some months there had been a disinclination to indulge in the more speculative forms of enterprise. The difficulties which arose with the war were not, therefore, seriously aggravated by what would ordinarily be called bad debts. They were due to the abnormal shock to credit, the brunt of which fell upon England as the chief creditor nation. England's position as creditor was a main cause at once of her weakness and of her strength. It gave her the power in the long run to compel her foreign debtors to pay either in gold or in goods, but, so long as the war prevented such payments from being made, it involved bankers and traders in correspondingly great, if temporary, loss.

The meaning of the various measures which the Government took can only be understood in relation to the magnitude of the crisis with which they were faced. The London Stock Exchange, following the example of most of the Continental Bourses, closed on Friday, July 31st. On the same day there were pronounced symptoms of a rush to hoard both gold and foodstuffs. But the main problem which faced the country was the impossibility, as it appeared, of carrying on its foreign trade. The seriousness of this difficulty had never before been fully realised, nor its immediately paralysing effect on the home trade. The stoppage was caused partly by the natural reluctance to do business at a time of crisis when no man's credit stood secure, but it was mainly due to the failure of persons abroad to send remittances to their English creditors.

At any one time there is owing in the London money market a sum of anything up to £300,000,000 in the form of bills of exchange, which may be regarded simply as post-dated cheques, of which many millions mature day by day. These bills of exchange are "accepted" or guaranteed for payment on behalf of home or foreign firms by English houses, who, if their foreign clients failed to put them in funds would find themselves either insolvent or immediately liable to become so. A Proclamation (the first of the Moratorium Proclamations), dated August 2nd, enabled accepting houses to re-accept bills, originally accepted before August 4th, as they fell due, and to postpone payment for one month. But this measure by itself was clearly inadequate. It averted immediate ruin, but, while it did not enable the accepting houses to enter on fresh business, it hit the holders of bills, banks and discount houses, who normally rely upon the prompt meeting of bills as they fall due. Bills of exchange, usually one of the most liquid assets of a bank, were suddenly solidified. On August 12th the

Treasury announced that the Bank of England would discount pre-moratorium bills at five per cent, the Bank being guaranteed by the State against ultimate loss. The Bank had naturally to satisfy itself as to the quality of these bills, but it did not in fact refuse bills which could have been readily discounted, or converted into immediate cash, under normal circumstances. This enabled the banks and other holders of bills to get the ready money for bills which the first Proclamation had prevented. The acceptor also received further assistance, for if on maturity he could not meet the bills he was allowed to postpone payment for an indefinite period, paying the Bank interest at two per cent over Bank rate. This was a far more drastic measure than the first, for it meant that the Bank of England was prepared to take over responsibility for hundreds of millions pounds' worth of bills. In point of fact, however, the total amount of bills so taken to the Bank does not appear to have exceeded £100,000,000, and only on a small proportion of these would the State have to meet an ultimate loss. On September 4th a further measure of relief was offered to the accepting houses, who were allowed, instead of postponing payment for bills which they could not meet, to borrow money from the Bank of England at two per cent over Bank rate in order to pay them off. Repayment would not be demanded by the Bank for at least a year after the close of the war, and as in the meantime the Bank's claim ranked after claims incurred in the course of new business the resources of the accepting houses were at last set free for the purposes of financing the country's foreign trade. In order to rehabilitate the credit of the accepting houses still further, the Treasury at the same time announced that, so far as new business was concerned, the joint stock banks had arranged, in co-operation with the Bank of England if necessary, to advance money to acceptors in cases where acceptors' clients had failed to put them in funds in time to meet bills on maturity.

There are thus three well-defined stages in the measures which the State found it necessary to adopt to ensure the payment of bills, the universal medium of exchange in foreign trade. The first was a simple moratorium, the postponement for one month of obligations incurred before the outbreak of war. The second was the use of State credit, where necessary, for the actual fulfilment of these obligations. The third was a small but definite assumption by the State of responsibility for payment even in the case of obligations incurred after the outbreak of war.

The immediate effect of these measures was less marked than had probably been hoped. The number of pre-moratorium bills taken to the Bank of England

was, indeed, large—so large that the physical difficulty of dealing with them led to no little confusion. But the money thus obtained from the Bank of England was not used in the money market. Directly or indirectly it found its way to the joint stock banks, and remained to swell their balances. Business in new bills developed only slowly. No definite date can be given, but it was not until September that the market can be said to have worked with anything approaching freedom in post-moratorium bills.

A Proclamation of September 3rd extended the period of the moratorium for another month, but it was hoped that the special assistance given to the accepting houses

THE GENERAL MORATORIUM.

Few people at the outbreak of the war could have explained clearly what a moratorium was. The few who could certainly never imagined that it would ever be proclaimed in this country. It is perhaps hardly necessary now to state that it means the legal authorisation to postpone payments of debt. It involves to that extent the breaking of contracts. It becomes advisable to proclaim a moratorium only when the enforcement of debts would mean bankruptcies on such a vast scale that the partial breaking of contracts is a lesser evil. Even before war broke out it had become clear that the position of many houses with remittances due from



The War Crisis in the City : The Closing of the London Stock Exchange.

[Topical Press.]

would enable the moratorium for bills of exchange to be brought to an end a month before the ending of the general moratorium. This step was in fact officially announced on September 25th. A Proclamation of September 30th, however, showed a change of view. Under this Proclamation it was made clear that all bills accepted before August 4th could be postponed in the first instance for a period of a month whenever they fell due. Thus, a six months' bill originally falling due in December, 1914, could be postponed until January, 1915. But once a bill had been re-accepted, no claim for further postponement could be made after November 3rd, 1914, and such postponement could only be for a fortnight instead of a month.

abroad, and particularly the London accepting houses, had become precarious. But the credit of the accepting houses could not be allowed to fail. Failure here would have brought in its train such a vast series of consequential failures throughout the country that the disaster had to be averted at all costs. That, as is pointed out above, was the justification for the first Moratorium Proclamation relating to bills of exchange. But it is the essence of a moratorium that the relief to the debtor involves a corresponding burden on the creditor who cannot get in his money. That is why a partial moratorium is almost impossible. Every class relieved means an additional handicap to another class, and it is obviously unjust to drive B into bankruptcy in order to save A

from the same fate. In the case of the bills of exchange it was the holders of the bills, chiefly the banks and discount houses, who suffered. They found themselves in the position of having to meet their usual claims, or rather more, and of not being able to realise the considerable proportion of their assets which they held in bills. They, too, therefore, demanded the protection of a moratorium. But to extend the moratorium in their favour only was clearly impossible. If a bank was to be protected against its depositors these depositors must have protection against their creditors, or else the same difficulties would again arise. For this reason the Government decided to make the moratorium almost universal. Powers were taken under the Postponement of Payments Act, passed on August 3rd, and on August 6th the text of the General Proclamation* was issued.

Under this Proclamation payment of debts incurred before August 4th could be deferred until September 4th, or for a month from the date on which the debt originally fell due, whichever was the later date. Interest was carried on at the old rate fixed in the contract or, where not so fixed, at six per cent. But there were certain exceptions from the scope of the moratorium. It did not apply to wages and salaries, to rates and taxes, to maritime freight charges, to dividends on trustee stocks, to the obligations of the State, to debts of less than £5, and to certain other classes of debt. There was, of course, nothing to prevent a debtor from paying immediately if he wished.

To the mass of the people the moratorium came as only a minor, though rather odd, incident at a time when the mind was bewildered with strange happenings. It was received with good-humoured tolerance. But to others it was a matter of supreme importance, and for many weeks bitter controversies raged, less in public than in private, on the behaviour of individuals and firms. The joint stock banks came in for much criticism. Much of this was ill-informed, and about the banks as a whole it would be unfair to generalise. It is true that they attempted to follow a concerted policy, but the interpretation of this policy differed widely as between banks even in the same area. The general policy of the banks was to allow depositors to withdraw at least such sums as they needed for their ordinary personal and domestic expenditure, and for the payment of wages. Instances, however, arose in which difficulty was made in the withdrawing of money even for these purposes. But they were rare, at most, and of little importance. More serious difficulties arose in the payment of ordinary trade accounts. Here there was scarcely any attempt at uniformity. Traders were in doubt for some time as to whether they should pay, even if they could, and if they decided to do so, in whole or in part, it was doubtful whether their cheques would be honoured. It was not usual for cheques to be dishonoured. If the bank did not wish to release the balance drawn upon, an overdraft would be granted. Interest on such overdrafts was not charged unless the amount exceeded the amount of the balance withheld. For about a fortnight the confusion showed no signs of abating, but gradually a more liberal policy, both among traders and bankers developed, and on August 31st the Chancellor of the Exchequer was able to announce that the "timidity" of certain bankers had "largely disappeared."

In the same speech, however, Mr. Lloyd George declared that "it would be much too big a risk" to bring the moratorium to an abrupt end on September 4th. He

had previously tried to get a consensus of the views of the parties chiefly affected. The replies sent to the Treasury showed that 4,653 persons or firms had voted against an extension in any form, and 3,603 in favour of an extension in one form or another. Bankers, discount houses, and the stock exchanges were overwhelmingly in favour of an extension. Retailers and manufacturers especially the former, were against an extension. General traders were hopelessly divided in opinion. The Proclamation of September 1st extended the period for another month, but owing to faulty drafting this Proclamation had to be revoked by another Proclamation dated September 3rd. On September 24th it was further announced that the general moratorium would be extended for one last period of a month, that is, till November 4th. The only exceptions, apart from bills of exchange, to this last extension were in the case of debts to or from retail traders incurred in the course of their business and of rents. To say that the moratorium ended on November 4th is not strictly accurate, for a debt falling due on November 3rd under a contract entered into before August 4th could still be postponed till December 3rd. But all debts falling due on or after November 4th became payable in the ordinary way.

THE COURTS (EMERGENCY POWERS) ACT.*

That the Government felt able to bring the general moratorium to end at this time was due to two reasons. The necessity for a general moratorium had arisen mainly, in the first instance, owing to the difficulties of the accepting houses, and this particular problem had now been solved in another way. But the Government had also passed a bill which, in a more scientific manner achieved the same results as the moratorium. This was the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act, passed on August 31st. The general effect of the Courts Act was to give the courts of law power to suspend proceedings for the recovery of debt. Like the moratorium, the Act except in the cases of rents under £50 per annum) did not apply to contracts made after August 4th. It declared that creditors could not enforce the judgment of any court, "levy distress, resume possession of any property, foreclose, realise any security (except by way of sale by a mortgagee in possession), or forfeit any deposit" except after application to the court. In certain cases, also, life and endowment policies came before a court before being allowed to lapse. In all these cases the court could stay proceedings on the ground that the debtor's inability to pay was due "directly or indirectly" to the war. This was evidently a substantial equivalent to the moratorium. In some respects, notably for debts of small amount, it has been wider in its application than the moratorium. For persons of substance, traders and business houses, to whom payment was not so much an impossibility as a serious inconvenience, it afforded a less comprehensive and simple protection, but could certainly be used with effect to prevent ruin and bankruptcy. It is important to note, also, that it covered the case of loans to stockbrokers by the banks, who were not to be regarded as mortgagees in possession.

EMERGENCY CURRENCY.

On the last day of July and on the first day of August appeared the first and last symptoms among the public of financial panic. On those two days a certain number of misguided people went to their banks and demanded to be paid in gold. How much was asked for and how much was obtained will probably never

* See Appendix.

be known, but the sum may have run into millions. Over £8,000,000 was withdrawn from the Bank of England, but it cannot be known how much of this was actually put into the pockets of the people. It may be that large sums withdrawn by the joint stock banks, in view of the possibility of a run, were not actually needed for the purpose. But some banks certainly considered themselves to be short of gold, and, as they were legally quite entitled to do, refused to pay the full amount demanded. They gave Bank of England notes instead. The nervous depositors hastened with their notes to the Bank of England, with the extraordinary result that a queue of people waited outside the doors of the Bank until they could get gold for their notes. The seriousness of this so-called run, which was exaggerated at the time, was not in itself very great, and the Bank of England had no difficulty in coping with it. But the danger was none the less a real one. Nothing is so contagious as panic, and nobody knew to what extent the alarm might grow. Certainly the gold reserves of the Bank of England could not be depleted at that rate for very long. Monday, August 3rd, happened to be a Bank Holiday, and the Government, on the advice of leading bankers and merchants, decided to extend it for three more days, thus giving a breathing space of five days, during which measures could be taken to avert, if not panic, at least its evil consequences. The moratorium gave the joint stock banks power to refuse withdrawals which they had reason to suppose were for hoarding purposes. But that was not enough. Gold had to be induced to flow back to the Bank of England, whose reserves were dangerously low. Those who had hoarded must be induced to disgorge. The means for this were found in the issue of Treasury notes in denominations of one pound and ten shillings. These were made legal tender, and convertible into gold at the Bank of England. Postal Orders were also made legal tender. The notes were issued, primarily at least, through the joint stock banks, who obtained them as a loan from the Treasury and paid interest at Bank rate on them. When the banks re-opened on August 7th there were some £3,000,000 of these notes ready, and Mr. Lloyd George stated that they could be turned out thereafter at the rate of £5,000,000 a day. On September 30th the value of the notes outstanding amounted to £28,408,605. The notes issued were thus in excess of what could have been issued by the Bank of England without a suspension of the Bank Charter Act. That Act limits the amount of notes which the Bank of England may issue against securities as distinct from gold.

But the Treasury were bound in no such way, and could issue notes to any bank up to twenty per cent of its total liabilities on current and deposit account, the security being a floating charge on the assets of the bank. The issue of these notes was a complete success. The notes themselves had serious faults, and could be easily forged, but the public accepted them with a good grace, and did not make exorbitant demands for withdrawals of balances either in gold or otherwise. To some extent the public were no doubt influenced by the knowledge that such demands, if made, could and would be refused.

THE BANK OF ENGLAND.

To the Bank of England and to the Treasury belongs the chief credit for the way in which the financial difficulties were surmounted. It is difficult to distinguish between the two, for although the Bank of England is not a Government bank, it is the Government's banker, and the two, which always work in harmony, may almost

be regarded as jointly responsible for the measures which were actually taken. The position of the Bank of England at this critical period, and its subsequent recovery, may be gathered from the following figures, in some respects the most remarkable ever published by the Bank:—

	Coin and Bullion.	Gold from Abroad.	Other Deposits.	Other Securities.	Reserve.	Proportion of Reserve to Liabilities.	Bank Rate.
	(In thousands of £.)						
July 22.....	£ 40,164	£ 443	£ 42,185	£ 33,632	£ 29,297	52½	3
„ 29.....	38,131	820 (out)	54,418	47,307	26,875	40	4
Aug. 5.....	27,622	2,298 (out)	56,749	65,351	9,966	14½	6
„ 12.....	33,014	9,590	83,326	70,786	15,530	17	5
„ 19.....	37,959	3,402	108,094	94,726	19,223	15	5
„ 26.....	43,473	4,297	123,892	109,904	26,351	17½	5
Sept. 2.....	47,772	1,350	133,818	121,820	30,934	19	5
„ 9.....	47,508	1,191	130,704	116,922	30,736	19½	5
„ 16.....	48,720	1,222	135,042	113,792	32,547	21½	5

At the beginning of August the gold question, though not really the most serious problem to be solved, had become acute. Up till July 29th the position did not look particularly discouraging. A couple of millions had been withdrawn for abroad and for internal circulation, but this still left a reserve of nearly £27,000,000, or only about a million less than at the corresponding date of 1913. In the next three days the Bank lost more than two millions by export and over eight millions for home requirements. About six and a half millions were withdrawn in notes, so that the reserve fell by some seventeen millions, and to a lower figure than had been seen for nearly a quarter of a century. That was at the close of Saturday, July 31st, when the Bank had five days' respite owing to the extended Bank holidays. On July 30th the Bank rate had been raised from three to four per cent. Late on the following day it was decided to raise it to eight per cent, and on Saturday, August 1st, still further to ten per cent. These were the three black days in the city—days of rapidly growing tension, and culminating in a state almost of demoralisation. The stagnation of business in the open discount market meant that discount houses could not dispose of their bills except at the Bank of England. The joint stock banks would not take them. On the contrary, they were in some instances pressing for the repayment of the loans which they had at call. But the effect of sending the discount houses to the Bank of England was shown in the unprecedentedly rapid rise in the item of the Bank Return headed "other securities." The growth in these securities is attributable to the purchase of bills by the Bank from holders who had no other means of raising money on them. But it involved a serious strain on the Bank, whose liabilities were thereby increased. When the Bank of England has more bills taken to it than it likes, the recognised remedy is to raise the rate of discount. But the jump to ten per cent in the Bank rate—efficacious though it might be from this point of view—meant, if the rate were to be continued at that level, the complete throttling of finance and industry. The Bank of England in times of emergency has always risen to its responsibilities. Unlike some of the joint stock institutions, it has never

deluded itself with the idea that it can protect its own interests at the expense of the country. The ten per cent rate, therefore, had to come down. The day before the Bank holidays ended it was, in fact, reduced to six per cent—a by no means prohibitive rate—and on Saturday, August 8th, to five per cent. But this could not have been done unless good use had been made of the breathing space between August 1st and August 7th. The protection afforded to the joint stock banks and discount houses by the moratorium, and the provision of an emergency paper currency, both indirectly took much pressure off the Bank of England. But the indirect psychological effect was even greater. The steps taken were unprecedented, but they were not panic measures; they created no such alarm as the suspension of specie payments would have done. The mere fact that the Bank of England was willing to continue its business on perfectly normal lines was in itself the surest guarantee of financial sanity. Even so, it is doubtful if the Bank of England would have been able to reduce its rate so rapidly had not its gold in the meantime been safeguarded from all danger of a foreign drain. The failure of foreigners to send remittances to this country meant that a huge indebtedness to this country was accumulating, and that it was only a question of time before the Bank could draw as much gold as it needed from abroad. The Table (page 60) shows how rapidly in fact the Bank did replenish its holding of gold in this way. It should be recollected, however, that not all the gold represented as having come to the Bank from abroad ever actually touched these shores. The influx includes many millions deposited in Canada and South Africa to the credit of the Bank. This was a remarkably simple and yet effective device for overcoming the practical difficulty of shipping metal.

On August 12th the scheme for enabling holders of bills of exchange covered by the moratorium to re-discount them with the Bank of England was announced. The effect of this comes out clearly in the Table. The total of other securities, which was already large, swelled out to unheard-of proportions, the maximum being reached on September 2nd, after which date the number of bills maturing at the Bank exceeded the number of bills brought in. But so far as these bills were concerned, the ultimate loss, if any, fell upon the State, and not upon the Bank.

It had naturally been hoped that the credits thus freely granted by the Bank would be employed in the ordinary course of business by those who received

them. The slight extent to which this can have been done is shown by the equally abnormal proportions of the column headed "other deposits." These deposits are composed mainly of balances of the joint stock banks deposited with the Bank of England. Some forty millions indicates that the joint stock banks have ample available credits with the Bank of England for the purposes of the money market in normal times. By the end of August they had three times that amount. The credits released by the Bank of England were thus standing practically idle, partly because trade itself had so shrunk that it was difficult to employ money in financing it and partly because the banks, or some of them, did not show any particular anxiety to make use of such opportunities as did offer.

THE STOCK EXCHANGE.

Of all financial barometers the London Stock Exchange is the most sensitive and the most easily read. But, if one had but known, it was not the London Stock Exchange which gave the first indications of the impending European storm. About a fortnight before the presentation of Austria's note to Serbia, the Bourse at Vienna was flooded with selling orders; prices tumbled heavily, and for a time the market was almost demoralised. It was known that the political relations with Serbia were the cause of the trouble, but the London market is not accustomed to take a lead from Vienna and, for whatever reason, virtually ignored

this plain hint. As between the prices fixed at the settlement of July 8th and those ruling on July 23rd, the day when Austria's note was presented, the depreciation was no greater than it had been during many of the previous accounts. But from that day until the closing of the Stock Exchange on July 31st, the day before the German ultimatum to Russia, the selling pressure was continuous, and finally overpowering. Consols lost a point on each of the last five days that the Exchange remained open. But towards the end prices were no real guide as to the real state of affairs, because dealers, finding themselves unable to take more stock on their books, and not wishing to mark prices down and against the stock which they had already taken, had come to a tacit agreement not to deal. Bargains, especially in the more speculative securities, were only executed by negotiation, and the formal closing of the Exchange did little more than register an accomplished fact.

The Stock Exchange, like the money market, suffered from its position as the leading mart of Europe. It



[Topical Press.

Depositors reading the notice announcing the Closing of the National Penny Bank.

had to cope with the sales not only of English but of foreign clients, and from this source the pressure was probably unprecedented. The suggestion has been made that it was due in part to an organised attack, but it may probably be explained by the natural concentration of orders in the market where they could be most easily executed, and the formal or practical closing, one by one, of the chief Continental centres. Many of the orders were not in fact executed, and those which came from German and Austrian firms could not be legally executed later under the terms of the Proclamation prohibiting trading with enemies. But the Stock Exchange had to meet two other difficulties. Not only were prices forced down by selling orders, but firms with big Continental connections found themselves unable to enforce payment of their debts from abroad—that is to say, payment on account of such purchases as they had made on behalf of foreigners since the previous settlement of July 8th. The other difficulty was in connection with the Stock Exchange loans from the banks. A very large amount of money is lent in this way by the banks from fortnight to fortnight at each settlement, the banks receiving as security stocks and shares to a value in excess of the loans granted. But the collapse in prices meant that in many cases the value of the securities had fallen below the value of the loans, and the uncertainty as to the course which the banks would pursue in such circumstances added considerably to the tension. Instances were reported of the banks calling in loans, but as a whole the Stock Exchange received fair treatment at the end-July settlement. The rate at which money was advanced by the banks was three to three and a quarter per cent, or only one-quarter per cent higher than it had been at the previous settlement. At the same time many individual members of the Exchange considered that they had not been treated with the generosity which should have been shown to them. Foreign banks in London are at ordinary times big lenders, but their inevitable restriction of facilities at this time cannot be considered a ground of complaint either against them or against the banks as a whole. The evidence goes to show that the banks treated the Stock Exchange with more liberality than they did the discount market.

On the last day of the settlement, July 29th, seven failures were announced, of which only one was important. That was a distinctly better conclusion than had been generally feared, and towards the end of the day things for the first time began to look brighter. But the improvement was only momentary. On the next day further failures were announced, and many more were known to be threatening. On the following day, Friday, July 31st, the Exchange was closed for an indefinite period.

The following table will give some idea of the decline which occurred during the long nineteen-day account:—

	July 8.	July 27.	Fall.
Consols 2½%	75½	72½	—3*
French 3% Rentes	82½	77½	—5
German 3%	76	73½	—2½
Russian 5% 1906	102½	98	—4½
Great Western	115½	112½	—2½
Lancashire and Yorkshire ..	81½	79½	—2
London and Brighton def. ..	84½	77½	—7½
London and North-Western ..	129	124½	—4½
South-Eastern def.	47½	36	—11½
Canadian Pacific	198½	176	—22½
Union Pacific	160½	155	—5½
Buenos Ayres and Pacific ..	65½	55½	—10
Buenos Ayres Western ...	112	106½	—5½
San Paulo	242	230	—12
Brazilian Traction	78½	65	—13

* The price of Consols is included for comparison, although the settlement in Consols takes place independently.

Between July 20th and July 30th the value of 387 representative securities selected by the *Bankers' Magazine* depreciated by £188,000,000, or over five and a half per cent, a bigger fall than is known to have occurred before in a month.


The re-opening of the Stock Exchange became during August the subject of keen discussion. The settlements had been postponed, but it was argued that dealings might soon be opened on a cash basis. If the problem of the old account could be left to time and the moratorium it was felt by some that at least a beginning could be made in this way. The difficulty, however, lay in the relations between the Exchange and the banks. So long as there were no official prices the banks could scarcely demand additional security for their loans. Unless the Allies achieved a brilliant victory in the field it was believed that prices would fall further, and the position of members be rendered still more precarious. About the middle of August a certain amount of outside dealing did in fact take place on a cash basis, but members who had themselves refused to do business, in what they considered to be the interests of the Stock Exchange, naturally did not encourage this movement. Gradually, however, things began to straighten themselves out. Outstanding bargains were slowly being completed, and the burden of indebtedness as between members themselves was being reduced by degrees. At the end of August a committee of the Exchange required members to declare in confidence the extent of their indebtedness to the banks and other institutions, and whether there was any margin still left on such loans. This step was taken in order that the exact nature of the problem to be solved might be known, and some arrangement made agreeable both to the banks and to the Exchange. On September 15th the Stock Exchange Committee fixed a list of prices for Trustee and other gilt-edged stocks, at or above which level members were to be allowed to deal for cash. Dealings below that level were prohibited. This forward step, however, did not do a great deal to promote activity. A trickle of bargains was executed day by day, but the volume of business did not enable a real market to be established. Dealings could only be effected by means of often protracted negotiation. It was, however, found that investment buying was by no means at an end, and the prices fixed by the Committee, though only a trifle below those ruling at July 30th, were not generally prohibitive.

THE NATIONAL FINANCES.

On August 6th Mr. Asquith asked for a Government credit for £100,000,000. This amount, he explained, would not be devoted entirely to military and naval purposes. The Government were given a free hand, and the money would be used for many objects, including the assistance of food supplies and trade and the relief of distress.

On August 27th the House of Commons passed the War Loan Bill. This Bill empowered the Treasury to borrow such an amount, and in such ways as they thought fit, for the purpose of meeting the supply services voted for the year. The Treasury, that is, could borrow money to meet not only the £100,000,000 credit vote, but such sums as would be needed to make up the deficiency in ordinary revenue which the war would cause.

Even if they had wished, the Government could hardly have raised a permanent loan while the Stock Exchange was closed, and they decided in the first instance to



[Topical.]

Unloading at Liverpool the first consignment of the One Million Bags of Flour given by the Canadian Government towards the Relief of Distress in Great Britain.

meet their requirements by means of temporary advances. The first indication of the method of financing the early stages of the war was contained in the Treasury Return for the week ended August 8th. This showed that the Government had borrowed £9,000,000 from the Bank of England by way of an advance on the security of Ways and Means grants. On Supply Services the amount expended for the week was over £12,000,000, an increase of over £9,000,000 as compared with the corresponding week of 1913. Further sums were raised later on Ways and Means grants, but the Government relied chiefly on the issue of Treasury Bills. Of these there were three public issues of £15,000,000 each, on August 22nd, August 29th, and September 16th. The bills had a currency of six months, except as regards £7,500,000 of the third issue, which matured in a year's time. The wisdom of the Government's policy was shown by the ease with which the money was raised. Not only were the issues in each case heavily over-subscribed, but the rate of interest which the Government had to pay has often been exceeded in times of peace. This was due in the main to the abnormally large balances held by the joint stock banks, a subject dealt with in the section on the Bank of England. On the first issue the Government had to pay at the rate of about £3 13s. per cent per annum, on the second about £3 15s. 6d., and on the third about £2 18s. 6d. for the six and about £3 8s. on the twelve months' bills. In addition, the Government placed £7,100,000 Treasury Bills privately. By September 30th, if the differences

between the years 1913 and 1914 may be taken as differences due to the war, the temporary war loans amounted to about £65,000,000 raised as to some £42,000,000 by means of Treasury Bills, and as to about £23,000,000 by means of advances on Ways and Means grants. On the other hand, the war expenditure on Supply Services amounted to about £45,000,000. These figures, however, are only a rough indication, and cannot be taken as an accurate index to the cost of the war over the period. Some of the expenditure actually incurred was only met later, and on the other hand some of what was actually spent was non-recurring, and should be regarded as capital expenditure, to be spread over the whole period of the war.

The Government's ordinary revenue held up during the first six weeks of war remarkably well. At September 12th the revenue from all ordinary sources amounted to £69,200,000, as against £71,300,000 at the corresponding date of 1913, a deficiency of little more than £2,000,000. Up till the outbreak of war the amounts for the two years had approximated very closely, so that in this case the disturbing effect of the war is more clearly marked. More than half the decline fell under the head of Estate Duties, a source of revenue which is liable at all times to great variations, and which is, therefore, the less significant. Almost all the rest was due to the falling off in stamp duty receipts, attributable to the temporary closing of the Stock Exchange. Customs receipts were actually higher and Excise receipts barely lower than in 1913.

Appendix to Chapter VI.

THE GENERAL MORATORIUM PROCLAMATION

FOR EXTENDING THE POSTPONEMENT OF PAYMENTS ALLOWED TO BE MADE BY THE PROCLAMATION OF THE 2ND AUGUST, 1914, TO CERTAIN OTHER PAYMENTS.

GEORGE R.I.

WHEREAS under the Postponement of Payments Act, 1914, His Majesty has power by Proclamation to authorise the postponement of the payment of any bill of exchange or of any negotiable instrument or of any other payment in pursuance of any contract to such extent for such time and subject to such conditions or other provisions as may be specified in the Proclamation:

And whereas it is expedient that provision should be made for the purpose of such postponement of payment in addition to the provision already made by Our Proclamation, dated the second day of August, nineteen hundred and fourteen, relating to the postponement of payment of certain bills of exchange.

NOW THEREFORE, We have thought fit, by and with the advice of Our Privy Council, to issue this Our Royal Proclamation, and We do hereby proclaim, direct, and ordain as follows:—

Save as hereinafter provided, all payments which have become due and payable before the date of this Proclamation, or which will become due and payable on any day before the beginning of the Fourth day of September, nineteen hundred and fourteen, in respect of any bill of exchange (being a cheque or bill on demand) which was drawn before the beginning of the Fourth day of August, nineteen hundred and fourteen, or in respect of any negotiable instrument (not being a bill of exchange) dated before that time, or in respect of any contract made before that time, shall be deemed to be due and payable on a day one calendar month after the day on which the payment originally became due and payable, or on the Fourth day of September, nineteen hundred and fourteen, whichever is the later date, instead of on the day on which the payment originally became due; but payments so postponed shall, if not otherwise carrying interest, and if specific demand is made for payment and payment is refused, carry interest until payment as from the Fourth day of August, nineteen hundred and fourteen, if they become due and payable before that day, and as from the date on which they become due and payable if they become due and payable on or after that day, at the Bank of England rate current on the Seventh day of August, nineteen hundred and fourteen; but nothing in this Proclamation shall prevent payments being made before the expiration of the month for which they are so postponed.

This Proclamation shall not apply to:—

- (1) any payment in respect of wages or salary;
- (2) any payment in respect of a liability which when incurred did not exceed five pounds in amount;
- (3) any payment in respect of rates or taxes;
- (4) any payment in respect of maritime freight;
- (5) any payment in respect of any debt from any person resident outside the British Islands, or from any firm, company, or institution whose principal place of business is outside the British Islands, not being a debt incurred in the British Islands by a person, firm, company or institution having a business establishment or branch business establishment in the British Islands;
- (6) any payment in respect of any dividend or interest payable in respect of any stocks, funds, or securities (other than real or heritable securities) in which trustees are, under Section One

of the Trustee Act, 1893, or any other Act for the time being in force, authorised to invest;

- (7) any liability of a bank of issue in respect of bank notes issued by that bank;
- (8) any payment to be made by or on behalf of His Majesty or any Government Department, including the payment of old age pensions;
- (9) any payment to be made by any person or society in pursuance of the National Insurance Act, 1911, or any Act amending that Act (whether in the nature of contributions, benefits, or otherwise);
- (10) any payment under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, or any Act amending the same;
- (11) any payment in respect of the withdrawal of a deposit by a depositor in a trustee savings bank;

Nothing in this Proclamation shall affect any bills of exchange to which Our Proclamation dated the Second day of August, nineteen hundred and fourteen, relating to the postponement of payment of certain bills of exchange applies.

Given at Our Court at *Buckingham Palace*, this Sixth day of August, in the year of our Lord, one thousand nine hundred and fourteen, and in the Fifth year of Our Reign.

GOD SAVE THE KING.

THE COURTS (EMERGENCY POWERS) ACT

TO GIVE, IN CONNEXION WITH THE PRESENT WAR, FURTHER POWERS TO COURTS IN RELATION TO THE REMEDIES FOR THE RECOVERY OF MONEY, AND IN RELATION TO OTHER SIMILAR MATTERS.

BE it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:—

1.—(1) From and after the passing of this Act no person shall—

- (a) proceed to execution on, or otherwise to the enforcement of, any judgment or order of any court (whether entered or made before or after the passing of this Act) for the payment or recovery of a sum of money to which this subsection applies, except after such application to such court and such notice as may be provided for by rules or directions under this Act; or
- (b) levy any distress, take, resume, or enter into possession of any property, exercise any right of re-entry, foreclose, realise any security (except by way of sale by a mortgagee in possession), forfeit any deposit, or enforce the lapse of any policy of insurance to which this subsection applies, for the purpose of enforcing the payment or recovery of any sum of money to which this subsection applies, or, in default of the payment or recovery of any such sum of money, except after such application to such court and such notice as may be provided for by rules or directions under this Act

This subsection shall not apply to any sum of money (other than rent not being rent at or exceeding fifty pounds per annum) due and payable in pursuance of a contract made after the beginning of the Fourth day of August, nineteen hundred and fourteen.

This subsection applies to life or endowment policies for an amount not exceeding twenty-five pounds, or payments equivalent thereto, the premiums in respect of which are payable at not longer than monthly

intervals, and have been paid for at least the two years preceding the Fourth day of August, nineteen hundred and fourteen.

(2) If, on any such application, the court to which the application is made is of opinion that time should be given to the person liable to make the payment on the ground that he is unable immediately to make the payment by reason of circumstances attributable, directly or indirectly, to the present war, the court may, in its absolute discretion, after considering all the circumstances of the case and the position of all the parties, by order, stay execution or defer the operation of any such remedies as aforesaid, for such time and subject to such conditions as the court thinks fit.

(3) Where a bankruptcy petition has been presented against any debtor, and the debtor proves to the satisfaction of the court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy that his inability to pay his debts is due to circumstances attributable, directly or indirectly, to the present war, the court may, in its absolute discretion, after considering all the circumstances of the case and the position of all the parties, at any time stay the proceedings under the petition for such time and subject to such conditions as the court thinks fit.

(4) This Act shall apply to all proceedings for the recovery of possession of tenements under the Small Tenements Recovery Act, 1838, as if they were in all cases proceedings for the payment or recovery of a sum of money due and payable on account of rent.

(5) The Lord Chancellor may make such rules and give such directions as he thinks fit for the purpose of giving full effect to this Act, and may, by those rules or directions, provide for any proceedings for the purposes of this Act being conducted, so far as desirable, in private and for the remission of any fees.

(6) The powers given under this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other powers of any court.

(7) Nothing in this Act shall affect any right or power of pawnbrokers to deal with pledges, or give any power to stay execution or defer the operation of any remedies of a creditor in the case of a sum of money payable by, or recoverable from, the subject of a Sovereign or State at war with His Majesty.

(8) Any stay of execution or of other proceedings, and any postponement of the operation of the remedies of a creditor, which has been granted or ordered by any court since the commencement of the present war and before the passing of this Act shall be as valid as if this Act had been in operation when the stay or postponement was granted or ordered.

2.—(1) This Act may be cited as the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act, 1914.

(2) In the application of this Act to Scotland the Court of Session shall be substituted for the Lord Chancellor; "Act of Sederunt" shall be substituted for "rules"; "a petition for sequestration" shall be substituted for "a bankruptcy petition"; "diligence" shall be substituted for "execution"; and "decree" shall be substituted for "judgment or order," and shall be deemed to include any warrant authorising diligence; "creditor in a heritable security" shall be substituted for "mortgagee"; and "proceedings in removings and ejectments in the case of subjects let at a rent not exceeding twenty-one pounds" shall be substituted for "proceedings for the recovery of possession of tenements under the Small Tenements Recovery Act, 1838."

(3) In the application of this Act to Ireland the Lord Chancellor of Ireland shall be substituted for the Lord Chancellor.

(4) His Majesty may, by Order in Council, at any time determine the operation of this Act, or provide that this Act shall have effect subject to such limitations as may be contained in the Order; but, subject to the operation of any such Order in Council, this Act shall have effect during the continuance of the present war, and for a period of six months thereafter.



The First Battle Cruiser Squadron sets out to sea.

[Gale and Polden.]

CHAPTER VII.

THE WAR AT SEA.

GERMAN NAVAL RIVALRY—THE DISPOSITIONS IN THE NORTH SEA—MINE LAYING AND THE ATTEMPT TO SEAL UP HARWICH—
THE EARLY NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS—THE ESCAPE OF THE "GOEBEN" AND THE "BRESLAU."

IT was only natural that at the first moment when it became clear that war between this country and Germany was inevitable, the coming conflict should be conceived mainly in the terms of the two navies. The passing of the German Navy Law in 1900 had meant the creation of another naval power in northern European waters, and though the German nation started for the race in naval armaments late, its enormous power of organisation and industry, and its natural capacity for warlike operations, speedily forced our own Government to the conclusion that British naval supremacy, which had been threatened by somewhat illusory menaces of French and Russian naval strength, might really be threatened by the more carefully and scientifically prepared and trained fleets of Germany.

For four years, during which the first modern German battleships were built, the challenge flung down by the first German Navy Law was disregarded by this country, but from 1904 onwards, when Lord Fisher became First Sea Lord, it was plain that English naval policy, which had for generations been directed towards maintaining a supremacy in all the seas of the globe, was concentrating itself to its task of watching and counteracting the growing strength of the new naval power on the other

side of the North Sea. Lord Fisher's policy was two-fold. It economised in respect of old and semi-obsolete ships, many of which had been kept at foreign and expensive stations, in order that it might spend the same money on the development of gunnery and material at home. This money saved on the upkeep of doubtfully useful squadrons in the Pacific, in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean, was spent on developing gunnery. It was also spent in giving a new direction to battleship construction. During the earlier and more vigorous years of Lord Fisher's administration, the Powers of the world were for the first time given a practical indication of the respective capabilities of different kinds of naval armaments in the Russo-Japanese war. From the lessons of that war, as given to the Admiralty and its constructors by the British Naval Attaché, Captain Pakenham, who was on board the Japanese Admiral's flagship, came the building of the Dreadnought, and with it the new period of battleship construction, which imposed on the navies of the world a fresh standard of values, and, by imposing it, hastened the process which Lord Fisher had begun of lopping off older, slower, less heavily armoured and less heavily armed vessels from the effective strength of the fleet.



The menace of the German Navy Law, which had been felt by the Board of Admiralty as early as 1904, and which led to these reforms of Lord Fisher, impressed itself more heavily in the succeeding years. By 1908, two years after the present Government had been in office, it had become the theme of every expert or so-called expert in naval matters. In the year 1909, when the present Home Secretary was First Lord of the Admiralty, it had led to the expedient, now famous, of the four contingent

Dreadnoughts—ships which were in addition to the main programme of the year, and were laid down later in order to meet an acceleration in construction, partly real and partly fancied, on the part of the German Naval authorities. By the end of that year, it had become a commonplace in the English naval policy that Germany—and not that theoretical and more impalpable entity, the two-power standard—was the scale by which we must measure the margin of safety in our naval strength. From that time onward our building

has been consistently directed to the necessity of increasing the lead which we possessed over the German naval programmes. This policy of preparation for the possible future conflict with the German navy took a further step in the administration of Mr. Churchill, when he became First Lord of the Admiralty. Under Mr. Churchill, the Board of Admiralty, which had been previously engrossed in the work of construction and accumulating

material, took what was the next great step, after the reforms of Lord Fisher, in the direction of organisation for war. Out of the Intelligence Department of the Board of Admiralty, by a process of combination and expansion, there was created a Naval War Staff. At the same time the organisation of the fleets at sea was altered, and, in place of the older system of Home and Channel and Atlantic Fleets, there was introduced a new system, modelled, avowedly or not, on the German


High Seas Fleet, by which all the forces in Home waters were grouped together in homogeneous squadrons, with their attendant cruiser, destroyer, and submarine divisions, and arranged on the basis of instant preparation for war. That organisation laid down, so far as the first fleet was concerned, in 1911, was fortunately practically completed in the summer of the present year. That is to say, of the four squadrons of which that fleet was composed, three were exclusively composed of Dreadnoughts, one of the latest and

best pre-Dreadnought battleships, the Fleet flagship, being itself the latest Dreadnought to be in commission. Mr. Churchill's scheme of organisation also implied powerful and numerous torpedo and destroyer flotillas, attached to the first fleet, and a great scheme of destroyer and coastal defence, under the Admiral of Patrols, in relation to which was the Naval Air Service, with its sea-plane stations around the coast. By the



Fitting up an Electric Contact Mine.

Record Press.



How a Torpedo enters the water after being fired from its tube.

[G West & Son, Southsea.]

earlier part of the summer of 1914, the destroyer flotillas and the first fleet had been reinforced by powerful new vessels of the 1912 programme, while the Air Service had reached a pitch of organisation unparalleled by any other country in Europe. The naval situation was therefore favourable, so far as this country was concerned.

A FORTUNATE TEST MOBILISATION.

A further and purely accidental circumstance increased our readiness for a naval campaign. Early in the year it had been decided that, owing to the definiteness and completeness of the lessons taught by the grand manœuvres last year, there should be no repetition of these exercises this year, and in their place it was decided to hold a test mobilisation of the second and third fleets, forming the reserve lines of defence behind our battle and cruiser squadrons. The second fleet, which was kept in what was called "active" commission, needed only drafts from the Royal Naval Barracks to bring it to its war complement. The third fleet, which contained our oldest battleships and cruisers, were manned on what was called "reserve" commission, by skeleton crews; and in order to bring them to full strength, the mobilisation of the Royal Naval Reserve, the Royal Naval Volunteers, and various classes of boys from training establishments was necessary. By a piece of good fortune, to which we owe, if not any great military advantage, at any rate the absence of fuss which characterised our naval preparations for this great struggle, this test mobilisation took place only a fortnight before the declaration of war. At the end of the short period of training which followed the mobilisation, the first fleet was concentrated at Portland, and was about to give manœuvre leave to its crews. The second and third fleets had dispersed to their usual bases, but the second fleet had not yet sent

back its war complement to the Naval Barracks. On the threat of war it was, therefore, only necessary to stop the manœuvre leave, to retain the ratings from barracks on board, and to call up again to their ships those reservists who had only newly gone home, and with whom, therefore, the Admiralty was immediately and easily in touch. War was declared on August 4th, which was a Tuesday. On the Wednesday before, as a measure of precaution, the whole of the first fleet, fully coaled and provided with stores and munitions of war, had put to sea. On the Sunday, between that time and

the declaration of war, the reservists were called up again by an order for full mobilisation. At midnight, therefore, on the 4th of August, when the Government ultimatum to Germany expired, the first fleet was at its war strength, the patrol flotillas were ready, and the second and third fleets were fully manned.

In his first speech on the Naval Estimates of 1912 Mr. Churchill laid down the doctrine that the British navy, at its average moment, must be in a position to meet the German navy at its selected moment. Owing to the fortunate circumstance by which the test mobilisation immediately preceded the international crisis, the British navy was at the commencement of the war, so far as its organisation was concerned, at what may be described as its selected moment. On the other hand, from the point of view of shipbuilding, and having regard to



[Gale and Polden.

The Stokehold of a Battleship.

the programmes on hand in both countries, the German navy was at its selected moment also; that is to say, the numerical superiority of the British navy at the moment of the declaration of war was less than it had been six months before, and considerably less than it would have been six months later. By reason of working overtime, by the purchase of the two completed Turkish battleships—both of them of the Dreadnought type—and by the purchase of the two powerful vessels of the destroyer type belonging to Chili, the Admiralty could

look to an earlier attainment of the full numerical superiority, foreshadowed in the Ministerial declaration earlier in the autumn, than would have been possible under peace conditions. Great Britain began, therefore, this, her greatest naval campaign since the year of Trafalgar, under favourable auspices.

A word is here in place on the commands in the fleet. For the three years previous to the declaration of war the Home fleets had been commanded by Sir George Callaghan—a very distinguished officer, to whose energy in training and gift for inspiring the officers and men under his command the highly efficient condition of our battle and cruiser squadrons must largely be ascribed. Admiral Callaghan would, in the normal course, have hauled down his flag in December, and Sir John Jellicoe had already been announced as his successor. It was therefore natural (especially having regard to the fact that the latter was ten years younger) that the transfer of command should be antedated to take place at the declaration of war. Nothing but sheer necessity could excuse the transference of the direction of a great fleet in the middle of a campaign. Sir George Callaghan went to the War Staff

at the Admiralty, where his experience and sagacity cannot have failed to be of the utmost value, and Sir John Jellicoe went to sea. This admiral, who had for some years been recognised by both our own and foreign navies as the "hope of the British navy," combined in a remarkable degree the two great qualities of the British seamen of the past. A born fighter and adventurer, who had fought hand to hand in Egypt and

China (where he was severely wounded), and had survived the wreck of the *Victoria*, he was also a technical expert in two supreme and important branches of the art of war at sea. In the revival, or rather the introduction, of the study of scientific gunnery he had taken a leading part, and he was Master of Ordnance under Lord Fisher's régime at the Admiralty. As an admiral afloat, under Sir Arthur Wilson, he had co-operated with that officer in the elaboration of those new conceptions on which the strategy and tactics of the British navy are now based. His pre-eminence on this side of naval science was, as has been said, recognised as cordially in the German navy as in our own. Under him were a number of distinguished men—all of them, following the practice of the present trend of Admiralty, much younger than the flag officers of earlier years. The oldest of them—Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble, was fifty-seven; the youngest, Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, no more than forty-three, and though, with the exception perhaps of Sir John Jellicoe himself, none of them was known to the public, it would have been hard to collect from the Navy List a body of commanders more trusted and believed in by the fleet.

THE DISPOSITION OF THE FLEET.

When the first fleet, which is the main line of our naval forces, put to sea on the Wednesday before the declaration of war, it went immediately to the place allotted to it in a scheme long matured in the counsels of the Admiralty. Roughly speaking, it based itself on two Scottish ports, which in the last few years have acquired an increasing importance in our naval dispositions. From these bases it commanded the egress from the North Sea to the Atlantic, and it lay in a situation favourable for its main purpose, which was, of course, to engage the German battle squadrons, if and when they chose to risk an engagement. Between it and the German coast lay first, and nearest to England, the cruiser squadrons; secondly, spread out possibly in some fan-like formation the destroyer flotillas attached to the first fleet; and last, and nearest the German coasts, the latest and best of our submarines. The last two divisions—destroyers and submarines—were based on Harwich, and it was the knowledge of this fact which dictated the earlier German naval operations. The first and second fleets—known since as the "Grand Fleet"—

were under the command of Sir John Jellicoe, who hoisted his flag as the fleet left Portland. The third fleet, and the patrol flotillas which protected in an inner line the Straits of Dover and the approaches to the Thames and the Medway, were under the direct control of the Admiralty.

The first action was not long in coming. As has been said, the German War Staff knew well that the destroyer and sub-

marine flotillas, which were the eyes of the main fleet, and which lay as a protecting line between it and the German coasts, were based on Harwich. They knew that neither of these classes of vessel was able to keep the sea continuously, but must go back in relays to their base for fuel, and the making good of minor mishaps or defects. If they could, therefore, seal the port of Harwich, they would by that fact largely clear the North Sea of the most advanced British patrols, and force them either to work from a base more remote, and therefore unsuitable for these particular types of ship, or so frighten them by losses from contact mines as to keep them in port altogether.

EARLY ENGAGEMENTS.

Either before or immediately after the declaration of war, the Hamburg-America liner *Königin Luise*, taken over by the German navy, and disguised as a Great Eastern Railway Steamer Harwich-Rotterdam packet boat (a ruse which sufficiently indicated its contemplated area of operations), left a German port. Early next morning she was discovered by one of the vessels of the third destroyer flotilla, operating from Harwich, laying mines




[Cribb, Southsea.]

An important part of a modern battleship: The Operating Theatre.



Clearing the deck for action.

[Gale and Polden.]



Inside the Barbette of a Battleship showing the opened breech of a 13'5 inch gun.

[Gale and Polden.]

in the latitude of Aldeborough Head. She was immediately brought to action, and after a running fight, which lasted a considerable time, heeled over and sank. Among the prisoners of war rescued was her captain; he died shortly after capture, and it was said that on his body amongst his papers was found a plan of the mine field which it was his duty to lay down. Whether that be so or not, though there is no reason to doubt that the area was subsequently accurately determined, first blood was drawn quickly. When the third flotilla was returning to Harwich, steaming in line after the action, the destroyer leader, H.M.S. *Amphion*, struck one of the double-chained mines laid down by the sunken enemy, and foundered quickly. Many of her crew, and many prisoners from the *Königin Luise* (amounting in all to 131 men) were killed as a result of the explosion, which ignited the forward magazine; the rest were for the most part saved by the destroyers' boats. No further attempts at mine laying have, so far as has been ascertained, been made by large vessels. The field was subsequently extended by the surreptitious activities of German trawlers, possibly in some cases disguised as Dutch, or even English, vessels. A somewhat remarkable raid made by a German cruiser and destroyer division on the Dogger Bank, which resulted in the capture of many Grimsby trawlers, may be ascribed to the necessity of acquiring more vessels to do work of this kind. This German mine field cannot be said to have been specially successful. In so far as it was designed for a military purpose, viz., the blocking


of Harwich, it failed absolutely, and in the subsequent Heligoland action the Harwich flotillas bore the main brunt of the fighting. It caused one or two casualties in the mine-sweeping squadron, one or two disasters to non-combatants (though the number of these first reported must be reduced, one disaster having been reported separately from several sources as if several ships were involved), and it accounted, besides the *Amphion*, for one ship of war, H.M.S. *Speedy*, an obsolescent gunboat. H.M.S. *Pathfinder*, which perished later off the coast of Berwick, was not sunk by a mine.

Only one other naval incident, though that was one of considerable importance, occurred in the North Sea in the first weeks of the war. On August 9th, the light cruiser *Birmingham* was reported to have sunk the German submarine *U15*. No part of the locality in which this action occurred was given at the time, and none has been given since. There is, however, reason to believe that the highly circumstantial account given at the time of the method by which the German vessel was sunk was erroneous, and that she was actually rammed by the cruiser in question. Her loss was admitted by the Germans, and she was described as missing—a term

which would perhaps hardly be applied to a vessel lost in a case where there had been gunfire. German accounts published since have described the location of the cruiser squadrons by the enemy's submarine division. Whether any torpedoes were fired on this occasion or not, at any rate no damage was done. The enemy was in all probability using his submarines, as the success of the Heligoland action proved that we had used ours, for the purpose of reconnaissance rather than of attack. While the *U15* and her consorts were exploring British waters in the effort to locate our main squadrons, our own adventurous crews were lurking in the channels of the Ems and the Elbe, and patrolling the North Sea mouth of the Kiel Canal. It may well be that just as an aeroplane may be better employed watching than bomb-dropping, a submarine may do better than disclose its position by discharging a torpedo.

These were the only naval actions or incidents until the Heligoland action of August 28th. They were, however, supplemented in popular rumour by highly-coloured reports of terrific naval battles, in which whole fleets

were engaged, and in which battleships were sunk in great numbers. Occasionally these rumours got into the press; for the most part they passed from mouth to mouth, growing more circumstantial as they went. One passed round London, and was repeated even by people in Government employ as coming from persons connected with the Board of Admiralty. Others were industriously circulated in East Coast seaport towns. In the case



[Gale and Polden.

The Guns of a Battleship on broadside.

of some it is probably not too fantastic to ascribe them, like some of the earlier reports of sanguinary engagements on land, to the activity of secret agents of the enemy. In the case of others, they proceeded from the natural human desire to elevate what was considered a probability to the dignity of a fact. So much that was highly-coloured and irresponsible had been written and said for years past about "the day," that the German fleet appeared in the minds of many to be merely waiting for the signal of a declaration of war to sally forth and engage at considerable odds with our own forces. In fact, we know the German fleet, following a plan recommended by some of their own writers on strategy, had made up its mind to risk no action until a series of submarine attacks had diminished our superiority in battleships and cruisers, or until the advantage of fog enabled it to make a successful destroyer raid. The Heligoland action greatly impaired the chances of any successful enterprise in this direction.

Outside the North Sea, there were, at the beginning of the war, only two German vessels in European waters. At the time when the Powers had undertaken joint naval action on the coast of Albania, the German Government



Coaling a Battleship.

[Gale and Polden.]


decided to have itself represented by the battle cruiser *Goeben*, a fast and powerful vessel, mounting ten eleven-inch guns, and by the fast light cruiser *Breslau*, which was an armoured cruiser, roughly corresponding to our own town class. These vessels remained in the Mediterranean all through the spring and summer of this year, and they had visited Malta only a few days before the declaration of war. On August 4th, when war between France and Germany had been already declared, and when the English ultimatum was already in the hands of the German Government, they appeared off the Algerian ports Bona and Phillipville, and, in a couple of short bombardments, sunk or damaged one or two merchant vessels lying in the harbour. These two bombardments were the last pieces of damage inflicted by these two powerful ships, and it was obvious, even at this early date, that the captain of the *Goeben*, who presumably directed the operations of both, had made up his mind to avoid an action. The task of forcing him to one lay upon the French and British Admirals, whose forces, not yet combined, were ready for war at their respective bases. It was obviously a matter of some perplexity to the Allied Admirals to make up their minds exactly how the German vessels would proceed. Provided they were fully coaled, they might have hung about the Algerian coast on the chance of impeding the transport of French troops to Marseilles, or they might have attempted to slip through

the Straits of Gibraltar and join the five light German cruisers operating in the Atlantic.

In this case, of course, the coal difficulty would have been more serious, but, as subsequent events have proved, there was probably a sufficiently well-organised coal system of German ships to have made such a dash possible. They had, however, another alternative. The probability that troops would be despatched both from Egypt and India to the seat of war in Western Europe must have been already present to the German Government. It was possible that the *Goeben*, with its powerful guns, might have damaged the entrance to the Canal at Port Said. In any case, the bombardment of Alexandria would have been worth attempting, if only for the influence on Egyptian public opinion. These two possible modes of offensive action might have helped to direct these German vessels eastward. It was also possible that at one time they might have thought of forming a junction with the Austrian fleet, a manoeuvre which would have caused considerable diplomatic difficulty, as Great Britain, which was by that time at war with Germany, was still at peace with Austria. Nor had there been a formal declaration of war between France and Austria. Finally, it is possible that the course of action, which was in fact adopted, of running to the Dardanelles, and there transferring the vessels to the Turkish Government, had been pre-arranged from the beginning. We are, however,

inclined to believe that this transference to Turkey was not part of the original German scheme, and was probably communicated to the captain of the *Goeben* when he was coaling at Messina, or by wireless at sea. Be that as it may, after bombarding the two Algerian seaports, the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* turned eastward, pursued apparently both by the French and British fleets. In the race the Germans had the advantage of speed, for the *Goeben* was a clear two knots faster than the speediest of the British battle cruisers, and probably five knots faster than the best of the French. The *Breslau* was not quite so fast as the *Goeben*, but its speed was at least equal to that of the *Indefatigable*, which was the fastest British ship. Though the Germans had the advantage in pace they were hopelessly outnumbered. The Mediterranean squadrons of the French navy had its whole effective strength, and against one battle cruiser and one light cruiser the British Admiral had at his disposal three battle cruisers, mounting eight twelve-inch guns each, four heavily-armed armoured cruisers of a recent type, and two light cruisers, besides torpedo boats and destroyers. With this combined force at its heels, the German squadron put into Messina to coal. There the officers were reported to have left their wills with the German Consul, and there no doubt they received their last instructions from the German Government. By the time they were ready to leave, it may be assumed that both the British and French squadrons were outside, the French to the north, and the British to the south of the Straits. Unless they wanted to attempt a bombardment of the coast of Corsica, or of Marseilles,

there was of course no likelihood of the Germans going out of the northern end of the Straits; and no doubt it was the anticipation, amounting almost to certainty, that they would go out at the other end which induced the British Admiral to make his disposition. His vessels were faster than the French, and therefore had the better chance of keeping up in a running action. The two vessels left the Straits with their bands playing, and other appearances of going out, like the Russian cruisers at Chemulpo, to fight to the death. A day later it was known in England that they had succeeded in getting away altogether, and four days later it was announced that they had entered the Dardanelles, and that the two vessels had been sold to the Turkish Government. The somewhat remarkable circumstances under which these two vessels succeeded in evading being brought into action are still the subject of enquiry at the Admiralty, and it would therefore be improper to comment upon them. Though no official account of the fact has ever been published, it does seem established that, while they were running by the northern coast of Crete, they exchanged shots with the *Gloucester*, one of the British light cruisers. The *Gloucester* could not of course possibly hope to do more than make a demonstration, which might induce the *Goeben* to turn aside, and then fight a delaying action until the British battle cruisers had come up. It is satisfactory that a well-attested report described both vessels as apparently damaged when they entered Turkish waters. With their transfer to the Turkish Government, German naval power disappeared from the Mediterranean.



The route of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*.



The Great Recruiting Meeting at the London Guildhall.

[*Topical Press.*

CHAPTER VIII.

LORD KITCHENER'S POLICY.

THE ARMY OF OUR POLICY—LORD KITCHENER'S TASK—THE TRANSPORT OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE—
THE MAKING OF A NEW ARMY.

THE position of the new Secretary for War was not an enviable one. He had to lay down the military policy which should carry this country through a Continental war. No adequate military provision had been made by Parliament for the contingencies that had now arisen, and for the simple reason that the idea of our ever being involved in such a war was the last thing to which the Government had encouraged Parliament or the country to give its attention. Even the fact that military discussions had taken place between French and English representatives had been kept a profound secret, and for years Parliament had debated the Army Estimates as though there had been no change in our military responsibilities other than the development of the Territorials from the old Volunteers. The strength of our diplomacy in that it reserved our decision to the last possible moment made the weakness of our military position. It may have been convenient for the Government to shirk the real issues of policy that were shaping themselves under the surface, but it was certainly not convenient to the army. There are few, looking back now on our military policy during the last six or seven years, who would say that it was in that close touch with our foreign policy which is so desirable in the national welfare and so necessary for the successful conduct of a war. Our existing military organisation was as unprepared for the great struggle that was now upon us as it was for the struggle in South Africa. The war had not been going long before we were discovered at the old game, at once inspiring and sad, of extemporising an army large enough for the tremendous military responsibilities which began to unfold themselves.

The causes of our unpreparedness were, however, radically different in the two cases. In South Africa there was a fundamental misunderstanding of the political conditions and of the peculiar local military problems presented. But there was no room for such surprises as we had in South Africa in the European war which had now begun. No one ever imagined that it would be anything but a life and death struggle, calling for every ounce of energy that the country could command. The main cause of unpreparedness was the reluctance of the Government to agree that our membership of the Triple Entente made such changes in our political relationship to Europe as should have been reflected in our military organisation.

Rarely have the military responsibilities of an army been so rapidly and widely extended as were those of the British army within the last thirty years. The Report of the South African War Commission quoted a Memorandum drafted by Mr. Stanhope, the Conservative War


Secretary in 1888, defining the objects of our military organisation. They were thus set forth:—

- (a) The effective support of the Civil power in all parts of the United Kingdom.
- (b) To find the number of men for India which has been fixed by arrangement with the Government of India.
- (c) To find the garrisons for all our fortresses and coaling stations, at home and abroad, according to a scale now laid down, and to maintain these garrisons at all times at a strength fixed for a peace or war footing.
- (d) After providing for these requirements, to be able to mobilise rapidly for home defence two army corps of regular troops and one partly composed of regulars and partly of militia; and to organise the auxiliary forces, not allotted to army corps or garrisons, for the defence of London, and for the defensible positions in advance, and for the defence of the mercantile ports.
- (e) Subject to the foregoing considerations, and to their financial obligations, to aim at being able, in case of necessity, to send abroad two complete army corps, with cavalry division and line of communication. But it will be distinctly understood that the probability of the employment of an army corps in the field in any European war is sufficiently improbable to make it the primary duty of the military authorities to organise our forces efficiently for the defence of this country.

Thirty years ago it was believed that the largest force that would need to be embarked from our shores for service in a foreign war was two army corps and a cavalry division, say ninety thousand men, and on that supposition our military organisation was based. That was the theory which still held at the beginning of the South African War, in the course of which we embarked from England some three hundred and eighty thousand men. Great as that disproportion was, it was soon to be exceeded in the war with Germany. It had hardly begun before it was found necessary to ask for a million men over and above the regular forces of the Crown. The provision of these enormous forces was the task of the new Secretary for War, Lord Kitchener.

THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

A great deal of very valuable work had been done by Lord Haldane, as Secretary for War, in organising an army immediately ready to take the field. The nominal



London Territorials encamped in the quadrangle at Somerset House.

[Topical Press.]



Recruits waiting outside the Central London Recruiting Depot.

[Topical Press.]

strength of this Expeditionary Force, as it was called, was about 150,000 men of all arms. Thanks, next to the fleet, to the organising skill of Lord Haldane, this country was able, within a fortnight of the declaration of war, to put on the Continent of Europe four divisions of infantry, a cavalry division, lines of communication troops, with artillery, and an exceptionally strong equipment of the technical services—perhaps 100,000 men in all. We mobilised these troops, moved them down to the port of departure, embarked them, disembarked them, and moved them up to the frontier of France in about the same time as it took France to mobilise and move her army—enormously larger, it is true—by railway alone. It was a great triumph of organisation. And it was made the more remarkable by its absolute silence. From the moment that the Expeditionary Force broke up its camp to the landing of a couple of army corps in France a fortnight later, not a single printed word appeared in the public press about the movements of this army. Whether this silence kept the enemy in ignorance of the transport of our troops is very doubtful indeed. Photographs of the landing of the troops appeared at the time in more than one French newspaper, and a Swiss newspaper of August 9th announced on official authority from Paris that twenty thousand British troops had already by that time disembarked at Calais, Ostend, and Dunkirk. Two months later, a German Army Order, dated 20th August, was made public in this country, in which occur the words: "It is reported that an English army has disembarked at Calais and Boulogne, *en route* for Brussels," and the inference has been drawn that the Germans never knew that we had been landing troops for nearly a fortnight by then. If they did not, their Intelligence Department must have been sadly at fault, for although the English newspapers did their best to keep the secret, other papers did not, either in France or in neutral countries. But how, it may be asked, comes it, if the Germans were not certain on August 20th that the British had landed, that on the day previous, August 19th, the Kaiser issued his celebrated order about "French's contemptible little army"?

Yet, although it is in the highest degree improbable that the Germans did not know that we were transporting troops, the secrecy may have been useful in keeping from them the times of departure and the ports. Undoubtedly, the transport of troops across the sea with the enemy's fleet still intact is an operation of very grave risk. A mass of transports and warships is the most vulnerable thing in war. The enemy's fleet need not win a victory in order to do great damage. It is sufficient to throw the

line into confusion, and open up the way to torpedo attack. It is impossible to keep a blockade so strict and close that nothing can come out, and yet, so far as we know, not a single attempt was made by the German fleet to interfere with the transport of the army. It showed either extraordinary ignorance of what was happening, or an extraordinary lack of enterprise. In the war between Russia and Japan, a rumour reached Tokio that the Russian fleet had escaped from Port Arthur in a snow-storm, and the transport of Japanese troops was stopped for ten weeks in consequence. In the American war with Spain, too, the bare suspicion that a few Spanish cruisers were at sea was sufficient to stop the whole work of transportation from Key West to Santiago until it could be verified. If the German fleet had come out it could not have won a battle, and it would have lost ships, but it would almost certainly have sunk transports. But it refused to risk even a single ship in that enterprise.

But even if there had been no German fleet, the transport of so large an army in so short a time would still have been a remarkable achievement. For every three combatants in an army there are at least two non-combatants, so that the numbers transported in the first fortnight must have been nearer one hundred and fifty thousand than one hundred thousand men. Perhaps the best measure of the achievement is the comparison with what was done in the Boer war. The transport service in that war was generally regarded as the one green oasis in a desert of mismanagement. It took us three months to despatch from England a force consisting of fifty thousand and eighty combatants, four thousand and sixty-five horses, sixty-three guns, and six hundred and three vehicles. In half as

many weeks as it then took months, a force of twice the size was transported across the sea almost under the eyes, if it had come out and used them, of the enemy's fleet.

THE NEW ARMY.

But the Expeditionary Force was only a small fraction of the men required for prosecuting the war. On August 6th, two days after the declaration of war, Parliament sanctioned a motion for the addition of five hundred thousand men to the Regular Army. Of this half million men, enlisted for three years or for the period of the war, whichever should be the shorter term, all but sixty thousand were raised within a month. At the end of that month, on September 11th, an addition of another five hundred thousand men was sanctioned by Parliament. These million men, however, would none of them be fit for war on the Continent until spring. The immediate



[Record Press.]

General Smith-Dorrien and his Staff.



[News Illustrations, Record Press, and Topical Press.]

TRAINING THE NEW ARMY MEN.

Sighting Tests.

Cavalry Sword Drill.

Teaching Recruits the use of the Bayonet.

difficulty was to raise men capable of taking part at once in the war, of reinforcing the Expeditionary Force, and of making good the wastage of a hard-fought campaign. It was here that the resourcefulness of the new Secretary showed itself. "The Empires with whom we are at war," he said on August 25th, "have called to the colours almost the entire male population. The principle we on our part shall observe is this: that while their maximum force undergoes a constant diminution, the reinforcements we prepare shall steadily and increasingly flow out until we have an army in the field which in numbers, not less than in quality, will be not unworthy of the power and responsibilities of the British Empire."


Accordingly, he set about while the new army of a million was being trained, trying to use to the best possible advantage every man who had any degree of military training. The effective strength at the outbreak of war of the Regular Army at home, with the Reserve and the Special Reserve, amounted to perhaps three hundred thousand men of all arms. Of this strength the Expeditionary Force took half; the remaining half was required to keep up the force abroad to its original strength, and to serve as a home defence force until such time as the Territorials were sufficiently trained to act alone as a field force. If there was to be any question of increasing the strength of the Expeditionary Force from the Home army, and releasing every Regular at home as soon as he was trained, it was necessary to maintain a steady flow of recruits into the army. Lord

Kitchener accordingly asked for one hundred thousand men for the Regular Army, independently of the million men recruited on special terms.

Locked up in garrison work in the colonies, there were about forty thousand Regular troops. Some of these could not be moved. But in South Africa the Imperial garrison, although it had been steadily reduced since the Boer war, still consisted of four and a half battalions of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and five batteries of artillery. In Gibraltar, again, there were nearly four thousand men of all arms, in Malta between seven thousand and eight thousand, and in Egypt more than six thousand men. The whole of these garrisons were released, thus adding well over twenty thousand men for service on the Continent. In addition, as we shall see, he obtained seventy thousand troops from India. By these means he secured an early enforcement of one hundred thousand men, all highly trained professional soldiers, while the Regular army at home was kept up at a strength not only sufficient to repair the wastage of war, but also from time to time to provide fresh brigades, as the men matured in training.

The effectives of the Territorial Forces numbered at the outbreak of the war about two hundred and fifty thousand. They were not sufficiently trained to put into the field on the Continent, but were quite equal to garrison work. Lord Kitchener's great difficulty was that as no Territorial could be sent abroad unless he volunteered, he could make no immediate use of them until he knew how many were prepared to go abroad. That meant dividing the force into two parts, those who were willing to be used abroad, and those who were not. Lord Kitchener was very careful to point out that the decision to stay at home was no reflection on a Territorial's zeal, and that the duties of home defence were quite as important as foreign service. On the other hand, Territorial commanding officers very naturally did not want their battalions broken up, and a great deal of moral compulsion was, almost unavoidably, applied to induce battalions to volunteer as units for foreign service. Nearly a hundred did so. The best of them were used at once to replace the garrisons that had been withdrawn from

Egypt and the Mediterranean; the remainder remained at home under training for foreign service, for which it was reasonable to expect that they would be fit early in the New Year. By all these means, Lord Kitchener saw a prospect not only of maintaining our original Expeditionary Force up to its original strength, but of doubling, and perhaps even trebling its numbers, until such time as the million men specially enlisted were fully trained.




[L.N.A.]

Drilling Recruits on the roof of Somerset House, London.

THE RECRUITING OF THE NEW ARMY.

In the first days after war was declared, and before any announcement of the scheme for raising the new army had been made, the great rush to the recruiting stations began. In the published figures of enlistment it appeared as a stream only gradually gathering force, and at first but slowly, and in the early days there were inevitably those who complained, with how little justice was very soon to appear, that the voluntary system was breaking down. In reality, the first line of recruits was already there, clamorous to be accepted; it was only the recruiting offices, organised on a peace basis, and not yet adapted to the change of war, which had temporarily broken down. How quick was the country's response to the call for recruits, within the limits of Lord Kitchener's scheme, may best be seen in the fact of six hundred thousand men raised within the first two months—a period which would certainly have been much shorter had the system of examining and passing the new soldiers been able to keep pace with the recruiting zeal of the country. The instructions for raising the new army—



[London News Agency—Newspaper Illustrations.]
THE LANDING OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN BOULOGNE.

enlisted for the period of the war—had been accompanied, as is the usual course with an increased demand for men, by a relaxation of the more formal physical standards; the minima of height and chest measurement were slightly reduced, and the change was soon followed by an instruction to the doctors, still more important, that the dental test should be no more than reasonably severe; so that no set of teeth capable of keeping a man in good general health should exclude him from the service. These changes were reasonable enough, and meant no real sacrifice of efficiency, but before the two months ran out the old peace standards for height and chest were more than restored. The new regulation came suddenly, and as a great check to the progress of recruiting, with no other explanation than the obvious one. The War Office was quite satisfied with the type of men it had hitherto been taking, but the regimental depôts from which the new battalions were being organised were now overcrowded with the new recruits. It had already been found necessary for a great many men, in all parts of the country, to be posted immediately on enlistment to the Reserve, and in the interests of sound organisation the flow of recruits had for the moment to be checked.

Before the adjournment of Parliament the political parties had offered their machinery to assist in the encouragement of recruiting, and a general "campaign" of recruiting meetings opened on September 4th, with the speeches of the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition at the Guildhall. Mr. Asquith addressed meetings also at Edinburgh, and at Dublin and Cardiff, where he announced the War Office's intention of forming new Irish and Welsh Army Corps. In the meantime, news from the front—news especially of the gallant behaviour of the British forces in the retreat from Mons—spurred on recruiting more effectively than could any such campaign. In home organisation it was a matter of greater moment when, on September 17th, Mr. Asquith announced a substantial increase in the separation allowance for soldiers' dependants. Apart from the early difficulties of soldiers' wives in establishing their individual claims to the allowance—difficulties merely of delay, but of delay which brought many of them on to the Relief Fund, and some even to the Poor Law—the old scale, going as it did no higher than seventeen shillings and sixpence for a wife with four children, was clearly inadequate, and, in raising it, the Government, though it still kept the maximum allowance at no more than twenty-two shillings and sixpence, did a great deal to remove the immediate economic obstacle to enlistment which stood in the way of many of the best of its potential recruits.

Already, all over the country, a great deal had been done by private employers to assist recruits with similar allowances; many of the great limited companies had come into line with offers of the same kind—"half wages for your wife and your job kept open"—as well as various trade organisations; and while such treatment was not universal, it is safe to say that perhaps a majority of the wage-earners who enlisted

in the new army were able to leave their homes in reasonable security. In the result it was seen that, in war time, a voluntary British army could be as representative of the community as a whole, from the coal mine to the Stock Exchange, and from warehouse to university, as any force based on compulsory and universal service. It was characteristic of the spirit of the new recruiting that, in addition to the "K" battalions which "Kitchener's Army" supplied to the regular regimental depôts, a great number of quite special forces should come into being, each representing in a new, warlike aspect some separate part of the everyday, peaceful organisation of the community; each an expression of something more than individual patriotism. To enumerate them all would be impossible, for new corps of the most varied character and strength sprang up all over the country within those first two months. Partly they were due to the desire of some special class of men to act as a class, and partly to a natural prejudice of individuals to be associated in the new service with men of their own occupation or training, or social stamp. Of these new forces, the more privileged, such as the "City" battalions in Liverpool and Manchester, and a few other large towns, or the Public Schools' Brigade, were recognised from the first by the War Office. Semi-public arrangements were in some cases made for their equipment, and, as separate units, they were rapidly recruited and sent into training. In Ireland special plans were made for taking over the men of the Ulster and National Volunteers in connection with the New Army Corps. Others of the new forces held a more ambiguous position. Many "battalions" were enrolled by private committees—local Scottish forces, potential artillerymen, and trained engineers—with a view to more definite and authoritative organisation, if enough men should be raised to form a unit acceptable by the War Office, and as a general rule such men would be drafted as companies to one or other of the regular branches of the service. Other forces again were formed, still more informally, with the idea of training for local defence.

In spite of the rapidity with which the first divisions of the new army were recruited, plans were at once proceeded with for their preliminary training in the few months left before the beginning of winter. Large camps were prepared in various parts of the country, and plans made for the erection of a great number of wooden huts at Aldershot, on Salisbury Plain, and elsewhere, for winter quarters. As for the training itself, the greatest difficulty was the shortage of officers, and, for preliminary training, particularly of the non-commissioned ranks. Special inducements, however, in the way of combined pay and pension were offered to ex-non-commissioned officers, with the promise of their old rank, and a large number rejoined. A good number of the older men who did not wish to rejoin on service conditions were engaged as drill instructors, and by such expedients it was found possible to move the new recruits into training with great rapidity, and make room in the depôts for the men still to be enlisted.



Canadian Artillery laying a 4.5 inch gun.

[Central News.]



The Canadian Expeditionary Force leaves Quebec: The Transport and Field Artillery being loaded on board the Transport Ship.

[Topical Press.]

CHAPTER IX.

THE RESPONSE OF THE EMPIRE.

EMPIRE AND LIBERTY—INDIA'S LOYALTY—CANADA'S GIFTS IN MEN, MONEY, AND KIND—SOUTH AFRICA'S ATTITUDE—
THE FRUIT OF THE AUSTRALASIAN DEFENCE SCHEMES.

IT was among the confident expectations of the Prussian war party that in its day of trial the British Empire would be found fatally to lack coherence. India, so General Bernhardt assured his public, waited only for Great Britain's peril to break into a revolt, born of a growing discontent. The Boers would disrupt South African union at the bidding of an ancient hatred, which the grant of self-government had failed to allay. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, ardent with a spirit of nationality which could find expression—according to Prussian ideas—only in disaffection, would either hold back or respond reluctantly and feebly to the need of the Mother Country. In the first few days after the declaration of war it became clear to the world that the psychology of Bismarckian Imperialism was to suffer a rude shock; that the hope of apathy and disunion throughout the British Empire, with which the military party in Germany had comforted themselves, had no foundation. The German advance had hardly come to grips with Liège when from all corners of the British Dominions there set in a thrilling and heartening stream of offers of men, of money, of foodstuffs, and of service of all kinds, such as has no precedent in history. The widely-scattered, widely-different peoples of the Empire—British, French, Dutch, Indian, Maori—vied in their eagerness to help. From quarters to which Germany had looked most hopefully for indifference came the readiest and most heartfelt responses. In all history there has been no such refutation of those conceptions of Empire that would base union on force or material advantage alone, and no such vindication of the English ideal of Empire that draws its inspiration from liberty, and works through wise sympathy with the desires of subject peoples to order their own lives and government as they think best.

INDIA'S RESPONSE.

India deserves first place in an account of the Empire's rally, both because of the magnificence of her response and because she was the prime hope of the Zabernists in German politics. In the first few days of the war India suffered from an almost complete absence of news. The country remained on the whole calm, though there were considerable withdrawals from the banks, and an almost complete cessation of business. As soon, however, as news of the magnitude of the upheaval in Europe began to arrive, it provoked a wonderful evidence of loyalty and enthusiasm for the cause of the Allies. On August 7th it was known that the Nizam of Hyderabad and the Maharajah of Bikaner had taken the lead in offering themselves, their troops, and all the resources of their states for the service of

the Empire. Before the end of the following week, virtually every Indian ruling chief had placed his entire military and financial resources at the discretion of the Crown.

The full content of this magnificent response was not realised till the details of it were given to the world in a message from the Viceroy of India, read in the House of Commons by the Under Secretary for India on September 9th. Its impression on the House was profound. When the Under Secretary prefaced his statement with an apology for its length, he had the encouragement of a merely formal cheer. Very soon his audience hung on every word, cheer followed cheer, and this scene became historic in the records of Parliament. The statement was necessarily little more than a catalogue, but a catalogue of priceless gifts of men, arms, horses, money, and personal service from almost all the seven hundred ruling chiefs of India. Of the many chiefs and cadets of noble houses who had offered personally to fight, the Viceroy had selected the Chiefs of Bikaner, Kishangarh, Ratlam, Sachin, and Patiala; the heir-apparent of Bhopal, the brother of the Maharajah of Cooch Behar, and Sir Pertab Singh, Regent of Jodhpur. Sir Pertab Singh would not be denied his right to active service in spite of his seventy years, many of them spent in active service in China and elsewhere, and he took with him his sixteen-year-old-nephew, the Maharajah. Twenty-seven of the larger states in India which maintained Imperial Service troops had placed these at the disposal of the Government, and the Viceroy had accepted from twelve states contingents of cavalry, infantry, sappers and transport, besides a camel corps from Bikaner. The Maharajah of Mysore gave fifty lakhs of rupees towards the expenses of the Expeditionary forces. The Chief of Gwalior and the Begum of Bhopal combined to share the expenses of a hospital ship, and the former offered, in addition, thousands of horses as remounts, as well as financial help. Numbers of horses were offered also by the Nizam's Government, by the Bombay States, and by Maharajah Holkar. Several chiefs offered to raise additional troops if they were needed. The Maharajah of Rewa offered "his troops, his treasury—even his private jewellery." Most of these offers were additional to princely contributions to the, Indian Relief Fund, or to the Prince of Wales's Fund, or to both.

The small and remote states were not less fervent in their loyalty. "Letters have been received," said the Viceroy's message, "from the most remote states in India, all marked by a deep sincerity of desire to render some assistance, however humble, to the British Government in its hour of need." Beyond the Indian



The Indian Army : Types of Indian Lancers.

[Central News.



An Indian Camel Corps : A Camel Corps from Bikaner is included in the Indian Expeditionary Force.

[Central News.

border, the Prime Minister of Nepal, for one, placed the entire military resources of his state at the Viceroy's disposal, with three lakhs of rupees for the purchase of machine guns for the Gurkha regiments going overseas, and gave as well large donations to the relief funds. Even the Dalai Lama of Tibet offered 1,000 Tibetan troops for service, "and the prayers of Lamas innumerable throughout the length and breadth of Tibet for the success of British arms and the happiness of the souls of all victims of the war." These examples are typical, but far from fully descriptive, of the ready generosity and zeal of India's peoples and rulers. As their immediate practical outcome, the Viceroy was able to announce in Council, at Simla on September 9th, that India had already despatched two divisions of infantry and one cavalry brigade to Europe, or over 70,000 men, and that three more cavalry brigades would follow immediately—a force which he described with pride as "the finest and largest that has ever left the shores of India."

A sidelight from a very different quarter shows how the crisis laid bare a fundamental feeling of friendliness to the British people, even where it was often in normal times overclouded. Shortly before war broke out, Mr. Tilak, a well known Indian agitator, had returned to India after serving a transportation sentence on a charge of sedition. On the outbreak of war he addressed a large native gathering at Bombay. His speech was memorable, and its tone is well seen in this passage:—


"The Morley-Minto reforms certainly meant a step further in the path of progress, though we want the pace at which we are proceeding much more accelerated. However wide be the gulf dividing us from the Government in ordinary times, we must now show that we support our Government against the common foe. Many reforms which will require years of patient toil are still necessary, but this is not the time to press for them; we must sink our differences, and convince the Government of our sincere desire to assist them in the present crisis."

The speech revealed an attitude of mind in many Indians for whom Mr. Tilak spoke with which German calculations had quite failed to reckon.

WHAT CANADA GAVE.

In Canada the first news of the crisis in Europe provoked a general hope that Great Britain would be able honourably to refrain from going to war, but coupled with this was an equally general determination that Canada should take a full share if the Mother Country found peace with honour impossible. When Belgium was invaded this determination bore immediate fruit. On August 2nd the Governor-General, on behalf of Canada, offered to enlist regiments and make full financial provision for them. A great wave of recruiting overspread the Dominion. Before a grateful acceptance of 20,000 Canadian troops had been formally cabled, on

August 6th, a great proportion of that number were already available. The commanding officers of the militia regiments in the various provinces had taken for granted that a contingent would be offered, and many battalions had volunteered to a man. In Western Canada, in Ontario, and especially round Ottawa, recruiting was particularly brisk—indeed the whole force of 20,000 could have been raised without difficulty in the Toronto and Ottawa districts alone. Among the interesting phases of the recruiting were the offer of Hindus in British Columbia, whose status had long presented an imperial problem of some difficulty, to raise a small force of their own; and the fact that among those who offered to fight



The Indian Army: Typical Sikhs.
Typical Bengal Lancers.

[Central News.]

with the Canadian force were thousands of American citizens, whose services, for obvious reasons, could not be accepted. When recruiting for Canada's first contingent ceased on August 14th, it became amply clear that Colonel Hughes, the Minister of Militia, spoke only the truth when he told a cheering crowd of fifty thousand in Montreal that "ten, yes, twenty more contingents would be sent, if necessary, in order that the liberties of the British people might be preserved."

It was finally decided to accept from Canada, as a first contingent, one division of 22,000 men, one additional cavalry regiment, and two horse artillery batteries, an infantry battalion of ex-regulars, raised by Mr. Hamilton Gault, of Montreal, and three units of 1,000 men raised by New Brunswick, Manitoba, and Calgary.

For the equipment of the troops the Canadian Parliament voted fifty million dollars, and the Government grant was splendidly supported by private and municipal help. Toronto was the first of several cities to raise money for the maintenance of the troops. She contributed £100,000. The city of Ottawa offered to equip a machine gun section of four guns on armoured motor cars, at a cost of £60,000; and typical of the response of wealthy men throughout the Dominion was the offer of Mr. Clifford Sifton, formerly Minister of the Interior, to equip a battery of field guns. A Toronto citizen gave one hundred thousand dollars for a battery of quick-firing guns, a handsome steam yacht, and his private wireless station.

The Canadian troops were got under canvas at Valcartier Camp, Quebec, by the third week in August, there to undergo preliminary training before they should set sail, in the first instance for England, early in October. At the same time arrangements were made for the enlistment and training at Valcartier of a second and larger force, from which further contingents could be drawn if they were needed, and before long it was announced that the Canadian overseas force would be brought up to a strength of 100,000.

As a contribution to naval defence Canada purchased two powerful submarines, intended for Chili, and presented them to the Admiralty, at whose disposal she placed also the two light cruisers *Niobe* and *Rainbow*, and the smaller ships that were to have formed the nucleus of her own much-debated navy, and two merchant vessels, the *Margaret* and the *Canada*.

Not less eloquent of the resources and zeal of the Empire than the gifts of men and arms were the offers of foodstuffs for the United Kingdom that reached Downing Street from all quarters of the globe. On August 10th, this telegram from the Duke of Connaught, Governor-General of Canada, to Mr. Lewis Harcourt, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, was published:—"I am desired by my Government to inform you that the people of Canada, through the Government, desire to offer one million bags of flour, of ninety-eight pounds each, as a gift for the people of the United Kingdom, to be placed at the disposal of His Majesty's Government, to be used for such purposes as they may deem expedient. This size is most convenient for transportation. The first shipment will be

sent in about ten days, and the balance as soon as possible afterwards." Mr. Harcourt replied that Britain "could never forget the promptitude and generosity of the gift, and the patriotism from which it springs." The huge order for flour—ninety-eight million pounds would make two loaves per head for every inhabitant of the United Kingdom—was divided among all the largest milling firms in Canada, with the proviso that the last consignment should be ready for shipping on October 1st.

A few days later the Government gratefully accepted from the Province of Alberta an offer of "half a million bushels of oats, delivered free on the Atlantic seaboard, for the use of His Majesty's forces."

Close on the news of these heartening gifts came offers

from Quebec Province of four million pounds of cheese for the troops, from Nova Scotia of one hundred thousand tons of coal for the Admiralty, and from Ontario Province of five hundred thousand dollars, for use in any way the Imperial Government might think best, and later of two hundred and fifty thousand bags of flour. Prince Edward Island sent one hundred thousand bushels of oats, and quantities of cheese and hay; Saskatchewan, one thousand five hundred horses for remounts, at a cost of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars; New Brunswick, one hundred thousand bushels of potatoes; Manitoba, fifty thousand bags of flour; and British Columbia twenty-five thousand cases of canned salmon. Many of the Provinces contributed, in addition, large sums to the relief of distress in the United Kingdom, besides making generous provision for the dependants of the men of their Expeditionary Force. Newfoundland agreed to provide five hundred men for land service, and to raise her contribution to the Naval Reserve to one thousand men.



Sir Pertab Singh.

[Central News.]

The spirit that made possible this splendid practical refutation of the vain imaginings of the German military school can best be understood from the words of Canada's two greatest statesmen, the veteran Sir Wilfrid Laurier, long the leader of Canadian Liberalism, and of Sir Robert Borden, the Conservative Prime Minister of the Dominion. In reply to the speech from the Throne on the opening of the Parliament, on August 21st, Sir Wilfrid Laurier said:—

"There was not a British subject in the universe who was not prouder of his British citizenship than ever before, and whose admiration for England was not greater on account of her noble and firm attitude. He believed the baptism

of blood in the common cause would wash away that distrust of each other that had been the curse of Ireland, and that the British Empire would emerge from the strife with a new bond of union and as a blessing to other nations."

The Prime Minister summed up the reasons why Canada "must stand shoulder to shoulder with Britain" in these words:—

"Not for love of battle, not for great possessions, but for the cause of honour, to maintain a solemn pledge, to uphold the principles of liberty, to withstand the forces that would convert the world into an armed camp, and in the very name of the peace we sought at any cost to save we have entered into this war; and while gravely conscious of the tremendous issues involved and all the sacrifices they may entail, we do not shrink from them, but with stout hearts we abide the event."

THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.

South Africa, so recently the scene of a war of great bitterness that left its scars deep on the face of the country, presented a problem of special interest in relation to the Imperial crisis. To Germany more than to any country save Holland the Dutch of South Africa had looked for sympathy, if not for actual help, in their struggle against Britain. Could anything short of active provocation, which Germany might be careful not to give, rouse them to enthusiasm for the cause of the Allies?

On August 4th the Governor-General cabled the willingness of the Union to employ its defence force in place of the six thousand Imperial troops stationed in South Africa, should these be withdrawn, an offer that was gladly accepted by the War Office. But the Union Defence Act provides only for the use of the force for the defence of the Union. Could any further help be counted upon? The answer began to emerge with the news of meetings held up and down the Union, of which one on August 9th, at Aliwal North, in Cape Colony—a Boer stronghold at the time of the South African War—was typical. It was attended largely by Dutch, and the chief speaker had been active on the Boer side in the war. "Many of those present," he said, "had been rebels then, but the Union had been so successful that they would now shed their last drop of blood for the British flag. 'The ex-rebels of Aliwal,' he added, 'wished Germany to know that Great Britain could depend upon them.' Equally significant was an article in the Dutch South African organ, *Ons Land*, referring to the kinship of the Dutch with the Belgians, and the "ideals for which their common ancestors bled—ideals now threatened

by Germany's wanton attack on Belgium." The article was by a member of the Hertzogite party—a party accused with some bitterness by the followers of General Botha of selfishly placing the interests of South Africa before those of the Empire. On August 23rd the second line of the South African Defence Force was mobilised. General Botha proceeded to justify the use of the Defence Force in extra Union territory by giving some particulars of the invasion of that territory from German South-West Africa. "A German force was," he added, "entrenched in kopjes on Union land at that moment."

On September 11th it became known that on the outbreak of war General Botha had telegraphed to the British Government, "We will do our duty," and in a

speech in the Union House of Assembly, on September 10th, he made it clear what he conceived that duty to be. He said that the Imperial Government had informed the Union Government that certain war operations in German South-West Africa were considered to be of strategic importance, and if the Union Government could undertake these operations they would be regarded as of great service to the Empire. The Union Government, after careful consideration, had, he said, decided to comply with the request, in the interests of South Africa as well as of the Empire. There were many in South Africa, he added, who did not recognise the tremendous seriousness and great possibilities of this war, and some thought that the storm did not threaten South Africa. This was a most narrow-minded conception. The Empire was at war; consequently South Africa was at war with the common enemy. Their duty and their conscience alike, he continued, bade them be faithful and true to the Imperial Government in all respects in this hour of



[Central News.

The Maharajah of Bikaner.

darkness and trouble. That was the attitude of the Union Government; that was the attitude of the people of South Africa.

Of great importance was the view of Mr. Cresswell, the talented leader of the South African Labour Party—which had lately been much estranged from the Government by the deportation of ten Labour leaders during the great strike some months before. Mr. Cresswell, while insisting that South Africa was at war with the German Government and not with the German people, went so far as to urge that an Expeditionary Force should be sent from South Africa, to fight side by side with the Allies on the Continent. That, indeed, might have

been the wiser course. Had the Union Government asked for volunteers for the war in Europe, and used its powers under the Defence Act merely to repel German aggression from South West Africa, the services to our cause might have been even greater, and there would have been no risk of friction with the somewhat narrow nationalism of the Hertzogite party. General Smuts, and other leaders of South African politics, spoke in the same strain as General Botha, and it was soon clear that they spoke the mind of the majority of South Africans, British and Dutch. There was, however, a considerable minority. On September 22nd the British Press Bureau published correspondence between General Beyers, Commandant-General of the Union Defence Force, and General Smuts, Minister for Defence, in which General Beyers tendered his resignation, on the ground that it was beyond both the obligations and the powers of the Union Government to use the Defence Force for aggressive operations outside the Union.

"Whatever may happen in South Africa," he wrote, "the war will be decided in Europe in any case, so if Germany triumphs and should decide to attack us, then even Great Britain would be unable to help us. . . . I accepted the post of Commander-General under our Defence Act, the first section of which provides that our forces can only be employed in defence of the Union. My humble opinion is that this section cannot thus be changed by informal resolution of Parliament, such being contrary to Parliamentary procedure. So the Defence Act does not allow us to go and fight the enemy over the frontier, and to light the fire in this way. But should the enemy penetrate into our country it will be our duty to drive him back, and pursue him in his own territory."

General Beyers, whose views as to the use of the Union force were shared by Generals De Wet, Hertzog, and probably Delarey, alluded also to the sympathy the Germans had shown for the Boers at the time of the South African War, asserted that Britain's record was not untarnished in the matter of observing the rights of small nations, and that in the South African War "almost all farms, not to mention many towns, were so many Louvains" (an allusion to the Belgian town burnt to the ground), and suggested that the Union Government had been influenced in their decision by a loan of seven million pounds which they had received from Britain.

His point that there was not German aggression to justify the use of the Defence Force had already been answered by General Botha in Parliament. To his other charges General Smuts returned an effective rejoinder. "You forget to mention," he said, "that since the South African War the British people gave South Africa her entire freedom, under a Constitution which makes it possible for us to realise our national ideals along our own lines, and which, for instance, allows you to write with impunity a letter for which you would, without doubt, be liable in the German Empire to the extreme penalty. . . . You speak about duty and honour. My conviction is that the people of South Africa will in these dark days, when the Government as well as the people of South Africa are put to the supreme test, have a clearer conception of duty and honour than is to be

deduced from your letter and action. For the Dutch-speaking section in particular, I cannot conceive anything more fatal and humiliating than a policy of lip loyalty in fair weather and a policy of neutrality and pro-German sentiment in days of storm and stress."

In a subsequent speech General Beyers disavowed any intention to stir up strife, and said that if the country wanted him he would be prepared to fight till the last drop of his blood had been shed.

On September 23rd it was announced that General Botha would take supreme command of the forces engaged in operations against German South-West Africa. Thus

it came about that the man who, in South Africa, had initiated us into the tactics that were to make British infantry so efficient in France, took command of a Boer and British force on active service. The German press was quite frankly astonished at this upshot, and the *Kölnische Zeitung* wrote an article which is worth quoting as a testimony from the enemy to the value of the English Imperial ideal.

"We actually read," said that paper, "that the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa—General Louis Botha, son-in-law of Paul Kruger, the late Transvaal President—is eagerly making common cause in Africa with England. . . . When we remember how things stood in South Africa twelve, or even ten, years ago, we may reasonably wonder that the English should have succeeded so quickly in the process of Anglicising the country; that a land should have learnt so quickly



[A. Elliot, Capetown.]

General Botha and his three sons.

to feel itself a part of the British Empire which for a decade stood defiantly on its rights against the English, and finally fought, on behalf of its liberties, a war which was followed by the whole world with that sympathy which ever goes out to a conflict so unequal as was that.

. . . The Englishman, as we have already said, showed himself a good coloniser. He did indeed put a bridle on his prisoners, but he left it as loose as was possible, and as Prime Minister of the new State he chose the very man who had fought against the Union Jack longest and most bitterly—Louis Botha. To-day the English are reaping the crop which they have sown. The people which for a hundred years has fought for its freedom to the last drop of its blood is happy to-day to be able to serve its conqueror, now that he is in need."

AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.

The recent adoption of defence schemes, naval and military, had placed Australia and New Zealand in a good position to give prompt help to Britain. Australia had some thirty-two thousand citizen soldiers, or militia, between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six, and some ninety thousand cadets under compulsory training. Of the Australian Fleet Unit, which, in accordance with her policy of making herself completely responsible for her own defence, she had resolved to maintain, she had, when war broke out, a Dreadnought battle cruiser, the *Australia*, three protected cruisers of the "Town" class, and six "River" class destroyers. By arrangement with the Admiralty the Australian Unit was to be controlled normally by the Commonwealth. New Zealand, under her defence scheme of 1909, possessed a territorial force of some thirty thousand men, between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five, who had received compulsory training as cadets. She was party to Australia's naval agreement, and had a sister vessel, the *New Zealand*, to the Australian Dreadnought. On the outbreak of war the Australian Fleet Unit was handed over to the British Admiralty by the Commonwealth for the term of the war, and simultaneously Australia offered an expeditionary force of twenty thousand men for any destination, all costs to be borne by the Commonwealth Government. On August 2nd, New Zealand asked whether circumstances warranted an immediate call for volunteers for an expeditionary force, and a few days later the Government replied in the affirmative, and suggested that the force should be made up of a mounted rifle brigade, a field

artillery brigade, and an infantry brigade, with supply columns. On August 11th, the Dominion accepted responsibility for the equipment of this force. These valuable steps were supported with the greatest enthusiasm in the two Dominions. In Sydney, Melbourne, Wellington, and Adelaide thronged public meetings echoed the determination of the Australian Premier to "see the thing through at whatever cost." As in Canada, the difficulty of the authorities lay not in the finding of the expeditionary troops, but in the selection of them. By August 6th it was clear that Australia's force would be ready to sail in little over a month, and the Commonwealth was able to begin arrangements for the despatch, early in November, of an additional infantry brigade and light horse brigade.

The Australasian gifts in kind were as notable and characteristic as those of Canada. A conference of State Premiers at Melbourne invited Australian farmers to give a million sheep to Britain. Queensland sent five thousand six hundred pounds of butter, sixteen thousand two hundred and twenty pounds of bacon, five hundred and fifty cases of beef, nine thousand six hundred pounds of condensed milk, and two and a half tons of arrowroot, while from Victoria came one thousand gallons of port for the wounded. The Patriotic Committee of Brisbane sent frozen meat to the value of ten thousand pounds, and foodstuffs to the same amount; and gifts from private citizens were well typified by one of fifty thousand pounds of biscuits for the Expeditionary Force. The State Legislatures of the Australasian Dominions were able also to render useful service in securing that the Imperial Government should have first claim on all supplies of food for sale.

It was mainly in the supply of food, too, that the smaller British possessions played their part, and the finest opportunity for visualising the might and resources of the Empire that the British people has ever had was given by the news, which throughout August came almost daily, of gifts from all corners of the globe. Ceylon would send a million pounds of tea; Mauritius, two million pounds of sugar; Southern Rhodesia, maize; even the Falkland Isles, three thousand pounds towards relief at home. It was no merely formal phrase that concluded the King's message of thanks to his Dominions on September 10th:—"All parts of my Oversea Dominions have demonstrated in the most unmistakable manner the fundamental unity of the Empire amidst all its diversity of situation and circumstances."



"ITALIA IRREDENTA."

[Exclusive News Agency.

General Views of Trieste (top) and (below) of Trent.



[Record Press.]

**The Grand Duchess
of Luxembourg.**

[Central News.]

**Queen Wilhelmina of Holland and Her Consort,
Prince Henry of the Netherlands.**

[Russell and Sons.]

The King of Italy.

CHAPTER X.

THE NEUTRALS IN EUROPE.

THE POSITION OF ITALY—THE WEAKNESS OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE—THE TRENTINO AND TRIESTE—ROUMANIA AND THE BALKAN STATES—THE NETHERLANDS AND ANTWERP.

ALONG the frontiers of the combatant Powers lay a fringe of States almost all of whom had cause for hope or fear in the war. There were some with national ambitions long unsatisfied, and some with fellow-countrymen abroad still "unredeemed." There were others who had recently suffered from an unfortunate war, and hoped by another turn of fortune to regain something of what they had lost. Others, again, with nothing to gain but a great deal to lose, were anxious only to be left in peace; fearful lest their more powerful neighbours should involve them in the war, they bent their efforts to the maintenance of the most strict neutrality, not knowing even then whether the war might not in the result leave them more seriously threatened than at its beginning. Holland could not look without anxiety even on the distant prospect of a Germany which enveloped her on the south, east, and north; Sweden had long found a ground for disquietude in the slow Russian pressure westwards.

Most important for the belligerents, as it was most difficult for herself to determine, was the position of Italy, since 1882 a member of the Triple Alliance. Although the precise terms of the Alliance had not been published, it had been inevitable in all calculations of the opposing forces in a great European war to range Italy by the side of Germany and Austria. This would have thrown into the scale against France and her allies not only a strong fleet in the Mediterranean, but an active army of three-quarters of a million men. It would have compelled France to make front against both Germany and Italy; it would have enabled Austria to devote her undivided attention to her Slav enemies. On the other hand, the neutrality of Italy meant more than a great convenience to France, leaving her free to devote her fleet to Austria and her army to Germany. It meant also a positive inconvenience to Austria, against which military precautions must be taken. The historical relations of Italy

and Austria might permit of neutrality, but it could not be a benevolent neutrality; and Austria must necessarily keep troops on her western frontier lest the war should kindle a movement, which the Italian Government might be unable or unwilling to resist, for the long-sought union of Italy with the Italian towns now under Austrian rule.

This was, indeed, one of the many difficulties of Italy's position. At first, Austria might be glad to console herself with the thought that Italy had not gone so far as actually to side against her, but at the close of a victorious war she could only feel resentment, which Germany would certainly share, at the cold neutrality of the Italian Government, behind which lay a profound popular hostility to the Austrian cause. The Italian Government, however, had many other things to consider than possible resentment of a successful Austria. It declared definitely that this was not a defensive war on the part of the Triple Alliance, and that Italy was therefore not called on to fight by the side of her allies. Austria must undoubtedly have anticipated such a decision. She had not consulted the Italian Government about her ultimatum to Serbia, nor sought her consent, as she had that of Germany, to a policy which meant the provocation of a European war. Austria knew that the Triple Alliance, which had been dying for years, was now virtually dead. It had been renewed, indeed, but the renewal was of the form only; the life had gone out of the treaty.

Ever since 1866 the policy of Italy has had two aspects: she looks across the Mediterranean to Africa, and over the Adriatic to Austria and the Dalmatian coast. In the Mediterranean she had the ambition to become a power on the African coast, and to revive there the Empire of ancient Rome. To the east she aspired to round off her territories by the inclusion of the Italian population of the Trentino, Trieste, and the coast of Istria, and to prevent the Adriatic from being turned into a closed



[Exclusive News Agency.]

CONSTANTINOPLE.

The Waters of the Golden Horn, seen from the cemetery at Eyoub.

Constantinople, looking across the Galata Bridge towards Stamboul.

Turkey and Germany: The Fountain at Stamboul, presented to Constantinople by the Kaiser in commemoration of his visit to the Turkish capital.



sea against her. In the path of her Mediterranean ambitions stood France; eastwards, her opponent was Austria. Obviously, the Triple Alliance was a remarkable solution for difficulties such as these. But then, it was the alliance which Italy had to take, not the alliance which she would have liked. The whole problem of Italian statesmanship, *i.e.*, how to meet and overcome both France and Austria, is summed up in the now famous conversation between Crispi, the Italian statesman, and Bismarck, in 1877. The narrative of the interview is Crispi's own ("Memoirs of Francesco Crispi," vol. 2.):—

CRISPI: I am charged to ask whether you would be disposed to sign a treaty of eventual alliance with us, in case we should be forced into war with France or Austria.

BISMARCK: You are already aware of our intentions, which are, that should Italy be attacked by France, Germany would give proof of her solidarity by joining with you against the common enemy. We shall be able to arrange for a treaty to this effect.

As regards Austria, the conditions are totally different. I shrink from even assuming that she might one day be hostile to us, and I frankly admit that I must refuse to consider such a possibility.

To-morrow I am to meet Andrassy [the Austrian Chancellor], and I wish to be able to give him my word that I am bound by no obligations to others, and that I will remain his friend.

CRISPI: But it is reported that Russia, in order to secure the friendship of Austria, has offered her Bosnia and Herzegovina. Now Italy can never allow Austria to occupy that territory.

As you are well aware, in 1866 the Kingdom of Italy found her boundaries in the direction of the Eastern Alps practically non-existent. Should Austria's position on the Adriatic be strengthened by the annexation of fresh provinces, our country would find herself clasped as in a vice, and would become the victim of easy invasion whenever appeared desirable to the neighbouring Empire.

BISMARCK: At all events, if Austria takes Bosnia, Italy can take Albania, or some other Turkish province on the Adriatic.

I believe that the relations between your Government and that of Vienna will become more friendly, and, in course of time, even cordial. But be this as it may, should you engage in a contest with Austria, no matter how deeply I might regret the circumstance, we should not allow it to induce us to go to war.

As long as I remain in office, I shall be with Italy, but although I am your friend, I will not break with Austria.

In 1860 I was at St. Petersburg, but my heart was with you. I followed your successes with delight, for they represented the triumph of my own convictions.

Nevertheless, I must repeat that we wish you to be friends with Austria. In solving the Eastern question you may be able to come to some understanding, by means of which Italy would take some Turkish province on the Adriatic, as a compensation, should Austria annex Bosnia.

CRISPI: A Turkish province on the Adriatic would not satisfy us. We should not know what to do with it.

We have no frontiers on the East. Austria is this side of the Alps, and can invade our kingdom whenever she sees fit to do so. We ask nothing of others, and we are loyal to our treaties, but we must feel safe at home. Pray mention this to Count Andrassy.

BISMARCK: No. I have no wish to touch upon the question of Bosnia, and much less of your eastern boundaries. Let us drop the matter for the present. I cannot introduce topics that are sure to irritate Count Andrassy, for my great desire is to keep on friendly terms with him.

Thus was the character of the Triple Alliance determined. Bismarck refused to give Italy any assistance against Austria, and in 1882 an Alliance was made between the three Powers, which had, as Italy hoped, an edge turned against France. But Italy was disappointed. She had entered into the Alliance because France had in 1881 made clear her designs on Tunis, which Italy had hoped might eventually fall to herself. Algeria had gone, Tunis was going, Tripoli (as Italy might well suppose) was threatened. But this new Alliance did not help her. Bismarck might "make his voice heard" in Paris or in London, but it was no intention of his to go to war in order to save Tunis for Italy, and France soon discovered that her Mediterranean policy had nothing to fear from the Triple Alliance. (Germany had not in those days begun to take a personal interest in the exploitation of North Africa.) So, for Italy, things went from bad to worse. It became clear that France intended to proceed from her protectorate of Tunis to annexation, and Italy was



[Central News.

Enver Pasha, the Turkish Minister of War.

powerless to prevent it. Then followed the great defeat in Abyssinia, and disillusionment in Italy over colonial adventures. The hostility to France was barren and, unprofitable, and in the early days of this century, when M. Delcassé was remodelling the policy of France, the two antagonists came at last to an agreement. M. Delcassé was clearing the way for the establishment of French dominion in Morocco, and he was prepared to pay Italy a price. In Morocco, France was to be granted a free hand; in Tripoli, she was to grant it to Italy. The structure of the Triple Alliance had now begun visibly to crumble. When, a year or two later, Germany

intervened in Morocco, and the conference of the Powers met at Algeciras, Italy was found in the opposite camp from her ally, Germany, supporting France, to threaten whom she had originally entered the Triple Alliance. A few years more and Italy, ignoring Germany's anxiety to attach Turkey to the Alliance, summarily proceeded to possess herself of Tripoli. Nevertheless, so far from there being any open breach in the Alliance, it was renewed in 1912, perhaps because its renewal was the best and the only security against a rupture. For the difference between 1912 and 1877 was only this, that the quarrel with France had been settled, but that with Austria still remained. Austria had completed the absorption of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which Crispi had feared and said his country could not tolerate. Italy, had, however, come to accept this new development, but the hope of recovering the unredeemed Italian cities was still strong. Ever since 1866 the agitation for their recovery had gone on with varying intensity on both sides of the frontier, and while the Italian Government, out of consideration for its ally, had sought to suppress the nationalist propaganda at home, the Austrian Government had attacked its activities in Austria, had played off the Slav against the Italian population, and had even tried on Italians such expedients as were well calculated to increase their sentiment for Italy, ordering them, for instance, to use the Croatian language beside their own. Thus, when the war came, and was judged to fall outside the scope of the Alliance, Italy was happily saved from a terrible dilemma. Her sympathies were with the Allies; popular feeling declared itself fervently on the side of England, who thus once again reaped her reward for sympathy with the cause of Liberty in days gone by. A growing section of the political parties were in favour of active intervention against Austria, and demanded that the Government should summon Parliament in special session. Had this been done, there would very probably have been a majority for war, although the Orthodox Socialists, the Clericals, and part of the Centre party were strongly for an unbroken neutrality. But the Government did not summon Parliament, whose warlike tendency might have placed it in a most difficult position. Neutrality might be evil, but it might also be by far the lesser of two ills.

After her experiences in Tripoli, Italy had need of peace; even that adventure was a luxury which she could ill afford. Much less could she afford to run the risk of a serious war with Austria, followed by invasion if things went badly with her. That Austria would be forced to concentrate her efforts against Russia was an unconvincing argument, for Austria would rely on her German ally to make head against Russia, and was therefore not in the least likely to neglect her Italian frontiers. Austria, as it happened, was badly beaten by Russia in the series of battles in Galicia. But the consequences of the defeats were much exaggerated by Russia, and as long as the Austrian military power had not been shattered beyond hope of repair—and that is to say, so long as Germany, too, had not been crushed—Italy could not but view with anxiety the possible consequences of intervention in the war. On the other hand, persistence in neutrality had serious dangers for her long-cherished ambitions. If the central European Powers were victorious, they would owe nothing and would give nothing to the ally from whom, whether rightly or wrongly, they would certainly maintain that they should have had assistance. If the Allies prevailed and Russia broke up Austria-Hungary, so that a Greater Serbia were created, what

claim could Italy put forward which the Slav Powers would be disposed to grant? "The spoils to the victors" is the rule of war, and "*Beati possidentes*" is the only maxim which Italy could hope to set against it. If she could show herself in possession of the coveted regions when the map of Europe came to be formally re-drawn, then an international instrument might seal the accomplished fact. But if she sat at the Council board with only reason as her advocate, or perhaps approached it merely as a suppliant from without, she might see the hopes and ambitions of fifty years coldly put aside. Italy, therefore, followed a policy of quiet watchfulness, waiting on events. The war might yet do for Italy what Bismarck had refused to contemplate in 1877.

ROUMANIA AND THE BALKAN STATES.

The Italian question was, however, only one of a group of racial problems raised in an acute form by the war. The war itself was, from one point of view, the offspring of the ambition of the Serbs to include in a Greater Serbia their kinsmen under Austrian rule, or, from another aspect, it might be said to have sprung from the failure of Austria either to assimilate or conciliate her Serb subjects. But the Austrian Empire, with the Balkans and Turkey to the south of it, is full of such racial problems. Everywhere there are subject populations, small or great, absorbed by alien Powers and looking over an alien frontier to a mother-state which watches in the hope of recovering them some day, whether by diplomacy or war. Not Italy only, but Roumania, Bulgaria, and Greece, had reason to watch the course of Austria's fortunes anxiously. In each of them, since their liberation from Turkey, the development of a national consciousness had grown along with material prosperity. Each had extended its borders, and each now either hoped for further expansion or feared that Turkey might make one further effort to regain lost ground in Europe. Roumania, especially, had much to gain from successful participation in the war, but the adventure had its dangerous side.

The Roumanians, who pride themselves on being a Latin race, looking rather to Italy than to the Slavs or Germans, extend beyond the boundaries of Roumania proper into both Russia and the Austrian Empire. In Russian Bessarabia, over their north-east frontier, are some two million Roumanians; to their west, in Hungary, the Roumanians form a fairly solid block, three million in number, broken by an occasional large colony of Magyars, the ruling people of Hungary. From the time of the Russo-Turkish war in the late 'seventies, when Russia took Bessarabia from Roumania, up to the time when the Balkan States at last made their great league against Turkey, Roumania's sense of wrong was directed mainly against Russia. But the Russian Government, which had worked hard to bring about the Balkan union against Turkey, completed her work by conciliating Roumania, and as a result directed her thoughts towards the recovery of the lost Roumanian population over the Austrian border. When the second Balkan war broke out, and Bulgaria, with the unconcealed approval of Austria, made war on Serbia and Greece in order to recover the Bulgarian speaking parts of Macedonia, which lay to the east of Monastir, it was with Russia's permission that Roumania took the field, marched into Bulgaria, almost up to the gates of the capital, and forced the Bulgarian Government to a humiliating and disastrous peace. From that time onward it was the policy of Roumania to uphold the Treaty of Bucharest, by which she had gained a substantial

slice of Bulgarian territory. It was the desire of Austria to upset this arrangement, not indeed in order to deprive Roumania of anything which she had obtained, but in order to weaken Serbia, who had now become a more formidable neighbour.

But the same considerations which held Italy neutral at the beginning of the war applied to Roumania, and some other reasons, too. King Charles of Roumania, under whom for many years the growing prosperity of the country had been achieved, was both a cautious and far-seeing ruler, and a Hohenzollern. The Hohenzollerns, like the Coburgs, hold together, and the anti-Russian sentiment of the country from 1878 onward had been in keeping with King Charles's desire to remain on friendly terms with the Central Powers of Europe. His death, early in October, removed an influence which was likely to be persistently exerted in the interests of neutrality. Apart, however, from any personal considerations, Roumania, with its small population and resources, was not in a position to take a plunge in the dark. A nation with an active army of three hundred thousand, and perhaps the same number of reserves, was not likely to adventure into Hungary without a reasonable prospect that its enterprise could be conducted on economical lines. The bloodless expedition by which Roumania had squeezed territory from her unfortunate neighbour, Bulgaria, showed how little prone was her Government to be actuated by impulse, or to risk unnecessary expense either in men or money. Moreover, Roumania had now to consider that a rash step on her part might bring on her precisely the same kind of treatment which she had formerly dealt out to Bulgaria. Bulgaria had been so foolish, when attacking Serbia and Greece, as to forget that she had on her rear a quite unscrupulous enemy; Roumania, if she decided to advance into Hungary, might have to fear an advance over her southern frontiers of the Turkish and Bulgarian armies.


The devotion of the Balkan States to the idea of nationality does not deter them from oppressing any other nationality than their own. Bulgaria, who, more than any other Balkan Power had laboured to free her Macedonian kinsmen from the Turks, saw herself deprived by her allies and by Roumania of much of the fruits of the first Balkan war. Servians and Greeks divided between them the Bulgarian population of the Monastir region, and Bulgarians, again, (together with Turks) were subjected to Roumania in the territory which she filched from Bulgaria in her extremity. Bulgaria, therefore, had

grievances enough to have made her take advantage of Serbia's embarrassments when the war broke out. But Roumania and Greece, who had shared in the spoils, stood sentry over the treaty of Bucharest, and Serbia did not even have to buy the neutrality of Bulgaria by an offer of the Bulgarian regions in Macedonia which she had seized.


To this position Turkey added a fresh complication. In the days of Abdul Hamid, Germany—represented at Constantinople by the able Baron Marschall von Bieberstein—had gained more influence with Turkey than any other Power. When the revolution came, the Western democratic Powers, especially England, might have stepped into the shoes of Germany. A short-sighted and bungling diplomacy lost the opportunity, and German influence regained its former place. Soldiers like Enver Pasha, one of the leaders of the revolution and an ardent Nationalist, looked to Germany as the great military pattern, and were tempted, at her instigation, to put all to the test once more, and to press forward from Adrianople into the Balkans, if not openly to challenge Russia and to harass Great Britain in Egypt. Turkey showed open resentment at England's action in taking over the two Turkish battleships which were building in English yards at the opening of the war; she added to her own fleet the German cruisers Goeben and Breslau, engaged a number of German soldiers and officers in her service, and, as a sign of her increasing independence, abolished the Capitulations, and so deprived all foreign subjects of the special privileges which they had formerly enjoyed in Turkey. Still, throughout September, Turkey held to her neutrality. Nothing was heard of earlier rumours that she was attempting to negotiate an agreement with Bulgaria. Probably Turkey, too, like other neutral States, was anxiously awaiting the result of the great contest which was preparing along the Vistula between the Russian and the Austro-German armies. The shattering of Austria might furnish their opportunity to Italy and Roumania, should they desire to seize it; a crushing blow to Russia could not but tempt the Turks to make another throw for fortune, even though it might be their last.

HOLLAND AND PORTUGAL.

Of the neutral countries in the south-west and in the north of Europe, two were closely affected by the war. No circumstances were likely to arise which would involve either Spain or Norway, while Denmark and Sweden



The Neutral Countries in South-Eastern Europe.



Antwerp and the mouth of the Scheldt.

had less ground to fear the course of the war than the results which might follow an overwhelming victory for one side or the other. The sympathies of Denmark, though prudence discouraged their active expression, were, of course, against Germany; it was not in human nature to refrain from hoping that the defeat of Germany and the re-construction of the map of Europe on the basis of nationality might give back to Denmark the territory which she had lost to Prussia. In Sweden, popular feeling, though not ill-disposed towards England and France, was inclined towards Germany by the traditional fear of Russia, and Germany worked laboriously to strengthen her position in one of the few neutral countries which was disposed to take a favourable view of her activities.

Holland lay very close to the storm centre, and, like Switzerland, sought safety in the most careful performance of her duties as a neutral. Both sides watched her conduct jealously, but the policy of her Government gave no ground for complaint, and if among her people there were currents of sympathy both for the Allies and for Germany, that could not be wondered at in a country which not only looked overseas but had a large German colony, did a great trade with Germany, and held the mouth of the Rhine. The interest of Holland was to maintain her independence and to carry on her trade. Her independence, at the beginning of the war at least, was not in peril. Germany, had she thought the profit was sufficient, would no more have scrupled to violate the neutrality of Holland than she did that of Belgium. But as it happened it was greatly to her advantage to have Holland neutral, for Holland was her main source of supplies. Great as the power of Germany's resistance might be, and though she might draw some supplies by way of Italy and Roumania, it was certain that in time she must feel increasingly the pressure which the loss of the seas would exert on every branch of her commerce. She would look to Holland, therefore, as her main source of foreign goods, and it was to be expected that she would attempt to organise, through Dutch ports, a service of supplies which would be useful not only for her general population, but for her armies too. The policy of the British Government, on the other hand, was to prevent the importation through Holland of all articles which might be of use to the German Government in waging war, and it was almost inevitable that some friction should arise from the shipment of cargo whose ultimate destination might be a matter of dispute. The British Government,

in adopting the Declaration of London, with certain modifications, announced its intention of seizing cargoes on neutral vessels which it had good reason for thinking were intended for the German authorities, even though the ostensible destination lay in Holland. The Dutch Government, anxious to give no ground of complaint, took vigorous measures to ensure that the destination of such goods as were "conditionally contraband" was plainly and genuinely Dutch, and the first two months of the war passed without serious disagreement.

The capture of Antwerp by the Germans at the beginning of October sharpened the anxiety of Holland. Germany welcomed the fall of Antwerp, because it seemed to bring her nearer to England, but, unless she decided to violate Dutch neutrality, it did not really bring her nearer. Dutch territory lies along both sides of the Scheldt, from just below the city of Antwerp, to the sea, and Germany could no more use the Scheldt for naval operations against England than England could have used it to throw a garrison into Antwerp. An attempt to use Antwerp as a naval base for action against England would show that Germany had decided to ignore the neutrality of Holland, and to use her, like Belgium, as a short cut to her military ends. Such a step would have brought Holland into the field against her, for it would be made clear at once that German success meant the end of Dutch independence. In any case the possession of Antwerp by Germany could not but cause disquietude in Holland. What, she must ask herself, must follow if Germany emerged successful from the war? How precarious would Holland's position be when enveloped on three sides by a triumphant power which saw itself barred by a petty State from the control of the mouths of the three great rivers: the Rhine, the Meuse, and the Scheldt?

Away in the south, Portugal had, at the beginning of the war, declared her sympathy with England. Far distant as she might seem from the European conflict, she had for centuries maintained a close friendship with England. The first treaty between the two countries was made in the fourteenth century, and when the war broke out there existed between them an offensive and defensive alliance, under which it seemed that Portugal might at any time decide to take part in the war. At the beginning of October it was reported that this was her intention. A partial mobilisation was announced, and martial law was proclaimed in the Portuguese Congo.



A British Troopship arrives at a French Harbour.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER XI.

THE BRITISH ARMY ON THE CONTINENT.

THE RECEPTION OF THE BRITISH TROOPS—SIR JOHN FRENCH'S POSITION—THE BRITISH ARMY A CONTINGENT TO THE ARMY OF FRANCE—THE MODELS FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF BRITISH TROOPS ON THE CONTINENT—MINDEN THE PRECEDENT OF MONS.

THE British troops had a most enthusiastic reception at Boulogne, and wherever the French crowds had a sight of them. To the very last moment France had been uncertain whether we should take part in the war, and her gratitude for our assistance was all the greater because the most sanguine had not been able to count with certainty upon it. The people could not do too much for our soldiers. Their approach made a holiday for the countryside, and as they marched through towns and villages they were followed by crowds of admirers offering little presents and begging for keepsakes. English tags and catch-words became part of the patriotic war-slang. When the troops moved away there were more "good-byes" heard than "adieux," and the American catch-phrase, "Are we downhearted? No!"—which came into vogue about the time of the war with Spain—was imported by our troops into France and adopted by the streets. "*Est-ce que nous avons le coeur brisé? Non!*" Nor is it beneath the dignity of history to record that the favourite march-tune of our troops was "It's a long, long way to Tipperary"—a music-hall song, which had nothing to recommend it except a good lilt in the chorus.

This popular flattery was a great test of the good manners of the British army, and one from which it seems

to have come out very well. Each soldier carried in his active service pay book a brief address by Lord Kitchener, in the form of instructions on his behaviour, and its simplicity and directness make it worth quoting, even as a piece of literature.

You are ordered abroad as a soldier of the King to help our French comrades against the invasion of a common enemy. You have to perform a task which will need your courage, your energy, your patience. Remember that the honour of the British army depends on your individual conduct.

It will be your duty not only to set an example of discipline and perfect steadiness under fire, but also to maintain the most friendly relations with those whom you are helping in this struggle. The operations in which you are engaged will for the most part take place in a friendly country, and you can do your own country no better service than in showing yourself in France and Belgium in the true character of a British soldier.

Be invariably courteous, considerate, and kind. Never do anything likely to injure or destroy property, and always look upon looting as a disgraceful act.

You are sure to be met with a welcome, and to be trusted; your conduct must justify that welcome and that trust. Your duty cannot be done unless your health is sound. So keep constantly on your guard against any excesses. In this new experience you may find temptations both in wine



British Troops having a meal in a French Railway Station.

[L.N.A.]



The Expeditionary Force on the Continent: A halt in a French Town.

[L.N.A.]

and women. You must entirely resist both temptations, and, while treating all women with perfect courtesy, you should avoid any intimacy.

Do your duty bravely. Fear God. Honour the King.


KITCHENER, F.M.

On Wednesday, August 19th, Sir John French, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces in France, paid a visit to Paris, where, after seeing the President, he had a conference with M. Messimy, the French Minister of War, at the War Office. He must have learned before he left London the general nature of the conclusions which the conversations of British and French military experts had reached regarding the co-operation of the two armies in the event of war in which both their countries were involved. Whether he had any voice in those consultations is not known. There are phrases in some of his earlier despatches which would seem to show that he regarded himself not as one of the directors of the strategy of the war, but rather as an instrument in the execution of a policy which had been, and was being, determined by others. Nor did we know at the beginning of the war whether his military gifts were of the kind that could conceive a vast military problem as a whole, and whether he had the power, reserved to the greatest of men, of reducing complication to simplicity by an unerring instinct for the rejection of the detail which is irrelevant and non-essential. His reputation, won in South Africa, was that of a brilliant lieutenant rather than of a great organiser of victory. Yet even in South Africa he showed himself to be more than an English Ney. Sir John French was the first to employ the tactics by which the organised opposition of the Boers in the field was beaten down. In January, 1900, when the British armies in Natal, on the Modder, and in Eastern Colony were quiescent after their heavy defeats, Sir John French, at Colesberg, was beating the Boers at their own game. This, his first appearance in British military history, was as an innovator of new cavalry tactics in

the British army. Obviously, he was more than a dashing cavalry leader. He was a thinker, a soldier of original intellectual power, accessible to new ideas and skilled to absorb all that was good in them. As a tactician he was probably the superior of Lord Kitchener, whose conduct of his two great battles, Omdurman and Paardeburg, has often been severely criticised, and though many

Englishmen—and certainly most Frenchmen—expected that Lord Kitchener would be in command of the British forces on the Continent, there is little doubt that the selection of Sir John French was at the time the wiser one, and that the War Office gave the best scope to Lord Kitchener's genius.

Much, however, depended on the duties and the powers assigned to the British Commander-in-Chief in France. Was the British army to conduct its campaign separately from the French or as a wing of an Allied army? In the former case, was Belgium or France to be the field of its first activities? In the latter case, what were to be the relations between the British and the French Commanders-in-Chief? Was Sir John French to conform to the plans of the French Staff, or was he to be admitted into its counsels and to have a voice in the formation of the plans of operations for the Allied armies? These questions, amongst others, were presumably discussed in the conversations between the military experts which had begun as early as 1906, but it is not clear how a satisfactory answer could have been found to them in advance. Obviously, the nature of the military help from England would vary with the plans of the enemy. Our co-operation might take one form if he invaded by the eastern frontier, another and different form if—as in fact he did—he violated the neutrality of Belgium and came down from the north.



[Lafayette.
General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien.]



[Elliot and Fry.
General Sir Douglas Haig. General Sir James Grierson.]

THE PITT AND WELLINGTON MODELS.

There was plenty of precedent for British military action on the Continent, but it was not easy to say beforehand which of them would best fit the circumstances which had now arisen. The traditional British plan—a



Highlanders on the march through France.

[L.N.A.]



French Visitors inspect the Cooking Arrangements of an English Camp.

[Central News.]

tradition made by the two Pitts, father and son—was to fight our Continental wars anywhere by preference rather than on the Continent, to limit our military responsibilities, to act on land independently of our Allies, and against the enemy's outlying possessions, where our army had the cover of our mastery of the seas. Had that tradition been followed in this war, we should have blockaded, we should have stripped Germany of her colonies, and we might have landed an expedition in Belgium to operate near the coast, or have attempted operations by land and sea against one of the enemy's naval bases. This last method had been followed by us in our last European war, against Russia in the Crimea, and no doubt a campaign against Wilhelmshaven would have gratified English sentiment, if any sort of progress could have been made with it. All the conditions, however, were against success in such an enterprise, which would have been in the highest degree risky with the German fleet still unbeaten. Yet with joint military and naval operations of this ambitious character rejected as impracticable, or postponed until the invasion of Germany should have begun,

it was clear that the rest of the traditional Pitt programme would have accomplished nothing to speak of. The loss of her colonies would make little or no difference to Germany, and an old-fashioned strict blockade was impossible without alienating the neutral nations. The Pitt programme, therefore, had to be rejected as both useless and impracticable. It had had to be greatly extended even in the war against Napoleon. Pitt died just after Austerlitz, and

it is clear that his policy alone would never have brought the war to a conclusion, or even made the best use of our naval victories. Later began our campaigns in the Peninsula, which were objected to by many at the time as a departure from sound British traditions of war, but justified themselves completely in the end. The Peninsula War and the short Waterloo campaign form a second and a very brilliant model of British military policy in a Continental war. Had their precedent been followed, we should have landed an army in Belgium at a suitable opportunity—the most favourable time might have been after the main German invasion had gone south into France—and it would have operated with the Belgian army, either under a British commander of the Allied armies in Belgium, or each army under its own commander. That would, as it turned out, have been an exceedingly popular form for a British campaign on the Continent to take, and under favourable conditions it might have been successful. A British army appearing in Belgium, just after a French victory on the Marne, with Antwerp

and the coast still held and the Belgian army still intact, might have accomplished very great things. The risk, indeed, would have been so great that it is doubtful whether the Germans, if there had been any danger of the British army landing in their rear, would have gone on to invade France before they had taken Antwerp and seized the Belgian coast. They would have had to do in August what they afterwards did in October. That would have lost them so much time that the supposed advantages of the northern route of invasion would have almost disappeared, and there might never have been an invasion of Belgium. There were, however, very great, perhaps insuperable, objections to an independent British campaign in Belgium. Between ourselves and Portugal there was an old alliance, and it gave us a ready-made and natural base for Wellington's campaigns in the Peninsula. There was no such alliance between us and Belgium, nor could there be, for the same treaties which guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium against invasion bound her over to observe strict neutrality in European politics. Even if she had done no more than make arrangements

providing for the contingent assistance of Great Britain in case her neutrality was violated by Germany, she might have laid herself open to the charge that she was entering into the Triple Entente group and departing from her political neutrality. According to a statement made in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*—a semi-official German newspaper—as long ago as 1906 a complete plan was worked out by the Belgian Chief of Staff and the British Military Attaché at Brussels




[Sport and General.

Motor Transports on the outskirts of a French Village.

for the co-operation of a British Expeditionary Force with the Belgian army in the event of a Franco-German war. The plan was said to have been approved, and the Belgian Staff supplied with all data regarding equipment, supplies, and points of disembarkation. The plan, at any rate in this form, never had any existence, though it is not unlikely that unofficial conversations may have taken place between British and Belgian officers. If they did, the probability is that both sides convinced themselves that no such plans could be made. It was difficult to make them without departing from the strict neutrality which Belgium was most scrupulous in observing in letter and in spirit; but even if that objection could be surmounted, it was almost certain that if Germany decided to invade the country the British help would arrive too late to save it.

There was another objection from the British point of view. Military operations could not be undertaken in Belgium without some secure base on the sea. Ostend would not satisfy requirements, and Antwerp, which



[Topical Press.]

Red Cross Dogs now attached to the British Expeditionary Force. Each carries a full set of first aid requisites, and is trained to search out the wounded on the battlefield.



[Newspaper Illustrations.]

Old Friends in a new Setting: London 'buses in use on the Continent for transporting the British Troops.

would have done, for reasons explained in the last chapter, could not be used as a base without violating the neutrality of Holland. Even, therefore, had both sides been anxious to arrange for co-operation in the event of a German invasion, it is not easy to see how any satisfactory plan could have been devised beforehand. Ostend might have been made into a base by the construction of harbour works and elaborate entrenchments, but to do that would have been to advertise to the world that Belgium had entered into a species of alliance with Great Britain and France. And that was against the first principle of her politics, which was to do and say nothing which could be regarded as provocative to Germany.

These considerations seemed to rule out of account the second or Wellingtonian model for the operations of the British army. After the war had begun, and Belgium had appealed to us for assistance, the political objections to the Wellington model disappeared, but then it was probably too late.

CO-OPERATION WITH THE FRENCH ARMY.


The classic models of the Pitts and Wellington having been rejected for divers reasons, the only alternative that remained, if our army was to take a part in the land war, was to co-operate with France. Here the conditions were very different from what they would have been in Belgium. There we should have been the predominant military partner. In France, our army was and must remain for long enough a small fraction of the defending army. It was a mere reinforcement to the army of France, powerful and efficient it is true, but still only a contingent. Almost inevitably, so long as it was in line with the French army, it was under the over-command

of General Joffre, and must conform to the strategical plans of the French General Staff, probably without much opportunity, at any rate at first, of influencing them. There was precedent in British military history even for this position, but it was further back than Wellington. The last time a considerable British army had fought was in the Seven Years' War. At Minden, in Westphalia, the British contingent numbered some seven or eight thousand out of an Allied force of 36,000, and the whole army was under the over-command of Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick. The British infantry covered itself with distinction. "I have seen," said the defeated French General, "what I never thought to be possible—a single line of infantry break through three lines of cavalry, ranked in order of battle, and tumble them to ruins." Minden, which was fought to save Hanover from the French, was the precedent for the use to which the British army was now to be put in France.

There are not many precedents of this use of the British army as a contingent in Continental operations under other than British direction, and it is curious that the best precedent should come from the Seven Years' War, and be set by a statesman, the Earl of Chatham, who did more than any other to establish what may be called the insular use of the British army as a mere adjunct to the British fleet.


The British army, then, was on the Continent of Europe primarily to defend France. The defence of Belgium, which preoccupied people's minds in England, was, in the military sense, a mere incident and afterthought to that first object.

It is time now to turn to the military problems of the defence of France, and to examine the plans which the French General Staff had for dealing with them.



British Troops on the march through France.

[Central News.]



[Exclusive News Agency.]

A View in the Vosges Mountains.



French Troops marching through the Vineyards on their way to the Frontier.

[Central Press.]

CHAPTER XII.

THE DEFENCES OF FRANCE.

DESCRIPTION OF THE FRENCH FRONTIERS—THE COMPARATIVE NEGLECT OF THE NORTHERN FRONTIERS—THE DEFENCES OF THE EAST—THE TWO SCHOOLS OF MILITARY THOUGHT IN FRANCE—M. JAURES ON NATIONAL DEFENCE—THE PLANS OF THE FRENCH STAFF.

FRANCE has land frontiers with no fewer than six States—Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and Spain. The last two were not possible enemies of France in this war, and Germany did not find it in her interest to violate the neutrality of Switzerland. But her invasion of Belgium and Luxembourg more than doubled the length of frontier that France had to defend. Her frontier with Germany from Longwy to Belfort is about 150 miles long as the crow flies. Her northern frontier is more than 200 miles long. Moreover, this northern frontier, both by nature and in its artificial works, is much less strong than the eastern frontier.


Something has already been said of the French frontiers in the discussion of the military reasons which led the Germans to violate the neutrality of Belgium, but the policy of the French General Staff is not to be understood without a more general survey of the strategic features of the long line which the French Army, with the assistance of the British Expeditionary Force, was now to defend. (See map on page 113.)

The line falls into three divisions:—First, the Belgian frontier from the sea to the Meuse; second, the Luxembourg frontier, with which we may group the Belgian Ardennes; and third, the eastern frontier, with German Lorraine and Alsace, running down to Switzerland.

From the sea coast to Lille France is—geographically speaking—a part of Flanders. It is flat country, intersected by canals and watercourses, often marshy. Here are the fens of France. The rivers flow roughly parallel with the coast: first the Yser, then the Lys, the Scarpe, the Escaut (or Scheldt), and the Sambre. So level is the country that it seems the merest chance whether a river drains to the north or to the south. The Sambre nearly joins the Oise, and the Escaut


the Somme, and at almost every imaginable point there are canals connecting the streams, both parallel and perpendicular to the line of the frontier. The Somme is canalised to the Escaut, and the Sambre to the Oise; and running east and west across the country there is a continuous connection all the way from the coast to Cambrai. The Canal de la Bassée, between the Lys and the Deule, at Lille, and the Canal de la Sensée, between the Scarpe and the Escaut, are two of the most famous among scores of canals. Because of the difficulty of cross-country communications in the days before the fens were drained, the towns are all to be found along the course of the rivers. In the drainage area of the Lys are Ghent, Ypres, and Lille; in that of the Scarpe, which comes next, going east, are Douai and Arras; in that of the Escaut and Somme are Valenciennes, Peronne, and St. Quentin; and further east again the Sambre leads past Maubeuge and Landrecies, by canal, to Guise and La Fère on the Oise. On this frontier, Vauban, the great French engineer under Louis XIV., spent much of his ingenuity. It was called a frontier of iron after he had finished with it; but it might have been called, with more appropriateness, a frontier of mud, for its strength was entirely in its mixture of earth and water. In most of the old campaigns, the defence was assisted by inundations of the countryside, but, except in the neighbourhood of Dunkirk, no attempt was made in this war to use this means of defence in France.

On this part of the frontier much of the spirit of old Flanders has survived. There is among the people the same local pride and the same industrious habits. Lille is sometimes described as the Manchester of France, and near it are the cotton spinning towns of Turcoing and Roubaix. Further east, the Belgian coal seams run under the frontier. There is a good deal of coal-mining.



A General View of Nancy from the Town Hall.

[Exclusive News Agency.]



The Governor's Palace at Nancy.

[Exclusive News Agency.]

East of the Sambre the country changes its character, and the fens give place to rolling and thickly-wooded country. Maubeuge, on the Sambre, commands the shortest and easiest road to Paris, along the valley of the Oise. Most of the old fortifications along this northern frontier had been dismantled, or allowed to fall into decay; at first, because the neutralisation of Belgium was thought to have deprived this frontier of its military importance, and later, when it came to appear likely that Germany would invade that way, because the military fashion had grown somewhat out of conceit with fortifications, which were deemed to be too costly in men and to encourage false strategical ideas. But some of the forts were kept up, and among them Maubeuge, which, though not a place of great natural strength, held too important a position at the head of the best line of invasion from the north to be neglected. East of Maubeuge, the Belgian frontier line—whose general direction from the coast is south-east—takes a sudden bend to the south, to enclose in Belgium a triangular block of territory between the Sambre and the Meuse. This is strategically a very important district. At the apex, where the Sambre joins the Meuse, is Namur, one of Brialmont's Belgian fortresses, and reputed at the beginning of the war to be impregnable, and the sides of the triangle are formed by the Sambre and the Meuse, broad rivers with hills on either bank. The curious wedge of French territory which runs up the west bank of the Meuse in the direction of Dinant is fortified at Givet quite uselessly, seeing that the northern end could hardly be held against attack, and to somewhat more purpose at the southern end, at Rocroy and Mézières. Across the Meuse the Ardennes country begins.

To sum up, the possible lines of invasion on this northern frontier are five in number, namely:—

- (1) The coast line;
- (2) Courtrai, Lille, and Arras;
- (3) Mons, Condé, and Valenciennes;
- (4) The Sambre and Maubeuge;
- (5) Namur, Dinant, and Ayvelles.

East of the Meuse, the frontier runs alongside the borders of the Belgian Ardennes and Luxembourg. Formerly the forest and the deep narrow valleys made the Ardennes impossible for military operations on any extended scale, but in recent years the country has been opened up, and well metalled roads laid cross the hills, besides several lines of railway. In particular, one railway, which branches off the Namur line south of Dinant and runs parallel to the French frontier from the north of Givet to Luxembourg, was regarded, and with reason, as very dangerous to the defence in the event of an invasion of France from the north. A dozen miles up the Meuse from Charleville, and tucked in between the river and the Ardennes frontier, is Sedan, the scene of the great disaster to the French in the war of 1870. How came the Emperor Napoleon, with an army of more than 200,000 men, to be on this part of the frontier at all, seeing that the German invaders then came not from the north but from the east? It is worth while recalling the leading facts for the light that they throw on the geography and strategical features of these frontiers. At the end of August, Bazaine had been shut up in Metz, and was there besieged by the First and Second German Armies. The so-called Army of Châlons, consisting of the remains of the troops beaten in Lorraine, and of the army which had been formed to cover Paris, began operations for the relief of Bazaine. It was hoped by a rapid march to cross the Meuse at Stenay and gain the Metz road before

the two German armies not engaged with Bazaine—one at Verdun and the other near Commercy—could face north and bar the advance. But the Verdun army was too quick. It marched north through the Argonne, and headed off the French between Stenay and Vouziers. The French descended the Meuse, and crossed at Mouzon. Here they were headed off again, forced back on Sedan, and there defeated and forced to surrender. The strategical ideas of the French movements were sound, miserably though they broke down in their execution, and the Germans were undoubtedly influenced in their decision to violate the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg by their desire to prevent a similar movement across the Meuse under cover of a neutral flank that might be made in circumstances more favourable to the French than those in which it was attempted in 1870. The railway, already mentioned, from above Dinant, parallel with the frontier to Luxembourg, is, in fact, the strategical idea of the French before Sedan, put on rails and placed at the disposal of the Power which should be unscrupulous enough to violate the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg.

Between Sedan and Montmédy the frontier runs through the forest of the Ardennes. At Montmédy the country becomes more open, and near Longwy there is a gap made by the valley of the Chiers, through which come the railway and the main road from Luxembourg into France. At Longwy, on a plateau overlooking the valley, there is a strong, important fort.

THE EASTERN FRONTIER.

The eastern is the most interesting of the frontiers of France, and its geography, which at first sight appears to be very complicated, straightens itself out fairly regularly on a closer examination. To those who like mnemonics, a fair idea of the defences of this frontier may be had from the hand extended flat. On such a hand, the tip of the thumb is Paris, and the extension between the thumb and the first finger is the plain of Champagne and the valleys of the Aisne and the Marne. The first finger is the Argonne range, and if it were the longest finger on the hand Sedan would be at the tip of it. Between the first and second fingers is the depression made by the Meuse valley, where it runs due south, parallel with the German frontier. The second finger is the heights of the Meuse, with its famous chain of forts running down from Verdun towards Toul. Between the second and the third fingers is the plain of the Woëvre, blocked at the end by the barrier of Toul and the Plateau de Haye. The Metz ridge, running down through Pont-à-Mousson and Nancy, is the third finger overlooking the Moselle valley on the one side and the Mortagne and Meurthe valleys on the other, and blocked at the end by Épinal. And the Vosges are the little finger, with the Rhine valley outside the hand, with Strassburg at the tip, and Belfort on the knuckle. Finally, the ball of the thumb is the Plateau of Langres.*


Such descriptions, however, are useful only as mnemonics, and geographically, of course, are far from being accurate. The key to the understanding of this frontier is the fixing of the four ranges, the two westerly ranges, the Argonne and the heights of the Meuse, being entirely in French territory, the two easterly ranges of Metz and the Vosges in French territory before the war of 1870, but now only partially so. The valleys between these ranges have this general peculiarity that they are more accessible from the north end than from the south

* See page 128.



The River Side at Metz.

[Exclusive News Agency.]



A General View of Strassburg, showing the Cathedral.

[Exclusive News Agency.]

end, where they are more or less closed by cross ridges. There is only one exception to this rule, namely, the Gap of Belfort, which is at the extreme south end of the Vosges, and between them and the Alps.

The scheme of General de Rivières, who designed the system of defence on the eastern frontier after the war of 1870, took full advantage of these destructive features of the mountain barriers. All along the Heights of the Meuse he constructed forts to command the practicable roads over them. At the north end is the strong place of Verdun, overlooking a district where the Meuse valley, hitherto confined between steep hills, suddenly widens out before beginning to curve round the base of the Ardennes. The perimeter of the forts is more than twenty-five miles, and from some of the redoubts there is a view both of the plain of the Woevre and of the Meuse valley, with the Argonne hills in the background. The Meuse heights for some distance south of Verdun are thickly wooded, as is also the whole plain of the Woevre below; the two forts of Génicourt and Troyon command the exits from the Meuse woods. Further south, the ridge is broken by a valley, which runs up from Spada, and here is the fort of des Paroches, which enfilades the whole valley; and a few miles further on is the fort of Roman Camp, situated on a hill in the middle of a peninsula made by the windings of the Meuse. From here a road runs across the Woevre to Pont-à-Mousson, on the Metz range, on the other side of the valley, and a little south of St. Mihiel is the Rupt de Mad, which flows into the Moselle just where the French frontier crosses the range of hills running south from Metz. Further south, near Commercy, the barrier of the Meuse heights becomes less broad, but then comes the great fortress of Toul, which with the plateau de Haye straddles right across the valley to Nancy, and completely blocks the southern end of the Woevre.

Nancy—we are now in the Moselle valley—is an immense fortified camp, and a large and wealthy town. The frontier lies some distance to the east of Nancy, and runs in a south-easterly direction, past Moyenvic and Lunéville, to the Vosges. Except at Nancy, there are no fortifications on this section of the frontier, but at the southern end of the valley, between Nancy and the Vosges, are the barrier forts of Épinal and Remiremont.

Between Alsace and France the Vosges are the frontier, and at the southern end of the Vosges is the famous Gap of Belfort, leading from Alsace and Switzerland into France. Here is the fort of Belfort, ranking in strength and importance with Verdun and Toul.

It was one of de Rivières' principles to leave gaps here and there in his system of defensive fortifications, the idea being to shepherd the invading armies in directions where it would be possible for the reserve armies in rear of the barrier ranges to fall upon them, and also to tempt the enemy to show his plans of invasion, and so diminish the risk of surprise. There was one such gap purposely left to the north of Verdun, another near Épinal, and a third is the Belfort Gap just mentioned.

DEFENCE POLICIES IN FRANCE.


Such were the frontiers which the French Army had now to defend. The strategic policy of the German army was well known. It was attack—always attack; to aim not merely at the defeat of the enemy's armies, but at their annihilation. Sedan and Metz were an obsession in all their military thinking. The great object was the surrounding of the hostile armies, and the invariable means to that end was the outflanking

movement, and if from both sides then so much the better. They pursued the encircling strategy as persistently as the Boers, or as the Kaffirs, from whom the Boers learnt it, but their minor tactics on the actual field of battle were the Napoleonic shock tactics, which the British army had completely outgrown. Individual initiative was discouraged; everything was subordinated to the conception of an army as a great machine wound up ready to start off at the highest possible speed, kept going and directed by a few super-intelligences. It is strange that a nation so fertile of ideas as the French should not have evolved a rival system to the German, and one more suited to the national genius, but should have been content to imitate and adapt, often with very imperfect success, the ideas of their victors. Great wars are won, very rarely by imitation, however successful, usually by the possession by one side or the other of some new idea in tactics or organisation, or some original use of an arm, or by force of some new conception which has caught the imagination of the country and enlisted in its service all the thinking of the nation. War being the art of destruction, it is strange that military men, other than the giants who have made history, should be as a rule so slow to recognise the explosive value of a new idea.

For many years after the war of 1870 French military thought was almost purely imitative of the Germans. Except for the elaboration of the defensive system on the eastern frontier, it was entirely preoccupied with the strategical offensive against Germany, and for one plan of national defence there were a hundred variations of the old problem of how Germany might best be invaded. Some of the Germans had doubted the validity of the German theory of the advantages of attack. "I am convinced," said von Moltke, "that, thanks to the perfection of modern firearms, defensive tactics have a great advantage over offensive. It is true that in 1870 we had carried and attacked the strongest positions, but at the price of what sacrifices! If we wait to repel several attacks of the enemy before passing to the offensive, that seems to be preferable." The French had in the defensive system of their eastern frontier and in the north, as Vauban had shown, an excellent opportunity of evolving a new defensive, but no such plan seems ever to have been thought out. The dominant idea in French military thought, almost up to the very outbreak of war, is that of an offensive based on the Meuse forts through Lorraine.

There were, of course, exceptions to this general trend of military thought. In 1911, M. Jaurès, one of the ablest men of his generation in France, whose murder at the beginning of the war was a blow not to France alone but to all Europe, published "*L'Armée Nouvelle*," a remarkable work, in which he advocated for France the formation and elaboration of a defensive military policy in opposition to the generally accepted adaptations in France of the German military gospel. With the details of his proposed new military organisation in France we need have no concern, but one passage in the work has so close an application to the problems of this war, both at the beginning and for some time afterwards, that it is worth quoting at length. It need not, of course, affect our judgment of the passage that M. Jaurès connects his military ideas with his Socialism, for there is no essential affinity between the theory of the right place in the national strategy of the defensive and a Socialistic body of doctrine. M. Jaurès writes:—

Germany, then, knows what she wants. Does France? Commandant Rossel emphatically says "No." He begins by



A General View of Remiremont.

[Exclusive News Agency.]

defining what, from the National and Socialistic point of view, the defence of France should be. "Strategically we shall reply to the brutal offensive of the enemy with a defensive policy scientifically organised, and by manœuvres carried to the extreme limit of devotion and audacity. Should the invasion take us unawares—and that would be fatal—we should, no doubt, defend our territory foot by foot by rapidly concentrating all the combatants in the districts invaded or immediately threatened. But we shall not, in order to give the country a fleeting sense of security, commit the folly of putting our heads in the lion's mouth. However great a blow the invasion may be to French national pride, we shall not commit ourselves definitely to a counter-attack until the massed millions of our armed citizens, representing the life and the work of the nation, have all been brought together into the fighting line—by which time the enemy's hosts, weakened by successive deployments, disilluminated by repeated failure, by the constant lengthening of the distance from their base, by the prospect of indefinite prolongation of the war, and by the doubts and indecision now evident in their leading, have lost confidence in their offensive power and the strength of cohesion. The strategical conception which corresponds to a war of national defence means, on the one hand, the concentration of our armies at a point remote from danger, and, on the other hand, a general offensive at the psychological moment of time and place.

"Such is the only plan of campaign, at once defensive and offensive, for a country which wants peace but knows what war is, and how to draw its strength in war from its desire for peace."

After having indicated in bold outlines his own conceptions of what should be a truly national system of strategy for a twentieth-century France, menaced by German attack, Rossel proceeds to ask of the official rulers of France and of the army what their ideas are. He plies them with difficult questions. "From the point of view of strategy is our army, such as it is and such as the *bourgeoisie* has made it, fit to take the offensive? No; the higher ranks of the army have no illusions about that. The German army of the First Line will be ready two days, perhaps three, before us; possibly the South German contingents will be at the foot of the Vosges on the seventh or eighth day after mobilisation.

"But what then? Are we to fall back on the defensive? They are not prepared for that either any more than for the offensive. No military leader in France has ever dared to look the prospect in the face, and to prepare in advance for a policy of standing on the defensive. No minister has ever thought of confronting and forming popular opinion on that question. They will accumulate millions of men as near as they can to the frontiers, in the very jaws of the vice. But if the heights of the Meuse are carried or turned by a formidable army ready before our own; if Belgium is invaded—as is probable, and, from their point of view, rational; if our concentration is thrown into confusion while it is still in progress, what a rout there will be! It will be defeat before the battle."

These, then, were the alternatives before France: a military policy which was an imitation of the German, and one which was truly national. On the one hand, an adaptation to an organisation to which they were not suited of German military devices of the sudden offensive, and on the other hand an organised plan of defensive warfare, designed to overcome the weakness of France and to encourage the faults of the German army system. The passage quoted from Rossel reads almost prophetically now. Against the worst dangers that he described, the resistance of Belgium helped to protect France; but there was a stage during the retreat from the Belgian frontier when, but for the assistance of the British army, France might have fallen, as Commandant Rossel feared, between the two alternatives, having prepared for an offensive policy which she was not strong enough to carry out, and failed to prepare a rational policy of defence which, had it been understood by the nation beforehand, might have saved her the gravest anxiety and alarm.

GENERAL JOFFRE'S PLANS.

To which of these two schools did General Joffre, the French Commander-in-Chief, belong? What plans did he inherit from his predecessors? How far did he modify them? And what influence did the prospect of English assistance, which was at any rate likely, have upon them? It is exceedingly difficult to answer these questions. General Joffre was noted for his habit of silence. Plans of campaign were not in any case likely to be proclaimed from the housetops, though it is singular how close the actual German plans were to the speculations of the military writers. But in the case of General Joffre, no single sentence of his is recorded which indicated a preference for one policy over another. And if we take what actually happened in the first month of the war, we can find in it evidence of every conceivable military policy in turn. If his invasion of Alsace and Lorraine stood alone, there would be no hesitation in pronouncing him a Frenchman of the Prussian military school, consumed by the belief that in war nothing matters but the prosecution of a vigorous offensive. Or, again, if we restricted our examination to his plans for the defence of Southern Belgium and Northern France, we would be tempted to regard him as a commander of expedients merely, without consistent and well-thought-out general policy. Or, finally, if we looked solely to his actions during the retreat from Mons to the Marne, one might be tempted to see him a convert to the views of national defence expressed by Commandant Rossel and approved by M. Jaurès in the long passage that we have quoted. Can we, at this short distance from the events, construct a rational scheme of military policy and label it with any degree of confidence as the policy of General Joffre and his staff? Such speculations, hazardous though they may be, are too tempting to resist. It must be understood, of course, that they are pure speculation, and in no sense ascertained facts.

It is, in the first place, quite certain that the French were not taken by surprise by the German invasion of Belgium. For ten years almost every military writer had regarded it as probable, and since the Agadir crisis it had been all but certain. Whether France had ever during that time asked Belgium to concert measures for their common protection there is no evidence; but certain it is that Belgium in such case would have refused to arrange plans which might lay her open to the charge that she was entering into a defensive military alliance, and so violating the condition under which her neutrality had been guaranteed. There was the less temptation to concert these plans because if Germany did decide to invade Belgium the probability was that, owing to its more rapid mobilisation, the German army would be through Belgium and on the frontiers of France before the French army was in a condition to meet it on equal terms. And this, in fact, is what happened, in spite of the slight delays in the German army's advance caused by the defence at Liège, by the evident valour of the Belgian army, and by the unexpected hostility of the population. It seems likely, therefore, that a campaign for the defence of Belgium was no part of the plans of General Joffre and his staff at the outbreak of the war.

How, then, did he propose to meet the German invasion from the north? Not—there is no reason to think—by hurrying up the French army to meet it. Many have been puzzled by the early French attacks in Alsace and in Lorraine, and have found it difficult to fit them in a general scheme of defence. The motives may, as has been suggested already (p. 37), have been

partly political. Also, even though it may not have been intended to press them to extremity, it may have been hoped that they would delay or disturb the concentration against Belgium in the north. The offensive in the east was the complement to a strictly defensive policy towards the northern frontier; it was a compromise that attempted to combine in one plan the advantages claimed by the two schools of French defence—the older and imitatively Prussian school which pressed for a vigorous attack towards Metz, and the newer school which pleaded the suitability of the defence in view of the comparative weakness and unreadiness of the French army. Where the line of defence was to be in Northern France, according to this scheme, it is hard to say. The concentration was far back, in order that there might be no fear of its interruption by a rapid German onslaught; and the idea may have been to make the real line of defence as far back as was consistent with the defence of Paris and the holding of the Meuse line of forts. If this was the plan, it would account for the complete failure to make any provision for the north-west of France, from Valenciennes and Lille to the sea. Should the British army take part in the war—the French Staff could hardly count on its help with certainty beforehand—it may have been intended that it should remain on the flank of the German advance. If the main German advance passed it by, then it would attack their communications; if, on the other hand, they decided to deal with it before attacking the French, they would expose themselves to a flank attack by the main French army.

The following scheme seems, then, to emerge from the confusion of these early days of the war.

- (1) A vigorous attack by the French from their eastern frontiers in Alsace and towards Metz, in the hope of gaining some decisive victory over the comparatively weak forces opposed to them, or at the least of disturbing the German concentration against Belgium.
- (2) A policy of delay and expectant defence in the north of France.
- (3) Two armies on the flank of the German advance: first, the Belgian army based on Belgium, and secondly, the British army based on some defensive position on the French coast.

THE MAGNET OF BELGIUM.

This, so far from being a confused plan, was both clear and consistent. The main objection to it was that the counter-attack in Lorraine, if made in great force, would stake the success of the defence on what was, after all, a subsidiary operation, and that if it were not made in great force it might achieve no results at all, but be a mere useless dispersion of strength. Still, had it been possible to carry it out as it was designed, it might have yielded very satisfactory and even brilliant results. The main complication, however, was the difficulty of leaving Belgium alone. Very early in the war, the resistance of Belgium began to act as a magnet, drawing the French army further and further north. It seemed impossible




The Town Hall at Mulhouse.


[Exclusive News Agency.]

to remain on the strict defensive in Northern France while Belgium bore unassisted the brunt of the German attack. Thus the original plan, for reasons which it would have seemed callous and almost dishonourable to disregard, was disturbed by the unexpectedly vigorous character of Belgium's resistance, and by the great wave of popular sympathy with her sufferings. The French army did not join forces with the Belgian army for the defence of Brussels; nor, on the other hand, did it remain in an attitude of expectancy well behind the frontier. It went, as will be seen, half way, and met the German army just

over the Belgian border, not far enough north to take off from Belgium much of the shock of invasion, but far enough north to lead to the abandonment of a strictly defensive policy in the north of France. The policy actually pursued was a compromise superimposed upon a compromise. The original compromise was the combination of the offensive in Lorraine with the defensive in the north of France. The compromise now superimposed upon it was between waiting for the Germans on the Marne and going out to engage them on the field of Waterloo.



THE NORTHERN AND EASTERN FRONTIERS OF FRANCE.



THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES AFTER THE FALL OF LIEGE.

(The map must not be taken as indicating the exact positions of the Armies.)



[Exclusive News Agency.

Namur : The Citadel seen from the junction of the Sambre and Meuse.

CHAPTER XIII.


THE FALL OF NAMUR.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE FRENCH ARMY—THE CAMPAIGN IN THE VOSGES—THE DEFEAT IN LORRAINE—THE FIGHTING AT DINANT—THE NAMUR DISASTER.

IN the peace distribution of the French army there has been little change for years. The first line troops are distributed in twenty-one military centres, each the headquarters of an army corps. The First Army Corps is stationed at Lille, the Second at Amiens, and the rest, numbered in order up to the Twenty-first Army Corps, at Rouen, Le Mans, Orléans, Châlons, Besançon, Bourges, Tours, Rennes, Nantes, Limoges, Clermont, Lyon, Marseilles, Montpellier, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Paris, Nancy, and Épinal. The distribution of these various corps after the outbreak of war has not been revealed by the French War Office, for reasons which are not self-evident, though they have seemed sufficient to the French Government. It is not, therefore, possible, as it was in the case of the German army, to indicate at what point of the frontier the units of the French army were employed. But the probability is that all the corps of the French military governments on the east and southern side of France went to the eastern frontier. These would number ten—that is, roughly, about half the French first line army.

For a week before the war, the French troops ordinarily stationed on the frontiers had been withdrawn for a distance of five miles, partly in order to avoid occasion of provocation, partly to protect them against

being overwhelmed by a sudden rush. The first serious action of the French in the war was to recover the crests of the Vosges. The abortive campaign in Alsace has already been touched upon in the chapter describing the German advance in the north. It failed completely in its object, which was to distract the German concentration further north; nor were the operations in the Alsatian plain of much military interest or political importance. But some exceedingly good work was done by the French in recovering the crests of the Vosges. Here the frontier follows the line of the crests, and on the outbreak of war the Germans seized the positions evacuated by the French and began to fortify them. At the south end of the Vosges, the slopes are gentle on the French side and steep on the side of Alsace. Further north, however, the conditions are reversed. In the neighbourhood of the Passes of Bonhomme and Ste. Marie-aux-Mines, the French side is the steep one, and the summits of the hills are thickly wooded and very narrow. It was difficult to give the attacking French infantry attack artillery support, and without it the crests could not be carried, for the Germans had entrenched themselves very strongly, and all the approaches were covered with barbed wire. The first attempt on these passes had to be abandoned. The French accordingly marched still further north, to the



[Record Press.]

[Stanley's Press Agency.]

[Central News.]

GENERALS IN COMMAND OF GERMAN ARMIES.**The Crown Prince of Bavaria.****The Crown Prince of Germany.****Duke Albrecht of Wurtemberg.**

Saales Pass, and here it was possible to bring up the artillery, and to turn it on the Germans holding the passes further south. It was a considerable success, skilfully gained, and it gave the French the possession of the head of the valley of the Bruche, which joins the Rhine at Strassburg. Had the French been in a position to begin operations against Strassburg, the success might have had important military results. But they were not; and though the French retained their positions, they were not able to put them to further use.

The Germans replied by an attempt to work round the left flank of the French in the Bruche Valley. On August 12th, they advanced from Saarburg on Blamont and cut up a French brigade in the Paroy Forest, near Lunéville, taking 700 prisoners. The French, however, were in greater force in this district, and a few days later they drove the Bavarians over the frontier. On August 18th, General Joffre reported: "We have conquered the greater part of the valleys in the Vosges on the Alsatian slopes, from which we shall soon descend into the plain."

THE ADVANCE OF THE GERMAN ARMIES.

At the end of the second week of the war the position in France and Belgium was as follows:—

(1) In the south, the Germans were holding Alsace very weakly, and that in spite of the loan of an army corps from Austria. Covering Strassburg, and watching the issues from the Vosges passes, was General Heeringen, with the Seventh German Army.

(2) In Lorraine, and covering Metz, was the Sixth German Army, consisting of three corps, under the Crown Prince of Bavaria.

(3) In Luxembourg, with his right on Arlon, and his left on the town of Luxembourg, was the German Crown Prince, with the Fifth Army.

(4) In the Belgian Ardennes was the Fourth Army, under the Duke of Wurtemberg.

(5) On the German left, in Belgium, was General Hansen, with the Third Army, consisting of two Saxon Corps, and maintaining communication with the Fourth Army by detachment at Huy, half way between Liège and Namur.

(6) The German centre in Belgium was formed by the three corps of the Second Army, under General von Bülow.

(7) The First German Army, consisting of five army corps was on the right wing. This army, much the strongest of all the seven, was clearly destined to bear

the brunt of the fighting in the invasion of France. It was commanded by General von Kluck, one of the very few higher officers in Germany who did not make their career through the General Staff or Adjutancy, but in regimental service. He was born at Münster, Westphalia, in 1846, joined, when nineteen years of age, an infantry regiment as ensign, and took part in the war against Austria. In the war against France he was wounded twice, and afterwards served in the army of occupation. He became captain in 1879, taught a long time at the non-commissioned officers' schools in Berlin and Neu-Breisach, became colonel in 1896, and three years later was promoted to the rank of major-general, with the command of an infantry brigade. In 1902 he commanded the division at Allenstein, in East Prussia; in 1906 he was commander of the Fifth Army Corps, at Posen, and



[Record Press.]

General von Kluck.

received the rank of general of infantry, and from 1907 till the present year was commander of the First Army Corps, at Königsberg. In 1909 he was granted the letters-patent of hereditary nobility, and shortly before the war was appointed inspector of the army, with the rank of colonel-general.

The position of the French forces at this time cannot be accurately given, but approximately it was as follows :—

(1) On the eastern frontier, and confronting the Seventh and Sixth German Armies, was the French Army of the Vosges and the Moselle, in considerable numerical superiority to their opponents. This army was in command of Southern Alsace and on the Vosges Passes, and was beginning to threaten Strassburg from the head of the Bruche valley. Further north, they had just driven the Bavarians over the frontier, and were threatening to place themselves between Strassburg and Metz.

(2) In echelon with this Army of the Vosges was the Army of the Meuse, holding the line of the Meuse Heights from Toul to Verdun, and faced by the Fifth German Army. Its left wing was extended north on the left bank of the Meuse into the Belgian Ardennes. On August 14th, a strong force from the Fourth German Army in the Ardennes seized Dinant, and drove out the French who were in the town on the east bank of the Meuse. An engagement followed on the next day, and the French, thanks to their superior artillery fire, succeeded in expelling the Germans and driving them south-east towards Rochefort.

(3) There was the French Army of the North. Its exact position at this time was uncertain, but the magnet of Belgium was drawing it further and further north. Here were the French headquarters and General Joffre. Its strength, too, is uncertain, but probably did not exceed six army corps.

(4) Finally, there was the British contingent near Boulogne.


General Joffre must have had grave doubts by this time of the wisdom of continuing his offensive on the east, which was depriving him of some of his best troops. But the advance into Lorraine had gone too far to be recalled, and its chances of success seemed good. Moreover, there was the Belgium army still unbroken, and Namur, the fortress, might be trusted to detain the Germans for some time, until the effects of any victory gained in Lorraine began to tell on the German advance. It should further be borne in mind that at this time General Joffre

had not realised that the Germans in Belgium were as strong as they were, or that they had put so much of their strength into their right outside wing.

THE DEFEAT IN LORRAINE.

At the beginning of the third week of the war, the French troops of the Vosges army were in a promising position. They had driven the Bavarians over the border, and were now advancing on a wide front between Strassburg and Metz. Their strength was estimated by the Germans at five army corps, or about 250,000 men. Three days later, they were pouring back across the border, a badly defeated army. It was the first great battle in the war, but neither from the French nor from the German side has there yet appeared a rational account of what happened. The battle was fought in very broken country, between the Vosges and the hills above Nancy. The French right was at Saarlouis, and its left at Delme,


and the line between these two points ran in front of Chateau Salins, through Dieuze, on the main road to Sarreguimines. The right wing had evidently been swung forward from Donon, a commanding hill in the Vosges which had been won in the hill fighting already described; and the plan was the one indulged for many years by the French Staff of driving a wedge between Metz and Strassburg and cutting one of the knots of German communications. Undoubtedly, had the advance succeeded, it would have ruined the German concentration through Luxembourg, and



The Campaign in the Vosges.

probably against Belgium too. The whole movement was a test of the doctrines of the "forward school" of French strategists. It broke down, it would seem, through the failure of the French columns to keep in touch with each other. One whole division seems to have been isolated and more than 10,000 prisoners were taken. In addition, during the hasty retirement, a great number of guns had to be abandoned—150 in all, according to the German accounts, whose accuracy was only formally denied by the French War Office, which never published an account of the losses. The Bavarian loss was, in all probability, very heavy, for these troops in this as in the war of 1870 were singularly reckless in the attack, and the fighting in these broken hills would resolve itself into a number of separate engagements, without much general direction.

The battle definitely killed the idea for months of a



The Valley of the Meuse : A General View of Dinant.

[Exclusive News Agency.]

French offensive into Germany. The news must have been a serious blow to General Joffre. He had employed a great part of his army in these operations in the Vosges, which had produced no more definite results than the recovery of the crests of the hills towards Alsace, and in which, from beginning to end, the French army must have lost more than 20,000 men. In the meantime, the German movement through Belgium—which he had hoped to distract by these attacks—was gathering force and impetus. Brussels had been occupied on the same day as the defeat in the Vosges, and the main German army was now little more than thirty miles to the north.

THE FALL OF NAMUR.

There was still some hope that Namur would delay the German advance. Liège had kept a German force in front of it for nearly a fortnight—not, indeed, engaged in siege operations all that time, but unable, at any rate, to go elsewhere. Namur, if it could not hold out indefinitely, as some Englishmen—misunderstanding what had happened at Liège—hoped, might at any rate gain time for the Allied forces in Northern France to prepare themselves for the German onslaught.

The forts at Namur had been designed by Brialmont, whose system of fortification has already been described. The town stands at the junction of the Meuse and the Sambre, just where the Meuse turns round the Ardennes. The position is extremely important. It commands the principal railway to the south, and covers the right or left flank of an army conducting defensive operations east or west of the Meuse river. The garrison had had plenty of warning of the attack, and the experience of Liège had shown what the weakness of Brialmont's fortifications was. The first condition of a successful

defence was the construction of elaborate entrenchments between the forts, in which the defending army could remain secure under a bombardment. Another condition might have been the dismantling of the forts and the removal of the guns from a building of concrete and steel, in which their presence was advertised, into artfully-concealed emplacements, where their positions could be constantly changed. But it was hardly to be expected that the Belgians would go to such extremes. Under favourable conditions, no army has ever fought better than the Belgians; but at Namur their whole theory of defence was wrong. Except that the guns in some of the forts—notably Maizeret and Marchevotte—were very old-fashioned, and all the guns of inferior range to the new Krupp siege-guns, the mechanics of the defence were excellent. Enormous stores of ammunition and food supplies had been accumulated, large areas round the forts had been mined, and electrically-charged barbed wire had been laid down at suitable places. It was this mechanical genius of Brialmont that paralysed the defence. The commander of the garrison, General Michel, had such confidence in the forts and in the mechanism of defence, that he forgot that the real strength of a fort is the garrison. He, too, was probably misled by the exaggerated accounts of the siege of Liège which had obtained currency. Properly understood, the lessons of that siege were, first, the necessity of entrenching very elaborately the wide intervals between the forts, and, secondly, the powerlessness of fixed fortifications to stand against the new German guns, if they were allowed to be advantageously placed. Both these lessons were neglected.

In the first place, no effort was made to prevent the Germans from bringing up their siege guns. They were



[Newspaper Illustrations.]

The effect of the German siege guns on a Belgian fort: German officers inspecting a smashed cupola on Fort Loncin at Liège.

fixed in their positions, out of range of the guns of the forts, under cover of a dense fog; but there had been many opportunities of preventing their arrival, had the Belgian commander used his army as the commander of Verdun used his—as a field-force based on the forts, but not a mere garrison to be shut up in them, passively awaiting the beginning of the siege. An even more serious error was the failure of the Belgians adequately to entrench themselves. The fire even of the most formidable guns need not be very deadly against sufficiently elaborate field-works.

The circumstances under which the defence began were very depressing. Brussels had been lost, and the Belgian Government had been removed to Antwerp, at the opposite end of the country from Namur. At Namur, the garrison must have thought of themselves less as defenders of their own country than as members of an Allied army taking part in operations that may have looked to them more like the defence of France than of Belgium. Yet the spirit of the garrison was excellent, and under better direction the defence of Namur might have been one of the finest things of the war. As it was, the most patriotic Belgian has to admit that it was his great failure—a failure not of the men, but of the military ideas that governed the defence.

The bombardment of Namur began on August 24th, from thirty-two guns, which the Germans had been allowed to place in the most suitable positions. It was directed first on the entrenchments, in which, if they had been properly prepared, it might have been borne, if not with comfort, at any rate with philosophy. As it was, the ordeal was too much for the garrison.

Without troubling about the forts, the Germans at first centred their rain of steel upon our entrenchments, where our men were posted awaiting attack. For ten hours our brave young fellows stood this terrible ordeal without being able to fire a shot in return. Any man who put his head above the fire-

swept ramparts simply had it mown off. Lying flat on our stomachs, using whatever we could to shield our heads, all we could do was to wait for this rain of iron and fire to end. We were all burning to emulate our valiant brothers who fell at Liège, but what human being would not be disheartened when he could not even see the enemy attacking him and could do nothing to protect himself, nothing to avenge the comrades falling around him? Whole regiments were being decimated. I still shudder at the memory of these horrors.


The losses among the officers were terrible, and gradually the soldiers, deprived of their leaders, became demoralised. With one bound they suddenly rose and fled—a general *saute qui peut*,—and only when the lines were reformed to the rear was it seen how many were missing.

Meanwhile, many of the German guns had been turned on the forts, especially those of Maizeret and Marchevelette. Armed with old-fashioned guns of much smaller calibre, they could offer but a feeble resistance, and Maizeret, in fact, only fired about ten shots, while it received no less than 1,200 shells, fired at the rate of twenty a minute. At Marchevelette seventy-five men were killed in the batteries, and both forts soon surrendered. Other works, however, were still holding out when the army left the town.*

Nothing was saved. Stores and artillery were all abandoned, and the retreat was wildly disorderly. "Tramping over the fields with ranks broken, regiments hopelessly intermingled, our troops continued their retreat, ever pursued, ever harassed. More than that, we tumbled right into the path of the French retreat from Charleroi. This further demoralised our men, and it was not until we got to Philippeville that the troops were pulled together and re-formed."

Namur, and the retreat from Namur, lost the Belgian army 16,000 men. Its fate at the first attack was the greatest shock that the Western Allies had, and it is to the credit of the British Press Bureau that it gave out the news at once, without any attempt at concealment.

* Account by a survivor, quoted by the Press Association's correspondent at Ostend in an admirable despatch.



The Fortifications of Namur.



After the Battle of Mons : General Shaw and the Staff of the 9th Brigade, 3rd Division, directing the fight in a street at Frameries. At the top of the street is a barricade held by British troops. The Germans were firing into and over this barricade when the photograph was taken.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE BATTLE OF MONS.

THE STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH ARMY—DESCRIPTION OF THE BRITISH POSITION—THE PLANS OF GENERAL JOFFRE—THE FAILURE EAST OF THE MEUSE—BREAKDOWN OF THE FRENCH ATTACK TOWARDS CHARLEROI—THE BRITISH DEFENCE AT MONS.

THE whole of the British force that took part in the Battle of Mons was in France by the end of the second week of the war. The principal landing places were Boulogne and Havre. From there the battalions, as they landed, moved into camp, and during the week they moved up nearer to the Belgian frontier. On the evening of Friday the concentration was almost complete, and on the following day the troops were moved up to their positions.


The strength of the British force at Mons was two army corps, one cavalry division and a cavalry brigade, sixteen brigades of field artillery, with some horse and garrison artillery, some line of communication troops, with Engineer, Medical, and Army Service Corps units.* The following diagram shows approximately the strength

and organisation of the British army on the Continent at this time :—

1ST ARMY CORPS. (Sir Douglas Haig.)					
1st Division.			2nd Division.		
Infantry Brigades.			Infantry Brigades.		
1st.	2nd.	3rd.	4th.	5th.	6th.
Four	Four	Four	Four	Four	Four
Battalions	Battalions	Battalions	Battalions	Battalions	Battalions
2ND ARMY CORPS. (Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.)					
3rd Division.			5th Division.		
Infantry Brigades.			Infantry Brigades.		
7th.	8th.	9th.	13th.	14th.	15th.
Four	Four	Four	Four	Four	Four
Battalions	Battalions	Battalions	Battalions	Battalions	Battalions

With Divisional Troops, i.e., a Squadron of Cavalry to each Division, Field Artillery, Engineers, Army Service Corps, and Field Ambulance.

* The embargo on the publication of the full details of the composition of the British army at Mons is even yet not removed.



THE BATTLE OF MONS AND THE RETREAT TO LE CATEAU.

CAVALRY DIVISION.
(General Allenby.)

Brigades.			
1st. Three Regiments.	2nd. Three Regiments.	3rd. Three Regiments.	4th. Three Regiments.

With Divisional Cavalry, (Horse) Artillery, Engineers, and Field Ambulance.

5TH CAVALRY BRIGADE.
(Brig.-General Sir Philip Chetwode).
Three Regiments.

LINE OF COMMUNICATION TROOPS.

Altogether there were some fifty-seven battalions of infantry (the casualty lists and soldiers' letters show that some at least of the troops on the line of communications were brought up to take part in the first battle), fifteen regiments of cavalry, besides artillery and engineers—say, in all, about 70,000 men.

The plan of action for the British army was, apparently, not that which Sir John French had expected when he left England. There is some reason to think that, like General Joffre himself, he believed that his position would be further south, or possibly at some point between Paris and the Channel shores. At any rate, it is significant that in his despatch Sir John French speaks of "operations which the French Commander-in-Chief requested me to undertake in pursuance of his plans of the campaign," and that these plans were not, in fact, explained to the Commanders of the First and Second Army Corps until Saturday, August 22nd. It would, however, appear from the despatch that, though the general nature of the operations was fixed, Sir John French, as indeed was natural, was left quite free to choose his own means for carrying it out.

Sir John French chose a position rather more than twenty miles in breadth. Its centre was at Mons, a

substantial industrial town in the mining district of Southern Belgium, about seven miles from the French frontier and twelve miles from Maubeuge. The left of the line was at Condé, which is connected with Mons by a canal, and the right was at Binche. A straight line drawn between Condé and Binche would pass some distance to the south of Mons, which was thus the apex of a very flattened triangle, of which the side towards Condé was longer than the side towards Binche. On the left was the Second Army Corps, under Sir H. Smith-Dorrien. Sir J. Grierson, who had been appointed to the command of this corps, had died through heart failure soon after the landing in France. On the right

wing was the First Army Corps, under the command of Sir Douglas Haig, who, like Sir H. Smith-Dorrien, made his reputation in the South African War. The Fifth Cavalry Brigade was at Binche, on the right flank, and the Cavalry Division was held in reserve to act on the left flank, or wherever the line was threatened. The distribution of the troops, with rather more than half of them on much the shorter line to the east, seems to show that the heavy fighting was expected on the right and not the left of the line. The reconnaissance of the Fifth Cavalry Division had been active on Friday and Saturday, and had pushed as far as Soignies, twelve miles north of Mons. There were encounters with the enemy's cavalry, in which our cavalry showed its superiority, but nothing had happened to make it appear that the enemy was in strength. General



Throwing up a barricade in the streets of Mons with the battle in progress. The troops under the house are sheltering from flying shrapnel bullets.


The Battle of Mons: The barricades held by the Northumberland Fusiliers.

Joffre's information was that one or possibly two army corps were in front of the British, and Sir John French's information, such as it was, confirmed it. It must, however, be remembered that the British army had just arrived in Southern Belgium, and that the reconnaissance cannot have been very thorough.


Our own battle-front was only a small part of a very long line which extended up the Meuse valley to the




**The Advance on Mons : British Artillery on the March
(August 21st).**



**Past and Present : British Troops passing the
Monument erected on the battlefield of
Malplaquet (August 22nd).**



**A British Transport Column on the march to
Mons (August 22nd).**



British 6-in. Field Guns (48th Battery) in the advance on Mons.

Woevre. A French army was attacking the Crown Prince's army from the Woevre, and yet another had entered the Ardennes from the neighbourhood of Sedan. General Joffre's plan was, apparently, to attack all along the line, east as well as west of the Meuse, and the junction between his right and his left wing was the fortress of Namur, which he undoubtedly expected to hold the Germans until his attack could develop. The idea, clearly, was to drive a wedge between the German armies, and the defence of the fortress of Namur was an essential condition of the success of his plan. It is not necessary to follow the attacks on the east of the Meuse. They all came to nothing, and had no influence on the course of the battle.

THE FRENCH ATTACK.

Something, however, must be said of the French position immediately to the east of the British. Its left was in touch with our cavalry at Binche, and the line was continued through Charleroi towards the Meuse. His cavalry had penetrated some distance into Belgium, but at no time was he in close touch with Namur, though this place would have made the natural pivot between the left and right wings of the French army. The strength of this left wing was probably not more than three or four army corps, and General Joffre must already have begun to regret that so many corps were on the eastern front, where, so far as their influence on the battle which was now approaching was concerned, they were wasted.

The only official French statement on the operations where the French were in touch with the British gives the following account of the tactics. "A third army, from the region of Chimay, has been moved forward to make an attack on the German right, between the Sambre and the Meuse, and is supported by the English army, which set out from the region of Mons. A movement of the Germans, who had sought to envelop our left wing, has been followed step by step, and their right is now being attacked by our army forming our left wing, in junction with the English army. At this point the battle has been raging violently for more than a day." It is difficult to square this account with the English

stories of the battle, but it seems to make it quite clear that the French Commander was incorrectly informed of the position of the German right. The Germans whom the French attacked were not the right at all, but the centre.

Sir John French, in his despatch, is very reticent on the details of the battle, and the soldiers' letters, though numerous and very often graphically written, do not give a clear idea of the battle as a whole.

The battle began on the morning of Sunday with a French attack on what they thought was the German right. On Saturday the Germans had seized the passages of the Sambre—a fact that Sir John French, apparently, did not hear of till the evening of Sunday—and doubtless the French hoped, by attacking with vigour, to drive the Germans over the river again. The attack was made with the customary brilliancy of the French army, but it would seem that the strength of the Germans south of

the river was underestimated. At any rate, it made little headway, and though it inflicted loss on the enemy it had to be withdrawn, with the co-operation it would seem of the British right, in face of a heavy German counter-attack.

THE ATTACK ON MONS.

The British army at Mons, and along the canal to Condé, did not meet attack, but awaited it. The attack on the Mons position began about three o'clock on Sunday afternoon. Some of the outposts were surprised while bathing, and more than one soldier speaks of the suddenness of the attack. It was the first time British infantry had met the army of Germany, and the conditions of the



[Exclusive News Agency.]

Mons: A view of the old quarter of the town.

fighting were new and unfamiliar. In South Africa there had been no shock tactics, and, ingenious as the use which the Boers made of their artillery, the extreme violence of the German bombardment was unexpected by most of them. On the other hand, they were surprised, after their South African experience and their own training, at the density of the German formations and the pooriness of the German rifle practice. In the strict sense—though there was excellent range-finding by the artillery—there was no marksmanship in the German army. Rifles were used as the guns were used to keep up a bombardment of the



Preparing for the battle: British Troops building barricades across the streets between Cuesmes and Mons on the afternoon of Sunday, August 23rd.



The Battle of Mons: The barricades at Cuesmes.



**The Battle of Mons: In the trenches at Cuesmes
(a photograph taken immediately before the fighting began).**


enemy, and with this theory of rifle practise massed formation was almost inevitable. The losses of the Germans in these early massed attacks must have been very great indeed.

The first weight of the German attack seems to have fallen on the right wing of the British army, and Sir Douglas Haig fell back south of Bray, while the cavalry evacuated Binche. The severity of the fighting towards night extended to the west. General Hamilton, commanding the Third Division at Mons, had been warned not to keep his troops too long on the salient, or apex, of the triangle, but to retire behind the town if the enemy threatened seriously. This was done before dark. The British line was now bent back on the right, and the left was heavily engaged; but at no point had it been broken. The enemy had lost far more heavily than we; and though our artillery had suffered, the battle—in spite of the superior numbers of the Germans—had not gone against us.

But at five o'clock in the afternoon Sir John French received news which must have convinced him that the

whole plan of the battle had been misconceived. Namur had fallen by this time, and the French retreat had begun on his right. A heavy German attack was preparing on the British position, and, in addition, an army corps was moving by Tournai, many miles to the west. There was no alternative but to retire. Fighting continued all through the night, but the British army held on to its positions. Next morning the retreat from Mons began.

It was now clear that the whole plan of fighting in the Mons—Charleroi position had been a mistake, especially after the seizure of the Sambre passages, and the fall of Namur had deprived the operations in the triangle between the Sambre and the Meuse of military meaning. It was clear, too, that the character of the great sweeping movement of the Germans through Belgium had been misunderstood. The real flank of the movement was not near Namur, but much further to the west; and, moreover, the German movement through Belgium had acquired tremendous force and movement. An anxious week lay ahead.



Refugees in flight from the neighbourhood of Mons as the troops approached. The corn which was left ungarned in the fields was used for the soldiers' beds.

Appendix to Chapter XIII.

The following statement from an interview with Lord Sydenham, which appeared in the *Manchester Guardian* of October 15th, has a very important bearing on the defence of Liège and Namur, and the Belgian forts generally, and corrects many of the misconceptions which were current at the beginning of the war.

"In my controversy with General Brialmont," said Lord Sydenham, "I maintained that it was no use placing guns in forts, and I urged this view nearly twenty-five years ago. What is necessary is to provide shelters for the men, to which they can quickly retire when they are being shelled, and strongly entrenched lines with effective obstacles for defence when the enemy's infantry comes close. I got that idea from the Siege of Plevna, on which I wrote a book in 1879. That place was defended mainly by rifle lines, because the forts were small and inconspicuous, so that the Russian fire did not damage them. You must have your artillery defence quite independent of the forts, placing the guns and howitzers in the intervals, well concealed, and so organised that they can be moved about from place to place. The general organisation of a fortress, therefore, would be infantry redoubts of shallow depth, with good shelters, and artillery positions, with strong infantry trenches in the intervals of the forts. This is the principle which I advocated in my book published in 1890.

"This principle was strongly confirmed by what happened at Port Arthur, where the permanent forts acquitted themselves badly, as usual. It was in attacking the improvised defences on 203-metre Hill that all the heaviest Japanese losses were incurred. These entrenchments were the backbone of the defence.

WHY HE CONDEMNED LIÈGE FORTS.

"I went to Belgium in 1890, at the request of King Leopold, to report on the forts that were then being constructed. I strongly condemned the defences of Liège and Namur. I said that they could not defend their intervals properly, that their armaments were weak and slow in action, and that if the places were to be held at all it would only be done by constructing field entrenchments, with artillery and good obstacles in the intervals. I put the number of field forces alone necessary to hold these two places at 70,000 men, exclusive of the garrisons of the forts. What happened at Liège and Namur is clear. The intervals were not properly entrenched or adequately manned. There had not been time to do the manning work, and the obstacles were not sufficient, while the available field force was insufficient. Such defences as had been prepared appear to have been only on the eastern front. The Germans tried to storm

the eastern front without artillery preparation and failed, but they almost immediately got into the town through intervals that had been left undefended. That experience exactly carried out my theory, that the place could not be held except by a strong field force guarding intervals, thoroughly well entrenched, and not only provided with obstacles, but guarded with artillery that could be moved about.

"In those days I thought that the armaments of lines between forts need not consist of anything bigger than 6-in. guns and 10-in. howitzers, although I added a number of 6-in. and light howitzers in addition to field guns. The forts of Liège and Namur could only hold their own against field artillery. Directly the Germans brought up the big howitzers the forts were doomed, and it was clear from their later attacks that they could have wrecked any forts of this class by a few hours' concentrated bombardment.

THE FORTS AT ANTWERP BAD.

"The forts of the inner line at Antwerp and a few of the outer line, which were then being constructed, struck me as being very bad. The latter were similar to those at Liège, but much larger. What has disappointed me about Antwerp was that I thought that in the long time at their disposal the Belgians would have entrenched themselves in the intervals so carefully, and would have been able to mount so many guns in the intervals, that the loss of a fort need not have compromised the defence. I thought Antwerp, thus strengthened, was capable of holding out for several weeks, and so long as the outer line of defence was held the town could not have been bombarded.

"When writing in 1889 I did not allow for the bringing into the field of these very big howitzers. In the second edition of my book in 1907 I did contemplate this, because that was after Port Arthur, where the Japanese, with great difficulty, brought up 11-in. howitzers taken from their coast defences, and that showed that guns of that size could be brought into the field. No one knew that 16-in. howitzers would be brought into the field. That is a *tour de force* on the part of Krupp, but we know now that it can be done by dividing the equipment into manageable loads. I cannot understand how these guns could have been mounted, unless upon concrete foundations which had been set some months before. In our own forts

we used to allow six months for this purpose.

THE BEST DEFENCES.

"The experience of this, as of other wars, shows that the best defences are those which have been prepared in a rough-and-ready way to meet the requirements of war. The conventional fortifications of the great masters almost invariably prove disappointing when tested by experience. The contention that a permanent fort of ordinary type is really a shell trap which cannot hold out in the face of the concentrated fire of modern howitzers is proved by what happened at Antwerp, where neither the armoured gun positions nor the casements were proof against heavy shells. I imagine that the forts at Maubeuge were equally unable to resist concentrated fire, though a much longer defence was made there.


"There you have two vast armies with powerful artillery on both sides who cannot make much way against each other. There are no permanent fortifications at all, and they are fighting in extempore positions created during the course of the war. On the other hand, you see theoretically strong places like Namur and Liège falling without any difficulty at all. In 1870 some of the French fortresses which had not been modernised made a good defence—Toul, for example, lasted thirty-seven days, and Belfort, where improvised works had been added, lasted 103 days,—but siege artillery was then much weaker than now.

THE VALUE OF THE AEROPLANE.

"Another new and important factor, of course, is aeroplane reconnaissance. There is no doubt that it is proving a very great help to the direction of artillery fire, and this will have an important effect upon the theory of fortifications, though the latter will also benefit. At present the aeroplane seems to have got rather ahead of the power of attacking. I believe in time we shall be able to make aeroplane work much more hazardous than it has been in this war. Observations cannot be taken at very high altitudes, and at a height greater than 3,500 or 3,000 feet accurate discrimination is very difficult."

Lord Sydenham added that in this war the large use of spies using electric communication, in some cases by underground wires, was a new feature which has told against the defence of fortresses.

A Mnemonic for the Eastern French Frontier (see page 107).





[Central News.]

Abandoned British trenches and guns at Maubeuge: The breech blocks of all these guns were removed before being abandoned in order to make each gun useless.

CHAPTER XV.

THE RETREAT FROM MONS.

FROM MONS TO MAUBEUGE—THE GERMAN CONCENTRATION AGAINST OUR LEFT—THE ARRIVAL OF THE FOURTH DIVISION—THE DILATORINESS OF GENERAL SORDET—THE BATTLE AT COMPIÈGNE—THE CASUALTIES—THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE RETREAT.

SIR JOHN FRENCH had been doubtful of his ability to hold Mons, and he had already reconnoitred a position in the rear. He had found one, which he thought would be suitable, between Maubeuge and Valenciennes, and on this he decided to retreat on Monday morning, August 24th. But the withdrawal from Mons in the face of an enemy whose numbers were increasing hourly, and who, moreover, had already begun a wide turning movement by Tournai, was by no means an easy operation. Fighting had been going on all night, and the tendency noted on the Sunday afternoon for the attack to move west had been continued until by Monday morning our left was in great difficulties. It was necessary to make a diversion in its favour.

Accordingly, at daybreak on Monday, the Second Division of the First Army Corps made out from Harmignies, as if to retake Binche, and the First Division took up a position at Peissant, a couple of miles to the south of Binche, in order to support the demonstration. Under cover of this false attack the Second Army Corps began its retirement from the Mons-Condé position. The Third Division suffered heavily during the retirement, for, as they fell back from Mons, the enemy occupied it and shelled their retreat. At Cuesmes, immediately to the south of Mons, there was severe street fighting. (See photographs of the streets of Cuesmes in Chapter XIV.) The other Division (the Fifth) of this Corps

was even more severely handled. The whole strength of the German right was thrown against it in the hope of encircling it and cutting off its retreat. Fortunately, it was not quite without support on its exposed flank.

The most formidable movement of all—that through Tournai—was not yet developed. At seven o'clock on Monday morning a small French force, consisting of a section of Dragoons and four companies of Territorial Reservists, entered the town. They had been marching since three o'clock that morning, and had only just had time to take up their positions on the north side of the town when the Germans attacked. For three hours these Vendée veterans of forty held up a picked corps of the best German troops, and the delay was invaluable to the British left, not so much on that day as later. There was a time, as will be seen, in the retreat when much less than three hours stood between the British army and annihilation; and when the contributions to its deliverance are reckoned up, that made by this handful of French Territorials at Tournai should not be forgotten. It would seem that the force was a scratch one, hastily collected by Major-General Marquis de Villaret, who took the command, and, apparently, acted throughout on his own initiative, without instructions from the French General Staff. But this was not the only assistance that was given on the left flank of the Fifth Division. Providentially, the Nineteenth Brigade, which had been guarding the lines of communication, had been



The entry of the German troops into Amiens.

[Central News.]



British troops retiring in excellent order on August 28th. This photograph was taken just south of Noyon.

brought up to Valenciennes on the Saturday, and was able to assist the retirement of the Fifth Division by moving out from Valenciennes and taking up a position at Quarouble, thus filling up a gap on the British left into which the Germans were already threatening to penetrate. The cavalry, under General Allenby, had been flung very wide on this flank, doubtless with the idea of getting into touch with the German movement through Tournai, but it had to be drawn inwards in order to cover the left of the Fifth Division in its retirement. This it did in concert with the Nineteenth Brigade, but not without suffering severe losses. General de Lisle, commanding the Second Cavalry Brigade, attempted to charge the flank of the German infantry, which was trying to work round by the gap on the left of the Fifth Division. Unfortunately, the cavalry was caught in wire entanglements—laid down, no doubt, by some local enthusiasts, and intended for the defence of Quarouble or Valenciennes—and two of the regiments, the Ninth Lancers and the Eighteenth Hussars, came under heavy fire from the enemy at a range of 500 yards. In spite of these checks the Fifth Division reached the Dour-Frameries line soon after noon, and then the Second Corps returned to the First Corps on the right the service that it had already rendered them in the morning, and held this position while it made good its retreat towards Maubeuge. By nightfall, the Army had reached the position which Sir John French had marked out for it on his way to Mons. The First Corps, still to the right, held the line from Bavai to Maubeuge. West of Bavai was the Second Corps; on its left was the Nineteenth Brigade, and on the extreme left flank was the cavalry, under General Allenby. (See Map on page 134.)



After the fighting at Mons: British troops digging trenches outside Frameries after being forced to fall back.

THE CONCENTRATION AGAINST THE BRITISH LEFT.

The gravity of the situation in which the British army found itself was now apparent. The shortest and best roads from the north to Paris are these: (1) from Tournai to Valenciennes, (2) from Oudenarde to Condé and Valenciennes, (3) from Mons to Valenciennes, (4) from Mons to Bavai, (5) from Mons to Maubeuge, Avesnes, and Laon. These five roads are the centre of the defence of France on the north. Even against an enemy of equal numbers it would have been a dangerously wide front to hold. But it was now evident that the whole of the German First Army, under Von Kluck, was being thrown against it.* The right of our army was secured not so much by the fortress of Maubeuge, but under the cover of the French army to the east. But our army was far

* The Kaiser's order "to destroy French's contemptible little army" seems, however, to have been apocryphal.

too small to straddle across all the five roads, even after the Nineteenth Brigade had been taken away from its original task of guarding the communications and brought into line. With its left at Jenlain and Bry, the roads south of Valenciennes were uncovered, and further west still there were the southern roads through Lille. Nor had the weakness in numbers of the defenders been assisted by careful organisation of the local defences in this district to the west of the British line. The effort made by the Marquis de Villaret at Tournai has already been noted, and the valour of the French Territorials was unquestionable. But they were ill-equipped, their efforts were not co-ordinated with a general scheme of defence, and everything seems to have been left to individual initiative. With the best of wills, they could not extemporise the defence of the country on the exposed left flank of the British army. Even the position actually held by the British army was not one of great natural strength. Maubeuge was strongly fortified by a circle of forts at a distance of three or four miles from the centre of the town, but, though excellently placed for an offensive movement, it is a trap for an army thrown on the defensive.

In 1793, in the early wars of the Revolution, 20,000 men had been shut up in Maubeuge, and only relieved when they were on the point of surrender through starvation. It was already clear on Monday night that the idea of the Germans was to encircle the British left, and by cutting off its retreat to drive it back on Maubeuge. Even if the French had been maintaining their position on the right, it would have been doubtful

policy for our army to cling to a position which seemed to invite an encircling movement. But, fortunately perhaps for our freedom of choice, the French army was still retreating. Under these circumstances to stay in the Maubeuge line would have served no military purpose, and could only have exposed the British army to the risk of a double encirclement, from the east side as well as from the west. Accordingly, a further retreat was decided upon.

THE RETREAT TO LANDRECIES.

The march was resumed early on the morning of Tuesday, the Second Corps falling back on Le Cateau, the First Corps on Landrecies. In the very nick of time reinforcements arrived. The Fourth Division, under General Snow, had detrained at Le Cateau on Sunday morning, and early on Tuesday was ready to assist the retirement. Sir John French stationed it on the rear flank of the line of retreat. Its right was on Solesmes, its left on the road between Cambrai and Le Cateau, and in this position it was able to cover the retirement



A General View of Amiens.

[Central News.]



A General View of Lille.

[Record Press.]

of the Second Corps as it approached Le Cateau. The earlier stages of the retreat nearer Bavai were covered by the cavalry, which was now all, or nearly all, on the west. On the west this was the quietest day since Sunday. But there was heavy fighting on the other wing, especially towards evening, as it approached Landrecies.

The road from Maubeuge, half way to Landrecies, skirts the eastern side of the forest of Mormal, which completely screens this road from the Bavai road, along which the other corps was retreating. Into this forest the Germans plunged, hoping to reach Landrecies before our First Corps and to separate it from the Second Corps on its left. Sir John French had foreseen this danger, and he had arranged that the First Corps on reaching Landrecies should close in towards Le Cateau on the west, so as to prevent the Germans from carrying out this very manœuvre. The men, exhausted by three days' incessant fighting and marching, did not begin to enter Landrecies until after nightfall, and the rear of the column was still on the road to the east of the forest when the Germans debouched from its cover into the narrow streets of Landrecies. Their appearance was badly timed. Had they waited longer, they might have taken the brigade at much greater disadvantage. As it was, they were caught as they emerged from the forest. Machine guns on the south side of the town swept the streets from end to end, and the head of the German columns advancing down the streets were shot away. They fell back into the shelter of the forest

with a loss of from 700 to 900 men. At the same time, the First Division was heavily engaged at Maroilles, and only the skilful handling of Sir Douglas Haig, with some assistance from two French Reserve Divisions, extricated it from its difficulties.

Tuesday of the retreat had on the whole been a less arduous day than Monday, at any rate for our left wing. How came it that the Germans who had pressed that flank so hard on Monday were so comparatively inactive on Tuesday? The explanation seems to be that they were quite convinced that we could not resist the attractions of the fortress of Maubeuge, and right down to the fall of that place they believed that a portion of the British army was shut up in it. The official German reports of the fighting, both on Tuesday and the following day, speak of it as a British defeat at Maubeuge. Believing that one portion of our army was shut up in Maubeuge, and knowing that our left had been strengthened by the arrival of another division—the Fourth—they heavily reinforced their troops on the west, and, instead of attacking our flank, went round through Cambrai and made preparations for arresting our retreat on the

following day. By nightfall, when the Second Corps was in position between Le Cateau and Caudry, with the Fourth Division to its left at Seranvillers, approaching Cambrai at the same time and working round it to the south, were no fewer than four army corps, nearly the whole of Von Kluck's First German Army. On the British right at this time there was, apart from the forces investing Maubeuge, probably not more than one German Corps—the Ninth—and that had been rather badly mauled.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF GENERAL SORDET.

The arrival of the Fourth Division, which had enabled us to prolong our line to the west, had been providential, and the cavalry had done excellent work in protecting our flank. But it had far too much ground to cover in the square block of country, with Cambrai, Valenciennes, Le Cateau, and Bavai at its corners, and had its numbers been greater it might have held the Cambrai road and delayed the advance of the Germans sufficiently to enable the British left to continue its retreat to the Somme. All the week there had been a strong French Cavalry


Corps, consisting of three divisions, at Avesnes, south of Maubeuge, and in a line with Landrecies. In this position it was useless, and Sir John French tried to secure its transfer to his left wing. He visited the Commander, General Sordet, and "earnestly requested his co-operation and support." General Sordet seems to have had two excuses. The first was that it was necessary for him to get the sanction of his Commander-



[Central News.]

After the fighting at Senlis: Civilians searching for bullets and fragments of shells as souvenirs.

in-Chief. That, in itself, was reasonable, for General Sordet may have believed that his cavalry had been stationed there in order to protect the left wing of the retreating French army. There are, however, times when a good soldier must disregard his instructions; the capacity to discern when to follow the letter of instructions and when to break them in order to carry out their spirit is, in fact, one of the tests of a good commanding officer. Still, Sir John French seems to have convinced him that his presence was more useful on the left wing of the British, for General Sordet is said by General French to have "promised" to obtain the sanction of his Commander. He could hardly have made such a promise unless he had been clear in his own mind that he could do better work on General French's left than where he was. And if that were so, it was clearly a case in which he should not have stood on formalities, but should have acted at once, as he was urged to do. But then General Sordet seems to have fallen back on his second excuse, that his horses were in any case too tired to move till next day. Avesnes is well on the right of the British line, and it would take him a full day to transfer his strength to



THE RETREAT FROM MAUBEUGE, AUGUST 25th and 26th.

the left wing, where its protection was needed. To say, therefore, that he could not move till the next day was to postpone assistance for a couple of days, and by that time the British army for all that he knew might have been broken for good, and the French army would have lost that protection on its left flank for which General Joffe later expressed his thanks in very generous terms. General Sordet was a very capable cavalry leader, as his conduct when he did give assistance showed, and his desire to render loyal service was at no time in question. But he was not one of those leaders who can rise to an emergency, and he missed, whether by pedantry or by some sluggishness of temperament, an opportunity which, had it been seized, might have made his name famous.

THE CRITICAL DAY.

On Wednesday, then, which was to be the most critical day of the retreat, the British army received no reinforcement. The order had been given to continue the retreat to St. Quentin, but at daybreak the Germans had the artillery of four divisions placed in position against our left flank. Our line was already dangerously extended, but unless we were to be surrounded it was necessary at all costs to hold the Cambrai road, and this task, which should have fallen to General Sordet with his three divisions, was undertaken by General Allenby with half a division. General Sordet was by this time on our left rear, but owing to the continued fatigue of his horses he did not arrive in time to take any part in the battle of that day. It was a painfully anxious time. Sir H. Smith-Dorrien, with the Second Corps, was heavily attacked by a force which outnumbered his own in infantry by three to one, and in artillery by more than four to one, and it seemed out of the question to withdraw his army intact in the face of such an attack. Nor was it possible for the right wing to create a diversion in its favour, as it had done by its false attack on Binche on the first day of the retreat from Mons. It was itself attacked. It had been fighting through the night, and was "incapable of movement." Towards the middle of the afternoon the pressure of the Germans was so strong, and their encircling movement so pronounced, that it became necessary to attempt what is the most difficult operation in war, the slow withdrawal of a force heavily engaged against overwhelming numbers without any break in the line. Thanks to the skill of the Corps Commander, General Smith-Dorrien, the feat was accomplished. The order for retirement was given at 3-30 in the afternoon, and the march lasted well into the night. Fortunately, the enemy was himself too exhausted to pursue with any vigour. In this, the first of many contests of endurance, the British army outlasted its opponents.


The next two days, except for hard marching, were by comparison light work for our army. Not only was General Sordet now on the British left, but General d'Amade, of Morocco fame, and one of the most accomplished of French Generals, came down from Arras, with two French Divisions of the Reserves, and drew off the German attacks. Better still, on the following day, a new French army, consisting of the Seventh Army Corps (from Besançon, and one of the corps that had been employed in the operations in Alsace), four Reserve Divisions, and General Sordet's cavalry, took its place on the left of the British army.

All danger to the retreat was now past, and, though fighting continued, these last three days of the week were almost restful by comparison with the first four days.

THE GREATNESS OF THE RETREAT.

Sir John French writes of the fighting from Sunday to Wednesday as a four days' continuous battle, and popularly, but inaccurately, the whole four days' battle is sometimes spoken of as the Battle of Mons. But the actual fighting at Mons on the Sunday was the least of the trials of the British army at this time. Its interest lay mainly in the remarkable contrast which it afforded between the individualistic English tactics learned in the South African War, and consonant with the spirit of the English people and with the professional character of this army, and the highly centralised German tactics which also reflected the genius of the nation. The test at Mons was not complete, for the battle was not fought to a finish, and its decision was forestalled by the retirement of the French. It was not, however, at Mons, but in the retirement from Mons, that the true greatness of the British army's spirit showed itself. Our materials for forming a complete picture of this four days' battle are still incomplete. General French's admirably lucid despatch* is the bare bones of history which may some day be clothed with flesh and blood; but it is a curious fact that though no war was ever fought in which so many men skilled to observe and write were engaged, there was never one in which the task of the contemporary chronicler has been so difficult. For the moment one leaves the broad, beaten track of official description one is lost in a trackless jungle, in which it becomes almost impossible to take one's bearings. Soldiers' letters have been published in great number, and many of them are written with a vigour and vividness which almost reconcile us on literary grounds to the disappearance in this war of the war correspondent. But they are valuable more as a revelation of the spirit of the army than for any light that they throw on the military operations. The soldier writing home rarely specifies the exact place at which the events which he is describing took place. Probably he does not know; but, even if he knew, the chances are that he would suppress the detail out of an artificially-cultivated belief in the importance of that sort of secrecy in war. Most of the details of the great retreat which are set forth in soldiers' letters are at present impossible to locate with precision. For example, exactly at what point of the fighting on the left wing on Tuesday was it that the Colonel of the Connaught Rangers—one of the regiments in the Fourth Brigade—was made by one correspondent to say to his men: "The eyes of all Ireland are upon you, and I know you never could disgrace the old country by allowing Germans to beat you while you have arms in your hands and hearts in your breasts. Up, then, and at 'em, and if you don't give them the soundest thrashing they ever got you needn't look me in the face again in this world or the next." What battle was it into which a section of the King's Own entered shouting: "Early doors this way! Early doors ninepence!" Where was it that a company of an Irish regiment charged and bayoneted a battery? And was it on Monday, or in that harder fighting on Wednesday, that a famous charge of Hussars took place on an attacking German line that was just after heavy losses steadying itself for a final charge, when "Hell's fury blazed from the eyes of the trapped Germans as they tried to grapple with their new foe, and we stood there, silent spectators, lest we should hit the cavalry?" As contributions to a story of a battle these soldiers' letters are a zig-zag puzzle, in which most

* See Appendix for the full text of the despatch.



Compiègne: The Hotel de Ville.

[Exclusive News Agency.]

of the pieces are missing, and the rest are shaped not to a general design, but by the fancy of the individual writer. But as contributions to the psychology of the soldier they are invaluable.*

The remaining movements in the retreat belong rather to the story of the Battle of the Marne than to that of the retreat from Mons. They may be chronicled here because their general direction was south. On the 28th the British army was on the line from Noyon to La Fère. Here there was a good defensive position, but General Joffre had decided to make his stand further to the south, and on the next day the British army, continuing its retreat, arrived at Compiègne-Soissons line. That retreat involved the abandonment of the British base at Havre, and the formation of a new base at St. Nazaire. South of Compiègne there was a very smart cavalry engagement. The First Cavalry Brigade, overtaken by some German cavalry, were forced to abandon a horse artillery battery; later, however, with the assistance of infantry, they not only recovered these guns but took twelve of the enemy's. This was the engagement in which an Irish regiment received a cavalry charge on their bayonets. Two days later there was more fighting at Villers-Cotterets, and on September 4th the British army retired across the Marne near Lagny, blowing up the bridges as it crossed. That was the farthest south reached by the British, for the next day, September 5th, the retreat was over and the advance began.

Our casualties during the retreat from Mons were exceedingly heavy, and the lists were issued in a manner which made it quite impossible to tell at which point in the retreat they were incurred. Sixty-four officers and 212 men were returned as killed, 162 officers and 1,061 men as wounded, and no fewer than 230 officers and 13,413 men as missing. The totals of officers and men were:—

Killed	276
Wounded	1,223
Missing	13,643

Total	15,142

The large proportion of missing is not surprising when the nature of the operations—which were a series of rearguard actions—is remembered. In these actions it is often necessary for the rearguard deliberately to sacrifice itself in holding a strategic point until the rest of the army has got safely past, and on the left wing particularly our line was so wide that an enemy in overwhelming numbers could not but find out its weak points. Some crumbling was inevitable. The worst sufferers were the Gordon Highlanders and the Cheshires, both of whom lost eighteen officers and more than half their strength. Another Highland Regiment, the Argyll and Sutherland, lost eleven officers, and the Royal Munster Fusiliers lost nineteen. Some of the Lancashire regiments also suffered very heavily. The casualties were far more serious than a British army had ever suffered in a week, and came within a few thousands of the total number of British soldiers—23,991—who fought at Waterloo. The German casualties are not known; but although no German prisoners were taken, their total is not likely to have been much inferior


to our own, and in the number of killed and wounded they were vastly in excess.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE RETREAT.

Were the military results obtained in the four weeks' fighting commensurate with the cost? The question is sufficiently answered by the fact that at the end of the week the reputation of British infantry stood higher than at any time since Waterloo. At the beginning of the war no one could feel confident of the result of conflict between the British and German armies. At the end of the first week's fighting the British army had established its superiority; and that, too, in the face of overwhelming numerical odds, and under grave disadvantages of every kind. A week's continuous victory could not have done more; rarely has it done so much. The plan which the German army was carrying out had been elaborated for years. The strategy of the great sweeping movement through Belgium was finely conceived, and it was carried out with extraordinary brilliancy. Probably no army—certainly none comparable to it in size—has ever moved with such rapidity as the German army against France when its deployment was complete. Except for a few slight delays in Belgium—which did not greatly affect the time-table—everything up to the moment of shock between the two armies went according to programme. Every difficulty had been foreseen and met, so far as provision could meet the myriad accidents of war. No scruples and no political misgivings were allowed to deflect the remorseless logic of the German plan of campaign. On the side of the Allies there was a certain amount of uncertainty and doubt. General Joffre, as will be seen, was later able to oppose to the German plans military conceptions more subtle than theirs, but between the beginning of the war and the appearance of the French plan there was a period of miscalculation and disappointment. The Belgian resistance, and the tremendous popular sympathy which it aroused, probably disturbed the French plans more than Germany's. It led the French army much further north than it had ever meant to go, and exposed it to the risk not merely of defeat but of annihilation. The French began badly. Their successes in the Vosges failed in their military object, and had their left flank not been protected by the British in the battle of Charleroi, on August 23rd, they must have suffered a tactical defeat as great as that in Lorraine, and far more serious in its strategical results. That the jaws of the vice never closed was the achievement of the British army on the French left.

Except for the affair at Compiègne later in the week, the British army never during this time won a tactical victory; it was never left in possession of the stricken field. Yet, in spite of every drawback, of having to extemporise against an elaborately prepared plan of campaign, of the discouragement of constant retreat, of the doubt and uncertainty in strategic plan which so soon reflects itself in the bearing of an army, and of the great physical strain of being hurried immediately after landing into fighting against the most formidable opponents they had ever met, and these in overwhelming numbers and flushed with a succession of victories, and in the first impetus of hitherto unchallenged military prestige, the British army was stronger and more confident at the end of the week than it had been at the beginning.

* See Chapter XVIII., "The Spirit of the Army."



THE ENVIRONS AND FORTIFICATIONS OF PARIS.



[Central Press.]

The preparation for the threatened siege: Searchlights on the look-out for aeroplanes in the Place de la Concorde, Paris.

CHAPTER XVI.

PARIS AND THE WAR.

THE GOVERNMENT LEAVES PARIS—PREPARATIONS FOR A SIEGE—THE FRENCH USE OF FORTRESSES—GENERAL JOFFRE'S PLANS—THE PRINCIPLE OF "DETACHED RESERVES."

MONS, and the retreat from Mons, were the extreme left wing of a battle which extended as far east as Nancy. On this wing there was retreat, but not actual defeat; on the other wings there was both retreat and defeat. To the right of the British army, the French were defeated at Charleroi by the Second and Third German Armies on August 23rd, after a battle in which the British right wing at Mons took some part. Of the French defeat in Lorraine some account has already (page 117) been given. It was one of the great battles of the war, and the defeated force was as much the largest of the French armies as the right wing of the Germans forming the First Army under Von Kluck was of the German armies. These two defeats naturally had their effect on the armies resisting the Duke of Wurtemberg in the Ardennes and the Crown Prince of Prussia on the Upper Meuse. On August 25th Longwy fell to the Crown Prince, who is said, on receiving the surrender of the French Commander of the garrison, to have broken his sword, because—as the Crown Prince alleged—he had behaved dishonourably in permitting the garrison to use so-called

dum-dum or soft-nosed bullets—bullets, that is, in which the hard nickel cover had been filed away so as to expose the lead, thereby inflicting a bigger and more serious wound. There seems to have been no foundation for the charge, and perhaps one ought, too, to be cautious in accepting without confirmation stories of the Crown Prince, which just because they agree with the popular estimate of a singularly disagreeable personality are on that account open to suspicion. The French were also defeated by the Duke of Wurtemberg's Army, and on August 27th the Crown Prince of Bavaria followed up his victory in Lorraine by capturing Manonviller, one of the frontier French forts between Toul and Lunéville. The last ten days in August were remarkably brilliant for Germany. Only on the right wing, where their hopes were highest, was there any disappointment. So certain were the Germans of capturing the British army south of Maubeuge, that the General Staff in its report was actually guilty of the indiscretion of speaking of its attempts to surround it in language which suggested that the feat had already been accomplished, and the streets of Berlin were wild with enthusiasm over a victory



A Paris crowd watching one of the German aeroplanes flying over the city. [Central News.



Outside one of the big Paris provision stores in the days when a siege of the city was feared. So great was the rush of people anxious to lay in a store of food that the gates were half drawn and the purchasers admitted one by one. [Central Press.

which in fact escaped them. There seems some reason to doubt whether the Kaiser did in fact ever issue an order to annihilate "French's contemptible little army," but the premature rejoicings in Berlin clearly showed that a victory over the British army would be far more popular than any other.

After the later victories, and even before them, the legend had sprung up that the retirement of the Allies in the west was voluntary, and part of a deep-laid plan to draw the Germans on to their destruction. That theory, though very consoling in the hour of defeat and danger, did not accurately correspond to the facts, and, moreover, does some injustice to the remarkable fortitude which the people of France—and in particular of Paris—displayed during this trying week. The French were bitterly disappointed at the failure of their attacks on the east, which they had hoped would interfere with the German concentration in the north, nor did they in fact expect the defeat of the northern army to come so soon. Had General Joffre seen what was likely to happen, he would certainly not have committed himself to a campaign in Belgium; nor if his retirement had been voluntary would it have been so rapid. Not to admit so much is to deprive Paris of the honour that is due to most of her people for their conduct in the last week of August, when a siege of Paris became more and more likely with each day's news. The calmness of the city is the more creditable in view of the stories that were rife of the disgraceful excesses of the German troops in Belgium. That there was much gross exaggeration in these stories

does not diminish, but rather heightens, respect for the conduct of the Parisians. It was impossible then to sift the truth from the falsehoods or the exaggerated distortions of truth; it will be difficult for many years to come. And when all deductions have been made, there remains, as will be seen later in this narrative, a sufficiently large deposit of truth in the stories of the atrocities of the German armies to give even firm and reasonable men cause to fear the worst. The pillage and outrage committed in Belgium were repeated on French soil; at Senlis, in particular, the misconduct of the German invaders was especially gross and inexcusable.

THE GOVERNMENT LEAVES PARIS.

On August 26th, the day on which the British army extricated itself from what seemed to be certain destruction south of Maubeuge, the Government showed its sense of the extreme gravity of the situation by forming a new Cabinet, representative of all the Republican parties. Room was found in it even for M. Guesde, the hitherto irreconcilable Socialist, though not for M. Clemenceau,

whose attacks on the suppression by the French Bureau of material facts about the progress of the war, bitter as they were, were not without justification.

On September 4th, the new Government left Paris for Bordeaux. Before leaving, it issued a Proclamation to the country, admirable both in its substance and its expression. It ran:—

PEOPLE OF FRANCE,—For several weeks relentless battles have engaged our heroic troops and the army of the enemy. The valour of our soldiers has won for them at several points marked advantages, but in the north the pressure of German forces has compelled us to fall back.

This situation has compelled the President of the Republic and the Government to take a painful decision. In order to watch over the national welfare, it is the duty of the public powers to remove themselves temporarily from the city of Paris.

Under the command of its eminent chief the French army, full of courage and zeal, will defend the capital and its patriotic population against the invader, but war must be carried on at the same time on the rest of its territory without peace or truce, without cessation or faltering.

Endure and fight. Such must be the motto of the allied British, Russian, Belgian, and French armies. Endure and fight, while at sea British aid is cutting the communication of the enemy with the world. Endure and fight, while the

Russians continue to advance to strike a decisive blow at the heart of the German Empire.

It is the duty of the Government of the Republic to direct this stubborn resistance. Everywhere Frenchmen will rise for their independence, but to ensure the utmost spirit of efficacy to the formidable fight it is indispensable that the Government should remain free to act. At the request of the military authorities the Government is therefore temporarily shifting its headquarters to a place where it can remain in constant touch with the whole of the country. It

calls upon members of Parliament not to remain away from it, in order that they may form with their colleagues the symbol of national unity.

People of France, let us be worthy of these tragic circumstances. We shall gain the final victory. We shall gain it by unflagging will, endurance, and tenacity. A nation which does not wish to perish, and which in order to live does not flinch either from suffering or sacrifice, is sure of victory.

On the same day General Gallieni, the Military Governor of Paris, proclaimed his intention of defending the city to the end.

THE FRENCH ARMY AND THE FORTRESSES.

Paris, as the map that we give shows, is strongly fortified, and in particular Mont Valérien, on the north side, had in the last war showed that it was impregnable, at any rate with the artillery of that time. It is, however, very doubtful whether any concrete and steel forts are capable of resisting the new siege artillery, if only it is allowed to take up a favourable position. Had the field armies been defeated and driven south, Paris would probably have fallen, like Liège and Namur, though its



[Newspaper Illustrations.]

The result of one of the bombs dropped by a German aeroplane: A horse lying dead in the Rue du Faubourg St. Antoine.



French cuirassiers riding through the streets of Paris on their way to the front. [Central News.



Preparations for the threatened siege: One of the outer defences of Paris which was used as a grazing ground for a food reserve of many thousands of cattle. [Newspaper Illustrations.

resistance would doubtless have been very obstinate. The great difficulty in the siege of a great city is always the extent of its perimeter if a complete investment is to be attempted. But that is a difficulty for the defence as well as for the attack; for if a large army is needed for the investment, an almost equally large army will be needed to man the defences. Neither Germany nor France could spare the men for a formal siege or for a defence that could make certain of success. What the Germans would have done had it come to an attack on Paris would have been to destroy the forts on one small section of the circle of defences, and to rush men in overwhelming numbers through the breach. The French could only have beaten those tactics either by keeping the enemy at so great a distance that he could not bombard, or, if they failed to do that, by shutting up in Paris a field army equal in strength to that which the Germans could have brought against them. As will be seen, the French succeeded in defending Paris in the first of these ways; but had the Battle of the Marne gone differently, the garrison left in Paris, though not so small as not to be able to put up a good fight, would not have been so large that its loss would have crippled the power of the French to continue a vigorous resistance in the field.

Sad experience in the last war had branded one important strategical principle into the mind of every Frenchman, namely, that in war what mattered was the defeat of the enemy's armies, and not the defence of this or that district, however important it might be. Paris could not be abandoned without a strong resistance, for the possession of a rich and populous city is always of great practical as well as sentimental value to an enemy; still, the Frenchman was willing to lose even Paris rather than compromise the strategic freedom of his armies. And when it is remembered how much more Paris is to France than any other capital is to its country, the calm way in which all but some very rich Parisians accepted the decrees of war and prepared themselves to share the fate of their beloved city, whatever it might be, was beyond praise. It is not easy for Englishmen to realise how much strength of mind Paris showed in the anxious days at the end of August and the beginning of September.

THE SIEGE OF MAUBEUGE.

France made a singularly judicious use from the very beginning of the war of her frontier fortresses. The larger fortified places—like Verdun, Toul, and Paris itself—were used more as bases for the operations of the field armies than as fortresses in the strict sense. The French,

army never made the mistake made in the defence of the Belgian fortresses of waiting until the enemy placed his guns, and trusting to the strength of the fortifications to defend the garrison. In the French practice—carried out with remarkable success—the men, not the concrete, were the defences of the forts; the forts were the pivots for the movements of the armies, not military carapaces for sedentary troops. In the smaller forts, held by weak garrisons, this practice could not be followed. These were mere *forts d'arrêt*, designed to cover some important strategic position or an important knot in the system of railway communications. Such forts were soon isolated as the tide of invasion rose, and the most that could be expected of them was to delay the enemy's advance, or to clog the flow of his supplies, or to detain a certain percentage of the invaders, which might else have been

free to attack the retreating defenders. Longwy, Ayvelles, and Manonviller are examples of forts of this kind, and all did useful service. Maubeuge was an exceptional case, for here the number of the garrison was very large—25,000 according to the French, 40,000 if we may accept the German accounts of the prisoners taken. Perhaps the first figure represents the numbers of the French army, and the second includes civilians from the town and the surrounding district, who may have taken part in the defence and been made prisoners along with the rest. The attack on Maubeuge began late on August 25th, and from then to the surrender of the town, on September 7th, there was an almost unceasing bombardment. The garrison could do little to reply to the bombardment, and its resistance was an example of passive endurance which moved the admiration even of its assailants. It did great service to the defence of France, for the fort

commands one of the most important lines of railway from the north, and its possession by the French during the critical period of the German advance greatly embarrassed the commissariat of Von Kluck's army. This service, however, hardly compensated France for the loss of half an army corps. Among the prisoners were said to be 200 British soldiers, shut up in the retreat from Mons. The smallness of their number was a great disappointment to the Germans, whose first question, on hearing of the fall of Maubeuge and the surrender of its garrison, was how many of the prisoners were British.

From Maubeuge came the first version of a remarkable story, which had a very great effect on popular opinion in England, and supplied the subject of a theme repeated with many variations both in France and England. The story, first given in the *Matin*, was that when the Germans



The Eiffel Tower.

[F. Whitaker.]



The arrival of captured German flags at the Invalides.

[Topical War Service.]



German flags captured by the French and deposited in the Invalides.

[Central News.]

reached Maubeuge they found a ready-made platform for their great siege guns in the Lanières works, which were alleged to belong to the firm of Messrs. Krupp. The *Matin*, under threat of a libel action, two months later admitted that the Lanières works were a French concern, that its directors were all French or Belgian, and included a brother of a prominent official in the French Foreign Office, and that, in any case, the German guns were never mounted anywhere near the works. Another version of the story was that the Germans, some time before the war, had put in ferro-concrete foundations on a farm under the pretext of boring for water. "This story," wrote an acute and open French observer, "was the prototype of the other similar stories that have cropped up in various parts of France, not one of which is at present supported by any satisfactory evidence. If and when the others are investigated we shall see whether they have any foundation, or whether, like the Lanières myth, they are pure inventions, without even a plausible basis in fact. At present it is impossible to investigate the other stories, because—no doubt for excellent reasons—no exact indications of locality have been given. All that we have been told is that platforms for guns have been found in some unnamed place near somewhere or other. When details are given enabling the stories to be investigated, it will be time to consider them."

GENERAL JOFFRE'S PLANS.

On August 29th, Sir John French met General Joffre, who "was most kind, cordial, and sympathetic, as he always has been." Together they discussed the plans of operations, and a very interesting conversation it must have been, though all that has been published of it is a few details about the relative distribution of the French and British troops. General Joffre was unknown to Englishmen at the beginning of the war, but the more attentive their study of his plans the greater grew their admiration of his personal and professional qualities. "He is not only a great military leader," said Lord Kitchener, at the Mansion House dinner in November, but he is also a great man." His greatness, lost in the fogs of a war singularly uncertain and confused in its opening passages, was presently to appear in an extremely skilful application of his views about the right strategic uses of great fortified places to the immediate problem in hand. Paris, which many had feared might be a trap for the French Field Armies, became, as will be seen, the most powerful agent in their deliverance from the strain and disappointment of constant retreat. The details of his plan will best be studied in their working out in the events described in the next chapter. Here it will be sufficient to notice one or two general principles for our guidance in understanding the remarkable events of the middle of September.

In examining the conflict of the various schools of French military thought, a previous chapter (Chapter XIII.) has already drawn attention to the plea of some thinkers for an independent school of French strategy, which should oppose to the German doctrine of immediate violent impact of the whole offensive strength of the nation a rival doctrine which should resist the violence of the storm by yielding, and confront a diminishing impetus in attack by a gradual increment of the nation's reserves of military strength. This rival doctrine had never been adequately worked out in published treatises, and it seemed at the beginning of the war as though General Joffre's ideas were perhaps only French variations on the familiar German tune. In fact, as September was

to show, he was a military thinker of originality and power; and the trend of his thought ran on parallel lines to that of the English military system. When Lord Kitchener said, in one of his early speeches, that our ideal was to increase our military strength proportionately to the decline in that of the enemy, he may or may not have known what were the leading military conceptions of General Joffre; but if he did not, his language betrayed a quite remarkable degree of sympathy with what, as will be seen, was to be the policy of General Joffre—a policy, there is reason to think, which was evolved by himself in the face of a great deal of opposition from within the higher ranks of the French army and of some political difficulties. This policy necessarily meant a period of retreat and disappointment at the beginning of the war; and it was, in fact, seriously interfered with by the arguments, to which it may or may not have been right to yield, for advancing north to give direct assistance to Belgium. The key to it was the maintenance of the strong French positions on the eastern frontier.

The best description of the policy is given by an ingenious writer,* who calls it the doctrine of the "detached reserve." If four units have to meet six it is obvious that if they are spread out evenly in line, the four will be outmatched. But if two can manage to hold the six in check, it is possible that the time may come when, by a sudden concentration of his reserves on one side or the other, he may be able to find himself in a decisive superiority on one wing. The geography of the French frontiers, with the strong lines of forts on the east, lent itself to this plan, because it enabled the defence to hold up one wing of the attack while the "detached reserves" were brought into action at the decisive moment. Let our military writer explain his meaning further:—

The French knew that the German advance would take place through Alsace-Lorraine, through the Ardennes, and through the Belgian Plains. They did not know exactly in what proportions the advance would be organised. They did not know what fraction of the invaders would pass through the Belgian Plain, what through the Ardennes, and what through Alsace-Lorraine, though they did know that the main attack would probably come from the north through Belgium. They put one body, less than a quarter of their total forces, with the British contingent along the Sambre, and up to and beyond Mons, with the right flank reposing upon Namur. They also put in the angle between the rivers Sambre and Meuse further forces, not very numerous, which were destined while this first line met the shock through Belgium to advance into the Ardennes country, and to check the German movement there by a counter-offensive. They counted on some considerable delay to be inflicted upon the German attack here by the resistance of the fortress of Namur, and they further counted upon a lesser number coming through the Belgian Plains to attack the positions on the Sambre than the Germans had, as a fact, accumulated at that point. With the effect of both these miscalculations we shall deal in a moment; but at any rate the advance body upon the Sambre and Meuse was not intended to hold the whole German advance permanently, and could not have done so. Meanwhile, in at least two other regions (1) that of the Alsace-Lorraine frontier (where in the first days of the war the French had already made considerable progress), the other (as yet) unknown, two main masses were lying detached from that advance body at Mons and Namur upon the Sambre and Meuse, and the fourth reserve was represented by numerous detached bodies, some of which have still to come into play. That the whole strategy was one of using such reserves and not of bringing every man into line at once, is the very soul and core of the solution the French proposed to that most difficult problem: How to meet more than six men with less than four.

That was the French plan. We have now to see how it was worked out.

* In the "Candid Review," November, 1914.



British artillery passing through a French village.

[*Newspaper Illustrations.*



Turcos waiting for the order to advance.

[*Central News.*



French troops on the march to the front.

[Central News.

CHAPTER XVII.

FROM THE MARNE TO THE AISNE.


THE POSITIONS OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES—GENERAL VON KLUCK'S AMAZING MANŒUVRE—THE COUNTERSTROKE OF THE ALLIES—THE BATTLE OF THE OURCQ AND MARNE—GENERAL RETREAT OF THE GERMAN ARMIES—THE PASSAGE OF THE AISNE.

ON September 3rd, the German attack was aligned right across the Marne and Aisne valleys, from the north of Paris to the Argonne. On the west was the First German Army under Von Kluck, at Compiègne and Senlis. The Second Army, under Von Bülow, was occupying extended positions west of Rheims; the Third (Saxon) Army was east of Rheims; the Fourth (Wurtemberg) Army was between Rethel and Chalons; and the Fifth (German Crown Prince's) Army was in the Argonne. The Metz (Bavarian) and the Vosges Armies were not in touch with the German Armies advancing from Belgium and Luxembourg, owing to the barrier of the forts along the heights of the Meuse from Verdun to Toul and Nancy.


On September 4th, the plans of the German Army suddenly changed. The German First Army, which had followed the British all the way from Mons, and had been engaged in a constant effort to outflank them on their left wing, quite unexpectedly, when it had reached Senlis, altered its direction. Instead of continuing its march on

Paris, it suddenly swerved to the south-east, and following the easterly bank of the Ourcq proceeded to cross the Marne at several points between Meaux and Chateau Thierry. On September 5th, his troops had penetrated still further south, across the Petit Morin, and were extended on a line between Lagny, Coulommiers and Montmirail. He had marched parallel to the Allies' lines at Paris, presenting his front to their flank.

This is the most unorthodox movement in war, and broke a rule which admits of no exceptions, at any rate in civilised warfare. Obviously, if one army marches across the front of another it puts itself voluntarily in the very position into which the opponent is also trying to force it by flank marches. These principles were, of course, perfectly familiar to Von Kluck, a soldier of great experience, energy, and natural ability. How, then, came he to make a manœuvre which was not only theoretically wrong, but in fact gave the Allies their first great opportunity? There are many explanations, none of which is wholly satisfying, and perhaps the truth, when



THE EARLY STAGES OF THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE.



THE PASSAGE OF THE AISNE.

the end of the war brings it out, is in a combination of causes, some of which have up to the present escaped conjecture.

THE FIRST ARMY CHANGES ITS DIRECTION.

It may be (1) that Von Kluck grossly overestimated the damage that he had inflicted on the Allies' left in the retreat from Belgium. He may even have thought that a large portion of the British army was shut up in Maubeuge. If this be the true explanation, the manœuvre was bad generalship, due to contempt of the enemy and miscalculation of his losses. Another possible explanation (2) is that the extensive withdrawals of men from France to meet the new danger in Russia (see Chapters XX. and XXI.) had so weakened the German forces that the original scheme could not be carried out. The Germans had counted on beating the French army of the north decisively before Paris was reached. Having failed to do that, and unable simultaneously to carry out operations against Paris, the German Staff had to choose between retiring and falling back on the defensive and leaving Paris alone for the time, and making a desperate attempt on the French Army in the hope of breaking its lines, separating it into two or more parts, defeating each in detail, and then devouring Paris at leisure. A third (3) explanation that has been put forward is that General Joffre had accumulated strong reserves in Paris, and that Von Kluck marched south east not because he despised the enemy, but because he suddenly found himself in face of forces superior to his own. Unable to retreat


by the way he came without uncovering the flanks of the armies to his left, he rapidly marched past Paris in the hope that before General Joffre's Reserves there could do him any injury he might force the French to an engagement and break their line. Whichever of these explanations be the true one, or whatever other explanation be possible, the move was a very bad blunder. General Joffre had been waiting for this chance, and he seized it. On September 5th, before the German movement south of the Marne had fully developed, he saw Sir John French, and informed him that he proposed to attack, as the conditions were now very favourable to success.

The British army was now south of the Marne, with its left resting on that river. On its left across the Marne, and bent backwards so as to cover the northern approaches to Paris, was the Sixth French Army, and on its right the Fifth French Army between Courtacon and Esternay. General Joffre proposed to wheel the Sixth French Army right round from before Paris to the line of the River Ourcq. The British army was to wheel in line with it,

forming front to flank, and the Fifth French Army was to pivot on its right, maintaining the alignment with the British and with the cavalry of General Conneau between its left at Courtacon and the British right. On September 6th, the positions of the Anglo-French left wing, and of the German armies opposing it, were as shown on map (page 148). The German armies on the map are shown just after the cessation of their southern movement, when they have become aware of the advance of the Anglo-French left, and have formed front to flank in order to meet it. These dispositions do not, of course, cover the whole front of the opposing armies. East of the Fifth French Army was the Ninth, under General Foch, opposing the advance of Von Bülow, and still further west were the Fourth and Third French Armies, reaching a point north of Verdun, and opposed to the Saxon-Wurtembergers, and the German Crown Prince's Armies. For the present, however, the duty of the French right was to maintain its ground until the movement of the left produced its effect against the First Army under Von Kluck

THE BATTLE ON THE LEFT WING.

The Anglo-French attack on Von Kluck had the immediate effect of arresting his southern movement, and from the afternoon of September 6th his sole hope was that he might—if only he could hold his ground long enough—give time to the other German armies to break the French centre and right. He never looked like succeeding. On September 7th, the British (who had now been reinforced by a new Division, raising their strength



[Sport and General.

A destroyed bridge near Meaux, and the wreckage of a train which dashed into the river.

in all arms to perhaps 150,000 men) advanced rapidly, pushing back before them the German cavalry, who suffered heavily at the hands of the Ninth Lancers and Eighteenth Hussars. The Sixth Army was strongly engaged along the Ourcq, and the Fifth thrust back the enemy to the Petit Morin, carrying positions at the point of the bayonet. On the next day the enemy was in full retreat. The British crossed the Petit Morin, meeting with very stubborn resistance at Rebais. Here our First Corps was greatly assisted by the cavalry, which crossed upstream in the direction of Montmirail, and all three corps made considerable captures. On the 9th, the third day of the battle, there was very heavy fighting, especially on the left, where the Sixth Army—now across on the east bank of the Ourcq—drove the enemy north. The Fifth Army met with very obstinate resistance at Montmirail, but by nightfall was between Chateau Thierry and Dormans. The British in the centre were opposed very strongly at La Ferté sous Jouarre, where the bridge was broken down; and the Third Division, under fire



One of the abandoned German trenches along the Marne.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Shells left behind by the Germans in their retreat.

[Central News.]

the Germans on the north bank, were not able to hold their passage till night. On the fourth day of the battle—September 10th—the resistance of the Germans was slight, and considerable captures were made. In guns, seven machine guns, about 2,000 prisoners, and a great deal of transport fell into our hands.

ON THE RIGHT WING.

Now, in the meantime, had the battle fared on the left centre and right? The attempts to break the German line persisted after the retirement of Von Kluck had begun, and it was only gradually that the effect of the victories on the left communicated themselves to the rest of the line. It was not until the third day of the battle that General Foch's Army was able to make any advance, and even then it was only the menace of a flanking movement by his left wing that induced the enemy to fall back. There was very heavy fighting on the upper reaches of the Petit Morin in the marshes of St. Gond, north of Sezanne. As General Foch advanced, he was able to relieve the pressure on General de Langle about Vitry. The Germans had made most desperate efforts to break the French lines between Sezanne and Vitry. Last of all, relief came to the French army under General Sarrail. This wing was holding the southern end of the Argonne, its left resting on Revigny, and its right on the heights of the Meuse, south of Verdun. Not only was his left involved in the vicious attempts to break the line near Vitry, but his right was in constant trouble from the direction of Clermont, and he was even in danger of an attack from behind, over the Meuse hills, from the


Germans, who had entered the Woevre. Had he yielded, the victories on the Ourcq and Marne would have been of very little value, and it was not until September 15th, five days after the fighting on the Anglo-French left was over, that the effect of the victory there reached him, and he was able to make headway. Over the Woevre, at the southern end of Woevre, the Germans made persistent efforts to break down the resistance near Nancy and Pont à Mousson, where a decisive victory would have given them the entry into the Marne valley by way of Commercy; but they all failed. The failure of the Crown Prince to break down the resistance of General Sarrail was one of the greatest disappointments of the war for Germany.

The Battle of the Marne was the first signal victory gained by the Allies in the western area. The total figures of the French captures have not been published, but

on the basis of the British captures it is reasonable to assume that the Germans lost some 7,000 to 8,000 men in prisoners, and their losses in killed and wounded must have been at least as great. But the significance of the battle was undoubtedly very greatly exaggerated at the time. On the last day of the battle the advancing British army found evidences at one point of the line of drunkenness and indiscipline in the German retreat, and the official statement published in England was so worded as to be capable of meaning that the demoralisation which was present at this point was general along the whole line. That was certainly not the case, for the number of prisoners taken was not quite so great as were lost by the very much smaller British army during the retreat from Mons. The German retreat from the Marne was, in fact, very skilfully conducted. It was an admission that at present the German army was not strong enough both to attack Paris and to defeat the

Allied army, and France was naturally jubilant at the escape of her capital. But the Germans had made very careful preparations against just such a contingency as had now arisen. They had decided, before committing themselves to the Battle of the Marne, to retreat on the line of the Aisne if they were defeated in their attempts to break the Allied armies, and they had made elaborate preparations for its defence.

The centre of their new position was the district between the Aisne and the Oise, where they approach for their junction. The Committee which made a strategic study of the problems of French defence after the war of 1870 had a project of fortifying the whole of this district between



[Exclusive News Agency.]

A General View of Soissons.

the rivers. The French know it as the Laon-La Fère position, and it could have been made exceedingly strong against an attack from the north. Had the French Staff been free to choose the best line of defence against the German invasion, they would probably have found it in this wedge of wooded country between the Aisne and the Oise, which, if it had been held obstinately, would have barred the best line of invasion from the north, and would have forced the attacker to use the much inferior route by the valley of the Somme. The German pressure, however, on their first advance was much too great to permit a halt on this line, and the Germans saw that the position which would have availed against an advance from the north was just as good for them against an advance from the south. They began carefully fortifying it as soon as they occupied the position—soon after the Battle of



Souvenir hunters collecting relics of the German defeat on the battlefield of the Marne.

L.N.A.



Gun entrenchments abandoned by the Germans in their retreat from the Marne. [*Sport and General.*

Compiègne—and in the second week of September it was an immense mass of field fortifications. Clausewitz, whose treatise on war is the best of the German military classics, had praised the advantages of the strategical defensive, and the use which the Germans were to make of their new position on the Aisne was soon to shed a new light on the motives of the German Staff in invading Belgium. The first principle of the Germans was seen to be to wage the war on the enemy's territory. The policy of an immediate aggressive at the very beginning, with the tautest stretch of military strength, promised two advantages. It might lead to the defeat of the enemy's force before they were fully prepared, and to the occupation of his capital. If so, then so much the better. But if it did not, at any rate it made the enemy's country the glacis of the defence of German territory. The Battle of the Marne disappointed the Germans of the best results they had hoped for. It still left them the second-best. Henceforth, strongly fortified positions in the enemy's countries were to be treated as advance bases for the defence of Germany. Nor, as will be seen, did the Germans believe in purely passive defence. The German military policy, as exemplified on the Aisne, has a family likeness to one of the favourite dicta of the old naval strategists, that the frontiers of England were the coast line of her enemies. This, then, was the German answer to the policy of "detached reserves" which had won the Battle of the Marne for the Allies.

THE PASSAGE OF THE AISNE.

The Battle of the Aisne which, with its extensions into the valley of the Somme and north into Belgium, was to last for months, and to be in itself a vast campaign, began on September 12th, when the Sixth Army, still to the left of the British advance, came into action west of Soissons. Our army, consisting now of three army corps, besides cavalry, was advancing on both banks of the Vesle, a tributary which flows into the Aisne from the south near Condé, and the artillery of the Third Corps assisted the French to drive the Germans over the Aisne at Soissons, not, however, before they had destroyed the bridges at this point. Towards nightfall, after the cavalry had dislodged the Germans from Braine, where they were disputing the advance down the Vesle, our infantry approached the line of the Aisne. On the left was the Third Army Corps, at Buzancy. The Second Army Corps was nearer the river, the Third Division opposite Condé, where it stuck for the rest of the battle, unable to move, and the Fifth Division to its left, opposite

Missy. On the right wing was the First Corps, at Vauxcéré. To the right of the First Corps was the Fifth French Army, and further to the east the rest of the French army was slowly wheeling into line.

The main German position opposite our army was at Vregny, whence it ran in an easterly direction along the Chemin des Dames towards Craonne. The front of our army would be about thirty miles broad. The valley of the Aisne, which our army now prepared to cross, varied in width from half-a-mile to two miles. Both on the north and the south bank, running parallel to the river, and some 400 feet higher than it, is a plateau, sloping gently back from the stream, and ridged with spurs which sink down from the hills to the water's edge. One of these spurs comes down to the river near Condé, where there is a bridge, which the Germans held and kept all through the battle, and after it. Another spur on the north bank was Vregny, the main German position at this point; and on the south bank of the river there were similar spurs at Sermoise and at Venizel. It was a strong position naturally, and even more from

the careful trenchments and emplacement for guns, which the enemy concealed with remarkable skill. One of the military characteristics of the position, noted by Sir John French, was that the top of the plateau on either side of the river is invisible from the other.

When the attack began, Sir John French was ignorant whether the opposition that he was to meet was a rear-guard action only, or whether something more serious was meant. He laid his plans very carefully. He had most hopes of a passage near Soissons. In the night,

and for the next day, the Engineers were exceedingly busy replacing the bridges that the Germans had destroyed. Near Soissons, a bridge that they built was destroyed by the enemy's howitzer fire. They had, however, greater success in repairing the bridge at Venizel. Here two brigades of the Fourth Division crossed in succession. One of them, the Twelfth, advanced as far as Bucy-le-Long, but there came under heavy fire from Vregny, and it was thought prudent to retire from it at nightfall. Its place was taken by the Fifth Division from the Second Army Corps, which, after long delay, managed to effect a passage at Missy, and advancing west along the north bank extricated the brigades under fire from Vregny from a dangerous German counter-attack. The other division of the centre made no progress. The best progress was made on the right wing. Here one division had the good fortune to find the canal aqueduct unguarded, and crossed




[Central Press.]

The grave of an English soldier killed during the battle of the Marne. The inscription written by the French peasant who buried the soldier is as follows: "Ici repose un Anglais mort pour la patrie bien loin de ses parents à qui l'on pense si souvent. Je ne puis laisser cet ami seul. Dors en paix! Je veillerai sur toi."



[Sport and General.

Collecting the equipment of dead soldiers after a battle : French soldiers sorting out the debris of a battlefield on a station platform in North France.



[News Illustrations.


A pontoon bridge of barges constructed by the French engineers to replace the destroyed bridge seen in the background.

by it almost without opposition. At Chavonne, the other division had more difficulty. One of its brigades crossed by a single girder, which was all that was left of the demolished bridge, and another—a brigade of Guards—had to wait till late afternoon before one of its battalions succeeded in getting across in a ferry. (See the map for the positions on each of the wings on the night of the first day.)

On the next day no progress was made either by the left or by the centre ; but, on the right, one of the brigades made a vigorous attack in the direction of Vendresse and beyond. The brigades of the other division of this First Army Corps, however, had very great difficulties owing to the thick woods, which made artillery support very difficult. At one time a section of the artillery was pushed right forward into the firing line. By noon, however, they had reached Ostel, and were preparing, with the troops on the right, to attack the Chemin des Dames. Then came a very characteristic move on the part of the enemy. He met attack by counter-attack, and advancing rapidly on Vailly, where, owing to the failure of the Third Division to make any sort of impression on the German force which still held the bridge at Condé,

we had no men across the river, they succeeded in interposing themselves between the First and Second Army Corps, and had the British Commander of the First Corps been less skilful and prompt a disaster might have followed. It was averted by Sir Douglas Haig, who rapidly extended his left towards Vailly, and so forced the Germans to retire.

These positions were retained in spite of many counter-attacks, but no further progress was made for some days. The incident in the second day of the battle, when the Germans threatened to cut the communications of the Second Corps, had convinced the British Commander that the capture of the bridge at Condé was the condition of any further advance ; but on September 18th came the news that General Joffre had decided on a turning movement against the German right. Here, while the preparations are being made to turn the German flank, and with our men clinging obstinately to the ground that they had won on the north bank of the Aisne, burrowing in their deep trenches while the artillery duel went on all day over their heads, the narrative of the campaign in France may pause for a time, and turn to what was happening in Belgium, on the frontiers of Russia, and on the sea frontiers of England.



[Exclusive News Agency.]

Soissons : The Cathedral.

Appendix to Chapters XV. and XVII.

GENERAL FRENCH'S DESPATCHES

I.—THE RETREAT FROM MONS.

7th September, 1914.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to report upon the proceedings of the Field Force under my command up to the time of rendering this despatch.

POSITION AT MONS, AUGUST 22ND-23RD.

1. The transport of the troops from England, both by sea and by rail, was effected in the best order, and without a check. Each unit arrived at its destination in this country well within the scheduled time.

The concentration was practically complete on the evening of Friday, the 21st ultimo, and I was able to make dispositions to move the Force during Saturday, the 22nd, to positions I considered most favourable from which to commence operations which the French Commander-in-Chief, General Joffre, requested me to undertake in pursuance of his plans in prosecution of the campaign.

The line taken up extended along the line of the canal from Condé on the west, through Mons and Binche on the east. This line was taken up as follows:—

From Condé to Mons inclusive was assigned to the Second Corps, and to the right of the Second Corps from Mons the First Corps was posted. The Fifth Cavalry Brigade was placed at Binche.

In the absence of my Third Army Corps I desired to keep the Cavalry Division as much as possible as a reserve to act on my outer flank, or move in support of any threatened part of the line. The forward reconnaissance was entrusted to Brigadier-General Sir Philip Chetwode, with the Fifth Cavalry Brigade, but I directed General Allenby to send forward a few squadrons to assist in this work.

During the 22nd and 23rd these advanced squadrons did some excellent work, some of them penetrating as far as Soignies, and several encounters took place, in which our troops showed to great advantage.

DEVELOPMENT OF GERMAN ATTACK, AUGUST 23RD.

2. At 6 a.m., on August 23rd, I assembled the Commanders of the First and Second Corps and Cavalry Division at a point close to the position, and explained the general situation of the Allies, and what I understood to be General Joffre's plan. I discussed with them at some length the immediate situation in front of us.

From information I received from French Headquarters I understood that little more than one, or at most two, of the enemy's Army Corps, with perhaps one Cavalry Division, were in front of my position; and I was aware of no attempted outflanking movement by the enemy. I was confirmed in this opinion by the fact that my patrols encountered no undue opposition in their reconnoitring operations. The observations of my aeroplanes seemed also to bear out this estimate.

About 3 p.m. on Sunday, the 23rd, reports began coming in to the effect that the enemy was commencing an attack on the Mons line, apparently in some strength, but that the right of the position from Mons and Bray was being particularly threatened.

The Commander of the First Corps had pushed his flank back to some high ground south of Bray, and the Fifth Cavalry Brigade evacuated Binche, moving slightly south; the enemy thereupon occupied Binche.

The right of the Third Division, under

General Hamilton, was at Mons, which formed a somewhat dangerous salient; and I directed the Commander of the Second Corps to be careful not to keep the troops on this salient too long, but, if threatened seriously, to draw back the centre behind Mons. This was done before dark. In the meantime, about 5 p.m., I received a most unexpected message from General Joffre by telegraph, telling me that at least three German Corps, viz., a Reserve Corps, the Fourth Corps, and the Ninth Corps, were moving on my position in front, and that the Second Corps was engaged in a turning movement from the direction of Tournai. He also informed me that the two reserve French divisions and the Fifth French Army on my right were retiring, the Germans having on the previous day gained possession of the passages of the Sambre between Charleroi and Namur.

BRITISH RETIREMENT TO BAVAI-MAUBEUGE LINE, AUGUST 24TH.

3. In view of the possibility of my being driven from the Mons position, I had previously ordered a position in rear to be reconnoitred. This position rested on the fortress of Maubeuge on the right, and extended west to Jenlain, south-east of Valenciennes, on the left. The position was reported difficult to hold, because standing crops and buildings made the siting of trenches very difficult and limited the field of fire in many important localities. It nevertheless afforded a few good artillery positions.

When the news of the retirement of the French and the heavy German threatening on my front reached me, I endeavoured to confirm it by aeroplane reconnaissance; and as a result of this, I determined to effect a retirement to the Maubeuge position at daybreak on the 24th.

A certain amount of fighting continued along the whole line throughout the night, and at daybreak on the 24th the Second Division from the neighbourhood of Harmignies made a powerful demonstration as if to retake Binche. This was supported by the artillery of both the First and Second Divisions, whilst the First Division took up a supporting position in the neighbourhood of Peissant. Under cover of this demonstration the Second Corps retired on the line Dour-Quarouble-Frameries. The Third Division on the right of the Corps suffered considerable loss in this operation from the enemy, who had retaken Mons.

The Second Corps halted on this line, where they partially entrenched themselves, enabling Sir Douglas Haig with the First Corps gradually to withdraw to the new position; and he effected this without much further loss, reaching the line Bavai-Maubeuge about 7 p.m. Towards mid-day the enemy appeared to be directing his principal effort against our left.

I had previously ordered General Allenby with the Cavalry to act vigorously in advance of my left front, and endeavour to take the pressure off.

LOSSES OF SECOND CAVALRY BRIGADE.

About 7-30 a.m. General Allenby received a message from Sir Charles Fergusson, commanding Fifth Division, saying that he was very hard pressed and in urgent need of support. On receipt of this message General Allenby drew in the Cavalry and endeavoured to bring direct support to the Fifth Division.

During the course of this operation General de Lisle, of the Second Cavalry Brigade, thought he saw a good opportunity

to paralyse the further advance of the enemy's infantry by making a mounted attack on his flank. He formed up and advanced for this purpose, but was held up by wire about 500 yards from his objective, and the Ninth Lancers and Eighteenth Hussars suffered severely in the retirement of the Brigade.

SUPPORTS BROUGHT UP FROM VALENCIENNES.

The Nineteenth Infantry Brigade, which had been guarding the line of communications, was brought up by rail to Valenciennes on the 22nd and 23rd. On the morning of the 24th they were moved out to a position south of Quarouble to support the left flank of the Second Corps.

With the assistance of the Cavalry Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was enabled to effect his retreat to a new position; although, having two corps of the enemy on his front and one threatening his flank, he suffered great losses in doing so.

At nightfall the position was occupied by the Second Corps to the west of Bavai, the First Corps to the right. The right was protected by the Fortress of Maubeuge, the left by the Nineteenth Brigade in position between Jenlain and Bry, and the Cavalry on the outer flank.

FURTHER RETIREMENT TO CAMBRAI-LE CATEAU-LANDRECIES LINE, AUGUST 25TH.

4. The French were still retiring, and I had no support except such as was afforded by the Fortress of Maubeuge; and the determined attempts of the enemy to get round my left flank assured me that it was his intention to hem me against that place and surround me. I felt that not a moment must be lost in retiring to another position.

I had every reason to believe that the enemy's forces were somewhat exhausted, and I knew that they had suffered heavy losses. I hoped, therefore, that his pursuit would not be too vigorous to prevent me effecting my object.

The operation, however, was full of danger and difficulty, not only owing to the very superior force in my front, but also to the exhaustion of the troops.

The retirement was recommenced in the early morning of the 25th to a position in the neighbourhood of Le Cateau, and rearguards were ordered to be clear of the Maubeuge-Bavai-Eth road by 5-30 a.m.

Two Cavalry Brigades, with the Divisional Cavalry of the Second Corps, covered the movement of the Second Corps. The remainder of the Cavalry Division with the Nineteenth Brigade, the whole under the command of General Allenby, covered the west flank.

The Fourth Division commenced its detrainment at Le Cateau on Sunday, the 23rd, and by the morning of the 25th eleven battalions and a Brigade of Artillery with Divisional Staff were available for service.

I ordered General Snow to move out to take up a position with his right south of Solesmes, his left resting on the Cambrai-Le Cateau road south of La Chaprie. In this position the Division rendered great help to the effective retirement of the Second and First Corps to the new position.

Although the troops had been ordered to occupy the Cambrai-Le Cateau-Landrecies position, and the ground had, during the 25th, been partially prepared and entrenched, I had grave doubts—owing to the information I had received as to the accumulating strength of the enemy against me—as to the wisdom of standing there to fight.

Having regard to the continued retirement of the French on my right, my exposed left flank, the tendency of the enemy's western corps (II.) to envelop me, and, more than all, the exhausted condition of the troops, I determined to make a great effort to continue the retreat till I could put some substantial obstacle, such as the Somme or the Oise, between my troops and the enemy, and afford the former some opportunity of rest and reorganisation. Orders were, therefore, sent to the Corps Commanders to continue their retreat as soon as they possibly could towards the general line Vermand-St. Quentin-Ribemont.

The Cavalry, under General Allenby, were ordered to cover the retirement.

Throughout the 25th, and far into the evening, the First Corps continued its march on Landrecies, following the road along the eastern border of the Forêt de Mormal, and arrived at Landrecies about ten o'clock. I had intended that the Corps should come further west, so as to fill up the gap between La Cateau and Landrecies, but the men were exhausted and could not get further in without rest.

The enemy, however, would not allow them this rest, and about 9-30 p.m. a report was received that the Fourth Guards Brigade in Landrecies was heavily attacked by troops of the Ninth German Army Corps, who were coming through the forest on the north of the town. This brigade fought most gallantly, and caused the enemy to suffer tremendous loss in issuing from the forest into the narrow streets of the town. This loss has been estimated from reliable sources at from 700 to 1,000. At the same time information reached me from Sir Douglas Haig that his First Division was also heavily engaged south and east of Maroilles. I sent urgent messages to the Commander of the two French Reserve Divisions on my right to come up to the assistance of the First Corps, which they eventually did. Partly owing to this assistance, but mainly to the skilful manner in which Sir Douglas Haig extricated his Corps from an exceptionally difficult position in the darkness of the night, they were able at dawn to resume their march south towards Wassigny on Guise.

By about 6 p.m. the Second Corps had got into position with their right on Le Cateau, their left in the neighbourhood of Caudry, and the line of defence was continued thence by the 4th Division towards Seranvillers, the left being thrown back.

During the fighting on the 24th and 25th the Cavalry became a good deal scattered, but by the early morning of the 26th General Allenby had succeeded in concentrating two brigades to the south of Cambrai.

The Fourth Division was placed under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Second Army Corps.

On the 24th the French Cavalry Corps, consisting of three divisions, under General Sordet, had been in billets north of Avesnes. On my way back from Bavai, which was my "Post de Commandement" during the fighting of the 23rd and 24th, I visited General Sordet, and earnestly requested his co-operation and support. He promised to obtain sanction from his Army Commander to act on my left flank, but said that his horses were too tired to move before the next day. Although he rendered me valuable assistance later on in the course of the retirement, he was unable for the reasons given to afford me any support on the most critical day of all, viz., the 26th.

At daybreak it became apparent that the enemy was throwing the bulk of his strength against the left of the position occupied by the Second Corps and the Fourth Division.

At this time the guns of four German Army Corps were in position against them, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien reported to me that he judged it impossible to continue his retirement at daybreak (as ordered) in face of such an attack.

I sent him orders to use his utmost endeavours to break off the action and retire at the earliest possible moment, as it was impossible for me to send him any support, the First Corps being at the moment incapable of movement.

The French Cavalry Corps, under General Sordet, was coming up on our left rear early in the morning, and I sent an urgent message to him to do his utmost to come up and support the retirement of my left flank; but owing to the fatigue of his horses he found himself unable to intervene in any way.

There had been no time to entrench the position properly, but the troops showed a magnificent front to the terrible fire which confronted them.

The Artillery, although outmatched by at least four to one, made a splendid fight, and inflicted heavy losses on their opponents.

At length it became apparent that, if complete annihilation was to be avoided, a retirement must be attempted; and the order was given to commence it about 3-30 p.m. The movement was covered with the most devoted intrepidity and determination by the Artillery, which had itself suffered heavily, and the fine work done by the Cavalry in the further retreat from the position assisted materially in the final completion of this most difficult and dangerous operation.

Fortunately the enemy had himself suffered too heavily to engage in an energetic pursuit.

I cannot close the brief account of this glorious stand of the British troops without putting on record my deep appreciation of the valuable services rendered by General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.

I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the Army under my command on the morning of the 26th August could never have been accomplished unless a commander of rare and unusual coolness, intrepidity, and determination had been present to personally conduct the operation.

The retreat was continued far into the night of the 26th, and through the 27th and 28th, on which date the troops halted on the line Noyon-Chauny-La Fère, having then thrown off the weight of the enemy's pursuit.

On the 27th and 28th I was much indebted to General Sordet and the French Cavalry Division which he commands for materially assisting my retirement, and successfully driving back some of the enemy on Cambrai.

General D'Amade also, with his Sixty-first and Sixty-second French Reserve Divisions, moved down from the neighbourhood of Arras on the enemy's right flank, and took much pressure off the rear of the British Forces.

This closes the period covering the heavy fighting which commenced at Mons on Sunday afternoon, 23rd August, and which really constituted a four days' battle.

At this point, therefore, I propose to close the present despatch.

I deeply deplore the very serious losses which the British Forces have suffered in this great battle; but they were inevitable in view of the fact that the British Army—only two days after a concentration by rail—was called upon to withstand a vigorous attack of five German Army Corps.

It is impossible for me to speak too highly of the skill evinced by the two General Officers commanding Army Corps; the self-sacrificing and devoted exertions of their Staffs; the direction of the troops by Divisional, Brigade and Regimental Leaders; the command of the smaller units by their officers; and the magnificent fighting spirit displayed by non-commissioned officers and men.

I wish particularly to bring to your Lordship's notice the admirable work done by the Royal Flying Corps under Sir David Henderson. Their skill, energy, and perseverance have been beyond all praise. They have furnished me with the most complete and accurate information, which has been of incalculable value in the conduct of the operations. Fired at constantly both by friend and foe, and not hesitating to fly in every kind of weather, they have remained undaunted throughout.

Further, by actually fighting in the air, they have succeeded in destroying five of the enemy's machines.

I wish to acknowledge with deep gratitude the incalculable assistance I received from

the General and Personal Staffs at Headquarters during this trying period.

Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Murray, Chief of the General Staff; Major-General Wilson, Sub-Chief of the General Staff; and all under them have worked day and night unceasingly with the utmost skill, self-sacrifice, and devotion; and the same acknowledgment is due by me to Brigadier-General Hon. W. Lambton, my Military Secretary, and the Personal Staff.

In such operations as I have described the work of the Quarter-master General is of an extremely onerous nature. Major-General Sir William Robertson has met what appeared to be almost insuperable difficulties with his characteristic energy, skill, and determination; and it is largely owing to his exertions that the hardships and sufferings of the troops—inseparable from such operations—were not much greater.

Major-General Sir Nevil Macready, the Adjutant-General, has also been confronted with most onerous and difficult tasks in connection with disciplinary arrangements and the preparation of casualty lists. He has been indefatigable in his exertions to meet the difficult situations which arose.

I have not yet been able to complete the list of officers whose names I desire to bring to your Lordship's notice for services rendered during the period under review; and, as I understand it is of importance that this despatch should no longer be delayed, I propose to forward this list, separately, as soon as I can.

I have the honour to be,
Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,
(Signed) J. D. P. FRENCH, Field-Marshal,
Commanding in Chief the
British Forces in the Field.

II. THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE.

On Saturday, September 5th, I met the French Commander-in-Chief at his request, and he informed me of his intention to take the offensive forthwith, as he considered conditions were very favourable to success. General Joffre announced to me his intention of wheeling up the flank of the Sixth Army, pivoting on the Marne, and directing it to move on the Ourcq, cross, and attack the flank of the First German Army, which was then moving in a south-easterly direction east of that river. He requested me to effect a change of front to my right (my left resting on the Marne and my right on the Fifth Army), to fill the gap between that army and the Sixth. I was then to advance against the enemy in my front and join in the general offensive movement.

These combined movements practically commenced on Sunday, September 6th, at sunrise, and on that day it may be said that a great battle opened on a front extending from Ermenonville, which was just in front of the left flank of the Sixth French Army, through Lizy-on-the-Marne, Maupersuis (which was about the British centre), Courtecon (which was on the left of the Fifth French Army), to Esternay and Charleville (the left of the Ninth Army under General Foch), and so along the front of the Ninth, Fourth, and Third French Armies to a point north of the fortress of Verdun. This battle, in so far as the Sixth French Army, the British Army, the Fifth French Army, and the Ninth French Army were concerned, may be said to have concluded upon the evening of September 10th, by which time the Germans had been driven back to the line Soissons-Rheims with loss of thousands of prisoners, many guns, and enormous masses of transport.

THE GERMAN CHANGE OF PLAN.

About the 3rd of September the enemy appears to have changed his plans, and to have determined to stop his advance south direct upon Paris, for on September 4th our reconnaissances showed that his main columns were moving in a south-easterly direction, generally east of a line drawn through Nanteuil and Lizy on the Ourcq. On September 5th several of these columns were observed to have crossed the Marne; whilst German troops, which were observed

moving south-east up the left bank of the Ourcq on the 4th, were now reported to be halted and facing that river. The heads of the enemy's columns were seen crossing at Changis, La Ferté, Nogent, Château Thierry, and Mézy. Considerable German columns of all arms were seen to be converging on Montmirail, whilst before sunset large bivouacs of the enemy were located in the neighbourhood of Coulommiers, south of Rebais, La Ferté-Gaucher, and Lagny.

I should conceive it to be about noon on September 6th, after the British forces had changed their front to the right and occupied the line Jouy-le-Châtel-Farmoutier-Villeneuve-le-Comté and the advance of the Sixth French Army north of the Marne towards the Ourcq became apparent, that the enemy realised the powerful threat that was being made against the flank of his columns moving south-east and began the great retreat which opened the battle above referred to.

THE ARMIES' POSITION.

On the evening of September 6th, therefore, the fronts and positions of the opposing armies were, roughly, as follows:—

Allies.

Sixth French Army, right on the Marne at Meux, left towards Betz.

British forces, on the line Lagny-Coulommiers-Maison.

Fifth French Army at Courtagon, right on Esternay.

Conneau's Cavalry Corps, between the right of the British and the left of the French Fifth Army.

Germans.

Fourth Reserve and Second Corps, east of the Ourcq and facing that river.

Ninth Cavalry Division, west of Crécy.

Second Cavalry Division, north of Coulommiers.

Fourth Corps, Rebais.

Third and Seventh Corps, south-west of Montmirail.

All these troops constituted the First German Army, which was directed against the French Sixth Army on the Ourcq and the British forces and the left of the Fifth French Army south of the Marne. The Second German Army (with the Guards) was moving against the centre and right of the Fifth French Army and the Ninth French Army.

On September 7th both the Fifth and Sixth French Armies were heavily engaged on our flank. The Second and Fourth Reserve German Corps on the Ourcq vigorously opposed the advance of the French towards that river, but did not prevent the Sixth Army from gaining some headway, the Germans themselves suffering serious losses. The French Fifth Army threw the enemy back to the line of the Petit Morin River after inflicting severe losses upon them, especially about Montceaux, which was carried at the point of the bayonet.

The enemy retreated before our advance, covered by his Second and Ninth and Guard Cavalry Divisions, which suffered severely. Our cavalry acted with great vigour, especially General de Lisle's Brigade, with the Ninth Lancers and Eighteenth Hussars.

STUBBORN FIGHTING.

On September 8th the enemy continued his retreat northward, and our army was successfully engaged during the day with strong rearguards of all arms on the Petit Morin River, thereby materially assisting the progress of the French armies on our right and left, against whom the enemy were making his greatest efforts. On both sides the enemy was thrown back with very heavy loss.

The First Army Corps encountered stubborn resistance at La Tretoire, north of Rebais. The enemy occupied a strong position, with infantry and guns, on the northern bank of the Petit Morin River. They were dislodged with considerable loss. Several machine guns and many prisoners were captured, and upwards of 200 German dead were left on the ground. The forcing of the Petit Morin at this point was much

assisted by the cavalry and the First Division, which crossed higher up the stream. Later in the day a counter-attack by the enemy was well repulsed by the First Army Corps, a great many prisoners and some guns again falling into our hands.

On this day, September 8th, the Second Army Corps encountered considerable opposition, but drove back the enemy at all points, with great loss, making considerable captures. The Third Army Corps also drove back considerable bodies of the enemy's infantry, and made some captures.

On September 9th the First and Second Army Corps forced the passage of the Marne, and advanced some miles to the north of it. The Third Corps encountered considerable opposition, as the bridge at La Ferté was destroyed and the enemy held the town on the opposite bank in some strength, and thence persistently obstructed construction of a bridge, so the passage was not effected until after nightfall. During the day's pursuit the enemy suffered heavy loss in killed and wounded. Some hundreds of prisoners fell into our hands, and a battery of eight machine guns was captured by the Second Division.

On this day the Sixth French Army was heavily engaged west of the river Ourcq. The enemy had largely increased his force opposing them, and very heavy fighting ensued, in which the French were successful throughout. The left of the Fifth French Army reached the neighbourhood of Château Thierry after most severe fighting, having driven the enemy completely north of the river with great loss. The fighting of this army in the neighbourhood of Montmirail was very severe.

The advance was resumed at daybreak on the 10th up to the line of the Ourcq, opposed by strong rear guards of all arms. The First and Second Corps, assisted by the Cavalry Division on the right and the Third and Fifth Cavalry Brigades on the left, drove the enemy northwards. Thirteen guns, seven machine guns, about 2,000 prisoners, and quantities of transport fell into our hands. The enemy left many dead on the field.

On this day the French Fifth and Sixth armies had little opposition.

THE BRITISH ENDURANCE.

As the First and Second German Armies were now in full retreat, this evening marks the end of the battle, which practically commenced on the morning of the 6th instant, and it is at this point in the operations that I am concluding the present despatch.

Although I deeply regret to have had to report heavy losses in killed and wounded throughout these operations, I do not think they have been excessive in view of the magnitude of the great fight, the outlines of which I have only been able very briefly to describe, and the demoralisation and losses in killed and wounded which are known to have been caused to the enemy by the vigour and severity of the pursuit.

In concluding this despatch, I must call your Lordship's special attention to the fact that from Sunday, August 23rd, to the present date, September 17th, from Mons back almost to the Seine, and from the Seine to the Aisne, the army under my command has been ceaselessly engaged without one single day's halt or rest of any kind.

Since the date to which in this despatch I have limited my report of the operations a great battle on the Aisne has been proceeding. A full report of this battle will be made in an early further despatch. It will, however, be of interest to say here that in spite of a very determined resistance on the part of the enemy, who is holding in strength and with great tenacity a position peculiarly favourable to defence, the battle which commenced on the evening of the 12th instant has so far forced the enemy back from his first position, secured the passage of the river, and inflicted great loss upon him, including the capture of over 2,000 prisoners and several guns.

I have the honour, &c.,
(Signed) J. D. P. FRENCH, Field Marshal,
Commanding in Chief the
British Forces in the Field.

III.—BATTLE OF THE AISNE.

October 8th, 1914.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to report the operations in which the British forces in France have been engaged since the evening of the 10th September.

In the early morning of the 11th the further pursuit of the enemy was commenced, and the three corps crossed the Ourcq practically unopposed, the cavalry reaching the line of the Aisne river, the Third and Fifth Brigades south of Soissons, the First, Second, and Fourth on high ground at Couvelles and Cerscail.

On the afternoon of the 12th, from the opposition encountered by the Sixth French Army to the west of Soissons by the Third Corps south-east of that place, by the Second Corps south of Missy and Vailly, and certain indications all along the line, I formed the opinion that the enemy had, for the moment at any rate, arrested his retreat, and was preparing to dispute the passage of the Aisne with some vigour. South of Soissons the Germans were holding Mont de Paris against the attacks of the right of the French Sixth Army when the Third Corps reached the neighbourhood of Buzancy, south-east of that place. With the assistance of the artillery of the Third Corps the French drove them back across the river at Soissons, where they destroyed the bridges. The heavy artillery fire, which was visible for several miles in a westerly direction in the valley of the Aisne, showed that the Sixth French Army was meeting with strong opposition all along the line.

On this day the cavalry under General Allenby reached the neighbourhood of Braine, and did good work in clearing the town and the high ground beyond it of strong hostile detachments. The Queen's Bays are particularly mentioned by the General as having assisted greatly in the success of this operation. They were well supported by the Third Division, which on this night bivouacked at Brenelle, south of the river. The Fifth Division approached Missy, but were unable to make headway. The First Army Corps reached the neighbourhood of Vauxcéré without much opposition. In this manner the battle of the Aisne commenced.

THE VALLEY DESCRIBED.

The Aisne Valley runs generally east and west, and consists of a flat-bottomed depression of a width varying from half a mile to two miles, down which the river follows a winding course to the west, at some points near the southern slopes of the valley, and at others near the northern. The high ground both on the north and south of the river is approximately four hundred feet above the bottom of the valley, and is very similar in character, as are both slopes of the valley itself, which are broken into numerous rounded spurs and re-entrants. The most prominent of the former are the Chivre spur on the right bank and the Sermoise spur on the left. Near the latter place the general plateau on the south is divided by a subsidiary valley of much the same character, down which the small river Vesle flows to the main stream near Sermoise.

The slopes of the plateau overlooking the Aisne on the north and south are of varying steepness, and are covered with numerous patches of wood, which also stretch upwards and backwards over the edge on to the top of the high ground. There are several villages and small towns dotted about in the valley itself and along its sides, the chief of which is the town of Soissons. The Aisne is a sluggish stream of some 170 feet in breadth, but being fifteen feet deep in the centre is unfordable. Between Soissons on the west and Villers on the east (the part of the river attacked and secured by the British forces) there are eleven road bridges across it. On the north bank a narrow-gauge railway runs from Soissons to Vailly, where it crosses the river, and continues eastward along the south bank. From Soissons to Sermoise a double line of railway runs along the south bank, turning at the latter place up the Vesle Valley towards Bazoches.

THE BRITISH ADVANCE.

The position held by the enemy is a very strong one either for a delaying action or for a defensive battle. One of its chief military characteristics is that from the high ground on neither side can the top of the plateau on the other side be seen except for small stretches. This is chiefly due to the woods on the edges of the slopes. Another important point is that all the bridges are under either direct or high angle artillery fire.

The tract of country above described, which lies north of the Aisne, is well adapted to concealment, and was so skilfully turned to account by the enemy as to render it impossible to judge the real nature of his opposition to our passage of the river or accurately to gauge his strength, but I have every reason to conclude that strong rearguards of at least three army corps were holding the passages on the early morning of the 13th.

On that morning I ordered the British forces to advance and make good the Aisne. The First Corps and the cavalry advanced on the river. The First Division was directed on Chanouille *via* the canal bridge at Bourg, and the Second Division on Courtecon and Presles *via* Pont Arcz, and on the canal to the north of Braye *via* Chavonne. On the right the cavalry and the First Division met with slight opposition, and found a passage by means of the canal, which crosses the river by an aqueduct. The division was, therefore, able to press on, supported by the cavalry division on its outer flank, driving back the enemy in front of it.

CROSSING UNDER FIRE.

On the left the leading troops of the Second Division reached the river by nine o'clock. The Fifth Infantry Brigade were only enabled to cross in single file and under considerable shell fire by means of the broken girder of the bridge, which was not entirely submerged in the river. The construction of a pontoon bridge was at once undertaken, and was completed by five o'clock in the afternoon. On the extreme left the Fourth Guards Brigade met with severe opposition at Chavonne, and it was only late in the afternoon that it was able to establish a foothold on the northern bank of the river by ferrying one battalion across in boats. By nightfall the First Division occupied the area Moulins-Paissy-Gény, with posts in the village of Vendresse. The Second Division bivouacked as a whole on the southern bank of the river, leaving only the Fifth Brigade on the north bank to establish a bridge head.

The Second Corps found all the bridges in front of them destroyed except that of Condé, which was in possession of the enemy and remained so until the end of the battle. In the approach to Missy, where the Fifth Division eventually crossed, there is some open ground, which was swept by heavy fire from the opposite bank. The Thirteenth Brigade was, therefore, unable to advance, but the Fourteenth, which was directed to the east of Venizel at a less exposed point, was rafted across, and by night established itself with its left at St. Marguerite. They were followed by the Fifteenth Brigade, and later on both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth supported the Fourth Division on their left in repelling a heavy counter-attack on the Third Corps.

On the morning of the 13th the Third Corps found the enemy had established himself in strength on the Vregny plateau. The road bridge at Venizel was repaired during the morning, and a reconnaissance was made with a view to throwing a pontoon bridge at Soissons. The Twelfth Infantry Brigade crossed at Venizel, and was assembled at Bucy-le-Long by 1 p.m., but the bridge was so far damaged that the artillery could only be man-handled across it. Meanwhile, the construction of a bridge was commenced close to the road bridge at Venizel. At 2 p.m. the Twelfth Infantry Brigade attacked in the direction of Chivres and Vregny, with the object of securing the high ground east of Chivres as a necessary preliminary to a further advance northwards. This attack made good progress, but at 5-30 p.m. the enemy's

artillery and machine gun fire from the direction of Vregny became so severe that no further advance could be made. The positions reached were held till dark.

The pontoon bridge at Venizel was completed at 5-30 p.m., when the Tenth Infantry Brigade crossed the river and moved to Bucy-le-Long. The Nineteenth Infantry Brigade moved to Billy-sur-Aisne, and before dark all the artillery of the division had crossed the river with the exception of the heavy battery and one brigade of field artillery. During the night the positions gained by the Twelfth Infantry Brigade to the East of the stream running through Chivres were handed over to the Fifth Division.

THE WORK OF THE ENGINEERS.

The section of the bridging train allotted to the Third Corps began to arrive in the neighbourhood of Soissons late in the afternoon, when an attempt to throw a heavy pontoon bridge at Soissons had to be abandoned owing to the fire of the enemy's heavy howitzers.

In the evening the enemy retired at all points, and entrenched himself on the high ground about two miles north of the river, along which runs the Chemin des Dames. Detachments of infantry, however, strongly entrenched in commanding points down the slopes of the various spurs, were left in front of all three corps with powerful artillery in support of them.

During the night of the 13th, and on the 14th and following days, the field companies were incessantly at work night and day. Eight pontoon bridges and one footbridge were thrown across the river under generally very heavy artillery fire, which was incessantly kept up on most of the crossings after completion. Three of the road bridges in Venizel, Missy, and Vailly, and the railway bridge east of Vailly, were temporarily repaired so as to take foot traffic, and the Villers bridge made fit to carry weights up to six tons. Preparations were also made for the repair of the Missy, Vailly, and Bourg bridges so as to take mechanical transport. The weather was very wet, and added to the difficulties by cutting up the already indifferent approaches, entailing a large amount of work to repair and improve. The operations of the field companies during this most trying time are worthy of the best traditions of the Royal Engineers.

SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S BOLDNESS AND SUCCESS.

On the evening of the 14th it was still impossible to decide whether the enemy was only making a temporary halt covered by rearguards or whether he intended to stand and defend the position. With a view to clearing up the situation I ordered a general advance. The action of the First Corps on this day, under the direction and command of Sir Douglas Haig, was of so skilful, bold, and decisive a character that he gained positions which alone have enabled me to maintain my position for more than three weeks of very severe fighting on the north bank of the river. The corps was directed to cross the line Moulins-Moussy by 7 a.m. On the right the general officer commanding the First Division directed the Second Infantry Brigade (which was in billets and bivouacked about Moulins) and the Twenty-fifth Artillery Brigade (less one battery), under General Bulfin, to move forward before daybreak, in order to protect the advance of the division sent up the valley.

An officer's patrol sent over by this brigade reported a considerable force of the enemy near the factory north of Troyon, and the Brigadier accordingly directed two regiments (the King's Royal Rifles and the Royal Sussex Regiment) to move at 3 a.m. The Northamptonshire Regiment was ordered to move at 4 a.m. to occupy the spur east of Troyon. The remaining regiment of the brigade (the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment) moved at 5-30 a.m. to the village of Vendresse. The factory was found to be held in considerable strength by the enemy, and the Brigadier ordered

the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment to support the King's Royal Rifles and the Sussex Regiment. Even with this support the force was unable to make headway, and on the arrival of the First Brigade the Coldstream Guards were moved up to support the right of the leading brigade (the Second), while the remainder of the First Brigade supported its left.

ATTACKS AND COUNTER-ATTACKS.

About noon the situation was roughly that the whole of these two brigades were extended along a line running east and west, north of the line Troyon and south of the Chemin des Dames. A party of the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment had seized and was holding the factory. The enemy held a line of entrenchments north and east of the factory in considerable strength, and every effort to advance against this line was driven back by heavy shell and machine-gun fire.

The morning was wet, and a heavy mist hung over the hills, so that the Twenty-fifth Artillery Brigade and the divisional artillery were unable to render effective support to the advanced troops until about 9 o'clock.

By 10 o'clock the Third Infantry Brigade had reached a point one mile south of Vendresse, and from there it was ordered to continue the line of the First Brigade, and to connect with and help the right of the Second Division. A strong hostile column was found to be advancing, and by a vigorous counter-stroke with two of his battalions the brigadier checked the advance of this column, and relieved the pressure on the Second Division.

From this period until late in the afternoon the fighting consisted of a series of attacks and counter-attacks. The counter-strokes by the enemy were delivered at first with great vigour, but later on they decreased in strength, and all were driven off with heavy loss.

GUARDS BRIGADE.

On the left the Sixth Infantry Brigade had been ordered to cross the river and to pass through the line held during the preceding night by the Fifth Infantry Brigade and occupy the Courtecon ridge, whilst a detached force, consisting of the Fourth Guards Brigade and the Thirty-sixth Brigade Royal Field Artillery, under Brigadier-General Percival, were ordered to proceed to a point east of the village of Ostel. The Sixth Infantry Brigade crossed the river at Pont Arcy, moved up the valley towards Braye, and at 9 a.m. had reached the line Tilleul-la-Buvelle. On this line they came under heavy artillery and rifle fire, and were unable to advance until supported by the Thirty-fourth Brigade Royal Field Artillery and the Forty-fourth Howitzer Brigade and the heavy artillery.

The Fourth Guards Brigade crossed the river at 10 a.m., and met with very heavy opposition. It had to pass through dense woods. Field artillery support was difficult to obtain, but one section of field artillery pushed up to and within the firing line. At 1 p.m. the left of the Brigade was south of the Ostel ridge.

A CRITICAL MOMENT.

At this period of the action the enemy obtained a footing between the First and Second Corps, and threatened to cut the communications of the latter. Sir Douglas Haig was very hard pressed, and had no reserve in hand. I placed the Cavalry Division at his disposal, part of which he skilfully used to prolong and secure the left flank of the Guards Brigade. Some heavy fighting ensued, which resulted in the enemy being driven back with heavy loss.

About four o'clock the weakening of the counter-attacks by the enemy and other indications tended to show that his resistance was weakening, and a general advance was ordered by the Army Corps Commander. Although meeting with considerable opposition, and coming under very heavy artillery and rifle fire, the position of the corps at the end of the day's

operations extended from the Chemin des Dames on the right through Chivy to Le Cour de Soupir, with the First Cavalry Brigade extending to the Chavonne-Soissons road. On the right the corps were in close touch with the French Moroccan troops of the Eighteenth Corps, which were entrenched in echelon with its right rear. During the night they entrenched this position.

Throughout the Battle of the Aisne this advanced and commanding position was maintained, and I cannot speak too highly of the valuable services rendered by Sir Douglas Haig and the army corps under his command. Day after day and night after night the enemy's infantry has been hurled against him in violent counter-attack, which has never on any one occasion succeeded, whilst the trenches all over his position have been under continuous heavy artillery fire. The operations of the First Corps on this day resulted in the capture of several hundred prisoners, some field pieces, and machine guns. The casualties were very severe, one brigade alone losing three of its four colonels.

The Third Division commenced a further advance, and had nearly reached the plateau of Anizy when they were driven back by a powerful counter-attack, supported by heavy artillery. The division, however, fell back in the best order, and finally entrenched itself about a mile north of Vailly Bridge, effectively covering the passage. The Fourth and Fifth Divisions were unable to do more than maintain their ground.

THE BIG GUNS AND THE TRENCHES.

On the morning of the 15th, after close examination of the position, it became clear to me that the enemy was making a determined stand, and this view was confirmed by reports which reached me from the French armies fighting on my right and left, which clearly showed that a strongly entrenched line of defence was being taken up from the north of Compiègne eastward and south-eastward along the whole valley of the Aisne up to and beyond Rheims. A few days previously the fortress of Maubeuge fell, and a considerable quantity of siege artillery was brought down from that place to strengthen the enemy's position in front of us.

During the 15th shells fell in our position which have been judged by experts to be thrown by 8-in. siege guns with a range of 10,000 yards. Throughout the whole course of the battle our troops have suffered very heavily from this fire, although its effect latterly was largely mitigated by more efficient and thorough entrenching, the necessity for which I impressed strongly upon army corps commanders. In order to assist them in this work all villages within the area of our occupation were searched for heavy entrenching tools, a large number of which were collected.

In view of the peculiar formation of the ground on the north side of the river between Missy and Soissons, the village of Vregny, to the west, was able to bring a blank fire to bear upon it. The division had therefore to retire to a line, the left of which was at the village of Marguerite, and thence ran by the north edge of Missy back to the river to the east of that place. With great skill and tenacity Sir Charles Fergusson maintained this position throughout the whole battle, although his trenches were necessarily on lower ground than that occupied by the enemy in the southern edge of the plateau, which was only four hundred yards away. General Hamilton, with the Third Division, vigorously attacked to the north, and regained all the ground he had lost on the 15th, which, throughout the battle, has formed the most powerful and effective bridge head.

GALLANT REGIMENTS.

On the 16th the Sixth Division came up into line. It had been my intention to direct the First Corps to attack and seize the enemy's position on the Chemin des Dames, supporting it with this new reinforcement. I hoped from the position thus gained to bring effective fire to bear across the front of the Third Division, which, by securing the advance of the latter, would also take the pressure off the Fifth Division and the Third Corps. But any further advance of the First Corps would have dangerously exposed my right flank, and, further, I learned from the French Commander-in-Chief that he was strongly reinforcing the Sixth French Army on my left, with the intention of bringing up the Allied left to attack the enemy's flank, and thus compel his retirement. I therefore sent the Sixth Division to join the Third Corps, with orders to keep it on the south side of the river, as it might be available in general reserve.

On the 17th, 18th, and 19th the whole of our line was heavily bombarded, and the First Corps was constantly and heavily engaged. On the afternoon of the 17th the right flank of the First Division was seriously threatened. A counter-attack was made by the Northamptonshire Regiment in combination with the Queen's, and one battalion of the Divisional Reserve was moved up in support. The Northamptonshire Regiment, under cover of mist, crept up to within a hundred yards of the enemy's trenches and charged with the bayonet, driving them out of the trenches and up the hill. A very strong force of hostile infantry was then disclosed on the crest line. This new line was enfiladed by part of the Queen's and the King's Royal Rifles, which wheeled to their left on the extreme right of our infantry line and were supported by a squadron of cavalry on the outer flank. The enemy's attack was ultimately driven back with heavy losses.

On the 18th, during the night, the Gloucestershire Regiment advanced from their position near Chivy, filled in the enemy's trenches, and captured two Maxim guns. On the extreme right the Queen's were heavily attacked, but the enemy were repulsed with great loss. About midnight the attack was renewed on the First Division, supported by artillery fire, but was again repulsed. Shortly after midnight an attack was made on the left of the Second Division with considerable force, which was also thrown back. At about 1 p.m. on the 19th the Second Division drove back a heavy infantry attack, strongly supported by artillery fire. At dusk the attack was renewed and again repulsed.

On the 18th I discussed with the general officer commanding the Second Army Corps and his divisional commanders the possibility of driving the enemy out of Condé, which lay between his two divisions, and seizing the bridge, which has remained throughout in his possession. As, however, I found that the bridge was closely commanded from all parts on the south side, and that satisfactory arrangements were made to prevent any issue from it by the enemy by day or night, I decided that it was not necessary to incur the losses which an attack would entail, as in view of the position of the Second and Third Corps the enemy could make no use of Condé, and would be automatically forced out of it by any advance which might become possible for us.

THE BRITISH LOSSES.

I have described above the severe character of the artillery fire which was directed from morning till night, not only upon the trenches, but over the whole surface of the ground occupied by our forces. It was not until a few days before the position was evacuated that the heavy guns were removed and the fire slackened. Attack and counter-attack occurred at all hours of the night and day throughout the whole position, demanding extreme vigilance and permitting only a minimum of rest. The fact that between the 12th September to the date of this despatch the total numbers of killed, wounded, and missing reached figures amounting to 501 officers and 12,980 men proves the severity of the struggle. The tax on the endurance of the troops was further increased by the heavy rain and cold which prevailed for some ten or twelve days of this trying time.

The Battle of the Aisne has once more demonstrated the splendid spirit, gallantry, and devotion which animates the officers and men of His Majesty's Forces.

I have the honour to be your Lordship's most obedient servant.

(Signed) J. D. P. FRENCH, Field Marshal,
Commanding in Chief the
British Army in the Field.



On the boat returning to England :
Wounded, but cheerful.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE SPIRIT OF THE ARMY.

THE LETTERS FROM THE FRONT—MARCHING SONGS—THE BORN SOLDIER—CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PROFESSIONAL ARMY—WARFARE WITHOUT BITTERNESS—THE PRIVATE SOLDIER AS CRITIC.

ELEMENTARY education has done one thing for the British army: it has made it articulate. The last time that the army went to fight in Flanders its kinsfolk and friends had to wait until the Corporal Trims were back again in person and settled down at Shandy Hall before they knew what the army thought of the battle at Malplaquet, or the taking of Ghent or Bruges. But nowadays, thanks to a generation of elementary education and a field postal service which follows the soldiers almost up to the trenches, we can know what the rank and file of the army are thinking almost from the moment when they touched French soil. Their letters come over in hundreds, letters which, though intended in the first place for the friends and families of the men who wrote them, have yet reached a larger but no less interested audience by finding a place in the columns of the newspapers. They have been very good letters. The army has not only been made articulate; it has quite often become a stylist. Often enough during the past weeks the newspaper reader has been held by some extract from the letter of a private or non-commissioned officer which has had all

the simplicity and force of an episode from the *Journal of the Plague Year*, together with some quick glimpses of character and individuality which Defoe never attempted. "Old men and the women came out and threw their arms around us," says one soldier, telling how the Rifle Brigade advanced, after the fighting on the Marne, through some of the French villages which had had to be left to their fate in the great retreat from the Belgian frontier, "weeping all the time with joy, and calling us their benefactors in their extravagant French way." "In their extravagant French way"—whole volumes might be written on the difference between the French and English tempers without getting any nearer the gist of that difference than this undemonstrative English private does in five sober words.

Think of the army which is sending home many letters as illuminating and well written as this extract; and then think of the army which went campaigning in these same parts of the world just a little over two centuries ago, the army of whose private moods and doings so little has survived beyond the famous fact that it swore terribly in Flanders, and whose officers in their letters home (if



Serving out the supplies at an Army Service Corps depot on the Continent.

[L.N.A.]



A meal-time group in one of the British camps in France.

[L.N.A.]

one may take Thackeray's "Frank Castlewood" as a fair case) were not above sowing their "wild otes" when they had had "enuf of soldering." The difference means that posterity—if anyone after the war is good enough to compile it for them—can have a complete record of what the men who fought in the greatest campaign of history thought and felt at the time they were fighting in it; and that those who have lived but not fought through that campaign can be brought into almost daily contact with the spirit of what began the war as the best professional army the world has ever seen since Cæsar carried the Roman eagles beyond the Rhine.

THE VALUE OF THE SOLDIERS' LETTERS.

This is the best use to which the letters from the front can be put—to help the people at home to understand just how the war looked to those Englishmen who fought in it, what sort of a spirit they brought to the hardships which it involved, and how they bore themselves, and what sort of things were limned on their memories when they came to play their individual parts under fire. Such letters do not throw any fresh light on the strategy of the war, or even on the tactics of its battles; for one thing the censor has been too busy deleting place names, and for another the modern battle, with its twenty league front, and its weeks of what are virtually siege operations against the enemy's trenches, is far too big a thing for the individual soldier to grasp. (The extraordinary size of a modern battle

and, as far as a large number of men engaged in it are concerned, its vague outlines and uncertain progress, were well illustrated by a queer story in one of the semi-official despatches from "Eye-witness." During a lull in the fighting a man, in a uniform which was apparently that of a British Staff officer, suddenly appeared near the English trenches. He walked along the line enquiring the extent of the casualties, and explaining that the situation was so serious that a general retirement had been ordered. No such retirement had been ordered, and none was attempted by the troops to whom this daring emissary of the enemy spoke; but the fact that he was able to regain the German lines in safety says

a good deal for the uncertainty which most of the rank and file and some of the officers must feel with regard to the general success or otherwise of the operations in which they are engaged.) But though the letters from our soldiers will not help the historian who is solely concerned with the strategy and "grand tactics" of the war, for the purposes that have already been mentioned, and as social documents, they are of the very greatest interest and value.

THE SOLDIER AND HIS CRITICS.

There has been a certain amount of interesting misapprehension about the spirit of the British soldiers and sailors. One or two very genuine patriots have missed—and have been variously pained and perplexed at missing—their own high seriousness in the spirit with which the army has gone to war. "Tipperary" left them a little


shaken; it seemed to them a wholly inappropriate and rather frivolous thing that an army going forth on such terrific national business should be observed swinging along to the Belgian frontier with nothing better on its lips than a music-hall catch, and some entirely inconsequential references to Piccadilly and the night side of London's West End. They would have been better pleased if something of the earnestness of those heroic Bavarians, each one of whom who advanced to almost certain destruction with "Die Wacht am Rhein" as the outward and audible sign of the inspiration which lent him the courage to do so, had been imported into the English advance from Boulogne.



[Record Press.]

The Soldier and his Rations: A photograph taken at one of the British camps in France.

There was a brief, but very interesting, correspondence of three letters to the *Times* on this subject. The first consisted of six sets of words written to well-known old airs—"Keel Row," and so on—which the writer submitted as appropriate and topical marching songs for the troops serving with the Expeditionary Force, and "such as a private soldier might think and write for himself." They were very interesting, because they were so obviously nothing of the kind; they were a sincere but very apparent effort of an essentially cultivated man to get into the skin of someone for whom he had the very greatest admiration, but nothing at all in common. The second letter was chiefly concerned with pointing this fact out.



Off to look for Uhlan scouts

[Record Press.]



The morning toilet on the Continent.

[L.N.A.]

One of the first correspondent's songs (to be sung to the air of "Here's to the Maiden") had included a verse which began:—

"Here's to Lord Kitchener, brown with the sun,
Gentle, persuasive, and balmy!"

All the epithets seemed a little ironical, but the last one was evidently explained by the necessity of finding some sort of rhyme to "army." Unfortunately, as the second correspondent pointed out, there is only one "balmy" that is in general use with the English private, and that, when it finds its way into print, is usually spelt "barmy." That "barmy" is in very general use (the men of the Manchester Regiment use it in some doggerel which has been fitted into the air of their regimental "march past"), but it is not customarily applied to superior officers or War Secretaries, least of all in open song and on the march. As an instance—and a very typical one—of the queer mixture of nonsense, modesty, and high spirits which does serve the British soldier as a marching song, the second of the *Times'* correspondents gave what he described as "the latest popular marching song from Aldershot." The tune was "a wild jumble of half-a-dozen music-hall airs," and the words by a sergeant in the Gordon Highlanders:—

"Send out the army and the navy,
Send out the rank and file.
(Have a banana!)

Send out the brave Territorials,
They easily can run a mile.
(I don't think!)

Send out the boys of the girls' brigade,
They will keep old England free;
Send out my mother, my sister, and my brother,
But for goodness sake don't send me."

The result of the publication of this fragment was the closing of a highly instructive correspondence by a final note from the first writer, the general burden of which was that if this really was the kind of song which the private soldier demanded, then it was clearly no use for any intelligent man to attempt to supply the demand, as the best qualified camp laureate was obviously a cheerful idiot.

From one point of view, of course, the would-be writer of marching songs, though a little embittered, was correct. But it needs to be a cheerful idiot of a peculiar kind, and a kind which this country may very well be devoutly thankful to have at its command, seeing the task which it expects of them. For what looks like its idiocy is merely a subtle and very English sort of modesty, and its cheerfulness is perfectly invincible. "In our own regiment it is not unusual to see men playing cards under fire while waiting for the order to advance," writes one private soldier, "and I know of one case where one of our chaps was just going to throw down the ace and win the trick when the Germans sent along a shell that hit every man of the card party, killing one and wounding three. They weren't so much put out as you would think, and when one was being taken off in the stretcher he called out, 'It was the Germans won that trick.'"

There is another glimpse of the gentlemen who are ready to protest so gaily from Aldershot that they are the last people who should be sent out to fight. It lacks solemnity, if you will. But it could not have been more impressive had those four men been singing an English equivalent for "Die Wacht am Rhein" when they were hit; and it would have been infinitely less characteristic of the spirit in which the Expeditionary Force went to war.

THE RAW MATERIAL OF THE ARMY.

For the British army—at this period of the war at any rate—is a professional army. It has not been recruited willy-nilly from the whole manhood of the nation, some proportion of whom—though they would doubtless acquit themselves with sufficient determination in the moment of conflict—can yet have no very great stomach for the actual business of fighting, and still less for the many and not so exciting campaigning hardships that precede the fighting. At his best "A sworded man whose trade is blood" is as much born, not made, as the poet who struck this description of him. A conscript system can supply the swords, but it can never be quite sure that it has got them attached to the right material. But the British army is as sure of its material as any conceivable army can be. It is recruited from men who may not primarily conceive their appropriate trade as blood (in spite of Coleridge, it is a little difficult to think of anyone who could do), but who certainly conceive it as high-hearted adventure, and life in the army as the promptest and most accessible gate to such adventure. Even where disaster, social or financial, has taken a man up to that gate, such disasters are more likely to be a symptom than the origin of the spirit which finally persuaded him through. The Germans, who pay their soldiers about as much in a week as ours are paid in a day, are rather fond of turning an amazingly simple psychology on the evidence of financial shipwreck among some English recruits, and discovering, as a result of their scrutiny, and what they are pleased to consider the enormous daily bribe of one shilling, that the British army is mercenary as well as professional. It is a conclusion as curiously devoid of understanding as many other Teutonic excursions into applied psychology. A man may take the King's shilling because he is out of a job and penniless—that is a proposition which can be easily grasped. But that such a man is very likely out of a job—for the majority of our able-bodied employed do not enlist—because he is of rather too high and venturesome a mettle to be worn smooth in the mill of modern industrialism, is apparently too subtle to be understood of the German people. To social shipwrecks the same truth applies. The scrapes which have brought some of the best grist to our army's mill have been of varying proportions—Clive had fought one duel and tried twice to snap a pistol at his own head before he found his appropriate trade in the Indian army—but it is not in the nature of things that they can have been mean or uncourageous scrapes. The poor-spirited man does not look upon the army as a refuge from the consequences of his own mistakes—he would call it out of the frying pan into the fire.

So that, however one looks at it, the British army now serving on the Continent has been recruited from the best possible material—men of high spirit and adventurous heart. The British soldier is in the army (in a very admirable English phrase) "for the fun of the thing." And though most of the fun has now turned to the most terrible earnest, the old spirit of gaiety still carries him along. "If you are all extra good," writes one of our soldiers from France to his family, "I'll bring you home a pet German"—there is one way of approaching the greatest war of history. It is not the only way of approaching it, but it is a very common one in the British army. And if anyone is inclined to deplore its levity, or to think he could exemplify a better one, it would add vastly to the value of his opinions if he tested both himself and his attitude by actual service on the Continent.



The sick and slightly wounded, who have been sent down from the firing line arrive at a base hospital.

[Central News]



Wounded English troops on their way to a base hospital.

[L.N.A.]

HIGH SPIRITS AND LEVEL HEADS.

One interesting and very natural characteristic of our professional army is that it takes its fighting cheerfully, and as part of the day's work. On the whole, it fights with a merciful absence of bitterness, and its brave, good-tempered letters home reflect this. There have, of course, been soldiers' letters which expressed anger and horror at some of the deeds done by the German troops—deeds not always personally witnessed by the writers—but it is significant that nearly all these were written after that terrible four days' fighting about Mons. Regiment after regiment was flung against the British troops—"they were all about us like bees out of a hive," "it put me in mind of Niagara," are the kind of phrases which recur about this time in the letters from the front—and the ordeal was enough to shake the composure of any troops that ever shouldered a rifle. But all the world knows how admirably the British army came out of that ordeal and how it retreated, hardly pressed but unbroken, almost to the walls of Paris. And as well as keeping its order, a good deal of it kept its head. "We hear awful stories of German treatment of our wounded," wrote one private soldier to his people at home, "but we are not inclined to believe all we hear in war, and those who have had personal experience are most sceptical." There is another way of approaching the war, and one which is not without its message and moral for some of those who do not happen to be fighting. Its testimony may be supplemented by an extract from another letter, which was not from a soldier at the front, but from a correspondent to a newspaper, writing "as one who has unusual opportunities of knowing what our soldiers feel and think at the present time." "Keen hatred of the enemy," he wrote, "does not appear to be a prominent feature, even in those who have been badly wounded. They look upon war in its professional aspects, and not for the chance it gives of revenge or of loot."

This absence of bitterness, and the gay courage which goes with it, is not exclusively a characteristic of the English soldier—it would be flying in the face of recorded facts to pretend that it belongs to him alone out of all the nations which are fighting. But from the very fact that the army now serving on the Continent was recruited on a professional basis, it is a characteristic which is found in the highest degree and most generally among the British troops. It is a characteristic which is the birthright of the born soldier; and the British army, as we have tried to point out, is recruited from born soldiers. The value of this spirit in war can hardly be over-estimated. At its best and in its largest aspects war is a terrible thing; at its easily reached worst and in its details it soon becomes a hideous one. A war fought out in the spirit of intense hatred which inspired that German "Poem of Hate," translations of which were quoted in the English papers, would soon become one long record of unthinkable savagery. Tolstoy, who was a good soldier before he became a rather cross-grained saint, made one of his soldier characters in "War and Peace" remark that—

"The weapons of war are espionage, and treachery and the encouragement of treachery, the ruin of inhabitants, and the pillage and robbery of their possessions for the maintenance of the troops."

When a keen hatred, and the savagery it can hardly help but engender, have been added to these weapons, all the nobler human qualities are in a fair way for being crowded out of the picture altogether. What brings them back, and in such splendid prominence that the dark

side of war can be almost forgotten, is not the Hague Conventions—we have seen in the present struggle how soon those can be swept aside by the havoc of war—but the spirit which those conventions attempted to embody. And there is no fighting force in the world which has a fuller measure of that spirit, or takes more of it into battle, than the "contemptible little English army." It fights without rancour, and the wounds which it gives and takes will heal all the sooner for it.

All this is made abundantly clear in the letters from the front. One cannot very easily think of the British soldier going into battle singing—as the writer of marching songs would have had him sing—

"He shot the wives and children,
The wives and little children,
He shot the wives and children,
And laughed to see them die."

He may have a hearty dislike for the German Emperor and his system, but it does not usually come out in that particular way. Such anthropomorphic excursions into fixing the blame for the German behaviour in Belgium are more the province of the less stable-headed journalists at home, or of highly civilised and complicated people who are trying to be rather simple and elementary. The English soldier scrawls "A present for the Kaiser" on a shell caisson and passes on into the trenches in the best humour in the world. And once in those trenches he will receive the Kaiser's "present" in return with the same spirit, cheerfully referring to the most terrific avalanche of flame and iron that Essen ever launched as a "Jack Johnson," or a "coal box." "To pass the time in the trenches," writes one soldier, "we have invented the game of guessing where the next German shell will drop. Sometimes we have bets on it, and the man who guesses correctly the greatest number of times takes the stakes."

HOW THE BRITISH SOLDIER REGARDS HIS ENEMIES.

Even when he has some complaint to make against the men he is fighting it is curious to notice how often it is a purely professional complaint—he writes contemptuously of bad shooting on the part of the Germans, even though that bad shooting means a greater chance of his own getting off with a whole skin. It offends his critical judgment as a soldier—"I don't believe they could hit a haystack at a hundred yards," "They shoot from the hip, and don't seem to aim at anything in particular," are the kind of phrases which occur in his summing up. When it comes to the larger and more important disagreements with the way in which his enemies go to war—and though his trade may, according to the poetical epigrammatist, be "blood," he has very decided views on the proprieties and conduct of that trade—it is interesting to see that he can disapprove in the same critical and dispassionate fashion. And his disapproval loses none of its force for having lost all of its fierceness. The private in the Royal Irish Regiment, who told the German prisoner, when he enquired in surprise how it was that the Irish soldiers were not all engaged in their own civil war that, according to the German scheme, ought to have been in progress, "This is the only war we know or want to know about for the time being, and there's mighty little about that that's civil, to my thinking, with the way you're behaving yourselves in it"—that private added a truly classical example of the retort



Breakfast by the side of the troop train in a siding
at a French railway station.

[Newspaper Illustrations.



One of the first batches of British wounded from the fighting
on the Continent arrives at Folkestone.

[Record Press.

courteous to our common stock, and ten times more fierceness could not have made his disapproval any clearer or more emphatic.


Nor is the British soldier's professional way of looking at war only confined to the doings of his enemies. He can bring the same curiously detached judgment to bear on his own exploits. Even when he writes home about some fighting in which he was actually concerned, he can contemplate that fighting with a critical eye for its value as a military spectacle. There is something of this attitude in the description given by a wounded Guardsman of the charge by the German cavalry at Compiègne, and the way in which it was received by the Irish Guards. "When the shock came it seemed terrific to us in the distance, for the Irishmen didn't recoil in the least, but flung themselves right across the path of the German horsemen. We could hear the crack of the rifles, and see the German horses impaled on the bayonets of the front ranks of the Guardsmen, and then the whole force of infantry and cavalry were mixed up in one confused heap, like so many pieces from a jig-saw puzzle. Shells from the British and German batteries kept dropping close to the tangled mass of fighting men, and then we saw the German horsemen get clear and take to flight as fast as their horses would carry them." And when the Manchester private, himself wounded and back in hospital, tells how "We saw the Hussars get at the German cavalry—a champion bit that was!" it really is a magic casement opening into the mind of the happy warrior, with whom soldiering is the best of professions and war the finest of spectacles.

It would, however, be a rather one-sided picture of him if, in this attempt to underline some of the salient characteristics of the English soldier, the reader were left with the impression that soldiering was his exclusive interest in life. In football he is in many cases so keenly interested that he plays it in the trenches, with a German helmet for ball, and certainly cannot keep it out of his letters from the front. Every one will remember the famous letter in which a sailor who had been engaged in the fight off Heligoland described the sinking of the five German ships in the terms of the football field, and summed up the result of the match as: "We won, five—nil; not bad, considering we were playing away." That was one way in which the football enthusiast betrayed himself. And an even more significant one was provided by the private in the Gordon Highlanders, who explained in a letter home that he was wounded when under fire in the trenches "because I got excited in an argument with wee Georgie Ferriss of our company about Queen's Park Rangers and their chances this season." The man who, in a trench that is being shelled, can get so "excited" about football that he needlessly exposes himself to fire cannot be said to be in any danger of becoming a fighting machine and nothing more.

PROFESSIONAL MODESTY.

No survey of the spirit of the army would be complete without some mention of the extraordinary and engaging modesty which appears again and again in its letters home. Perhaps this also is one of the characteristics of a professional army—it takes its exploits and hardships as all part of its chosen trade, and mentions them, very casually, as a less adventurous liver might mention that he had missed his last car and walked home. "Oh, by the way," writes one soldier who had taken part in the retreat from Mons, at the very end of a letter written from hospital, "will you send me that pair of plain-toed boots out of my bag? I came all the way from the frontier in my stocking feet." "I forgot to mention," says another, also at the end of his letter, "the fact that when I was wounded the gun and limber wheels ran over my chest and tummy, which gave me a very pressing feeling." And to these might be added the delightfully inadequate conclusion of the letter in which one of the sailors left adrift in the North Sea after the Heligoland fight described his adventure. He and his companions were picked up by an English submarine, when all their boats seemed to have disappeared. "Up popped E4 alongside of us," was his matter-of-fact description of the rescuer's arrival. The submarine took them on board and, as they were still being fired at, sank again, and so bore them all back to England and safety. The writer of the letter had been saved from destruction by one of the strangest incidents in naval warfare, and a quite unparalleled one. And his letter calmly summed up the affair by the information that he had got back to his own boat on the Sunday "after having had quite an experience"!

Of actual deeds of heroism it is hardly necessary to write. They proceed inevitably from those qualities which have already been touched on; they are the final and appropriate expression of those qualities. In a way, and with all humbleness, it may be said that we expect them, and are not disappointed; one of the strange results of war, which throws all old values into disorder and brings the same fierce light to bear on the greatness of the human soul as it does on the folly of the human understanding, is that it succeeds in making even the ultimate sacrifice of laying down one's life for others splendidly commonplace. But the purpose of this chapter has not been to record instances of the making of that ultimate sacrifice or of obvious and magnificent readiness to make it. Its aim has been to emphasise and illustrate some of the more easily overlooked qualities that go to shape the spirit which makes such sacrifices possible; and, as far as possible, to do this from the personal but unintended testimony of that brave, high-spirited and adventurous gentleman who, with very few exceptions indeed, is the rank and file of the British army.



**The Hotel de Ville, Louvain:
This famous building was not seriously damaged.**

[Exclusive News Agency.]



[Newspaper Illustrations.]

A general view of the destruction at Louvain: The walls of the Church of St. Pierre are in the background, the undamaged Hotel de Ville is on the right, and the wreckage in the foreground is all that remains of some of the old Flemish houses of the town.

CHAPTER XIX.


LOUVAIN AND GERMAN TERRORISM.

THE FORTIFICATIONS OF ANTWERP—ACTIVITY OF THE BELGIAN ARMY—THE RUSSIAN MYTH—GERMAN TERRORISM—THE MASSACRES AT AERSCHOT, DINANT, AND TAMINES—THE BURNING OF LOUVAIN.

AS the main stream of German invasion flowed south into France, the Belgian army fell back on Antwerp. Its numbers are unknown, but cannot have exceeded 100,000 men of all arms, and these somewhat shaken by the onslaught of the German right as it gathered momentum for the rush into France. The idea of holding Antwerp as a place of refuge for the military strength of the country was almost as old as the Belgian nation itself. It was a city which had endured many sieges, and two awful sacks, the so-called Spanish and French Furies. Wellington had advised on the fortifications of Antwerp in the early part of last century. Up to 1859, these consisted of an enceinte or continuous line of fortifications, enclosing the whole town. In that year the fortifications were remodelled, but the time was unfortunate for beginning new works, as fashions in fortification were rapidly changing. The new and extended enceinte was already obsolete before it was completed, for the modern system of detached forts some distance outside the town had come into vogue. Some eight detached forts, about two miles in front of the new enceinte, were accordingly built, but as the range of artillery extended, it was seen that they were too near

to protect the city from bombardment, and a new and outer line was decided upon in 1878, and had just been completed when the war began. Antwerp now passed for one of the strongest fortifications in Europe, and high hopes were fixed upon it. "In the defence of Belgium," said a French official statement issued just after the army had fallen back from before Brussels, "Antwerp has a double rôle. It is a formidable entrenched camp, capable of holding out indefinitely, and is also, especially in the present circumstances, a base of operations from which the Belgian army can threaten the flank of the German army penetrating into Belgium, and co-operate efficiently in the operations of the Allied armies." The statement went on to argue that to reduce Antwerp the Germans would have to detach extremely large forces for months, and bring up a considerable siege train, and that they would not face an enterprise which would weaken their field armies. On the other hand, if they refrained from besieging Antwerp, they would have to cover the place to prevent the Belgian army there from cutting their communications.

This idea got a great hold of the English mind, which at one time conceived the retreat of General Joffre as



[Exclusive News Agency.]

The Church of St. Pierre, Louvain.



Louvain : The rood screen in the Church of St. Pierre.
This screen is destroyed.

[W. A. Mansell and Co.]

a deliberate snare to induce the Germans to extend their lines of communication so that the Belgians might cut them. The remarkable legend of the Russian soldiers from Archangel, landed at Leith and brought down along every railway line in this country for service in Belgium, was a development of this idea, and will become a classic example of how easily people will believe what they want to believe. But the instinct which made English people believe in the Russians, though it was encouraged by a very defective sense of evidence, was in the military sense sound. There was no army ready to be sent to Belgium and powerful enough to cut the German communications. There ought to have been, and there would have been, if our military preparedness had matched our policy. Half a million men landed in Belgium at the beginning of September might have ended the war. Indeed, if there had been any risk of their being landed, Germany would not have gone through Belgium, or there might never have been a war at all, which would have been better still.

THE SALLY FROM ANTWERP.

The Belgian army did not remain inactive in Antwerp. On August 23rd, the day after the battle of Mons, it sallied out, and on the following day drove two German divisions out of Malines. On the same day a force of British Marines occupied Ostend, and though it withdrew mysteriously after a very short stay, it was generally thought at the time to be the precursor of a larger army.

The Germans were alarmed. They had thrown nearly every available man into the army that was invading France, and it is doubtful whether in the week of the retreat from Mons they had more than a couple of army corps left in Belgium. The Belgian population was exceedingly restive, and showed not the least inclination to fall in with the programme of conduct which the Germans had drawn up for them. Germany recognised that she had done Belgium a great wrong by invading her, and she was anxious to concert measures for removing what must have lain heavily on her conscience. "The German Government," said a document which was conveyed to the Belgian Government through the Hague, "are ready for any kind of compact with Belgium which can in any way be reconciled with their 'arrangements with France'—Germany is still ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so." That message was written just after the occupation of Liège, and it was answered in the only way a proud and much-wronged nation could answer. Germany could not forgive Belgium for putting her so hopelessly in the wrong and for refusing, so perversely as she thought, to consult her own interests. She came to regard the Belgian conduct as merely spiteful. It would have been so easy for her to save Germany's face, and yet she obstinately refused. Gradually, Germany actually brought herself to think that she had a grievance against Belgium for persisting in disgracing her in the eyes of the world. This was a dangerous frame of mind, even if things had gone well.



After the destruction of Louvain :
The University Library (on the left) and the Hotel de Ville in the background. [Central News.



The principal street in Louvain, in which every house was destroyed. [Central News.

When they began to go ill, and when the Belgians, instead of helping the Germans to remove their disgrace, obstinately clung to what Germany regarded as the "sentimental" view, and every one else as the only course consistent with honour, and even threatened to rise and involve their French plans in ruins, the worst passions of which human nature is capable began to be aroused.

It would be false to human nature to suppose that Belgian civilians, who had been so deeply insulted by the German invasion, did nothing but turn the other cheek to the insulters. The probability is that they missed no opportunity of requiting the insult with "outrage." Their moral right to do so is, indeed, unquestionable, at any rate by the ordinary codes. The invader, until he is in firm and certain occupation of a country, has no more rights than a burglar. It is, therefore, in the highest degree probable that the Belgians committed "outrages" when they got a chance. For the Germans, after doing Belgium the greatest wrong that one nation can do another, to cry out because the Belgians did not recognise the "rights" of the invader was to cap injustice with unreason; and when on the top of that they left themselves without an adequate army of occupation, they complicated their original crime with folly and incompetence.

In the last week of August the temper on both sides was very ugly. The German soldiers had had their passions aroused by tales of Belgian cruelty and treachery, and their higher officers, who knew how weak the German armies left in Belgium were, and how dangerous a war upon the lines of communication would be, feared that they might suddenly find themselves attacked from both sides at once, by the Belgian population in their rear, by the army of Antwerp, and perhaps by a British or even a Russo-British force—who knows that the Russian legend had not reached them?—advancing from Ostend. That the masses of Belgian people were ignorant of military training increased rather than diminished the danger of an explosion. The Belgian Government had long foreseen the peril of invasion, but, like our own Government, it had not had the courage to take the people completely into its confidence. Not only was the nation not prepared for defence, but the Belgian people had rather been encouraged in the idea that patriotic ardour would be a substitute for military training. One can imagine how such an idea worked in the minds of a people hot-tempered by nature, bellicose if not military, smarting under the sense of insult to their country, angered by outrage, and tempted by the comparative weakness of the invader after he had marched south.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GERMAN TERRORISM.


There was only one way in which Germany, having made the discovery that Belgium's resistance to the passage of her armies was not to be formal merely, but backed by the whole patriotic fervour of the nation, could have avoided plunging deeper into disgrace. That was so to overawe the country by a display of military strength that continued resistance should be seen to be impossible. That, however, was the very thing Germany could not do without abandoning the advantages which she had promised herself in going through Belgium. She went that way partly perhaps to secure the Westphalian frontier against attack, but mainly because she thought it would be the quickest way. The formal military occupation of Belgium in such force as to banish all thought of a popular rising would have taken months, and Germany, having committed herself to the offensive against France, could not spare months. Accordingly, she fell back, as everyone

might have foreseen that she would, on terrorism. Its practise, not in lust of cruelty, but as a coldly calculated object of policy, fitted in only too well with her military theories. Notice has already been taken of the way in which Germany used her cavalry in the early days of the invasion—not so much to reconnoitre the enemy's position, or to discover his preparations, as to spread an atmosphere of panic among the civil population. It was a recognised German method of carrying on war to frighten the civil population in order that their fears should force the Government to make terms. If that was the accepted principle, the arguments for applying it would have seemed irresistible in a country like Belgium, where the army was small and the population large, and in which, moreover, the German army had no immediate interest except that of establishing a right of way. The German army, then, was terrorist in principle from the first entry into Belgium, and only needed an excuse to convert principle into practice. It is right to admit at once that excuses were provided in plenty. They would be in Yorkshire, in the case of an invasion, unless the Government had taken care beforehand to educate the people in the dangers to the community of individual outrage, and there is no reason to think human nature is different in Belgium from what it is in England, or for that matter in any other country of Europe.

The strongest condemnation should be reserved for bad principle in an army rather than for the excesses of individuals in it. That there were individual soldiers in the German army who were guilty of cruelty for its own sake is very likely. But very few of the many stories of merely perverse and objectless cruelty—such as the cutting off of hands and other mutilations—have been confirmed on investigation, and all of them, in the absence of confirmation, should be received with extreme scepticism. M. Vandervelde, for example, after M. Jaurès' death, the most famous Socialist in Europe, and a member of the Belgian Government, has said with regard to one class of crime that though there were established cases of outrages against women, they were not very numerous. The German is not more prone to this class of crime, or to gratuitous cruelty, than the Englishman or the Frenchman. On the other hand, there is much evidence of drunkenness, and its moral excesses amongst the German soldiery both in Belgium and France; and its effect may have been exaggerated by the scarcity of food, which was often felt in the German army. In general, however, individual crimes of this nature may be left out of account in so far as they suggest that the average German soldier had a double dose of original sin. The infamies of the German occupation of Belgium were the trail of the vicious Prussian view of war and politics which first violated the neutrality of Belgium, then neglected to provide sufficient military support for its outrage, and finally sought to make up for its miscalculations alike in the material and in the moral spheres by a policy of deliberate terrorism.

THE BOMB OUTRAGES IN ANTWERP.

This terrorism took many different forms, some of which have already been mentioned, such as the shooting down right and left from armoured cars of civilians who might be hostile without the certainty or even a reasonable probability that they were, and the exaction from occupied towns of enormous fines out of all proportion to the requirements of the occupying army or to the costs of administration which it might have to carry on. Another form of terrorism was the dropping of bombs from aeroplanes and airships, not for a definite military object,



The ruins near the station at Louvain.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Louvain: The ruins in the Rue de Malines.

[Central News.]

but in order to frighten the civilian population. Civilians in Paris and Antwerp were killed in these raids, which served no military purpose whatever. When a German aeroplane dropped five bombs, killing one woman in Paris on August 31st, there were no troops in the city, and the aeroplane had crossed the lines of the defending armies, on which he would have been quite justified in dropping bombs, for no other reason than to make a panic in the city—which he failed to do. Article 25 of the last Hague Convention forbids the attack or bombardment by any means whatever of towns, villages, habitations, or buildings which are not defended. The next article

provides that where a place is defended and a bombardment is intended, notice should be given, and Article 27 further lays it down that all necessary steps should be taken to spare buildings devoted to religion, art, science, charity, and especially hospitals. The Zeppelin raid over Antwerp, on the night of August 25th, violated every one of these rules. The town, it is true, was defended, but the buildings at which the crew of the Zeppelin aimed (the Royal Palace, the Bourse, the Law Courts, and the Bank) were none of them defended, and in no sense a part of the defences of the city, and they should therefore have been immune from deliberate attack. There is no more justification for flying over the forts to attack Government buildings from the air than there would be in singling them out in a bombardment.

Secondly, even if it was held that there was a military object to be gained in destroying important public buildings, on the ground that it might hamper the work of governing the city, then notice should have been given of such intention. No notice was in fact given; on the contrary, the city was well lighted, and quite unsuspecting. Finally, none of the buildings, which from the position on which the bombs fell may be presumed to have been aimed at, was in fact hit. The bombs intended for the palace wounded two poor women in a street near by. The bomb aimed at

the Bank fell into an attic and killed a servant girl in her bed. Another smashed the windows of a hospital; the bomb for the barracks killed a civilian sitting at his window, and yet another fell in a square and killed five people on the spot—a police-officer, two dockers, an innkeeper, and a young woman. The Germans, no doubt, did not intend to kill these civilians, and accidents from mishits are easy in firing from aeroplanes and airships—the greater the obligation, therefore, not to attack at all unless there is some definite and legitimate military object to be gained. To admit the panic of civilians among those objects is to tear up

all the articles of war, which have as their object the limiting of the sufferings of war as far as possible to the combatants.


In a Report, issued from Antwerp at the end of August, the Commission of Jurists appointed by the Belgian Government to report on the violation by the Germans of the Laws of War attempted to reduce the procedure of the Germans to a system.

“The German procedure is everywhere the same. They advance along the road shooting inoffensive passers-by, particularly bicyclists, as well as peasants working in the fields. In the towns and villages where they stop they begin by requisitioning food and drink, which they consume till intoxicated. Sometimes from the interior of deserted houses they let off their rifles at random, and declared that it was the inhabitants who fired. Then the scenes of fire, murder, and especially pillage begin, accompanied by acts of deliberate

cruelty, without respect to sex or age. Even where they pretend to know the actual person guilty of the acts they allege, they do not content themselves with executing him summarily, but they seize the opportunity to decimate the population, pillage the houses, and then set them on fire.

“After a preliminary attack and massacre, they shut up the men in the church and then order the women to return to their houses and to leave their doors open all night.

“From several places the male population has been sent to Germany, there to be forced, it appears, to work at the harvest as in the old days of slavery. There are many cases of the inhabitants being forced to act as guides, and to dig trenches and entrenchments for the Germans.



[By permission of the "Architectural Review."]

A fine example of early sixteenth century brickwork on the facade of a house which was among the destroyed buildings in Louvain.



A street littered with bricks and other rubbish in order to hinder the movements of the German motor cars which were raiding the country about Alost.

[Central News.]



A trench built by the Germans near Ghent, and faced with tons of wire coils brought specially from Hamburg. The effect of the wire was to deaden the shell fire, by restricting the force of the explosion, and preventing the fragments of shell from scattering.

[Central News.]

"Numerous witnesses assert that during their marches, and even when attacking, the Germans place civilians, men and women, in their front ranks in order to prevent our soldiers firing."

This passage, unquestionably, is an exact description of what happened at a number of places. But neither the Germans nor any other people ever loved cruelty for its own sake. The Germans are a rational people, and it is important not to lose sight of the motives which rationalise—though they cannot palliate—their conduct in Belgium. The explanation of the excesses of the German troops is sometimes drunkenness and its unreason, oftener fright, but oftenest of all a thoroughly vicious theory of what is permissible to an army to protect itself against irregular combatants. The clauses of the Hague Conventions which govern the rights of a people, as distinguished from its army, to resist an invader have already been quoted (p. 35).

THE LEVÉE EN MASSE.

The broad effect of them is that until a district is in effective military occupation, civilians have the same right to fight as members of the recognised military forces, provided they take up arms "spontaneously," carry their arms openly, and respect the laws and customs of war. To be permissible, the *levée en masse* must be "spontaneous," that is to say, not prompted by the Government as part of their military plans. The German defence for the wholesale shootings of civilians of which they were guilty was that the attacks made by peasants were not "spontaneous" risings in face of the invader, but treachery, organised and encouraged by their Government. No evidence worth speaking of was ever adduced in support of this charge, which is, moreover, inherently improbable, seeing that the Government must have known that such a policy was sure to lead to terrible reprisals. But the Germans, being a disciplined people, with whom organisation for every possible contingency had become a national mania, could not, apparently, conceive the possibility of small risings which were the expressions of individual indignation. If a peasant sniped a Uhlan from behind a hedge, he was acting in accordance with some deep-laid plan. His burgomaster, in their view, must know about it, and be privy to his designs; and the burgomaster might, therefore, be punished for a species of constructive murder, in that he did not prevent these outrages. In the last resort, a whole town might be held collectively responsible for the crime of one man. "No general penalty," says a clause of one of the Hague Conventions, "pecuniary or otherwise, can be inflicted on the population on account of the acts of individuals for which it cannot be regarded as collectively responsible." To the German mind, there was collective responsibility for everything. Even the practice of marching with women and children in front of the column is only a particularly detestable application of the same principle. In the war of 1870, the Germans, in order to put a stop to the practice of train-wrecking in certain districts, organised a service of hostages to accompany the trains. Similarly, in this war, the Germans put wives and sisters at the head of columns to prevent their husbands and brothers from sniping them from hedges and attics.

It should, then, be clearly understood that in what they did in Belgium the Germans—except in some cases in which the army got out of hand through drunkenness or through panic—were acting upon a deliberate theory of their rights, and not in impulsive cruelty or callousness. It misses the real gravity of their crimes to denounce

the cruelty of individuals. The root of the tragedy of Belgium was the idea that the rights of one nation may be the convenience of another; its form was supplied by the Prussian doctrines of "constructive outrage" and "collective responsibility," which one of the objects of the war should be to eject from such lodgment in the body of international law as they have effected. Pending that change, an impartial observer, while not abating his detestation of the Prussian military doctrine, will not wholly acquit of blame those individual Belgians whose rashness in their irregular attacks upon the enemy brought down such terrible reprisals on their fellow-countrymen.

THE MASSACRES OF AERSCHOT, TAMINES, AND DINANT.

Louvain, Aerschot, and Dinant are the worst examples of the German system of terrorism. Mr. Asquith's instances were Louvain, Malines, and Termonde. Malines was ruthlessly bombarded by the Germans retreating before the sortie from Antwerp, in the last week of August, and Termonde was utterly destroyed, but in neither town was the conduct of the Germans so bad as in Aerschot and Dinant.

At Aerschot the German officer commanding was treacherously shot early in September by a son of the burgomaster, Tielemans. There was no proof that the father had any control over his son's actions, but he, with his brother, and twenty-five other citizens of the town chosen at random from a much larger number who had been arrested, were shot outside the town. Of the rest of the inhabitants, those who were of military age were made prisoners, and the rest—old men, women, and children—were turned adrift, and the town was then given over to looting.

In Namur Province and in Belgian Luxembourg the crimes of the Germans were probably worse than anywhere else in Belgium. Here there seems to have been a series of veritable massacres. At Taminés and its immediate neighbourhood 650 civilians were shot. We quote from a Report of the Belgian Commission:—

"About five o'clock on August 21st, the Germans carried the bridge of Taminés, and crossed the River Sambre. The soldiers penetrated into the houses, drove out the inhabitants, set themselves to sack the place, and then burnt it. The unfortunate peasants who stopped in the village were shot; the rest fled from their houses. The greater part of them were arrested either on the night of August 21st or on the following morning.

"On the evening of the 22nd (Saturday) a group of between 400 and 450 men was collected in front of the church. A German detachment opened fire on them, but as the shooting was a slow business the officers ordered up a machine-gun, which soon swept off all the unhappy peasants still left standing. Many of them were only wounded, and, hoping to save their lives, got with difficulty on their feet again. They were immediately shot down. Many wounded still lay among the corpses. Groans of pain and cries for help were heard in the bleeding heap. On several occasions soldiers walked up to such unhappy individuals and stopped their groans with a bayonet thrust. At night some who still survived succeeded in crawling away. Others put an end to their own pain by rolling themselves into the neighbouring river."

Taminés, where these atrocities took place, is a village on the Sambre, between Namur and Charleroi, and the time was just before the battle of Charleroi. The Belgian witnesses deny that there had been any shooting at the Germans except by French sharpshooters, who were in the neighbourhood; but even if some civilians had fired shots, the main German army was there, and could not plead that it was in any sort of danger. In any case,

supposing that it was thought dangerous to leave a possibly hostile village in their rear just before the battle of Charleroi, the Germans might just have easily taken the men of military age prisoners as shot them. But the massacres at Dinant were without even this shred of excuse, for there was no very serious fighting in the neighbourhood on August 23rd, when the worst took place. Of the 1,400 houses in this beautiful town, all but 200 were destroyed. Over 700 of the inhabitants were killed, and the rest are either prisoners in Germany or refugees. Whatever the inhabitants may have done, nothing could excuse this atrocity.

THE BURNING OF LOUVAIN.

The case of Louvain is both more notorious and more difficult, for at many of the most important parts of the story there is a direct conflict of evidence between the Belgian and the German witnesses. The admitted facts are these. On the evening of August 25th, rifle-firing suddenly broke out in the city. It was especially heavy in the neighbourhood of the railway station, and there was a certain amount of artillery fire as well. Soldiers were seen rushing wildly about the streets, shooting into houses. Presently the houses burst into flames, and from some of them people were shot down as they tried to escape; the streets were full of dead and dying. The fire spread, and was presently seen to be the deliberate work of the German soldiers. At daybreak the men who had not either already made their escape, or perished in the firing that had been going on all night, were made prisoners, and the women turned adrift. The city continued to burn for several days. Louvain is the Oxford of Belgium, and contains many beautiful buildings, a celebrated Town Hall, an ancient University (with a large and precious library), and many churches. All except the Town Hall were wrecked. Nothing that has happened in the war created indignation so strong and so wide-spread as the burning of Louvain.

Yet the burning of Louvain, though an infamous act of Vandalism, was less wickedly cruel than what happened at Aerschot and Tamines. The moment one leaves the very few undisputed facts about Louvain, one is involved in a mass of contradictory evidence, which inclines one to the belief that the Germans may have had more provocation than at the other places we have mentioned. The Belgian view is that the garrison in the city fired on the beaten Germans, as they entered the city after their defeat at Malines, under the belief that they were the pursuing enemy. Such mistakes are not uncommon

in war, and it is known that there was a great deal of suppressed excitement in the city. The rally of the Antwerp garrison had made a great impression on men's minds, and there were rumours of the approach of the British. In the panic that arose after the first firing, some of the German soldiers shouted "The English are coming." But that no one fired but the Germans seems hardly credible; and the body of evidence that firing came from certain tenements near the station is, on the whole, too strong to be set aside. That no responsible person in Louvain was privy to a plot among the inhabitants is certain; there, as in other towns of Belgium, the authorities did everything possible to discourage attempts at armed rising which had no chance of success, and could only provoke reprisals. But it may well be that in a city of 45,000 inhabitants there were some who really believed that the moment had come to rise. They may have been few in numbers; but if there were only two dozen, the panic into which the German soldiers undoubtedly fell would do the rest. The German army of occupation in Belgium was dangerously weak, and the air was full of rumours of approaching armies. A great part of England at that time believed that Russians were moving in thousands along their railways. The German army was in a nervous and excitable state. Its panic, though it may be explicable, was none the less deeply discreditable to the German reputation for military efficiency. But its results would have been less terrible if the disgrace of this panic had not coincided with the calculated ruthlessness of German theories of war. It was their combination against a beautiful and venerable city that staggered the civilised world with the tragedy of Louvain.

How far from secure even official Germany felt its position to be at this time in Belgium is shown by a statement issued in Berlin towards the end of the eventful last week in August.

"The Belgian population are taking part in the battles almost everywhere, and the most severe steps have been taken for the suppression of these bands of franc-tireurs."

"The safeguarding of the lines of provisional halting-places has up to the present been left to the army, but as the men left behind for this purpose are urgently required at the front, his Majesty has ordered the mobilisation of the last reserve. The latter will be employed to protect lines of communication, and to occupy Belgium, which country, now under German administration, will be used to supply the requirements of the army, and so relieve our home resources."

That is the language, if not of panic, at any rate of uneasiness.



A general view of Königsberg, showing the Köttel Bridge.

[Exclusive News Agency.]

CHAPTER XX.

THE CAMPAIGN IN EAST PRUSSIA.

THE STRATEGICAL POSITION OF EAST PRUSSIA—THE PROBLEM OF INVASION AND OF DEFENCE—THE RUSSIAN PLAN—
A VICTORY IN THE NORTH—THE BATTLE OF THE MASURIAN LAKES.

GERMANY, with a war on both frontiers always threatening her, could count on two advantages against Russia: the superior quickness of her mobilisation and the possession of East Prussia. The same distances which make Russia almost unconquerable also prevent her from developing her strength with the same speed as a highly-developed, thickly-populated State. Germany would have had time, if she had been fighting Russia alone, to concentrate her armies, march them into Russia, and establish herself on the Niemen and Vistula before Russia would have been prepared to give battle. In a war like the present, the advantage of time was even more valuable to Germany, for it gave her the opportunity of throwing the weight of her attack on France in the hope of breaking her enemies in the west before it was necessary to face those in the east.


The advantage thus held by Germany in point of time was greatly increased by the possession of East Prussia, a province of some 15,000 square miles, and a population of rather more than two millions. If Russia had been able, at the beginning of the war, to invade Germany at the point on her frontier nearest to Berlin, her task would have been comparatively light, for Berlin is less than 200 miles distant from the borders of Russian Poland. But,

unfortunately for Russia, an immediate invasion of Germany from Poland was, on military grounds, impossible. Poland juts out from Central Russia far into Germany, and both on the north and the south it is flanked by a foreign, which had now become a hostile, Power. On the southern border lies the Austrian province of Galicia; on the north, East Prussia. No attack could be directed from Poland into Germany so long as Galicia and East Prussia remained in the hands of the enemy, for an attack pushed from the flanks would inevitably have menaced the Russian communications. It was for this reason that Russia, some few years before this war broke out, had decided to remove the points of concentration of her armies farther east. This did not, however, alter the general lines of the strategy which both Germany and Austria would have followed had both had their hands free. But Germany was too deeply involved in Belgium and France to be able to think of taking the offensive against Russia at the beginning of the war; she was content for the time to stand on the defensive, using as few as possible of her first-line troops in what she thought the less important théâtre of operations. Austria was to compensate for Germany's enforced defensive. Her part, since superior speed in mobilisation permitted it, was to strike into Poland,



Königsberg: The Royal Castle viewed from the south,
showing the Bismarck Memorial.

[Exclusive News Agency.]



towards the regions behind Warsaw, and compel Russia to fight before her concentration was completed. A resounding blow in this quarter would have thrown the Russian preparations back for weeks, and would probably have saved not only Galicia but East Prussia, too, from invasion. The first thought of every Power is to save its people and soil from the miseries of invasion, and Germany might reasonably argue that both for political and for military reasons the Russian commanders would prefer to draw troops from the north in order to drive the Austrians back over the frontier than to indulge in a premature and less useful invasion of East Prussia.


MOTIVES FOR INVADING EAST PRUSSIA.

They knew, of course, that East Prussia furnished a great temptation to the Russians. The invasion of an enemy's territories is in itself a considerable military achievement, and a great moral success, and East Prussia alone held out the hope of it to Russia. On strictly military grounds the attack should have been delayed until the main Russian armies were at least ready to begin their advance from the Vistula towards the Polish frontiers, for just as a Russian advance through Central Poland might have been thwarted by a German attack from the East Prussian flank, so a premature campaign in East Prussia might have broken down on the threat of a German movement menacing the Russian communications from the south. Ever had such a threat not been made, an army which had occupied East Prussia would have met with formidable difficulties as it moved westwards. The line of the Lower Vistula is very strongly held, and the fortresses of Thorn and Graudenz, on the right bank, furnish excellent bases for attacks on the invading army. But the Russians were not likely in any

event to make their main effort to break into Germany from the direction of East Prussia, which was heavily fortified against them both by nature and by art. If they decided to attempt an invasion the moment they had sufficient forces available it would be because they had some other object in view besides the advancement of their own campaign. The Russians, as time went on, showed themselves cautious and deliberate in the handling of their armies. They were content to mark time at one point while they concentrated on a more important task elsewhere, and it would have been more natural that they should wait on the East Prussian frontier until they had driven the Austrian invader over the frontier. They chose the other course, perhaps from a mixture of motives. They had but to take a few steps to cross into German territory, which they knew was not strongly defended; they knew the moral effect which a Russian invasion must have on Germany as a whole; they perhaps thought that they could advance up to the Vistula and hold their positions until other armies arrived to support them on the south, and they must have reckoned on their action having its influence on the German attack in the west. The calculation was quite simple. Germany's hope was to deal France a crushing blow and then turn to deal with Russia. Germany was determined to preserve German soil from the invader. Therefore, to invade East Prussia would be to challenge Germany to allow one of her most famous provinces to be overrun and devastated. Purely military considerations might have bidden Germany look on at the invasion of East Prussia until the enemy drew near to the Vistula. East Prussia is entirely agricultural; invasion would have done great material damage, but the loss would not have been comparable with what would happen in Silesia or Westphalia in a like event. But in Germany, as elsewhere, military considerations may be



Saalfeld, showing the bridge over the Saal and the old town. [Exclusive News Agency.]



Königsberg: The Royal Castle.

[Exclusive News Agency.]

overborne by political scruples or sentimental feelings. East Prussia does not compare in wealth or population with other parts of Germany, but it counts for much in Prussia. East Prussia is the home of the Prussian kings; its university city of Königsberg is their traditional place of crowning; its Junkers (or squires), if they do not rule the German State, at least rule its army, and form a large part of the corps of officers, to whom its formidable character is largely due.

It was worth while, then, for Russia to march into East Prussia as soon as possible in the interests both of herself and her Allies. Of her Allies, because, if the Germans refused to tolerate the invasion of East Prussia, they would presumably detach part of their active army from the western campaign to drive out the invaders. Of herself, because if the western Allies profited by the intervention they would be the better able to deal with the weakened German forces, and might thereafter repay Russia by detaining in the west troops whom Germany would have been only too glad to be able to transfer to the east. Whatever the motive, it was decided that Russia should invade East Prussia. She did so, and thereby assisted her Allies in France at a critical hour of their fortunes. So doing, she ultimately benefited herself, too. But at the time she paid a very heavy price.

The configuration of East Prussia tempts the invader with the prospects of a great military success. The province must in the first place be attacked—and, therefore, defended—at its northern extremity. No invader would enter East Prussia south of the railway line which runs east and west between the fortress of Königsberg and the Russian frontier leaving a German army in his rear. His first aim must be to secure the line of this railway, and to drive the defending army either into Königsberg and invest it there or, still better, to drive it before him southwards. A retreat in this direction holds out brighter hopes of a great military success. For the East Prussian frontier, after running south from the point where the invasion will begin, takes a turn south-westwards, and then runs almost parallel with the course which a retreating German army would pursue. The strategy of the Russian commanders, therefore—and they pursued it twice in this war before the end of November—is both to

invade in the north and also to strike into the province from the southern border, and endeavour to intercept the German army which is being driven back by the first Russian army of invasion. The character of this manoeuvre is expressed simply in Diagram 1, which assumes that the resistance of the Germans to the Southern Russian army has been successfully defeated.

THE DEFENCES OF THE LAKE REGION.

A successful issue to this strategy would involve the destruction of at least one German army, but it is clear that it would demand military skill of the highest order to accomplish it. Not only must both the northern and the southern defending armies be beaten separately, but the Russian forces could only hope to cut off the retreating army from the north by the perfect timing of their movements in a very difficult country, and in the face of the superior mobility of their opponents. Not only so, but incautious haste or the failure of the several columns to co-operate and keep in touch with one another might enable the Germans suddenly to concentrate on one of them and dispose of it before the others could come up. Fascinating as the thought must have been to the Russians, that by directing their armies on a common point they might gain a decisive victory, they had to reckon with two disadvantages. The first was provided for them by nature, the second by the Germans. Nature had decreed that the Southern Russian invasion must be made through a country formidable in itself and made more formidable by art. All along the southern border of East Prussia, and for many miles after the bend of the frontier to the north, stretches an intricate and dangerous region of swamps and lakes and woods; the passages through them are at the best only narrow defiles, and they had now been narrowed still further by artificial inundations and protected by all the apparatus of defensive warfare. On this section of the front Germany had a position which enabled her to resist attack with comparatively weak forces, and at the same time she enjoyed the immeasurable advantages which spring from the possession of a superior railway system. A Russian invasion which entered East Prussia at points so widely severed as Stallupönen, Lyck, and Soldau had only three railways on which to rely—the




DIAGRAM 1. (See above.)




DIAGRAM 2. (See page 187.)



A wood near Tannenberg that was occupied by the Russians. [Exclusive News Agency. The trees were felled by the German shells.



German peasants who fled to avoid the Russian advance into East Prussia. [Photo Press.

line from Vilna and Kovno to Stallupönen and Gumbinnen, that from Bielostok to Lyck, and that from Warsaw to Soldau. (See Map, page 183.) On the other hand, the Germans, besides numerous branch railways from north to south, had at their disposal three great railways running the length of the province from west to east. Of these, the southernmost is admirably adapted to hurry troops up to any point threatened on the frontier; connecting (like the other two) with the fortresses of Graudenz, Thorn, and Posen, it runs parallel with the frontier, and just a few miles within it. Farther to the north, towards the centre of the province, is the great line which runs from Thorn through Osterode and Allenstein, and on to Insterburg. This is the line by which troops may be pushed up to the aid of the northern army of defence, or gathered behind the Masurian Lakes when it seems that the enemy is about to break through their defences. Westwards, again, another railway runs between Königsberg, along the coast of the Baltic Sea into West Prussia, and connects with Danzig.

Thus, in seeking to clear East Prussia simultaneously from the north and south, Russian strategy essayed a task which might not only not be accomplished, but might end in disaster. Even if the Northern German army were beaten, the successful resistance of the army in the south would enable it to secure its retreat in safety, and there was always the possibility that the Russians, threading the intricacies of the Masurian Lakes, might be caught unawares and crushed. In fact, the army in retreat from the north, so far from being itself cut off, might be in time to unite with other forces in a joint attack on the invaders advancing from the region of Soldau.

If things went well for the Germans, the positions would then be as shown in Diagram 2 (page 185).

THE BATTLE OF GUMBINNEN.

The campaign in East Prussia was decided within ten days. It began with a splendid success for the Russians, and ended in a disaster which not only cleared them out of the province but compelled them to let the Germans advance into Russia as far as the line of the River Niemen. Russia opened her attack by a simultaneous invasion at two points. In the middle of August a large army under General Rennenkampf, one of the best generals in the Russo-Japanese war, advanced along the road from Kovno, crossed the frontier at Wirballen, and occupied Stallupönen. It consisted of the Second, Third, Fourth, and Twentieth Army Corps and some reserve divisions. Its mission was to drive the opposing German army, three corps strong, back along the railway to Königsberg, or to push it southwards towards a second Russian army which was simultaneously attacking by way of Lyck, and was opposed by only one army corps. The army opposing Rennenkampf was disposed north and south of the railway—its left at Pillkallen, its centre on the railway, its right towards Darkehmen. The battle opened on August 20th, and continued for three days, the Russians being in superior numbers. On the first day Rennenkampf threw back the German centre and right wing, capturing thirty guns, and their repulse made it impossible for the left wing to hold its ground at Pillkallen. On the second day, therefore, the Russians drove the opposing left back from Pillkallen behind Gumbinnen, and on August 22nd the whole army was in full retreat on Insterburg, an important railway junction, with lines running both west to Königsberg and southwards to Allenstein and the country behind the region of the



General Rennenkampf.

[E.N.A.]



General Samsonoff.

[E.N.A.]

Masurian Lakes. The next day the Russians entered Insterburg, and those German troops which had



A German encampment on the Russian frontier.

[Sport and General.]



**The result of the East Prussian roads :
A German motor car with its front axle broken in consequence of the extremely bad road surface.**

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

not already taken the southward course had no way open except to retreat to Königsberg. The Russians during these four days had made considerable captures of material and prisoners, but they had gained nothing that could be called a decisive victory. The Germans had shown their aptitude (of which they afterwards gave frequent evidence in other parts of the theatre of war) for divining the precise moment at which their position had become untenable, and for retreating before they were the victims of the tactics of envelopment which they practised so assiduously themselves. The Russians were in superior force at Gumbinnen, and they had the advantage of the attack, but the policy of envelopment requires speed and the element of surprise if it is to be carried out successfully, and the lack of railways and good roads prevented the Russians from achieving either one or the other. Throughout this campaign the Russian cavalry were little heard of.

While Rennenkampf was fighting at Gumbinnen, another Russian movement was in progress in the region of the Masurian Lakes. Here General Samsonoff crossed the frontier over a wide front and seized Johannisburg, Ortelsburg, Neidenburg, and Soldau. He had with him five army corps, the First, Sixth, Eighth, Sixteenth, and Twenty-third, a much larger force than Germany could at the moment bring against him. His orders were to penetrate through the lake country to the railway which runs through Osterode and Allenstein, seize those places, crush any force which was caught between his army and that of the Northern Russian forces, and join with them in moving west and south, so as to complete the occupation of the province. Samsonoff moved towards Allenstein, meeting with comparatively little opposition.

Unfortunately, as it proved for himself, he did not advance towards the railway over the wide front which his troops covered when they crossed the frontier; fearing, no doubt, lest his columns should be surprised and cut off among the endless woods and passages of the lakes, he had drawn them closer together, so that the mass were concentrated within a rough triangle, of which the roads from Allenstein and from Bischofsburg to Neidenburg were the sides. But these roads themselves, or the most important parts of them, were not in Samsonoff's possession. Between them, where the bulk of his army was gathered, there were no good roads at all. There had been none in the advance, and there would be none available if retreat were necessary.

THE FLIGHT FROM EAST PRUSSIA.

Meanwhile, all Germany knew that a large part of East Prussia was in the hands of the enemy. Thousands of

fugitives had carried the news over the Vistula, and even to Berlin. They complained that the authorities had befooled them too long with the assurance that no invader would ever be allowed to set foot in East Prussia. They described their homes burned, their cattle carried off, the roads blocked with the disorder and débris of a population in flight. The German Government was shocked as it heard of the acts of violence which were alleged against the Russian army. It even drew up a formal protest and caused it to be delivered to the Russian Government, declaring that Russian conduct in East Prussia was contrary to international usage, and the German newspapers gravely published it in their columns at the same time as the populations of Belgian villages were being massacred. The Germans, indeed, seem to have alleged nothing against the Russians which was comparable with the wholesale slaughter of civilians which went on in Belgium, and, if we may trust the account given by a Russian officer, the

Russian Commanders pursued a definite policy of much greater mildness. They had, he explained, a tariff, which was put in force when civilians fired on Russian troops. On a first shot being fired from any house, the house was forthwith blown up. If a second came from the same street, the whole street was blown up.

The flight of the fugitives made a great impression throughout Germany, where it had been the popular hope that the war would not touch German soil. It was decided not to allow the invader to advance further, even though troops were withdrawn from France. Political considerations seldom deflect military plans for good, and certainly they did not do so here. The Germans may have thought in the last week of August that the French and English armies were securely in their power, and that it could make



General von Hindenburg. [E.N.A.]

but little difference if an army corps or two of first line troops were withdrawn and less experienced men hurried up from Germany to take their place. The calculation was unsound, and at the beginning of September the German General Staff discovered that they had not too many, but too few, men in France. They had decided, however, to make a great effort to regain East Prussia. The Emperor had appointed to the East Prussian command General von Hindenburg, who had been living in Hanover in retirement since 1911. He was a good choice for the post. Energetic and determined, he embodied in himself all the devotion of the Prussian soldier to the attack as against defensive strategy. He found an opportunity awaiting him in East Prussia, and promptly seized it.

The country of the Masurian Lakes was admirably suited for Von Hindenburg's purpose. Behind the natural screen of the lakes and woods he collected an army which was at least as large as Samsonoff's, and probably larger.



Cossack troops on their way to the front.

[Central News.]



A farewell party by the roadside as the Russian troops leave for the front.

[Underwood and Underwood.]


He had with him the Twentieth Corps, which had been opposing the Russian advance, part of the Northern Army which had been brought down hastily from the operations against Rennenkampf, troops from the west, and others from the fortresses of Thorn and Graudenz, which also furnished him with guns. Reinforcements were thus pushed up to him along both of the railways which ran roughly parallel to the frontier. Samsonoff never discovered what was preparing for him. It is a bad country even for better scouts than Russian cavalry have shown themselves to be, with its interminable narrow defiles between endless lakes and swamps. But, even so, it is surprising that Samsonoff's reconnaissances were not pushed far enough afield to discover what forces were collecting on both his flanks. As it was, Samsonoff had advanced imprudently. On his left flank was purely hostile country. On his right he was separated by a wide region, which was as difficult and inhospitable as that in which he himself was moving, from the support of the Russian column towards Lyck. In front of him, round Allenstein, was the enemy, as he knew, but in what force he did not know.

If Samsonoff could have discovered the dispositions of Von Hindenburg as they were on August 25th he could not but have recognised his danger. Von Hindenburg's right wing, drawing its support from the railway near the frontier, ran from behind Soldau to Usdau and Gilgenburg. Two roads ran eastwards from this line, and converged at Neidenburg, which lay directly in the rear of Samsonoff. The centre of the German army lay around Hohenstein. Its left wing rested on Allenstein, Wartenburg and Bischofsburg. From the left wing, again, two roads ran in a converging direction towards a point in rear of Samsonoff's right wing—the little town of Passenheim.

THE BATTLE OF THE LAKES.

On August 26th the battle began. Samsonoff soon discovered that the enemy were in unexpected strength on his wings. The German right directed its advance on Neidenburg, and having gained that place, closed to the Russians their main avenue of escape, for the only two good roads which they could use led straight to Neidenburg, and from Neidenburg, again, led the only road which would have brought the Russians to the railway which was their main line of communication.

If Neidenburg was closed to them, all that was left to the Russians was to break through to the railway on their right wing and escape towards the north, a course which would have the great advantage of enabling them to unite with Rennenkampf's army. But the German left wing was now pursuing the same tactics of envelopment as were proving so successful on the other side of the battlefield. Throughout the day the Germans gradually pushed back the Russian right wing towards Passenheim, and on the 27th they established themselves there. Both Russian wings were now pushed back towards the centre, and the army was virtually surrounded. On the 28th the Russians succeeded for a time in regaining Passenheim, but the guns which the Germans had brought up from the Vistula fortresses were too much for them, and the attempt finally failed. In the narrow region in which the army was penned up there is only one stretch of a few miles square which is neither woods, nor lake, nor swamp. The ways of escape were almost entirely closed. Only one and a half corps succeeded in getting away. The rest, three and a half in all, were captured or driven into the lakes. From 80,000 to 90,000 prisoners were taken. The German losses were comparatively small.



Map to illustrate the Battle of the Masurian Lakes, or, as it is sometimes called, the Battle of Tannenberg. The Germans succeeded in surrounding the Russian army. They held the centre in the neighbourhood of Hohenstein, while their wings extended towards Neidenburg and Passenheim, and cut off its line of retreat.

Von Hindenburg had won a victory which was a triumph of organisation and management. Samsonoff certainly had been imprudent. He had ventured too far and too hastily, and his intelligence service had failed him badly. But the responsibility was only partly his: this was the first of the great railway victories.

It made an immediate end of the invasion of East Prussia. Von Hindenburg pressed on to Lyck, where, with his overwhelming numbers, he defeated and drove

over the frontier the Twenty-second and part of the Third East Siberian Corps. In a few days he was at Suwalki, and had established there a seat of German administration, while Rennenkampf, whose retreat was menaced, had to raise the siege of Königsberg, on which he had entered, and retire in haste. Had it not been for the courage and endurance of his covering troops, things would have gone hardly with him. But he succeeded finally in extricating his army, and retreating to the Niemen, there to await the German attack.



[Exclusive News Agency.]

A corner in Graudenz.



Russian Poles flying for protection to the Russian lines.

[Record Press

CHAPTER XXI.

THE FIRST AUSTRO-RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN.

THE PROBLEMS BEFORE AUSTRIA AND RUSSIA—AUSTRIAN INVASION OF POLAND—THE RUSSIAN REPLY BY WAY OF LEMBERG—SUCCESSIVE AUSTRIAN DEFEATS—INVESTMENT OF PRZEMYSŁ AND THE RETREAT ON CRACOW.

WHILE the Russian invasion of East Prussia was running its short and unfortunate course, greater events were maturing further south. Here, the first word lay with Austria, to whom fell the honour of meeting the main shock of the Russian attacks on behalf both of herself and her ally. Had Germany had men to spare, there would, no doubt, have been a simultaneous invasion of Russia both from the north and the south; but in August, German plans did not admit of an offensive against Russia, and it was only after the destruction of General Samsonoff's army in the region of the Masurian Lakes that the Germans crossed the East Prussian frontier in force, and advanced up to the Niemen River. It was left to Austria to draw the lightnings. Her task was two-fold: in her own interest, to keep the Russians out of Galicia; in that of Germany, to strike the Russians such a succession of heavy blows as would keep them east of the River Vistula until Germany could turn her attention to them in real earnest.

The spaces of Russia are so vast, and the forces at her disposal so great, that no Power can invade her borders without great risk of being out-manœuvred. She concentrates her troops slowly, and at a great distance from her frontiers; but, nevertheless, she has one great advantage: she holds the interior lines, she can watch the advance and note the strength of the invading armies, and deal with them in detail. This was the danger which Austria had to face if she decided to take

the offensive. This Austrian frontier against Russia is between five and six hundred miles in length. It is for the most part the border of the province of Galicia, facing northwards to Russian Poland and eastwards towards Kieff. Galicia itself might be termed the northern slope of the Carpathian range, which runs roughly parallel to the Austro-Russian frontier. It is a province which is mainly Polish in character; it fell to Austria in the first partition of Poland, and contains Cracow, the ancient Polish capital. At the eastern extremity there is a large Ruthenian population, which, whatever was the case with the Poles, might be expected to be sympathetically inclined towards the approach of its Russian kinsmen. This was an additional reason why Austria, which had not a little to fear from the coldness felt for the Empire by many of its subjects, should strain every effort to keep the Russians out of Galicia. There were, indeed, not only the Ruthenians and the Poles to be considered—though it was more than doubtful whether the Austrian Poles would feel themselves drawn towards Russia—but also the peoples lying south of the Carpathians, in the Hungarian plains, to which the Russians would have access when they had cleared Galicia of its defenders. Galicia was also too rich a province to be lightly sacrificed. Its iron, tin, and lead mines, its deposits of salt, and—most important of all to modern warfare—its large supplies of oil, made it a most valuable possession. On all grounds—military, political, economic—Austria was called on to hold it at any cost. Its fortresses—Lemberg, Przemyśl,



A view in Przemyśl.

[Exclusive News Agency.



Lemberg: The Theatre Square, showing the Municipal Theatre. [Exclusive News Agency.

Cracow—barred the roads to the two capitals, Vienna and Buda Pest. Its occupation would rouse the hope of release in every discontented nationality. It would cut off valuable supplies from the Austrian (and also from the German) army, and it would definitely compel Germany, whether she would or no, to assemble her forces against the Russian advance, for the western corner of Galicia borders on German Silesia; and as soon as Russia threatened to take Cracow, Germany's policy of waiting must come quickly to an end.

THE DEFENCE OF GALICIA.


The method by which Galicia was to be defended had been long marked out. Its northern frontier may best be regarded, from a military point of view, as divided into three parts from west to east. The first two parts are the sections into which the northern line is divided by the Vistula, which here flows almost due north; the third is the eastern frontier looking towards Kieff. Now, if the Russians could have chosen freely their line of attack on Galicia, they would have directed their main effort against the most western and the eastern of these sections. While one army invaded Galicia from the east, captured Lemberg and advanced on Przemysl, the other would have marched up the left or western bank of the Vistula, and crossed it between Przemysl and Cracow. The result would have been that the Austrian forces between Lemberg and Cracow would have been caught as in a trap, and would have either been driven into Przemysl or over the Carpathian passes into Hungary. In the later campaign, at the beginning of November, the Russians succeeded, on a small scale, in carrying out this manœuvre.

The first care of Austria, therefore, was to interpose such a threat that the Russians dare not march on the western section of the Galician frontier. This they did, having the advantage of more rapid mobilisation, by crossing the second section of the frontier into Russia, and marching down the right, or eastern, bank of the Vistula. By this movement they threatened the rear of a Russian army advancing on the other side of the Vistula so effectually as to make the attempt impracticable. This was only a negative, though an important, success, but it was one which they were forced to aim at. They hoped, indeed, to add to it much more positive gains. Advancing down the Vistula, they might secure Ivangorod, with its important bridges over the river; spreading out towards Lublin, they might deal the Russians a resounding blow, and throw them back on Brest Litovsk and the

vast expanse of marshes which lies to the southwards between Brest and Pinsk, so threatening the line of communication with Warsaw, and holding the Russians back until the Germans were ready on their side to invade Poland, march to the Vistula, and capture Warsaw.

While the Austrians thus secured the northern two-thirds of their frontier, they had cause to be anxious about the eastern section, which lies in front of Lemberg. For this section lay on the flank of the main advance which they contemplated towards Ivangorod and Lublin, and a pronounced Russian success here would soon, unless it could be arrested, endanger the whole of their strategic plans—a Russian army which captured Lemberg and pressed westwards would come right on the rear of the Austrian army in Poland, whose main base was Przemysl.

This danger must, of course, have been foreseen by the Austrians; and had it not been that they thought themselves compelled to prevent a Russian attack from the west side of the Vistula, it is probable that they would have preferred to take up a defensive position along both their northern and their eastern frontiers. As it was, they undertook the offensive on the right bank of the Vistula, and deployed a smaller army on the eastern border to act as a covering force to the main movement farther north. In the circumstances this was the best thing they could do, and the character of the country gave them some assistance; for if Eastern Galicia shows no great natural obstacle to a Russian advance, it contains many small ones of military value. Between Lemberg and the Russian frontier there lie to the north the upper reaches of the Rivers Bug and Styr and their tributaries, and around them a wide region of lake and marsh. To the south the



Map to illustrate the position of Vienna and Budapest relative to the Russian advance on Cracow.

country is intersected by a host of rivers running from north to south towards the Dniester, and perpetually intersecting the roads running east and west from the Russian border into Galicia. This system of rivers was, in itself, a considerable obstacle to an invading army, and its value was increased by the mountainous ridges along the river banks, and by the craters of extinct volcanoes, which furnished easy and natural positions for defence. Nor had the Austrians neglected to prepare defensive works. Lemberg itself, a great junction of roads, and of the railways from Russia and Bukovina, was guarded by a double line of forts. Twenty miles to the south lay another fortress, Mikalajoff, guarding the passage of the Dniester, with forts disposed on either bank. Farther east along the Dniester were other fortified positions, which might have served as sally ports for columns intended




The difficulties of campaigning in Galicia : A view of the main road through a Galician village.



Another view of a water-logged "main road" in Galicia.



A view on the Dniester in Eastern Galicia. The bed of the river is a variable one, as can be seen in the photograph, and in the rainy season it spreads for miles over its ordinary course.



At the foot of the Carpathian Mountains in Eastern Galicia.

to harass the rear of a Russian army advancing into Galicia by the line of the railway from Proskuroff and Odessa. (See Map, page 199).

DANGERS OF THE AUSTRIAN POSITION.

The plan, therefore, was that the Austrian first, or main, army should advance northwards from its base, Przemyśl, into Russia and make what progress it could, while a much smaller force, the second army, should operate on the right flank around Lemberg, pursuing a strategic defensive, obstructing an invasion from the east, and guarding the rear of the first army. The strategic position was, therefore, not favourable to Austria. No successes that she could hope to win at Lemberg were likely to affect the fortunes of the campaign, but, unfortunately for her, it was unlikely that any successes which she could win with her first army would lead to the retreat of the Russians advancing on Lemberg. For the victorious advance of the Austrian army on Lublin and beyond it would not threaten the communications of the independent armies based on Kieff and Odessa; and so long as these armies remained, their communications intact, they would become a graver danger to the Austrian first army the farther it penetrated into Russia. On the other hand, whichever Austrian army Russia drove back she at once endangered the position of the other. If she defeated the second army at Lemberg, she threatened Przemyśl, the base of the first; and if she drove the first army back on Przemyśl, the second army would probably be driven into the Carpathians. The Austrians laid their plans carefully, but were not in a position to carry them out. They proposed to attack the Russians on the line from Lublin to Cholm, and to hold them at Lemberg. But the Russians, observing the Austrian positions, decided otherwise. They determined to hold the Austrian first army with inferior forces, and to concentrate superior numbers against the Lemberg army. They did so, and in the last week of August the Austrians discovered that their covering army at Lemberg was to be made the object of the chief Russian blow.

Meanwhile, in the hope of securing the support of the Poles both in and outside Russia, the Grand Duke Nicholas, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armies, had issued a proclamation which promised a united and autonomous Poland, "under the sceptre of the Russian Tsars." The proclamation, which was free from all ambiguity, was warmly welcomed both in France and England, which were glad to believe that this was a sign of the more Liberal Russia which they hoped would be one outcome of the war. The text of the proclamation, which was dated from Petrograd, August 14th, was as follows:—

"Poles! The hour has struck in which the fervent dream of your fathers and forefathers can be realised.

"A century and a half ago the living body of Poland was torn in pieces, but her soul has not perished. It lives on in the hope that the hour of the renaissance of the Polish nation, of its fraternal reconciliation with Great Russia, will come.

"Russian troops bring you the glad tidings of this reconciliation.

"May the frontiers be obliterated which split up the Polish nation! May it unite itself under the sceptre of the Russian Tsars! Under this sceptre Poland will be born anew, free in her faith, her speech, and her self-government.

"One thing only Russia expects from you—like regard for the rights of the nationalities with which history has connected you. With open heart, with outstretched, brotherly hand, Great Russia approaches you. She believes that the sword which overthrew the enemy at Gruenwald has not rusted. From the shores of the Pacific to the northern seas the Russian war forces are moving forward.

"The dawn of a new life is opening upon you. May the Sign of the Cross shine forth from this dawning symbol of sufferings and resurrection of nations."

The Poles in Galicia made no response to this invitation. Of all the Poles, they had the least ground for discontent with their lot; they had been comparatively well treated

by Austria, and they repaid her now by fighting her battles in Galicia. The Russian Poles welcomed the proclamation, and the chief political parties, meeting in Warsaw, declared their implicit belief that "upon the termination of the war the promises uttered in that proclamation will be formally fulfilled, and that the dreams of our fathers and forefathers will be realised. The blood of Poland's sons, shed in united combat against the Germans, will serve


equally as a sacrifice, offered upon the altar of her resurrection."

THE BATTLE OF LEMBERG.

The Austrian mobilisation had begun on July 28th, but the fourth week had come before the first army entered Russia and took up positions a few miles north of the frontier. Its left wing rested on the Vistula, just north of its junction with the San, at Zawichost; its centre at Bielgorai and Tomaszow; its right at Belz, close to the River Bug. There were seven army corps assembled here. For the defence of Lemberg there were at first only three corps, the Third, Eleventh, and Twelfth, with five divisions of cavalry. But at the same time that the Austrian first army was taking up its ground between the Vistula and the Bug, two large Russian armies were crossing the Austrian frontier at the points where the Russian railways enter Galicia from Dubno and from Proskuroff. The Northern Russian army was under General Russky, the Southern under General Brussiloff. Their strength came as a surprise to the Austrians, who hurried up to Lemberg



Polish refugees on the way to Berlin. [Record Press.]



parts of the Seventh, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Corps, together with some Landsturm, so that when the decisive engagement opened on August 30th the Austrians had about a quarter of a million men in position. Their lines in front of Lemberg stretched from Kamionka, north-east of Lemberg, to Halicz in the south. They thus reposed their wings on the Rivers Bug and Dniester, in heavily entrenched positions, while their centre lay behind the Gnila Lipa, a tributary of the Dniester, with hills along its banks, which provided the Austrians with defences which were thought to be almost impregnable. The battle was fought stubbornly for two days. The Austrians made an attempt to outflank the Russian left wing, but the effort was thrust back, and the Russians themselves succeeded in working round the southern flank of the enemy. At the same time they broke through the defences on the Gnila Lipa, with a loss to the Austrians, it was said, of not less than 20,000 in dead and wounded alone. By September 1st the right wing had been turned, the centre had been shattered, and the army of Lemberg was in flight. On September 2nd the Russians were within range of the guns of the fortress. The first line of forts offered some resistance, but the second none. The Russian official reports scarcely erred when they said that, for the time at least, the Austrian Second Army had ceased to have a military value. Between sixty and seventy thousand prisoners had been taken, and two hundred guns. The remainder of the army was in flight westwards. It was decided not to defend Mikolaieff, though this place, like Lemberg, had been stocked with ammunition and supplies for a long siege. It fell into the hands of the Russians on September 4th, with forty guns and a great quantity of munitions of war. Stryj, at the foot of one of the Carpathian passes, was next captured, and also Czernowitz, a town of nearly 100,000 inhabitants, and

the capital of Bukovina. The city of Lemberg itself was not defended. There was some panic in the town at the approach of the Russians, and some executions of Ruthenians, who were alleged to have acted as spies. The population hastened to the railway stations to take trains for the west and safety, but the time was too short. The Russians were fast on the heels of the retreating Austrians. In their occupation of Lemberg the Russians, by the testimony of Austrian correspondents, behaved well. They posted guards in front of the chief banks and commercial houses, and strictly forbade looting and disorder. A Russian Governor was appointed, Count Bobrinsky, who used words which seemed to imply that in certain directions Galicia would be called on to experience the familiar process of "Russification." The proclamation of the Grand Duke had, of course, referred only to a new and united Poland that was to arise at the end of the war. But the Galician Poles might be pardoned for hoping that the "new life" would have been heralded by a foretaste of the liberties to come. But Austria-Hungary includes many other nationalities besides the Poles, and the Grand Duke appealed to them in another proclamation, which was distributed in nine languages. This said :—

"Peoples of Austria-Hungary.

"Entering at the head of Russia's forces the confines of Austria-Hungary, I declare to you, in the name of the great Russian Tsar, that Russia, who has time and again shed her blood for the liberation of nations from the alien yoke, seeks one object only, namely, the restoration of right and justice. To you, peoples of Austria-Hungary, Russia likewise brings freedom and the realisation of national aspirations. The Austro-Hungarian Government has for ages past sown discord and enmity among you, for upon your differences solely has its power rested. Russia,

on the contrary, has but one aim, namely, that each one of you should develop in prosperity, retaining the precious



General Dankl.

[E.N.A.]



General Auffenberg.

[E.N.A.]

heritage of your forefathers—language and religion—and, in union with your brothers in blood, live in peace and concord with your neighbours, respecting their national peculiarities.

"In full confidence that you will exert every effort to co-operate towards this object, I summon you to meet the Russian troops as faithful friends, who are fighting for the realisation of your highest ideals."

It was not, however, till the Russian invaders had threatened the Hungarian plains, withdrawn and come a second time, that signs of crumbling began to appear in the fabric of the Austrian Empire.

So soon as the Austrians found that Generals Russky and Brussiloff were advancing in great strength towards Lemberg, it became necessary for them to strike the blow on which they depended for the success of their plans as a whole. In the last days of August their first army, numbering six army corps, advanced on the Russian positions between the Vistula and the Bug. No partial victory could be satisfactory to them. What they needed was such a decisive success as would enable them further to strengthen their second army, since it was too much to hope that in any event they could reach out so far to the eastward as to threaten the rear of General Russky's army and embarrass his advance. At first, fortune seemed to be with them. Their main attack was made on the wings. They assailed the Russians towards Krasnik on the left and at Tomaszow on the right, and in both cases, but especially on the left wing, they were successful. The Russians were found to be in inferior numbers, and were thrown back towards Krasnik, assailed and beaten again. The Austrians made large captures both of men and guns, and the details of the spoils were paraded for weeks afterwards in the official reports on the morrow of each successive Russian victory. The Austrians now pushed forward along the whole of their left wing and centre, and at the time when their second army was

being shattered at Lemberg their line stretched from Opole, which is almost as far north as Lublin, through Turobin and Zamosc to Belz, whence the right wing had not moved. The stability of the right wing depended almost entirely on the fate of the army on its southern flank, and there was, therefore, no attempt to push it forward.

COLLAPSE OF THE AUSTRIAN OFFENSIVE.

On September 1st and 2nd the Austrian command was made aware that the covering army had been heavily beaten, and that, though strong positions could be taken up somewhat further back, from Rawa-ruska to Grodek, no great confidence could be placed in them. It was necessary to choose whether the first army should fall back at once or whether it should attempt to repeat on a greater scale the substantial successes it had already won, and compel the Russians to strengthen their Lublin army lest the enemy should penetrate too far towards Warsaw and Brest Litovsk. The Austrians chose the bolder course. On September 4th, they launched an attack on the Russian centre at Krastnostav, of which the Tenth Army Corps bore the brunt. It was a complete failure, and with it their hopes of a successful offensive came to an end. The attack along the whole front passed to the Russians. Their army on the Lublin-Cholm front was now reinforced both from the north and from the Lemberg army, and, on September 6th, they entered on a series of attacks which destroyed, for this campaign, the resistance of the Austrian armies.

The Russian Commanders proceeded faithfully on the principle of manœuvring the Austrians out of their positions. They did not shirk hard fighting on the centre of the front,

but their object throughout was to compel the retreat of the whole Austrian army by driving in its right flank and getting behind its centre. Part of the Second Austrian



General Russky.

[E.N.A.]



General Radko Demetrieveff.

[E.N.A.]



German Poles sharpshooting from their rifle pits on the Eastern frontier.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



A group of Austrian soldiers on outpost duty.

[Photopress.]

army had fallen back on prepared positions at Grodek, and another strong force had entrenched itself at Rawa-ruska. The holding of Grodek was essential to the maintenance of Rawa-ruska, and if the Russians were victorious at Rawa-ruska, the Austrian First Army was at once in danger. After three days' fighting, victory in both parts of the field fell decisively to the Russians. On the same day, September 9th, the left wing of the First Army, which was under the command of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, was driven from its positions between Opole and Turobin, and began to retreat hastily towards the crossings of the River San. The right wing, which was led by General Dankl, was already in flight, having been put in imminent danger by the Russian victory at Rawa-ruska. The only question which remained to be answered was whether the retreating wings would make good their escape. They both succeeded in doing so. As was shown repeatedly in the course of the war, it is comparatively easy to out-manœuvre the vast masses which make up modern armies, but very difficult to capture or destroy them. Just because he has so much to lose by a successful attack on his communications, the Commander is quick to note the instant when prudence demands that the order should be given for retreat. General Russky, as events showed, could not move quickly enough to prevent the escape of the Austrian right wing. The left wing got away towards Cracow because the Russians could not spare a force of cavalry to move up the left bank of the Vistula, cross it, and come down on their rear. This was the movement which was obviously called for at this time; it was that which the Austrians had always feared, and it was that, it seemed, which the Germans anticipated, for they sent out a force which marched from Czenstochowa towards the Vistula and delayed the Russians moving up the western bank. This was not the only intervention of the Germans in this campaign, but the other was inglorious. In the fighting from Opole to Turobin on the Austrian left, a German force belonging to the Sixth Corps had taken part. It had shared in the defeat on September 9th, when the Russians captured thirty-six of its guns and 5,000 prisoners. Throughout this series of battles the Russian captures


of guns and munitions of war were remarkable. They took in all over 400 guns, apart from those which were abandoned in the retreat to the San. But in spite of this, and of the large numbers of prisoners who fell into their hands, they had by no means crushed Austria's power of resistance, as the second Galician campaign was to show.

But for the present neither Austrian army was capable of serious resistance, and their only concern was to make their way to the strongholds of Cracow and Przemyśl. The Second Army, after the defeat at Grodek, gave General Russky little trouble. By September 16th it was within the forts of Przemyśl, which was invested from the east. Farther to the south, General Brussiloff was moving along the slopes of the Carpathians; Stryj fell into his hands, then Sambor, and within a week of General Russky's arrival before the eastern face of the fortress he was moving up against it from the south. At the same time he had, in his advance, occupied the chief Carpathian passes, and sent detachments of cavalry down the southern slopes to make a brief excursion into the Hungarian plains. The Russian army of the north, whose business it had been to drive the Austrians over the San, had a somewhat more difficult task. Jaroslav, an outpost of Przemyśl, and, like it, standing on the San, stood in their path. It fell, however, with unexpected ease. The bombardment began on the 19th, and on the 22nd the forts were carried—an achievement which seemed to confirm the lessons of the German campaign in the west with regard to the value of fortresses, although it was not repeated in the case of Przemyśl. Przemyśl was now completely cut off, and the Russians pushed on towards Cracow. On the railway from Jaroslav to Cracow both Rzeszow and Dembica fell into their hands, but they were not to reach Cracow itself. The moment had come when Austria's ally entered the field in earnest. The Germans were now massing on the frontiers of Poland from Cracow to Czenstochowa, and on to Kalisz, and busied themselves, after their fashion, in preparing strong entrenched positions, sure sign that an advance in force was imminent. The Russians prepared to draw back their front in Galicia in order to meet the new enemy on favourable ground.




[Record Press.]

A Russian Red Cross detachment, on their way to the firing line, escorted by Cossacks.



British ships leaving Colombo harbour, Ceylon, after the news of the sinking of the Emden had been received. In all, 42 vessels left the harbour, all of which had been held up by the knowledge that the Emden was somewhere abroad in the Indian Ocean. [Central News.]



The wharves along the Hudson River, New York, showing a number of German liners and merchantmen, belonging to the Hamburg-America and North German Lloyd lines, being held up in harbour by the fear of being captured by British cruisers. [Record Press.]



Sir Samuel Evans presiding over the first sitting of a British Prize Court for over fifty years on September 2nd, 1914.

[Barratt.]

CHAPTER XXII.


THE NAVY AND OUR COMMUNICATIONS OVERSEA.

BRITAIN'S DEPENDENCE ON THE SEA—THE "EMDEN'S" CAREER—THE CAUSES OF THE COMPARATIVE IMMUNITY OF BRITISH SHIPPING—THE GOVERNMENT'S INSURANCE POLICY—THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE NAVY—OUR LOSSES IN THE NAPOLEONIC WARS.


SOME account has already (Chapter VII.) been given of the opening moves in the war at sea. But before the narrative of what are sometimes styled the military operations of the navy is resumed, something must be said of how it discharged its prime duty, namely, the maintenance of communications overseas. This war, by bringing our country into Continental politics, has made it easier than it is at normal times to forget that British Power is in the main sea-power, and the British Empire in the main a maritime Empire. Great Britain is dependent on the sea in a sense in which no other country in the world is dependent. Other countries, if their sea communications were severed, would be inconvenienced more or less greatly, or would suffer a check to their political ambitions. But sea-air, and plenty of it, is necessary to the very existence, economic and political, of this country. It is the breath that fills its lungs, and without it not only our political life as we know it, but livelihood itself, would be impossible for the great majority of its inhabitants.

Before this war began, there could be no certainty of what its effect would be. Our dependence on the sea had greatly increased since the last naval war. A century

ago we were almost independent of foreign countries as regards our food supplies. Now our imports of wheat and flour amount to eighty per cent of our consumption, and the percentages in many other necessities of life are, though lower than this, still very high. Nor is this dependence confined to food-stuffs; it extends to nearly everything that makes industrial and commercial life possible in England. In his evidence before the Royal Commission on Food Supplies in Time of War, Mr. Llewellyn Smith, of the Board of Trade, put in a calculation of the possible effect on food-prices caused by a serious naval war. Double freight rates and five per cent war insurance might, he thought, send up the cost of wheat from 27s. to 31s. 7d. a quarter; double freights, and ten per cent insurance, would send it up to 34s.; treble freights, and twenty per cent insurance, would send it up to 41s., an increase of more than fifty per cent. And that is taking no account of panic or speculative rises in price. An increase of fifty per cent in the first necessity of life (after water) is alarming enough in itself, but the same causes that produced that rise would lead to an interruption of the supplies of the raw materials of industry. If prices went up by half, the earning capacity



The new Post and Telegraph Office at Madras. [Central News.
This was one of the buildings hit by the shells fired from the Emden when she appeared off Madras.



The famous German commerce raider, the Emden. [Exclusive News Agency.

of the country would go down in at least the same proportion. And these figures do not presuppose a disastrous defeat at sea, but only a state of insecurity such as existed in the Indian Ocean during the career of the *Emden*.

THE CAREER OF THE EMDEN.

The raids of the *Emden* on British shipping did not begin until the war had been in progress for five weeks, but it will be useful to begin with some account of her doings, because they illustrate, much better than statistics and calculations of the effect of high freights and insurance rates could do, the gravity of the fears that have oppressed almost all who before this war began have tried to work out its possible effects on the commercial life of the country. The *Emden* was a light cruiser, of 3,540 tons displacement, steaming twenty-five knots at her trials in 1909, and carrying ten four-inch guns. At the outbreak of the war she was on the German China Station. Until the second week of September nothing was heard of her, but she had presumably made an early escape from Kiao-Chau, and, if she was chased, she managed to hide herself very successfully. She turned up on September 10th in the Bay of Bengal, and within the week captured in succession seven good-sized steamers, ranging from 3,500 tons to nearly 8,000, sank six, and sent the seventh, with its own crew and the crews taken off the sunk steamers, into Calcutta. The old British rule of capture was that destruction of captures was not permissible, and that the sole right of the captor was that of arrest and removal for trial before a Prize Court. Only after the Court had adjudged the ship to be lawful prize did the captor acquire any rights of possession.

The foundation of this rule was that only after adjudication by the Court could it be ascertained whether there was neutral property on board, over which the captor had no rights, and Captain von Müller has been criticised for sinking ships which he could not take into port for the judgment of a Prize Court. In fact, he did no more than stand upon the letter of the rights conceded by the Declaration of London, the last codification of the law of war at sea, which allows a captor to sink prizes which he could not take into port for adjudication without endangering his own safety or the success of the operations on which he is engaged. Obviously, if Captain von Müller had had to take his prizes to the nearest German port, Dar-es-Salaam, his career would have been neither so long nor so successful. This question apart, Captain von Müller seems to have been very mannerly, and nearly all his victims came away full of praises of his courtesy and kindness. The contrast between the compliments given by Englishmen


throughout the war to the sea-manners of the German naval officers and the Belgian and French denunciations of the behaviour of their army officers is, indeed, very remarkable.

After her captures in the Bay of Bengal, the *Emden* appeared off Rangoon, and then off Madras, where she set two oil-tanks on fire. She was sighted near Pondicherry, and at the beginning of October the *Gryfedale* came into Colombo with the news that she was one of five 3,000 to 4,000 tons steamers captured by the *Emden*, and that the other four had been sunk. The *Emden* then seems to have gone east across the Bay towards Sumatra; at any rate, the *Marcomannia*, which had been attending her, and a Greek collier which she had captured, were found there by the cruisers which were now in pursuit. Or perhaps the collier was sent there as a decoy. The *Emden* captured two more steamers before leaving the Bay, and then, at the beginning of the third week, she

turned up in the Gulf of Arabia, where she captured yet three more. Altogether, in six weeks, she sank more than 70,000 tons of shipping, twenty times her own tonnage; and besides holding up the trade of these waters, did actual direct damage amounting to several millions. (See Map, p. 209.)

IF THERE HAD BEEN A DOZEN EMDENS.

Nor was the *Emden* the only cruiser to do damage to British shipping, though she was much the most successful. The *Königsberg*, a sister ship to the *Emden*, had a more dangerous and less profitable beat, but in addition to a daring raid into Zanzibar harbour, where she caught the *Pegasus*, a somewhat smaller British cruiser, at a disadvantage, and destroyed her by long-range fire, she captured and sank the *City of Winchester*, a fine merchant-



[Lafayette, London.

Sir Samuel Evans, K.C., President of the Prize Court.

man. Two other cruisers, the *Karlsruhe* and *Dresden*, were off the east coast of America, and two others in the Pacific. Against the two cruisers in the Atlantic there were as many as twenty-four cruisers out, and thirty in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The brilliant success of the *Emden*, and the comparative success of the others in eluding capture, in spite of the enormous numerical superiority of their pursuers, show how unsuspectedly grave was the menace to our overseas communications at the outbreak of war. It was not a matter of course that even the strongest navy should maintain its communications overseas on the outbreak of war. Had there been a dozen *Emdens* at large, we might have had very anxious and critical times in this country in spite of our great preponderance of naval strength. In fact, the country passed through the first few weeks of the war without realising generally that there was any danger at all of interruption to our supplies



**Guarding Britain's shipping :
H.M.S Lark escorting a Channel steamer.**

[Alfieri Picture Service.]



On Guard: British cruisers patrolling the North Sea in rough weather. A wave is just striking the stern of the cruiser from which the photograph was taken, while the vessel next in line can be seen shaking herself free from an enormous wave.

[Graphic Photo Union.]

from abroad. And when the news came of the depredations of the *Emden*, they excited a certain amount of indignation, and were regarded unjustly as proofs of negligence on the part of the Admiralty. They were, in fact, the exceptions that proved the rule. And but for careful provision of the Government, and great watchfulness on the part of the navy, these depredations, instead of being the exception, might have been the rule, and that without our suffering any actual defeat at sea, or any diminution in our preponderance of naval strength. The story of the *Emden* has been put first in order to show that there was a very serious problem which was not by any means automatically solved by the possession of a superior navy. We have now to consider what causes contributed to the comparative immunity of this country from the worst dangers of panic and speculative prices. First among these causes must be put the Government's insurance scheme.

THE GOVERNMENT AND MARINE INSURANCE.

The shipping interest was naturally timid in the first few days of the war. The risk from commerce raiders was an unknown quantity, and underwriters put up insurance rates for Eastern and some other voyages from five shillings to twenty guineas per cent, which was much the same as saying that they were not prepared at the moment to do business at all. Our marine insurance arrangements were, in fact, inadequate for war-time, although they had served us well in times of peace. The difficulties had been foreseen, however, and as early as the 4th of August a State-aided scheme was announced in Parliament. The Government set up forthwith a War Risks Office, and undertook to cover eighty per cent of the insurance on hulls if the existing associations would cover the remaining twenty per cent. The price for this service was to be within a maximum of five per cent, and a minimum of one per cent of the amount at risk. The State also undertook to insure cargoes at a flat rate within similar limits. This meant in practice that the


War Risks Office would take the more dangerous part of the business, and the private organisations could continue to do the remainder by offering more advantageous terms, which they could well afford to do.

By the 7th of August it was known that the enemy had very few commerce raiders on the high seas, and the State's cargo insurance rate was then reduced to four guineas per cent. On the 17th of the same month it was further reduced to three; afterwards, in two stages, to one and a half guineas. The rates on hulls were also lowered at the beginning of September. The charge for a single voyage, which just before that had been one and a quarter per cent, was reduced to one per cent; that of a round voyage from two and a half to two per cent; and that for a period of ninety-one days from two and a half to two per cent. It was also arranged that a voyage in ballast, not exceeding eight hundred miles in length, should be treated as part of the following voyage.

The extra charges thrown upon shipowners led, of course, to an immediate increase in freight rates. For India and China the increase was twenty-five per cent, for South Africa and the West Coast of South America thirty-three and a third per cent, and for West Africa fifty per cent. The traders concerned objected very strongly to these increases, which were considered unnecessarily heavy, and likely to destroy such chances as there were of resuming export business. The shipowners so far accepted this view that during the month the extra imports were in most cases reduced by at least one-half. In the case of West African trade, Messrs. Elder, Dempster and Company were doubtless influenced, when they cut down the increase from fifty to twenty-five per cent, by the fact that the war had relieved them from the German competition which they had to face previously.

THE WAR AND PRICES.

By the end of August these matters had been adjusted as satisfactorily as circumstances permitted, but then a new set of influences began to tell strongly on the shipping



The Tracks of the Emden and Königsberg.

position. The British Admiralty had requisitioned a great number of vessels for the conveyance of troops and stores, and at the same time overseas trade was much better than it had been. Germany's great mercantile fleet, too, was all either laid up in port for safety or captured, and Great Britain had lost some ships in the same way. An increased demand thus coincided with a greatly reduced supply of shipping, and, as was inevitable, freight rates went up very sharply. Before the war these rates were mostly unprofitable, but the war made a vast improvement in the position of those owners who were fortunate enough to escape losses by capture. Even the pleasure steamers, which are usually laid up in the winter, were brought into service, very much to the advantage of the companies who owned them.

The employment for shipping would have been greater still if a larger proportion of it had been in neutral hands, and, therefore, available for the carriage of non-contraband goods for Germany and Austria. America was most anxious to send some of her superabundant cotton to those countries, but for a long time was unable to forward a single bale, and even when the British Government announced definitely that cotton would not be regarded as contraband, it was rather difficult to secure vessels to send to Germany. Trade with the northern countries of Europe was also restricted to some extent by fear of mines which the Germans scattered over the North Sea, as well as parts of the coast of Ireland, and to a still larger extent by the prohibition of certain classes of exports by all the countries concerned, and, in our case, the prohibition of some imports also.

The effect of war conditions upon the prices of commodities was not by any means all in one direction. Our supplies of timber, wood pulp, and other articles from Scandinavia and Russia were interfered with and made dearer, but in the trades of the main ocean routes the increases in freights were often offset by other circumstances arising out of the war. Cotton and copper may be cited as typical of the articles affected in this way. Cotton would have fallen in price in any case, owing to the American crop being an unusually large one, but it fell very heavily indeed when it was seen that the German and Austrian mills would be unable to take more than a fraction of their usual quantity. Copper and a number of other articles are on the contraband list; and as Germany and Austria were not allowed to obtain supplies, we had large quantities marketed here, with the result that prices fell by a great deal more than the equivalent of the rise in freight rates. The cost of food, leather, wool, drugs, and some other supplies went up, but this was not due to higher freights so much as to the shutting off of the supplies from the enemies' countries, and the great needs of the Allies' armies. Wool values in particular were influenced by the enormous demand for material for army clothing, although we had the great advantage of what amounted to the first call upon the Australian clips. The cost of our exports was, of course, enhanced to our customers by the higher freight and insurance rates, although in the case of our principal exports—cotton goods—this was not so serious as it would have been if the raw material had been as dear as it was when the war broke out.

THE SMALLNESS OF OUR SHIPPING LOSSES.

But no forethought of the Government in devising insurance schemes could have prevented our losses through rise of prices from being more serious than they in fact

were if the watch of our navy had been less vigilant, or the policy of the German Admiralty more enterprising. As has been already noted (page 68), by a rare piece of good fortune a test mobilisation of our navy had taken place a fortnight before the war began, and all the fleets were prepared for immediate action. If the Germans had wished to gain the open sea and begin a war upon our communications, the conditions were about as unfavourable for their success as could well be imagined. The British Isles are like a huge mole lying across exits from the German ports to the seas outside; and our fleets at the outbreak of war were stationed in the positions where it was easiest to prevent egress. Yet there is little reason to doubt that had the Germans chosen to run risks they could have got some of their strong, fast cruisers out to sea; and though their ravages would not have had any decisive influence on the progress of the war, they could have inflicted very great inconvenience, and perhaps even suffering, upon us. A very able and important school of French naval thought, before the conclusion of the Entente, was always advocating the advantages of the *guerre de course* (cruising warfare on commerce) if France should be at war with us; and the geographical position of France and her extensive coast-line made such a threat particularly dangerous. Germany's position was far less favourable; but she would have done well, from her point of view, to make some attempt. They would have had, as Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge expressed it to the National Guarantee Committee, "a run for their money." But whether because the vigilance of the British navy was too great and its dispositions were too skilful, or because the Germans took the British view that "the attack or defence of commerce is best effected by concentration of force, and that a dispersion of strength for either of these objects is the strategy of the weak and cannot materially influence the ultimate result of the war,"* the Germans, so far as is known, never made any serious attempt to gain the open sea with their fast cruisers, and such injury as they inflicted on our commerce was all the work of cruisers stationed abroad who were unable to get back to their home ports.

But, whatever the cause, the losses suffered by our merchant shipping were comparatively trifling. In the great war with Napoleon, when our mastery of the sea was undisputed, and for years after Trafalgar, we suffered an average annual loss from captures of 488 British ships, a total for the twenty-one years of war of 10,248. Many of these captures were made within sight of the English coast. "Privateers, sailing at sundown with a fair wind from St. Malo, or Dieppe, or Dunkirk, to cruise in the Channel, would reach their cruising ground before morning of the long winter nights of that latitude. The length of stay would be determined by their good fortune in making prizes, if unmolested by a British cruiser. They ventured over close to the English side: they were seen at times from the shore seizing their prizes. At Dover, in the latter part of 1810, 'signals were out almost every day, on account of enemy's privateers appearing in sight.' Innocent-looking fishing-boats, showing only their half-dozen men busy at their work, lay at anchor upon or within the lines joining headland to headland of the enemy's coast, watching the character and appearance of passing vessels. When night, or other favourable opportunity offered, they pulled alongside the unsuspecting merchantman, which, unmanned and unwatchful from the scarcity of seamen, was often first awakened to the danger by a volley of musketry, followed by the clambering of the enemy to

* Report of the Royal Commission on Food Supplies (1905).

the decks. The crews, few in number, poor in quality, and not paid for fighting, offered usually but slight resistance to the overpowering assault. Boarding was the corsair's game, because he carried many men."*

Such was the insecurity of the seas adjacent to our coast in the years immediately following the great victory of Trafalgar. The first few months of this war, although we had won no resounding naval victory, had nothing to show that even remotely suggested the insecurity of the days of our undisputed naval supremacy after Trafalgar.

A Board of Trade return, which was issued on the 26th November, is worth quoting. "When the war began we had 10,123 steamers of 100 tons gross register or more, the total tonnage being twenty and a half millions; Germany had 2,090 such vessels, of an aggregate tonnage of 5,134,720. After nearly four months of war we had lost forty-nine by capture and Germany eighty. We had seventy-five detained in German ports, while the Germans had 166 detained in the ports of Great Britain and her Allies. We had none held up in our ports, whereas the Germans had 329 in theirs. We had seventy-one held up in the Baltic or the Black Sea, while the Germans had 646 in refuge in neutral ports, and we had nearly 10,000 still on the seas, against only ten of any size belonging to the Germans. Notwithstanding the enormous size of the target which we presented, and the activities of the *Emden* and a few other enemy ships, we only lost 1.9 per cent of the whole of our mercantile marine by capture or detention."


Mistakes the Admiralty may have made, but never in any past wars has our merchant shipping enjoyed anything like the same security as in this, or industry and commerce been so nearly immune from interruption of communications oversea and rise of prices. That this

* Mahan: "Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution," II., 208.

result should have been achieved while all the time our main fleets were concentrated for battle in the North Sea and great armies were being convoyed across the seas would have been thought incredible before the war.

THE LAST OF THE EMDEN.

It remains to notice briefly the end of the careers of the *Emden* and the *Königsberg*, in the Indian Ocean. After destroying the *Pegasus*, in Zanzibar Harbour, on September 19th, the *Königsberg* disappeared completely from view, and for more than a month no trace could be found of her. On October 30th, however, she was discovered, six miles up the Rufigi River, in German East Africa, by the *Chatham*. She lay almost hidden in dense palm groves, aground except at high water, and the *Chatham*, owing to her greater draught, could not reach her. Part of her crew had been landed, and were entrenched on both banks of the river. The *Chatham* sank hulks in the only navigable channel of the river, and so imprisoned her out of harm's way. The later history of the *Emden* was more adventurous. After her captures of Cochin, in the Arabian Gulf, she ran for the Straits of Malacca, and sank a Russian cruiser and a French torpedo-boat, at Penang, on October 29th. She then made for Keeling, Cocos Island, where there is a wireless station and a cable. She landed, on November 9th, a party to cut the cable, which was done, but not before the operators had got a message through to Singapore. A wireless message from Keeling was also received by the *Minotaur*, and passed on to the Australian cruiser, *Sydney*. The *Sydney* was the more powerful ship, and after a short action the *Emden* was run ashore and sunk. Her losses were 200 killed, but her captain, Commander von Müller, fortunately escaped being wounded, and the Admiralty, in recognition of the honourable conduct of the *Emden*, gave instructions that her captain and officers were to retain their swords.




[Photopress.

One of the masts of H.M.S. *Pegasus* sticking out of the water in Zanzibar Harbour. The *Pegasus*, while under repair at Zanzibar, was sunk by the German Cruiser the *Königsberg*.



**Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty,
who was in charge of the engagement off the Heligoland.**

[Topical Press.]



A general view of Heligoland, taken on a stormy day.

[Exclusive News Agency.]

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE NAVAL ACTION OFF HELIGOLAND.

RECONNAISSANCE BY SUBMARINES—THE PLAN OF THE ACTION—ITS TWO PHASES—THE GERMAN LOSSES—OBSERVATIONS ON THE ENGAGEMENT.

IN an earlier chapter of this history (Chapter VII) the story of the naval operations in the North Sea was carried down to the sinking of the *U15*, an incident which for the first time made the public aware that the policy of "attrition"—by which the undoubted superiority of the British fleet was to be reduced by means of submarine and mine attacks—was already being attempted. The *U15* was sunk off the north coast of Scotland, and, as we now know from the published diary of an officer who was on another vessel near by at the time, was rammed by H.M.S. *Birmingham* after she had been discovered and shot at while on the surface under cover of a fog. That was on the 9th August, only five days after the declaration of war; only three hours after it, two English submarines, the *E6* and the *E8*, had proceeded unaccompanied to carry out a reconnaissance in the Heligoland Bight. Our submarines, that is, were at their stations outside the ports of the enemy; his were no long time after cruising about outside the war stations of our Grand fleet. So the positions of the two sides remained for three weeks. Off Scotland and the East Coast, English destroyers warded off the menace of submarine attacks from the transports which through these eventful days were carrying the British army to the Continent. Off the entrances to Wilhelmshaven and the Kiel Canal, English submarines were lying in wait to attack the German High Seas fleet should it come out to attempt to dispute the passage of the narrow seas. The German fleet did not come out; we have official information to the effect that in the whole submarine operations to the date at which these lines are being written only one of the enemy's armoured ships, and that only on one occasion, has been observed outside his harbours within torpedo range. But our submarine patrol, if it was not fortunate enough to find large vessels

of the enemy ready to take the sea in its presence, and consequently was unable to do anything of itself to diminish his fighting strength, was all the time acting as an extremely efficient adjunct to the Intelligence Departments of the Admiralty and the Commander-in-Chief. Valuable information was collected as to the composition and movement of the enemy's patrols of cruisers and destroyers. On the basis of this information was devised the first concerted operation of the war—the first operation, in fact, in modern naval warfare in which different types of ships have been combined in a carefully co-ordinated tactical scheme. The scheme, which allowing for the differences between action and theory seems to have been executed pretty much as it was designed in the conferences between Admiral Jellicoe and the Admirals and Commodores who took part in it, was put into operation, no doubt designedly, at the very moment when British fortunes on land looked most critical.


The lessons of this deeply conceived and brilliantly executed operation will be discussed later. It is, however, as well to disentangle from the official despatches the salient incidents of the action in the order in which they occurred. The initial movement was one of submarines, accompanied by two destroyers acting as parent ships, and one of them carrying the broad pennant of Commodore Roger Keyes, commanding the submarine flotillas of the Grand fleet.

"At midnight on the 26th August," writes Commodore Keyes, "I embarked on the *Lurcher*, and, in company with *Firedrake* and Submarines *D2*, *D8*, *E4*, *E5*, *E6*, *E7*, *E8*, *E9*, of the Eighth Submarine Flotilla, proceeded to take part in the operations in the Heligoland Bight arranged for the 28th August. The destroyers scouted for the submarines till night-fall on the 27th, when the latter proceeded independently



H.M.S. Lion, the flag-ship of Admiral Beatty in the engagement off Heligoland.

[Exclusive News Agency.]



H.M.S. Amethyst, which was damaged in the fighting off Heligoland.

[Central News.]

to take up positions from which they could co-operate with the destroyer flotillas on the following morning.

At daylight on the 28th August the *Lurcher* and *Fire-drake* searched the area through which the battle cruisers were to advance for hostile submarines, and then proceeded towards Heligoland in the wake of Submarines E6, E7, and E8, which were exposing themselves with the object of inducing the enemy to chase them to the westward.

THE SHIPS ENGAGED.

The submarines, therefore, sailed from Harwich at midnight on the 26th of August. At five o'clock on the 27th, the two destroyer flotillas who were to bear the brunt of the action and suffer all its casualties, made their way from the same port to the prearranged scene of operations. Commodore Tyrwhitt, who commanded all the destroyer flotillas of the Grand fleet, had transferred his pennant from the older cruiser, the *Amethyst*, to the new light cruiser, the *Arethusa*, immediately before the action; he had with him the whole of the first flotilla with the exception of three vessels, and all but one of the third. He was joined at sea by the *Fearless*, in command of Captain Blunt, the captain (D) of the first flotilla. Later still, the heavier vessels taking part in the operation put to sea from two different ports. From East Coast ports (it is wise not to be too precise) came a cruiser force under the command of Rear-Admiral Christian, who had, besides, general authority over the two commodores whose proceedings have been already described. This cruiser force, composed of older third fleet armoured and protected cruisers, did not in fact take any part in the subsequent action at all, and was not, except in certain circumstances which did not arise, expected to do so. By the evening of the 27th this force was in its allotted position, and the two destroyer flotillas had left it, as we have seen, to go eastward into the Bight. Lastly, coming from the war station of the Grand fleet, came the first battle squadron, under Sir David Beatty, the senior officer,


who, under the Commander-in-Chief's direction, was to be in supreme charge of the operations. He was joined at a rendezvous at sea by four destroyers, which had been detached to protect his ships from submarines, and by the *Invincible*, which had just been commissioned after an important refit, and carried aboard Rear-Admiral Moore, who was to have the opportunity, before leaving to take over the command of the second battle cruiser squadron in the Mediterranean, of going into the first considerable action of the war. With Admiral Beatty, also, was the first light cruiser squadron, an exceedingly useful force, which had been in at the sinking of the *U15* three weeks before. The force directly with Admiral Beatty was at its rendezvous, which had been searched for submarines by Commodore Keyes with the *Lurcher* and *Firedrake* just before, shortly after daylight on the 28th. That station was to the north of the position occupied by Admiral Christian's cruisers. Shortly after dawn on the 28th, therefore, when the action commenced, the position on the English side was as follows: Inside the Bight, that is to say in the enemy's territorial waters, there were eight submarines. Approaching the Bight from the north-west were the two destroyer flotillas, consisting of two fast light cruisers and over thirty destroyers. Behind them, to the north-west of the scene of the action, lay the first light cruiser squadron, and behind them the five battle cruisers. South of that again were the third fleet cruisers, under Rear-Admiral Christian. On the German side the number of vessels engaged is much less certain. There were at least three submarines, because three were seen making an attack on the

battle cruisers at noon on the 28th. In the case of destroyers, as the German Commodore was present (he was killed and his ship sunk in the action), it is fair to assume that the



[Stanley's Press Agency.

Admiral von Ingenohl, Commander-in-chief of the German High Seas Fleet.




[Exclusive News Agency.

Admiral von Schukmann, Naval Governor of Heligoland.



The cliffs of Heligoland, which, owing to the action of storm and frost, are steadily crumbling away.

[Exclusive News Agency.]



A bird's-eye sketch of Heligoland, showing the shape of the island.

[Exclusive News Agency.]

"numerous" destroyers mentioned in the despatches may have reached a total of at least thirty, and may possibly have been more numerous still. There were also present at least four light cruisers, three of them of the German town class, and one armoured cruiser. The action was fought as a running fight at a considerable speed, which appears to have varied from about eighteen to about twenty-seven knots, and took place round Heligoland, apparently on the north-east and west sides of the island.


THE FIRST PHASE OF THE ACTION.


It began at seven minutes to seven o'clock on the morning of the 28th, when one division of the third flotilla sighted and gave chase to a German destroyer. By seven, the whole of the third flotilla, as well as the *Arethusa*, were hotly engaged with German destroyers and torpedo boats making for Heligoland, and the course was altered to port (that is, was made in a north-easterly direction) to cut them off (see Fig. 1). In this first phase of the action it is clear that the English vessels had it all their own way. Their offensive power was unquestionably much superior to that of the enemy; indeed, a study of the casualty lists seems to show that it was only when engaged with enemy cruisers, which they did not hesitate to venture to do when the opportunity was given them later, that our destroyers were damaged at all. Up to three minutes to eight, then, the third flotilla and the *Arethusa* were engaged with the German flotillas, none of the other English vessels being by that time in action. At that moment, however, two cruisers, one of them a large one with four funnels, were sighted on the port bow (that is to say to the north-east), and a new and hotter engagement immediately

followed, in which the *Fearless*, which was leading the first flotilla, was also involved. The four-funnelled cruiser, about whose identity there is still much doubt, engaged the *Fearless*, the two-funnelled one the *Arethusa*, and the action continued for half-an-hour, till a shot from the *Arethusa* wrecked the fore-bridge of the German, and she retired to Heligoland, across the bows of the English vessel, that port lying at the moment slightly more south than east of the attacking force. As at no time during the action was it possible to see more than three miles distance, owing to the haze, the vessels were at this moment well within range of the guns of the fortress, and it was therefore thought better at half-past eight to order the whole force under the Commodore's command to turn to the westward. On steaming out of action it was observed that the speed of the *Arethusa* was much reduced. Her water tank had been hit by a shell; there had been a fire on her decks, and all her guns and torpedo tubes were, temporarily at any rate, out of action except one. Moreover, many casualties had occurred, including the death of her signalling officer, who was killed as he stood beside the Commodore on the bridge. Meanwhile, the *Fearless* and the destroyers of the first flotilla had not been idle. The four-funnelled cruiser which had been engaging them had drawn off, no doubt as a result of damage received, and the flotilla had then done further execution amongst the enemy's destroyers, sinking the Commodore's ship.

THE CRUISER ACTION.

By nine o'clock, therefore, what may be called the first phase of the action was over. The two flotillas, with their leaders, had temporarily retired westward, leaving





A British warship taking in ammunition.

[Gale and Polden.]



The German Fleet lying off Kiel.

[Record Press.]

behind them, and nearer the enemy, the submarines and their two parent destroyers, the *Lurcher* and the *Firedrake*. The damage to the *Arethusa* was repaired as far as possible, and all her guns except two of the 4-in. were again in working order. At ten o'clock the second phase of the action began. Up to the present the Germans appear to have had no suspicions that any English vessels, beyond the destroyers and their leaders, were in the neighbourhood of their coasts; and though the two cruisers which had come up earlier in the morning to attack the flotillas had both been damaged and retired, others (they were almost certainly not those which had previously been in action) now ventured out and attacked the two destroyers which had been left behind in the neighbourhood of Heligoland to assist the submarine force. The *Arethusa* turned back to their assistance; and though she did not succeed in getting into touch with them, she was herself attacked by a large four-funnelled cruiser. Apparently none of this cruiser's shots took effect. "We received," says the official despatch, "a very severe and almost accurate fire from this cruiser; salvo after salvo was falling between ten and thirty yards short, but not a single shell struck; two torpedoes were also fired at us, being well directed, but short. The cruiser was badly damaged by the *Arethusa*'s 6-in. guns, and a splendidly directed fire from the *Fearless*, and she shortly afterwards turned away in the direction of Heligoland." But though this cruiser was thus driven off with loss, this was unquestionably the most critical moment of the action. The German destroyers had most of them retired damaged, and two had been sunk before ten o'clock; but the enemy had not given up the fight. Their destroyers had been replaced by their light cruisers; and though these were destined to suffer most severely as a result of the action, their appearance did at the moment put the already war-worn destroyers and their leaders in a position full of peril. At eleven o'clock the battle cruisers, lying at their allotted station some way from the scene of the action, had just successfully evaded an attack by submarines, when Admiral Beatty received a signal for help from the Commodores on the *Arethusa* and the *Lurcher* respectively. The latter was being chased by the enemy's light cruisers; the former had gone to his assistance, and had on the way been obliged to engage a large and probably armoured cruiser. Clearly, both were in need of immediate help. Admiral Beatty took his decision quickly. He knew that the destroyer forces were not more than twenty-five miles away from Wilhelmshaven and Brunsbüttel respectively, and that they were heavily engaged; and though immediately on

receiving the wireless appeal for help he had sent off the light cruiser squadron, he was faced with the possibility that a large sortie in force of the enemy's armoured or battle cruisers might render the presence of his own ships imperative, and give the chance of a much larger action. All the German battle cruisers of the Seidlitz class were probably within hail, as also were the *Blucher*, *Roon*, and *Yorck*. "Accordingly" (to quote Admiral Beatty's own dispatch) "at 11-30 a.m. the battle cruisers turned to E.S.E., and worked up to full speed. It was evident that to be of any value the support must be overwhelming, and carried out at the highest speed possible. I had not lost sight of the risk of submarines, and possible sortie in force from the enemy's base, especially in view of the mist to the south-east. Our high speed, however, made submarine attack difficult, and the smoothness of the sea made their detection comparatively easy. I


considered that we were powerful enough to deal with any sortie except by a battle squadron, which was unlikely to come out in time, provided our stroke was sufficiently rapid." The Admiral's calculations proved correct. At 12-15 p.m., when he had been under way for three-quarters of an hour, and had therefore been travelling over a distance probably of eighteen to twenty sea miles, he sighted the first flotilla retiring west, and the light cruisers engaging the *Mainz*, which had been engaged for twenty-five minutes with the flotillas and the leading cruisers after the first appeal for help had been sent. She was now on fire and sinking by the head, two of her funnels were gone, and her decks were in an indescribable condition. Clearly she was done with without the intervention of the larger vessels, and Admiral Beatty steered north-east, to where the *Arethusa* and the third flotilla,



[Central News.]


Rear-Admiral Christian, who took part in the Heligoland fight.

on whom—as the narrative and the casualty lists show—the whole brunt of this heavy morning's fighting had fallen, were still unwearyingly engaging the enemy, this time a cruiser of the *Kolberg* class (see Fig. 2). On it the *Lion* opened fire, and pursued to the north-east, in the direction, no doubt, of the Schleswig-Holstein coast. On the way she sighted the *Ariadne*, and fired two salvos at her at a high speed, leaving her burning furiously and in a sinking condition. To pursue her until she was actually seen to sink was inadvisable in view of a report that floating mines had been observed ahead. The battle cruisers turned to port, *i.e.*, northwards, fell in again with the *Kolberg* (or a vessel of her class) and sunk her in ten minutes, and then at twenty minutes to two in the afternoon turned for home. All the destroyers and light cruisers were by now retiring to English waters, the latter spreading themselves out as a protecting fan before the



A stretch of the Kiel Canal, showing the German warship Frauenlob.

[Exclusive News Agency.]



A German mine layer leaving port with her mines ready on deck.

[Central News.]

battle cruisers on their way back to the northern base at which the Grand fleet was concentrated; the third fleet cruisers, which had been waiting to the westward of the battle all day, went eastward to meet the ships bringing wounded and prisoners, and to take in tow the damaged ships. The first naval action of the war was over.

Three German cruisers had been sunk, and two destroyers. At least seven destroyers and three cruisers, one of them probably the armoured cruiser *Yorck*, were badly damaged. Nine hundred Germans at least were killed and three hundred taken prisoners, while the English force escaped with a loss of sixty-two lives, and four ships—the *Arethusa* and three destroyers of the third flotilla—badly damaged.

These figures suggest certain reflections which will be considered in a moment. In the meantime, a fragment from the diary of an officer on one of the light cruisers which finally destroyed the *Mainz* is worth quoting, if only because it shows the personal and human side to this strenuous fighting.

At last, after an action of about forty minutes, the *Mainz* ceased fire with her fore-castle gun, the shield of which we afterwards found to have been wrecked by a lucky shot, and struck her flag. A cheer rose from our decks, though who it was for I cannot say. We now had time to look around. All the guns' crews had worked simply magnificently. They were all as black as niggers from cordite smoke. The stokers' fire brigade and the sick berth staff, who should have been down below, were on deck, humping along the ammunition supply, the rate of fire of the guns being very high. The gunnery lieutenant performed his last duty with great gusto, and went the round of the ship looking for damage, knowing perfectly that there was none. He then returned to the captain and reported, with face black but beaming: "No damage, no casualties, sir." The credit, of course, does not lie in sinking the enemy, for we were three to one, but in sinking her so quickly that she had no chance of injuring us before she went for her long docking. The lifeboats' crews were now called away, and as we were the leading ship, and the only one the enemy had fired at, we fully expected to be told to take charge of her, and if we could save her tow her into Harwich or some such place by way of bucking up the public with something solid. The battle cruisers, however, came up at this juncture; and some destroyers which had been nosing about in the mist, secure in their speed, sniffed out another enemy ship. We therefore steamed off in the wake of the battle cruisers, leaving the *Liverpool*—our lightest, slowest, and weakest ship—to save the survivors of the *Mainz* and to send the ship to the bottom.

Such was the day's work of August 28th, 1914. At about 2-30 p.m. we got a chance of some food, but I was too full of other thoughts to eat. Incidentally, too, I was badly deafened by the furious gun-fire. We spread out in a covering arc in front of the battle cruisers, and headed for home. Everything was squared off, and the usual rounds got up ready for the next enemy that might care to ask for trouble. The captain read the Special Thanksgiving Service after Action. As we steamed off for the second engagement we passed close to the wreck of the *Mainz*, and her decks were too horrible. I was gazing at them through some powerful glasses, and was much puzzled at first by the absence of corpses, and also by the wash-deck sponges that were scattered in such profusion, soaking in the blood with which her fore-castle was drenched, until I realised that the two accounted for one another. Enough said. A 6-in. projectile does not kill a man nor even dismember him; it simply scatters him. After prayers, the captain made a short speech, which was loudly cheered, thanking the men for their efforts, and drawing attention to the courage of our foe.—*Morning Post*, November 26th.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE ACTION.

That extract may give the student of modern naval war some idea of how it feels and looks to be in action. But it is time to turn to the general aspects of the Heligoland fight. It was said by at least one expert

critic, at the time when the despatches were first completely published, that though the material success rested with our own forces, the moral advantage lay with the Germans. That the enemy fought skilfully and bravely is obviously true, though perhaps there ought to be some slight reserves made in the case of some officers on the *Mainz*, but that this skill and bravery, and the preparedness which was shown in the German dispositions, should be used to abate the full measure of credit due to all ranks and ratings in the British flotillas and squadrons, and to the officers who led them, would be ridiculous. The Germans, it has been said by one critic, were ready for us in full force, and this fact is used by him as if it were evidence of some failure of our plans. Such a criticism ignores the whole point of the operation, which was to catch the enemy's patrol flotillas and squadrons when they were in full force, cut them off from their base, and destroy as many of them as possible. Judged as it ought to be judged, and having in mind this intention, the action was brilliantly successful.

It seems worth while calling attention to this misconception, because, partly owing to the fact that in a sea fight there are no eye-witnesses, and the official despatches are therefore left to tell their own tale without embroidery or elaboration, and partly to the overmastering interest of the land campaign, the Heligoland action has never received its full share of the public's attention. It was only what we expected the navy to do. We have all been brought up to require from it dash in action and perfection in the execution of a plan, and therefore we are apt to take this fine achievement a little too much for granted. What are the salient features of the Heligoland fight? In the first place it proved, what was further established in a brief action off the Dutch coast on the 17th of October, the marked superiority of the English destroyers. The vessels of the third flotilla, which were, it is true, the newest ships in the action, did not hesitate to engage the enemy's cruisers and destroyers at the same time, and one of them, the *Liberty*, whose Commander was killed in action, penetrated right into the middle of the German forces, well under the guns of Heligoland. If the official despatches are complete—and it is unlikely they would omit so important a circumstance—the forts there did not take part in the action. The destroyers, however, not only took the risk of attack from this quarter, but fought cruisers much more powerful than themselves. Their superiority is the more obvious when it is considered that, though almost the whole of two flotillas were engaged, casualties occurred on only four of them. The second salient feature of the action is the success of the new type of light cruiser, of which the *Arethusa* was the first to go into action. These vessels were designed to be "destroyers of destroyers," but as our own destroyers proved themselves quite equal to that task themselves, the *Arethusa* was constantly engaged with cruisers, and these of a bigger and supposedly more powerful type than herself. Thirdly, the action—the first in which this entirely new type had ever been engaged—was notable in that it proved the usefulness and justified the existence of the battle cruiser. The presence of the *Lion* and its consorts meant that, with the destroyers and light cruisers, and all but equal to them in speed, were vessels powerful enough to encounter in equal fight all but the latest type of battleship. The immense power of their armament enabled them to sink out of hand the enemy cruisers opposed to them, while their speed enabled them to give their support rapidly and effectively at a critical moment,

and to evade with security the attacks of hostile submarines. Lastly, the action displayed the superiority, which has been marked in every action up to now, of British gunnery.

But there was more in the action than this. It is clear from the despatches that the tactical studies which have been the main business of the officers in the higher commands in recent years have borne full fruit, and that that co-operation between different classes of craft which has been the object of all the studies of the war staff, and all the experiments in manœuvres, had been thought out on sound lines which would stand the test of action. In order fully to appreciate the significance of the operations from this point of view, we should, of course, require more information than we have yet been allowed to have about the actual disposition of ships, and particularly about the information which the patrolling submarines had been able to gather about the previous movements of the enemy. But it may be taken as certain that the operation was so designed, and the composition and disposition of the squadrons and flotillas which took part in it so arranged, that it could have been brought to a successful issue whatever the force which the enemy brought to bear to meet it. In fact, he brought out not only his patrolling force of destroyers and light cruisers, but one or two armoured vessels. Had he chosen to fight hard with these, instead of withdrawing them when it was clear that there was a considerable risk of their being sunk, the result would not have been different, though we should, of course, have suffered heavier damage. Had he even brought out his battle cruisers, or even one of his battleship squadrons, we should still—thanks to our submarine dispositions, to our superior speed, and to our heavier weight of gunfire, have been able to hold our own for long enough to do heavy damage to his ships and to secure our own retirement when necessary. We are a little apt to lose our sense of proportion, and to read into the despatches an air of greater strain and danger than was actually present to our men. To acquire a right point of view we should have to read the German despatches too, and these have not been given us; meanwhile, it is wise to remember that out of nearly sixty British ships in the neighbourhood less than half-a-dozen were hit, and that the battle cruisers and light cruisers, though they used their guns and between them sank three of the enemy, were never really subjected to the strain of a gunnery action at all, because none of the enemy's ships were in a position to hit them. Their difficulties in dodging

submarines are, of course, another matter; but even these do not seem to have been very serious.

For months after the Heligoland fight there was, with the exception of a short action off the Dutch coast, in which four German destroyers were sunk, no action in the North Sea at all. In that short affair, though there was a light cruiser of the *Arctusa* class present, the whole of the work was done by four English destroyers, with very small casualties. But there has been at least one marked invitation to action which was declined by the enemy. This incident was announced officially, and very briefly, at the time, and it came in for little notice. In fact, it appears to have been an attempt on the part of Admiral Jellicoe to invite the Germans to action in their own waters—an invitation which they very markedly declined. "Powerful and numerous squadrons and flotillas," to use the Admiralty's own phrase, swept the North Sea up to and into the Heligoland Bight. As an officer's letter, published in the *Manchester Guardian* shortly afterwards, proved, the English ships got close enough to see the church steeples of one of the chief naval bases of the German fleet. They were observed by a seaplane, but no attempt was made to interfere with their movements, and no German ship came out to accept battle. There could be no clearer evidence of the effect of the action of August 28th on the other side.

Perhaps because it was clear that there was nothing to hope from a general action, the policy of attrition was pursued from the beginning of September onwards with redoubled vigilance and skill. Mines were laid under a neutral flag, not only in the North Sea, but even off the north coast of Ireland; the enemy's submarines watched and manœuvred with great vigilance and determination off the coast of Scotland, and in the track of the patrol squadrons which watched the approaches to Harwich and to Belgian waters from off the south end of the Dogger Bank. In some cases these submarines were nearly certainly supplied with fuel, and possibly even with fresh supplies of torpedoes, by vessels purporting to be engaged in peaceful trade. In the north, where the battle fleets were presumably concentrated, their tactics were countered with success; and though only two were officially claimed as having been sunk up till the end of November, there is not much room for doubt that several more were in fact accounted for. In the southern area we were not so fortunate. But the German use of mines and submarines was so remarkable, and had so many and far-reaching consequences, that it demands treatment in a chapter to itself,

Appendix to Chapter XXIII.

The following despatches, describing the action in the Bight of Heligoland on August 28th, were issued from the Admiralty on October 21st, 1914.

ADMIRAL SIR DAVID BEATTY'S REPORT.

H.M.S. *Lion*, 1st September, 1914.

SIR,—I have the honour to report that on Thursday, 27th August, at 5 a.m., I proceeded with the First Battle Cruiser Squadron and the First Light Cruiser Squadron in company to rendezvous with the Rear-Admiral, *Invincible*.

At 4 a.m., 28th August, the movements of the flotillas commenced, as previously arranged. The Battle Cruiser Squadron and Light Cruiser Squadron supporting the Rear-Admiral—*Invincible*—with the *New Zealand* and four destroyers having joined my flag, the squadron passed through the prearranged rendezvous.

At 8-10 a.m. I received a signal from the Commodore informing me that the flotilla was in action with the enemy. This was presumably in the vicinity of their prearranged rendezvous. From this time until 11 a.m. I remained about the vicinity ready to support as necessary, intercepting various signals which contained no information on which I could act. At 11 a.m. the squadron was attacked by three submarines. The attack was frustrated by rapid manœuvring, and the four destroyers were ordered to attack them.

Shortly after 11 a.m., various signals having been received indicating that the Commodore (T.) and Commodore (S.) were both in need of assistance, I ordered the

Light Cruiser Squadron to support the torpedo flotillas. Later I received a signal from the Commodore (T.) stating that he was being attacked by a large cruiser, and a further signal informing me that he was being hard pressed, and asking for assistance. The Captain (D.) First Flotilla also signalled that he was in need of help.

A CRITICAL SITUATION.

From the foregoing the situation appeared to me critical. The flotillas had advanced only ten miles since 8 a.m., and were only about twenty-five miles from two enemy bases on their flank and rear respectively. Commodore Goodenough had detached two of his light cruisers to

assist some destroyers earlier in the day, and these had not yet rejoined (they rejoined at 2-30 p.m.). As the reports indicated the presence of many enemy ships, one a large cruiser, I considered that his force might not be strong enough to deal with the situation sufficiently rapidly, so at 11-30 a.m. the battle cruisers turned to E.S.E. and worked up to full speed. It was evident that to be of any value the support must be overwhelming, and carried out at the highest speed possible. I had not lost sight of the risk of submarines, and a possible sortie in force from the enemy's base, especially in view of the mist to the south-east. Our high-speed, however, made submarine attack difficult, and the smoothness of the sea made their detection comparatively easy. I considered that we were powerful enough to deal with any sortie except by a battle squadron, which was unlikely to come out in time provided our stroke was sufficiently rapid.

At 12-15 p.m. the *Fearless* and the First Flotilla were sighted, retiring west. At the same time the Light Cruiser Squadron was observed to be engaging an enemy ship ahead. They appeared to have her beat. I then steered N.E. to sounds of firing ahead, and at 12-30 p.m. sighted the *Arethusa* and the Third Flotilla, retiring to the westward, engaging a cruiser of the Kolberg class on our port bow. I steered to cut her off from Heligoland, and at 12-37 p.m. opened fire.

THE "LION" IN ACTION.

At 12-42 the enemy turned to the N.E., and we chased at 27 knots. At 12-56 p.m. we sighted and engaged a two-funnelled cruiser ahead. The *Lion* fired two salvos at her, which took effect, and she disappeared into the mist, burning furiously and in a sinking condition. In view of the mist, and that she was steering at high speed at right angles to the *Lion*, who was herself steaming at twenty-eight knots, the *Lion's* firing was very creditable.

Our destroyers had reported the presence of floating mines to the eastward, and I considered it inadvisable to pursue her. It was also essential that the squadrons should remain concentrated, and I accordingly ordered a withdrawal. The battle cruisers turned north, and circled to port.

To complete the destruction of the vessel first engaged: She was sighted again at 1-25 p.m., steaming S.E., with colours still flying. The *Lion* opened fire with two turrets at 1-35 p.m. After receiving two salvos she sank. The four attached destroyers were sent to pick up survivors, but I deeply regret that they subsequently reported that they searched the area but found none. At 1-40 p.m. the battle cruisers turned to the northward, and the *Queen Mary* was again attacked by a submarine. The attack was avoided by the use of the helm. The *Lowestoft* was also unsuccessfully attacked. The battle cruisers covered the retirement until night-fall by 6 p.m. The retirement having been well executed, and all destroyers accounted for, I altered course, spread the light cruisers, and swept northwards, in accordance with the Commander-in-Chief's orders. At 7-45 p.m. I detached the *Liverpool* to Rosyth, with the German prisoners—seven officers and seventy-nine men, survivors of the *Mainz*. No further incident occurred.

I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient servant,

(Signed) DAVID BEATTY,
Vice-Admiral.

REAR-ADMIRAL CHRISTIAN'S REPORT.

H.M.S. *Euryalus*, 28th September, 1914.
SIR,—I have the honour to report that in accordance with your orders a reconnaissance in force was carried out in the Heligoland Bight on the 28th August, with the object of attacking the enemy's light cruisers and destroyers. The forces under my orders (viz., the Cruiser force under Rear-Admiral H. H. Campbell, C.V.O., the *Euryalus*, the *Amethyst*, the First and Third Destroyer Flotillas, and the submarines) took up the positions assigned to them on the evening of the 27th August, and, in accordance with directions given,

proceeded during the night to approach the Heligoland Bight. The Cruiser force, under Rear-Admiral Campbell, with the *Euryalus* (my flagship) and the *Amethyst*, was stationed to intercept any enemy vessels chased to the westward.

At 4-30 p.m. on the 28th August these cruisers, having proceeded to the eastward, fell in with the *Lurcher* and three other destroyers, and the wounded and prisoners in these vessels were transferred in boats to the *Bacchante* and *Cressy*, which left for the Nore. The *Amethyst* took the *Laurel* in tow, and at 9-30 p.m. the *Hogue* was detached to take the *Arethusa* in tow. This latter is referred to in Commodore R. Y. Tyrwhitt's report, and I quite concur in his remarks as to the skill and rapidity with which this was done in the dark, with no lights permissible.

Commodore Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt was in command of the Destroyer Flotillas, and his report is enclosed herewith. His attack was delivered with great skill and gallantry, and he was most ably seconded by Captain William F. Blunt in the *Fearless* and the officers in command of the destroyers, who handled their vessels in a manner worthy of the best traditions of the British Navy.

Commodore Roger J. B. Keyes in the *Lurcher* had, on the 27th August, escorted some submarines into positions allotted to them in the immediate vicinity of the enemy's coast. On the morning of the 28th August, in company with the *Firedrake*, he searched the area to the southward of the battle cruisers for the enemy's submarines, and subsequently having been detached, was present at the sinking of the German cruiser *Mainz*, when he gallantly proceeded alongside her, and rescued 220 of her crew, many of whom were wounded. Subsequently he escorted the *Laurel* and *Liberty* out of action, and kept them company till Rear-Admiral Campbell's cruisers were sighted.

As regards the submarine officers, I would specially mention the names of—

(a) Lieutenant-Commander Ernest W. Leir. His coolness and resource in rescuing the crews of the *Goshawk's* and *Defender's* boats at a critical time of the action were admirable.

(b) Lieutenant-Commander Cecil P. Talbot. In my opinion the bravery and resource of the officers in command of submarines since the war commenced are worthy of the highest commendation.

I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient servant,

A. H. CHRISTIAN,
Rear-Admiral.

COMMODORE TYRWHITT'S REPORT.

H.M.S. *Lowestoft*, 26th September, 1914.
SIR,—I have the honour to report that at 5 p.m. on Thursday, 27th August, in accordance with orders received from their Lordships, I sailed in the *Arethusa*, in company with the First and Third Flotillas, except the *Hornet*, *Tigress*, *Hydra*, and *Loyal*, to carry out the prearranged operations. H.M.S. *Fearless* joined the flotillas at sea that afternoon. At 6-53 a.m. on Friday, the 28th August, an enemy's destroyer was sighted, and was chased by the fourth division of the Third Flotilla. From 7-20 to 7-57 a.m. the *Arethusa* and the Third Flotilla were engaged with numerous destroyers and torpedo boats, which were making for Heligoland.

The course was altered to port to cut them off. Two cruisers with four and two funnels respectively were sighted on the port bow at 7-57 a.m., the nearest of which was engaged. The *Arethusa* received a heavy fire from both cruisers and several destroyers until 8-15 a.m., when the four-funnelled cruiser transferred her fire to the *Fearless*. Close action was continued with the two-funnelled cruiser on converging courses until 8-25 a.m., when a 6-in. projectile from the *Arethusa* wrecked the forebridge of the enemy, who at once turned away in the direction of Heligoland, which was sighted slightly on the starboard bow at about the same time. All ships were at once ordered to turn to the westward, and shortly afterwards speed was reduced to twenty knots.

GUNS DISABLED.

During this action the *Arethusa* had been hit many times, and was considerably damaged. Only one 6-in. gun remained in action, all other guns and torpedo tubes having been temporarily disabled. Lieut. Eric W. P. Westmacott (signal officer) was killed at my side during this action. I cannot refrain from adding that he carried out his duties calmly and collectedly, and was of the greatest assistance to me. A fire occurred opposite No. 2 gun, port side, caused by a shell exploding some ammunition, resulting in a terrific blaze for a short period, and leaving the deck burning. This was very promptly dealt with, and extinguished by Chief Petty Officer Frederick W. Wrench (O.N. 158,630).

The flotillas were re-formed in divisions, and proceeded at twenty knots. It was now noticed that the *Arethusa's* speed had been reduced. The *Fearless* reported that the Third and Fourth Divisions of the First Flotilla had sunk the German Commodore's destroyer, and that the two boats' crews belonging to the *Defender* had been left behind, as our destroyers had been fired upon by a German cruiser during their act of mercy in saving the survivors of the German destroyer.

At 10 a.m., hearing that the Commodore (S.) in the *Lurcher* and the *Firedrake* were being chased by light cruisers, I proceeded to his assistance with the *Fearless* and the First Flotilla until 10-37 a.m., when, having received no news and being in the vicinity of Heligoland, I ordered the ship's company to turn to the westward. All guns except two 4-in. were again in working order, and the upper deck supply of ammunition was replenished. At 10-55 a.m. a four-funnelled German cruiser was sighted, and opened a very heavy fire. At about eleven o'clock, our position being somewhat critical, I ordered the *Fearless* to attack, and the First Flotilla to attack with torpedoes, which they proceeded to do with great spirit. The cruiser at once turned away, disappeared in the haze, and evaded the attack. About ten minutes later the same cruiser appeared on our starboard quarter. The *Arethusa* opened fire on her with both 6-in. guns. The *Fearless* also engaged her, and one division of destroyers attacked her with torpedoes, without success. The state of affairs and our position was then reported to the Admiral commanding the Battle Cruiser Squadron. We received a very severe and almost accurate fire from this cruiser. Salvo after salvo was falling between ten and thirty yards short, but not a single shell struck. Two torpedoes were also fired at us, being well directed but short. The cruiser was badly damaged by the *Arethusa's* 6-in. guns, and a splendidly directed fire from the *Fearless*, and she shortly afterwards turned away in the direction of Heligoland.

SINKING OF THE "MAINZ."

We proceeded, and four minutes later sighted the three-funnelled cruiser *Mainz*. She endured a heavy fire from the *Arethusa* and the *Fearless*, and many destroyers. After an action of approximately twenty-five minutes she was seen to be sinking by the head. Her engines stopped, besides being on fire. At this moment the Light Cruiser Squadron appeared, and very speedily reduced the *Mainz* to a condition which must have been indescribable. I then recalled the *Fearless* and the destroyers, and ordered cease fire.

We then exchanged broadsides with a large four-funnelled cruiser on the starboard quarter at long range, without visible effect. The Battle Cruiser Squadron now arrived, and I pointed out this cruiser to the Admiral Commanding, and was shortly afterwards informed by him that the cruiser in question had been sunk and another set on fire.

The weather during the day was fine, the sea calm, but visibility poor, not more than three miles at any time when the various actions were taking place, and was such that ranging and spotting were rendered difficult.

I then proceeded with fourteen destroyers of the Third Flotilla and nine of the First

Flotilla. The *Arethusa's* speed was about six knots until 7 p.m., when it was impossible to proceed any further, and fires were drawn in all boilers except two, and assistance called for. At 9-30 p.m. Captain Wilmot S. Nicholson, of the *Hogue*, took the ship in tow in a most seamanlike manner, and observing that the night was pitch dark, and the only lights showing were two small hand-lanterns, I consider his action was one which deserves special notice from their lordships.

PRAISE FOR OFFICERS.

I would also specially recommend Lieutenant-Commander Arthur P. N. Thorowgood, of the *Arethusa*, for the able manner he prepared the ship for being towed in the dark. His Majesty's ship, under my command, was then towed to the Nore, arriving at 5 p.m. on the 29th August. Steam was then available for slow speed, and the ship was able to proceed to Chatham under her own steam.

I beg again to call attention to the services rendered by Captain W. F. Blunt, of H.M.S. *Fearless*, and the Commanding Officers of the destroyers of the First and Third Flotillas, whose gallant attacks on the German cruisers at critical moments undoubtedly saved the *Arethusa* from more severe punishment, and possible capture.

I cannot adequately express my satisfaction and pride at the spirit and ardour of my officers and ship's company, who carried out their orders with the greatest alacrity under the most trying conditions, especially in view of the fact that the ship, newly built, had not been forty-eight hours out of the dockyard before she was in action. It is difficult to specially pick out individuals, but the following came under my special observation:—

H.M.S. "ARETHUSA."

Lieutenant-Commander Arthur P. N. Thorowgood, First Lieutenant, and in charge of the after control;

Lieut.-Commander Ernest K. Arbutnot (G.), in charge of the fore-control;

Sub-Lieutenant Clive A. Robinson, who worked the range-finder throughout the entire action with extraordinary coolness;

Assistant-Paymaster Kenneth E. Badcock, my secretary, who attended me on the bridge throughout the entire action;

Mr. James D. Godfrey, gunner (T.), who was in charge of the torpedo tubes.

THE CREWS.

The following men were specially noted: Armourer Arthur F. Hayes, 342,026 (Ch.), second sick berth steward; George Trolley, 290 (Ch.), chief yeoman of signals; Albert Fox, 194,656 (Po.), on fore bridge during entire action;

Chief Petty Officer Frederick W. Wrench, 158,630 (Ch.), for ready resource in extinguishing fire caused by explosion of cordite;

Private Thomas Millington, R.M.L.I., 17,417;

Private William J. Beirne, R.M.L.I., 13,540;

First Writer Albert W. Stone, 346,080 (Po.).

I also beg to report the services rendered by the following officers and men of His Majesty's ships under my orders:

H.M.S. "FEARLESS."

Mr. Robert M. Taylor, gunner, for coolness in action under heavy fire.

The following officers also displayed great resource and energy in effecting repairs to the *Fearless* after her return to harbour, and they were ably seconded by the whole of their staffs:

Engineer Lieutenant-Commander Charles de F. Messeroy;

Mr. William Morrissey, carpenter.

H.M.S. "GOSHAWK."

Commander the Hon. Herbert Meade, who took his division into action with great coolness and nerve, and was instrumental in sinking the German destroyer V187, and with the boats of his division saved the survivors in a most chivalrous manner.

H.M.S. "FERRET."

Commander Geoffrey Mackworth, who, with his division, most gallantly seconded Commander Meade, of the *Goshawk*.

H.M.S. "LAERTES."

Lieutenant-Commander Malcolm L. Goldsmith, whose ship was seriously damaged, taken in tow and towed out of action by the *Fearless*;

Engineer Lieut.-Commander Alexander Hill, for repairing the steering gear and engines under fire.

Sub-Lieutenant George H. Faulkner, who continued to fight his gun after being wounded;

Mr. Charles Powell, acting boatswain, 209,388, who was gunlayer of the centre gun, which made many hits. He behaved very coolly, and set a good example when getting in tow and clearing away the wreckage after the action.

Edward Naylor, petty officer, torpedo gunner's mate, 189,136, who fired a torpedo which the commanding officer of the *Laertes* reports undoubtedly hit the *Mainz*, and so helped materially to put her out of action;

Stephen Pritchard, stoker petty officer, 285,152, who very gallantly dived into the cabin flat immediately after a shell had exploded there and worked a fire hose;

Frederick Pierce, stoker petty officer, 307,943, who was on watch in the engine room, and behaved with conspicuous coolness and resource when a shell exploded in No. 2 boiler.

H.M.S. "LAUREL."

Commander Frank F. Rose, who most ably commanded his vessel throughout the early part of the action, and after having been wounded in both legs remained on the bridge until 6 p.m., displaying great devotion to duty;

Lieutenant Charles R. Peploe, first lieutenant, who took command after Commander Rose was wounded, and continued the action till its close, bringing his destroyer out in an able and gallant manner under most trying conditions;

Engineer Lieutenant-Commander Edward H. T. Meeson, who behaved with great

coolness during the action, and steamed the ship out of action, although she had been very severely damaged by an explosion of her own lyddite, by which the after-funnel was nearly demolished. He subsequently assisted to carry out repairs to the vessel.

Sam Palmer, leading seaman (G.L. 2), 179,529, who continued to fight his gun until the end of the action, although severely wounded in the leg;

Albert Edmund Sellens, able seaman (L.T.O.), 217,245, who was stationed at the fore torpedo tubes. He remained at his post throughout the entire action, although wounded in the arm, and then rendered first-aid in a very able manner before being attended to himself;

George H. Sturdy, chief stoker, 285,547, and Alfred Britton, stoker petty officer, 280,808, who both showed great coolness in putting out a fire near the centre gun after an explosion had occurred there. Several lyddite shells were lying in the immediate vicinity.

William R. Boiston, engine-room artificer, third class, M 1,369, who showed great ability and coolness in taking charge of the after boiler-room during the action when an explosion blew in the after funnel and a shell carried away pipes and seriously damaged the main steam pipe.

William H. Gorst, stoker petty officer, 305,616, Edward Crane, stoker petty officer, 307,275, Harry Wilfred Hawkes, stoker, first-class, K 12,086, and John W. Bateman, stoker, first-class, K 12,100. These men were stationed in the after boiler-room, and conducted themselves with great coolness during the action when an explosion blew in the after funnel and a shell carried away pipes and seriously damaged the main steam pipe.

H.M.S. "LIBERTY."

The late Lieutenant-Commander Nigel K. W. Barttelot, commanded the *Liberty* with great skill and gallantry throughout the action. He was a most promising and able officer, and I consider his death is a great loss to the navy.

Engineer Lieutenant-Commander Frank A. Butler, who showed much resource in effecting repairs during the action.

Lieut. Henry E. Horan, first lieutenant, who took command after the death of Lieut.-Commander Barttelot, and brought his ship out of action in an extremely able and gallant manner under most trying conditions.

Mr. Harry Morgan, gunner (T.), who carried out his duties with exceptional coolness under fire.

Chief Petty Officer James Samuel Beadle, 172,735, who remained at his post at the wheel for over an hour after being wounded in the kidneys.


John Galvin, stoker petty officer, 279,946, who took entire charge, under the engineer officer, of the party who stopped leaks, and accomplished his task although working up to his chest in water.

H.M.S. "LAFOREY."

Mr. Ernest Roper, chief gunner, who carried out his duties with exceptional coolness under fire.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

R. Y. TYRWHITT, Commodore (T.)



Examining a Torpedo.

[Gale and Polden.]

CHAPTER XXIV.

GERMAN MINES AND SUBMARINES.

THE ADMIRAL SCOTT CONTROVERSY—THE EFFECTS OF SUBMARINES ON NAVAL STRATEGY—BLOCKADE NO LONGER CLOSE—THE SINKING OF THE THREE CRUISERS—COAST RAIDS EASIER—THE GERMAN USE OF MINES—THE CLOSING OF THE NORTH SEA—LORD FISHER AGAIN AT THE ADMIRALTY.

TWO months before the war began, Admiral Sir Percy Scott, a naval officer of great distinction, declared that the day of the gun was over, and that the future of naval power was with the submarine and the aeroplane. He had "a bad press," and the experts were as little in agreement with him as the newspapers; but his argument was perhaps not so novel as it seemed. Ever since the first invention of the torpedo there had been a school of naval thought, particularly strong in France, which held that sooner or later it was sure to make the gun obsolete. The early torpedo boats were fragile, and only fit for harbour defence; but, small as they were, they were not invisible, and armoured ships found quite sufficient protection in quick-firing guns and search-lights. The torpedo could not surprise, and it could only strengthen itself against gunfire and extend its radius of action by increasing its size and so diminishing its chance of being unobserved. Then came the submarine, which gave the torpedo what it most wanted—invisibility. At the same time the torpedo developed rapidly in power, and the submarine increased its size and became a sea-going craft, with a wide radius of action.

All the old arguments of the French school, unjustified

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by the early torpedo, received a posthumous vindication in the modern improved submarine. But they received a further reinforcement in the growing size of the capital gunships. There had long been in the British Navy an undercurrent of criticism of the tendencies in shipbuilding policy which matured in the Dreadnoughts. The tactical idea in building these ships was to obtain the greatest possible intensity of fire at the longest possible range, and in order to give the freedom of manœuvre necessary for this long-range fighting to combine this heavy gun fire with high speed. All this meant inevitably an increase in the size of capital ships. At the very moment, therefore, that the submarine was raising the effectiveness of the torpedo, the increasing size in capital ships was making the rewards of a successful torpedo bigger and bigger. It is easier, rather than more difficult, for a submarine to sink the bigger than the smaller ship.

Admiral Sir Percy Scott's conversion from the gun, for which he had done so much, to the torpedo was not, therefore, so paradoxical or so sudden as it seemed. It was the emergence above the surface of naval ideas which had a very long history, and had been slowly maturing in the progress of mechanical invention. Nor is it necessary to suppose that the official views of the

Admiralty were wholly out of sympathy with his. In November of 1913, Mr. Churchill spoke of the time when the ships of the Dreadnought era would follow the mammoth and the mastodon into extinction. The question raised by Sir Percy Scott was not whether the submarine had superseded the gunship for some purposes—that was far more generally admitted than was commonly supposed—but whether it had, with the help of the aeroplane, superseded it for all purposes, as he contended that it had. A fair general measure of agreement amongst students of naval tactics was expressed by the *Manchester Guardian* in an article on the naval mobilisation at Spithead, which took place just before the Balkan crisis began to threaten danger to European peace. After opining that the time was coming when utility in narrow and inshore waters might settle the prevailing types of ships of war, the article continued :—

"In enclosed waters the case for the submarine is much stronger. Already it seems very doubtful whether battleships will ever take a very active part in blockade. The Japanese used them at Port Arthur, but the blockade was never, until the destruction of the Russian fleet, very close, and in fact it was rather expensive, for two great ships were sunk by mines in the blockade. Had the Russians had an active fleet of submarines within, it is doubtful whether the Japanese battleships would have survived a long blockade. Certainly, battleships will never be used again in maintaining a commercial blockade as distinguished from the siege of a fortified place. Even here, however, the uses of the battleship would seem to be limited. It will probably not risk its valuable sides against modern coast defences. For covering a landing of troops where there are no fixed shore fortifications the battleship will still have uses that can hardly be discharged by any other craft, certainly not by submarines, but that is to reduce the battleship to a mere subsidiary of land operations. Dogmatism on these matters is hardly seemly in laymen, but there seems strong reason for thinking that for the purposes of coast defence and for most inshore operations the submarine will very soon have a decided advantage over the battleship, and we are inclined to agree with the opinion expressed by Lieutenant Dewar in the course of the recent controversy that, though Dreadnoughts will not be driven off the ocean, they may be driven out to it."

CLOSE BLOCKADE NO LONGER POSSIBLE.

The stronger naval Power naturally tends to be somewhat conservative in its views of naval policy, and the weaker power to look to newer weapons to repair its inferiority in the older and established types. The German hopes of success in the war of attrition, by which they hoped to wear down our naval superiority, were fixed on the submarine. Our own Admiralty, as has been seen, had not neglected the uses of the submarine, but the Germans possessed many advantages. In the first place, it was not necessary for their ships to keep the sea. They surrendered the whole of their sea-borne trade, and made no attempt to keep open their com-

munications with foreign countries. Except for occasional raids, they had no craft at all in the North Sea except submarines. In the second place, whereas our ports for the most part lie open to the sea, theirs lie some distance up rivers with tortuous channels, and difficult of navigation. Further, their coast line on the North Sea is not only very short, but has the further protection of chains of islands with shallow seas between them and the mainland, and passages between them easily commanded by fortifications. These were ideal bases for submarine attack, and the worst possible places to attack by submarine.

The changes in the character of naval war from that to which former wars had accustomed us

were more or less directly attributable to the submarine. The first change was that no such thing as a close blockade of German coasts was possible, or even attempted, by our navy. There was a blockade, but it was conducted from the two ends of the North Sea. The widest exit was at the north end, and here, therefore, the bulk of our fighting fleet was concentrated. As the seas narrowed to the Straits of Dover our task became easier, for here the blockade could be kept by submarines and small craft, and the advantages of narrow, confined waters, elsewhere on the side of Germany, favoured us. The experience of



[Gale and Polden.]

Taking a submarine mine out of stores.



A British submarine running on the surface of the water.

[L.N.A.]

our Dutch wars had taught us that the chief danger of evasion lay at the north end, and Germany had the great advantage of two sally doors, one by the north of Denmark—in the same latitude as Aberdeen—and the other by the Kiel Canal, in the latitude of Hull. Owing to the necessity of closing the northern passage out of the North Sea, our main fleet had to lie well to the north of the waters between the main German bases at Wilhelmshaven and Emden. Between the main fleet in the north and the narrow waters to the south there was thus a wide area which was patrolled by us, but from which our main fleet was absent. These patrols invited attack, and the Germans were not slow to use their opportunities.

THE SINKING OF THE CRESSY.

On September 22nd occurred the most serious naval disaster that we had yet suffered in the war. In the early morning, the *Cressy*, the *Aboukir*, and *Hogue* were on patrol duty off the coast of Holland. They were large armoured cruisers, of 12,000 tons, fourteen years old, and becoming obsolescent, but still capable of useful service, and carrying each of them a crew of 750 men. They were not attended by their destroyers, which, it is to be presumed, had gone off for relief and had not been replaced. Between 6-15 and 6-30 the *Aboukir*, which was nearest the coast, was struck by a torpedo. No submarine had then been seen, but soon afterwards one was sighted to port, which, on the view taken in the diagram of the direction in which the cruisers were steering, would be the seaward side of the *Cressy*. After the *Aboukir* was struck, and was seen

to be in danger of sinking, her two companions closed up, the *Hogue* ahead, the *Cressy* astern on the seaward side. The *Cressy* launched her boats to save the men from the *Aboukir*, which began to sink almost immediately, and, as the cutters full of rescued men were returning to the *Cressy*, the *Hogue* was struck by two torpedoes, both on her starboard, that is, her landward side. Almost immediately afterwards, a periscope was seen on the seaward side of the *Cressy*. It seems unlikely that a single submarine, after discharging two torpedoes on the landward side of the *Hogue*, could have been seen "almost immediately afterwards" 300 yards on the seaward side of the *Cressy*, and the probability is that there were two submarines engaged. Fire was immediately opened from the *Cressy* on the submarine that was seen, and the men on deck believed that she was sunk. If a submarine was sunk, however, it was not the one that did the damage, for all the successful torpedoes seem to have come from the landward side, where "another periscope" was seen very soon afterwards. The *Cressy* by this time was rendering assistance to the men of the *Hogue* and the *Aboukir*. It was about 7-15, forty minutes after the *Aboukir* had been struck, and the *Cressy* must have been quite stationary. Finding a good target presented, the submarine that had just been sighted, which was the one that had already sent the *Aboukir* to the bottom—she sank about seven o'clock—and had mortally wounded the *Hogue*, launched a torpedo at the *Cressy*. The torpedo was fired at a range of 500-600 yards, and its track was plainly visible from the *Cressy*'s deck, clear sign that she had no weigh on her. The torpedo struck the *Cressy*.



H.M.S. Aboukir.

[Symonds and Co., Portsmouth (S. and G.).



H.M.S. Hogue.

[Symonds and Co., Portsmouth (S. and G.).

A second was launched very soon afterwards, but missed her, and passed over the place where the *Aboukir* had sunk, passing astern of the *Cressy*; but at 7-20 another torpedo—the sixth that is known to have been fired in the action—hit her, and she began to heel over, and finally sank at 7-55, an hour and a half after the *Aboukir* was struck.

The lives of sixty officers and 1,400 men were lost in this sad affair. The rest of the crews were rescued by a Lowestoft trawler and two Dutch ships which were near, and are said to have behaved with great kindness, as indeed they might, for some of the men were rescued from drowning for the second time in a couple of hours. At least one man was rescued three times, first from the *Aboukir*, then from the *Hogue*, and then from the *Cressy*. The men who were rescued by the Dutch ships were taken to Holland, but afterwards released, on the ground that they could not have been captured by the enemy, and were, therefore, not captured but shipwrecked men.

The disaster made a great impression in England, especially when it appeared that all three ships had been sunk by one submarine; but it did not bear all the inferences that were drawn from it of the dangerousness of the submarine. The cruisers, as has already been noted, were without destroyers, and were, therefore, particularly exposed to submarine attack. But it is further quite clear from the accounts that the disaster would have been much less serious than it was if, when the first ship was struck, the other two had not stood by to rescue the crew. In doing so, they deprived themselves of the movement which is the best protection against submarine attack; and though the instinct which led the *Hogue* and the *Cressy* to act as they did was honourably humane, the Admiralty regarded it as an error of judgment, though a pardonable one. It issued instructions "for the future guidance of His Majesty's ships that the conditions which prevail when one vessel of a squadron is injured in a mine field or is exposed to submarine attack are analogous to those which occur in an action, and that the rule of leaving disabled ships to their own resources is applicable. So far, at any rate, as large vessels are concerned, no act of humanity, whether to friend or foe, should lead to the neglect of the proper precautions and dispositions of war, and no measures can be taken to save life which prejudice the military situation. Small craft of all kinds should, however, be directed by wireless to close with the damaged ship with all speed."


COAST RAIDS BECOME EASIER.

Another result of the distant blockade which was forced on us by the submarine was that our coasts were not immune from raids. There was no question now of sealing the enemy's fleet up in his harbours. He had always a certain amount of open water before him, and under favourable conditions—and his submarines were

able to tell him from time to time when the conditions were favourable—he was able to sally forth from his naval bases and reach the East Coast of England without encountering a superior naval force on the way, or even being observed.

The first of these raids was on November 2nd, when three German cruisers, which had left Wilhelmshaven late in the previous evening, appeared early in the morning, and after sinking a small coast-guard gunboat, the *Halcyon*, attempted to shell Yarmouth. Their shells, however, fell short of the town, and no damage was done, and when our cruisers gathered the Germans beat a precipitate retreat. The rearmost German cruiser threw out mines in her retirement, and a British submarine, *D 5*, which was pursuing, struck one of them and sank. One of the raiding cruisers, said to have been the *Yorck*, fouled one of her own mines on entering Jathe Bay and was lost, with half her crew. The raid was, therefore, a somewhat costly one to the Germans. More serious was the second raid, on December 16th. At least three battle cruisers took part in it, and again they appeared off the English coast at breakfast time. Scarborough, which was an undefended town, and ought, therefore, by the rules of war, to which


Germany had herself subscribed, to have been immune from bombardment, was shelled for half an hour, property was destroyed, and there was some loss of life. Whitby, too, was bombarded, but the town which suffered worst was Hartlepool. An account of the raid will be found on a later page (Chapter XXXVI.); it is mentioned here merely as one of the effects of the



The sinking of the three cruisers.

submarine, which, by making a close blockade of the enemy's ports by our warships impossible, exposed parts of our East Coast to a danger from which it had been popularly supposed that they were immune.

But the blockade, though distant, was none the less effective. Unsuccessful attempts were made by the German submarines to use their torpedoes among the Grand Fleet; but though the story of these attempts has not yet been told, it is probable that they were not made without loss to the attack. The only success of the submarines in the northern waters of the North Sea was the attack on the *Theseus* and the *Hawke* on October 15th. The torpedoes missed the *Theseus*, an armoured cruiser of 7,350 tons, but the *Hawke* was struck and sank very rapidly, with nearly all her crew. At the other end of the North Sea, in the Straits of Dover, the cruiser *Hermes* was torpedoed, on October 31st, as she was returning from Dunkirk, but nearly all her crew was saved. On November 11th, the *Niger* was torpedoed in the Downs. These losses, though regrettable, were, after all, only incidents in a blockade which was successfully maintained. Nor were the losses from submarines all on our side. In the middle of September a small German cruiser, the *Hela*, was sunk by a British submarine off



A Torpedo Tube and the torpedo ready for insertion.

[Record Press.]



H.M.S. Niger.

[L.N.A.]

Heligoland, and on October 24th a German submarine was credibly reported as having been rammed by the *Badger*.

THE MINES OFF IRELAND.

The mine is an unpropelled torpedo, sometimes anchored, sometimes loose (as in the case of the mines discharged by the German cruiser after the raid on Yarmouth). The action of the Germans in sowing mines in the North Sea has already (page 71) been described, and there is reason to believe that they made an improper use of the neutral flag in the execution of their designs. Unfortunately, the minelaying was not confined to the North Sea, or to belligerent waters. In the last week of October a large German minelayer was discovered off the north coast of Ireland. On October 28th, the *Manchester Commerce*, a merchantman, was sunk in this field, and shortly afterwards the great White Star liner *Olympic*, crowded with passengers from the United States, escaped destruction in the same field by the merest good luck. The British Navy was also reported in American papers to have sustained a serious loss from the same cause, though the facts are still obscure. It was necessary to take strong measures. Prince Louis of Battenberg had just retired from the post of First Sea Lord, not because of any disagreement in policy or for any lack of confidence in his professional ability, but because popular sentiment was against the employment, in perhaps the most responsible of all the offices under the Crown, of anyone, however distinguished, who had a German name. Lord Fisher, an ex-First Lord, and a man of great originality and vigour of mind, succeeded him. On November 2nd the Admiralty announced, in consequence of the German mine-laying policy, its intention to convert the whole of the North Sea into a closed military area.

"During the last week the Germans have scattered mines indiscriminately in the open sea on the main trade route from America to Liverpool via the North of Ireland. Peaceful merchant ships have already been blown up, with loss of life, by this agency. The White Star liner *Olympic* escaped disaster by pure good luck. But for the warnings given by British cruisers, other British and neutral merchant and passenger vessels would have been destroyed. These mines cannot have been laid by any German ship of war. They have been laid by some merchant vessel flying a neutral flag, which has come along the trade route as if for the purposes of peaceful commerce, and, while profiting to the full by the immunity enjoyed by

neutral merchant ships, has wantonly and recklessly endangered the lives of all who travel on the sea, regardless of whether they are friend or foe, civilian or military in character.


"Mine-laying under a neutral flag and reconnaissance conducted by trawlers, hospital ships, and neutral vessels are the ordinary features of German naval warfare. In these circumstances, having regard to the great interests entrusted to the British navy, to the safety of peaceful commerce on the high seas, and to the maintenance within the limits of international law of trade between neutral countries, the Admiralty feel it necessary to adopt exceptional measures appropriate to the novel conditions under which this war is being waged."

The hand of Lord Fisher is clearly visible in the new policy, though there is no reason to think that it would not have commanded the assent of his predecessor under

the same circumstances. It was denounced by the German press as an interference with the rights of neutral shipping. In fact, it laid down the only conditions on which neutral shipping could avoid the risk of destruction from mines. The only right recognised by the German policy was the right of being sunk if they chose to take certain risks which the Germans did their best to conceal. The new British policy drew a line from the northern point of the Hebrides, through the Faroe Islands, to Iceland, and announced that it was our intention to sow this area with mines, and that all ships who crossed the line would do so at their peril. At the same time, it created a minefield between Ostend and Dover, leaving a channel alongside the English Coast through which neutral ships were invited to come, and promised that if they did they would be given sailing instructions which would take them up the English Coast free from all danger from British mines.

The changes made by mines and submarines in our naval policy and tactics were very great, and, if they

did not justify all that Admiral Sir Percy Scott had said in his controversy on the effects of the submarine and aeroplane on naval warfare, they certainly confuted the theories and prophecies of his hostile critics. Some of these changes were in our favour, for mines and submarines undoubtedly made it easier to hold the Straits of Dover than it would otherwise have been. Others were against us, for they made it impossible to maintain a close blockade of German harbours, and so exposed patrolling squadrons in the middle reaches of the North Sea to attack and our East Coast to raids. Yet other changes told against neutrals, for we had ourselves to fall back on the use of mines, not only in the south, but in the north,



[Gale and Polden.]

Exploding a submarine mine.

and to prohibit access to the North Sea except through one narrow channel.

This was a regrettable necessity forced upon us by the action of the Germans; but though it inflicted inconvenience on neutrals, it was the only course open to us,

and the inconvenience was far less serious to neutral shipping than the risk of destruction to which the surreptitious and in some cases almost treacherous sowing of mines on the high-roads of commerce, far from the scene of naval hostilities, had exposed it.



[*Sport and General.*

A floating mine washed up on the East Coast.



Mustering a South African Commando.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER XXV.

THE WAR IN AFRICA.

THE ATTACK ON GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA—THE TREACHERY OF MARITZ—REVOLT IN THE FREE STATE AND TRANSVAAL—BOTHAS AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF—DEATH OF BEYERS AND CAPTURE OF DE WET—FRONTIER FIGHTING IN EAST AFRICA—A DISASTROUS EXPEDITION—OPERATIONS IN TOGOLAND AND KAMERUN.

THE extension of the war to the African Continent raised at once issues far wider than the simple one of the supremacy of the Triple Entente or the Triple Alliance. Would the dominion and prestige of the white man over the black—maintained in many parts against odds of a thousand to one and more—survive a contest between the chief races that had parcelled out among them the lands and allegiance of the tribesmen; or would any attempt to alter the map of Africa by force add to a European war the horror of a native upheaval? Would the Union of South Africa, based on the newly-welded friendship of Boer and Briton, stand the greatest strain to which it could be put, or would the loyalty of the Dutch South African turn to apathy or worse when the need came to fight the people that had shown him most sympathy in his struggle of fifteen years before? Had German preparedness for war been extended in full to her colonies; and even if it had, how would a military genius that relied on numbers and heavy artillery acquit itself in the warfare of little battles where numbers meant little and resource and veldt craft everything—where blockhouses stood for Liéges and Namurs, and the capture of a water-hole might count as much as the crossing of the Marne? These were the main

questions raised by the operations in Africa, and the answers to most of them emerged in the first few months of the war.

The operations fall naturally into three divisions, according as they took place in the South, East, or West of the Continent. The first of these divisions includes both the attack on German South-West Africa and the rebellion in the Union. The grouping of these is not a mere geographical convenience, for General Botha's decision to comply with the request of the home Government by using the Union Defence Force for operations against German South-West Africa was a prime cause of discontent in the Union, and the adhesion of the traitor Maritz to the German cause delayed the attack on the German colony until the Union should be cleared of what were virtually German forces.

We have already (Chapter IX.) seen what was the situation in South Africa immediately after the outbreak of war. The Imperial Government had, at the suggestion of the Union Government, withdrawn the British garrison of some 6,000 men from the dominion. General Botha had asked his Government for *carte blanche* in taking offensive measures against the neighbouring German colony and obtained it, but had failed to reconcile a powerful minority,

who thought the Union need not, and should not, take aggressive measures. General Beyers resigned his post as Chief of the Union Defence Force nominally on this issue, and he was known to have the sympathy of the narrow Dutch nationalism represented by Generals Hertzog, De Wet, and Delarey. The violent death of General Delarey, who, on September 16th, was shot by a sentry while motoring with General Beyers, because he either did not or would not stop his car when challenged, contributed to the growing bitterness. The question whether German or British forces took the first step in the frontier fighting—which would ordinarily have been an academic one, and was in fact robbed of its importance by the discovery later that Germany had made preparations for aiding rebellion in the Union that would in any case have demanded the most vigorous reprisals possible—was hotly debated at the beginning, because the dissentients in the Union held that the aggressive use of the Defence Force was rendered the less justifiable by the absence of any German designs on South Africa. In Parliament, on September 11th, General Botha was able to counter this criticism with the news that not only were considerable German forces arrayed on the Union frontier before Union mobilisation had taken place, but there had been more than one affair of outposts caused by small German forces crossing the frontier, and even entrenching themselves.

GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA.

The problem of making an effective attack on German South-West Africa would have been a difficult one for the Union even if internal troubles had not complicated it. The colony, which was founded by a Bremen merchant, Luderitz, who established a factory at the port now called after him, in the course of the scramble for Africa—which took an acute phase after the formation of the German Colonial Society in 1882—grew to have an area of 326,000 square miles, or about three times that of the United Kingdom.

Mainly a pastoral country, it had been made the subject of experiments in cotton, tobacco, vine, and silk growing successful enough to refute the old South African belief that it was a profitless place to colonise. Diamond mines of moderate value had been discovered near Luderitz Bay, and other mineral wealth awaited development. Most of the eastern part of the colony has the semi-desert character of British Bechuanaland, from which it is separated by an artificial frontier; and the southern part, which is divided from Cape Colony by the Orange River, is arid and sparsely populated. In the thousand or so miles of coast line on the west, broken only by the little British possession, Walfish Bay, Luderitz Bay was the one considerable port, though a second was in course of


construction at Swakopmund. To the north lay Portuguese West Africa.

The Colony, then, could be attacked on the east only by long marching through desert country both before and after crossing the frontier, and from the west only by a landing at Walfish Bay or Luderitz Bay. Difficulties of attack from the south were increased by the fact that whereas the administrative centre of the German colony at Windhoek was connected almost with the Orange River by a railway, which made the transport of troops to that frontier a simple matter, the railways in Union territory, running as they do north-east from Cape Town, leave isolated a vast tract of barren country abutting on the German colony with a scattered population of natives, half-castes, and low-grade whites, and presenting military difficulties whose gravity was well shown in the South African war. Thus, while Union troops marching on the German colony must traverse some hundreds of miles of very hard country, German raids into British territory could


be made from a rail-head base not far distant. There was, however, one alternative line of advance for Union troops from the south. From Port Nolloth, on the extreme north-west coast of the Union, a small, isolated railway runs inland to the copper mining country that lies just south of the Orange River. From one of the stations on it, Steinkop, a track, sixty miles long, leads to Ramans Drift, on the Orange River, and thence to the southern terminus of the railway system in German South-West Africa. Transport to Port Nolloth, rail to Steinkop, and a march *via* Ramans Drift, was therefore a means of advance which the Union must keep open.

The German colony had made warlike preparations on a scale much more elaborate than her neighbours had thought necessary to meet ordinary contingencies. In

official publications the colony admitted to a police and military force of some 3,500 men, enrolled from a European population of 14,000 and a native population of 80,000. This was not excessive, but a very different account of her military resources was given by those who visited her before the outbreak of war. A correspondent of the *Cape Times* put her armed strength at 10,000 well-equipped mounted infantry and artillery, a camel corps of 500, and sixty six-gun batteries of machine guns. Thirty-two of these were concentrated at Keetmanshoop, in the south of the colony—an easy stage from the Orange River frontier. The country offered many natural defensive positions, and these were occupied by blockhouses defended by artillery. The communications throughout the colony had been brought to a high state of efficiency, and provision had been made for arming the considerable number of Boer farmers in the southern territory on whose sympathy Germany counted.



General Louis Botha. [Russell and Sons.]



THE WANDERINGS OF DE WET.



THE FRONTIERS OF GERMAN AND BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA.

FRONTIER FIGHTING.

Operations began with the rushing by German forces of the Union police posts on the frontier. By a series of surprise attacks, made usually at daybreak by vastly superior forces, the Germans succeeded in gaining possession of the posts along the twentieth degree of longitude, which on the east marks the frontier between the two colonies. At one of these, Nakob, just north of where the Orange River and the twentieth degree join, 250 Germans, with two maxims, met with considerable resistance from the little body of eight police, of whom three escaped, three were taken prisoner, one killed, and one was wounded. Rietfontein, on the border further north, was also occupied, and for some weeks the Upington kopjes north of Nakob were held by the enemy. These movements proved to be rather a safeguard against observance by our outposts of German preparations than the preliminaries of an invasion, for by the end of September the Union police had returned to some of their posts, which they found abandoned by the enemy, with the water-holes undamaged.

Meanwhile, a considerable German force had occupied Ramans Drift with the intention of entrenching themselves there and commanding the Steinkop-Warmbad road. Colonel Dawson, with the Fourth South African Rifles, marched the sixty miles from Steinkop to the Drift, through country choked with sand and parched by a fierce sun, in two days, and at the expense of only two casualties surprised and dislodged the enemy. An interesting feature of the relative positions of the German and British possessions in South West Africa was the menace to Rhodesia of the German territory known as the Caprivi strip. This thin neck of land, jutting from the north-east corner of the German colony far into Rhodesia, was obtained by the German Chancellor Caprivi to give access to the Zambesi River. (See Map, page 235.) It meets the Zambesi not far from the great Victoria Falls and the British settlement of Livingstone, where the river is crossed by a bridge, 420 feet high and 650 feet long, that carries the railway from Bulawayo northwards. The safeguarding of this vitally important link fell to the Rhodesian police, and they were able not only to secure it against raids, but in September to occupy the German post of Shuckmannsberg in the Caprivi strip, and arrange for the temporary administration of the German territory. A success of even more importance was scored on September 18th, when a Union

force occupied Luderitz Bay without meeting resistance, and hoisted the Union Jack on the Town Hall. The German garrison retreated after blowing up the railway line of which the port is the western terminus. The Union now commanded two good positions from which German South-West Africa could be attacked; and but for the emergence of grave trouble in South Africa itself, the attack would doubtless have been pressed without delay.

THE REBELLION OF MARITZ.

Ever since the resignation of General Beyers it had been clear that the forces operating in the north-western district of the Cape, of which Upington is the chief centre, were not normal. In particular, suspicion was aroused by the publication of the list of casualties in a border

action which occurred at Sandfontein, south of Warmbad, on September 26th, and which resulted in sixteen men being killed, forty-three wounded, and 192 "captured." No account of the action accompanied these casualties, and when an account was published it did not satisfactorily explain them. A force of South African Mounted Rifles and Transvaal Horse Artillery had pushed forward through a defile to gain a water-hole. The saucer-like depression in which the well lay was discovered to be commanded from every point of the compass by German artillery. The force held out from day-break till noon under a continuous fire, to which they could make little effective reply, and then, finding their retreat barred and no sign of relief, the survivors surrendered. The officer in command of the force was officially exonerated from all blame for the disaster, and the circumstances that made it possible remained for some days a mystery. On October 14th, however, it was announced that Lieutenant-Colonel S. G.




A typical veldt road.

Maritz, who had been entrusted with the command of the forces in the north-west of the Cape Province, had insolently disregarded an order from headquarters to report himself, had held prisoner Major Ben Bower, who was sent to relieve him of his command, and had then sent him back with an ultimatum to the Union Government that unless he was allowed within three days to meet Generals Hertzog, De Wet, Beyers, Kemp, and Muller, "to receive instructions from them," he would forthwith make an attack on the forces of Major Bower's superior officer, Colonel Conrad Britz. Major Bower reported that Maritz had German guns and a force of Germans under him, as well as his own rebel commando, that he held the rank of General commanding the German troops, and that he had

arrested all of his men who were unwilling to join the Germans and sent them as prisoners to German South-West Africa. Maritz had shown him many helio messages and telegrams from the German commander, dating back to the beginning of September, and an agreement which he had signed with the Governor of German South-West Africa guaranteeing the independence of the Union as a republic, with the Orange River as its boundary; ceding Wal-fish Bay to Germany; and undertaking that Germany would not object to the Union seizing the important Portuguese harbour of Delagoa Bay (which would give the Transvaal an outlet to the sea), and would not invade the Union except at the request of Maritz.

The adventurer who staked everything on this wild stroke of treason came of an old Transvaal stock. He had fought cleverly under General Smuts in the South African war, when he headed a rebellion in the Kenhart district. General Smuts was so impressed by his skill in keeping resistance alive in the north-west of the Cape at that time that he promoted him from corporal to colonel. He had served the Germans in their war against the Herrero natives in Damaraland, had tried cattle dealing in Holland, and finally applied for a commission in the police of South Africa. His unique knowledge of the troublesome north-west country made him valuable, and procured him in time the command which he now so grossly abused. His skill in guerilla warfare was not coupled with foresight or judgment. He had fallen an easy victim to German promises, which a wiser man might have seen were incapable of fulfilment, and he miscalculated the effect his treason would have on the mass of Dutch South Africans, who, though they might have little stomach for what they considered a needless war of aggression, had less for such shameless treachery. His demand to be allowed to consult five of his prominent compatriots must not be taken as

meaning that all or any of these were in league with him. The motives that led some of them to rebel soon afterwards were of a wider and—if distinction in treachery is possible—a less discreditable sort.



General De Wet. [Russell and Sons.]



General Beyers. [Topical War Service.]

When he declared for Germany, early in October, Maritz was in command of a mixed force of rebels and Germans under a thousand strong, and had a considerable store of German rifles, ammunition, and guns, in addition to what he had stolen from the Union. He had his base near Upington, on the Orange River, in the heart of the troublesome and difficult country he knew so well. When his force had increased to well over two thousand he divided it—the one part remaining in the Upington district, while the other moved quickly southwards, up the Great Fish River, hoping to gather recruits as it went, and perhaps to make good, by a march via Kenhart and Calvinia on the Fish River, Maritz's boast to Major Bower that he would "overrun the Cape." Maritz himself remained in the north. From October 16th onwards, Colonel Britz, with the Imperial Light Horse and Enslin's Horse (the latter composed of Dutch burghers from the Transvaal), gave the enemy round Upington no rest. Several parties of rebels were cut off and captured; several others, who had been forcibly detained by Maritz, surrendered voluntarily, and in some cases offered for active service for the Union. At day-break on October 22nd, Maritz, with a force of about 1,000, including a German contingent with machine guns, attacked Keimoes, a day's march south-west of Upington. The garrison of 150 held out pluckily till reinforcements came later in the day, and Maritz moved west again down the Orange River to Kakamas, twenty miles nearer the German frontier. Colonel Britz pursued him hotly, and

dislodged him with such violence that he left all his tents standing and abandoned a large quantity of stores and



One of the loyal commandoes "trucking horses" at a South African railway station. [Photopress.]



A baggage convoy on the trek across the veldt.

[Photopress.]

ammunition. In this engagement Maritz himself was wounded, and many of his men deserted. He withdrew to Scruit Drift, on the frontier, where he found German support, but on October 30th was again routed by Colonel Britz. Meanwhile, the force which had moved south had penetrated almost to Calvinia, in the middle west of the Cape Province, a distance of over 200 miles. It was engaged on October 25th by a force under Colonel van der Venter, and lost ninety men and two maxim guns. Three days later, pursued northwards to Onderstepoort, midway between Calvinia and Kenhardt, it was again defeated, losing 124 men. This southern body was now as badly broken as the northern, and the rebellion was virtually ended.

THE RISING IN THE TRANSVAAL AND THE FREE STATE.

Meanwhile, interest had shifted to the north of the Free State and the west of the Transvaal. In the former, General Christian De Wet had great influence; in the latter, the word of General Delarey had been law while he lived, and his friend, General Beyers, had now assumed his mantle. Beyers, in the letter which he addressed to General Smuts resigning his command of the Defence Force, had already made it clear that he thought South African participation in the war needless and vain, since the fate of the German colony must in any case be decided on the battlefields of Europe, and the Union might conquer it at great sacrifice only to see it handed back to Germany if the war went against the Entente Powers. He had, however, declared that he did not wish to stir up civil strife, and could be depended on to "shed his blood to the last drop for his country if she were attacked." Had the Union been asked to do no more than send a volunteer force to Europe and use its Defence Force only for defence, it is more than likely that Beyers would not have rebelled. As it was, his attitude of compromise was an impossible one to maintain, and the only problem was in which way it would harden. The critical weeks of September found him much in the company of De Wet, addressing meetings up and down the country, sometimes from the motor car in which General Delarey was shot. Older, harder, narrower, and more implacable than Beyers, De Wet had proved a disturbing factor in Union politics ever since, fourteen years before, he made a name for himself as one of the greatest guerilla leaders of all time. He was a Boer of the old type, for whom the grant of self-government had not allayed fierce resentment at defeat, and the Peace at Vereeniging was little more than a necessary makeshift, and whose nature was complicated by a strain of religious fanaticism. The spirit of revolt was, moreover, fanned by the exhortations of a religious monomaniac named Van Rensburg, who had a reputation as a prophet among the more primitive of the Transvaal Dutch, and who predicted that Beyers and De Wet would be the instruments of Heaven in bringing about a restoration of the old republics. It became increasingly clear that the menace could not be dealt with by peaceful means, but the Government held its hand till the last possible moment—until, indeed, De Wet had actually raised some commandoes in the Free State, held up a troop train at Reitz on October 27th, and arrested the Government officials at Heilbron, just off the main line from Bloemfontein to Pretoria.

GENERAL BOTHA AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

The future will rate very highly the services of General Botha to South Africa and to the Empire at this time.

He was now in his fifty-second year, and had been Premier of the Union from its formation in 1909. Those years had not been free from blunders. Among them was the deportation of ten Labour leaders under martial law in the great strike of 1912, and the rescinding of the deportation order shortly after war broke out was a wise and tactful step. But in his five years of leadership he had struck a balance between the aims of South African nationalism and the demands of the imperial tie which rallied round him the majority of South Africans, British and Dutch. The best evidence of his success was the dwindling in those years of the original official Opposition party of mainly British composition. The racial line of division in South African politics had almost disappeared, and in its place was emerging the saner and healthier, though not less sharp, demarcation between the representatives of employment and of the employed. Labour had become a political force, and the problem of the future seemed to be whether a considerable portion of the South African Party which General Botha led would, or would not, develop a Liberalism that would bring it in touch with the aims of Labour. The position was, however, oddly complicated by the fact that the ardent backveldt Dutch Nationalists, who, temperamentally, had nothing in common with Labour, but who were the bitterest opponents of General Botha for what they considered his betrayal of Dutch interests to the mineowners and "imperialists," saw in the rise of Labour a possible means of undermining the policy of compromise which they so much detested. Of these, General Hertzog was the most enlightened and reasonable spokesman, and General De Wet the most implacable and dangerous. On the outbreak of war the Labour Party, though many of its members shared the regret of its leader, Mr. Cresswell, that South African help had not been confined to an expeditionary force, rallied to the Government. Mr. Cresswell was given a Commission in the Defence Force. The implacables were thus isolated, and the only question was on how much Dutch support, passive or active, they could count.

Three things contributed to reducing that support to its minimum. General Hertzog, though bitterly critical of the Government's policy, refused to aid Beyers and De Wet in their preparations for armed resistance, and even pleaded with them personally to keep the peace. Again, the revolt of Maritz, besides disgusting the mass of the Dutch people, created what was *de facto* a German invasion of the Cape. Lastly, General Botha's decision, announced on September 23rd, to take supreme command of all the forces in the field, coupled with the stimulating speeches he made up and down the country, rallied all save the most extreme sections to him—many of the most enthusiastic promises of support and messages of encouragement coming from Hertzogite supporters and journals.

General Botha placed himself at once at the head of a force, which, besides the regiments of the compulsorily-raised Union Defence Force, included several strong Dutch commandoes organised on the old burgher lines. Many of the Dutch felt the indignity of the rebellion even more than the British, and though now called upon to fight against men of their own race, perhaps of their own family, came forward in a spirit which showed that they considered the stain could best be wiped off the Dutch name by Dutchmen. The call for men was sent from house to house in the old way, much as the fiery cross used to be in the Highlands of Scotland, and commandants, field cornets, and burghers who had fought under General Botha in the Boer war readily came forward to take their places besides the

mixed Dutch and British regiments of the regular Defence Force.

Botha determined to deal first with Beyers, and to crush his force before it could effect a union with the rebels in the Free State. He therefore entrained immediately to Rustenburg, in the Western Transvaal, just north of Beyers's headquarters. He came quickly in contact with the rebel commandoes and put them to flight south of Rustenburg, pursuing them vigorously. Within a week of going to the front he was able to report that Beyers's commandoes had scattered in all directions and were not likely to unite again.

Meanwhile, in the Free State, the Government had been endeavouring to avoid bloodshed, despite open acts of rebellion by De Wet and his followers, who had entered townships and commandeered horses, rifles, ammunition, and stores; smashed the telegraphs, sjamboked hesitating farmers and storekeepers, and in general endeavoured to bring the business operations of the Northern Free State to a standstill. In one of these raids, on Vrede, on October 28th, the petty, bigoted, and bitter spirit that animated the leader was revealed in a vivid flash. He had the magistrate of Vrede dragged before him, and delivered a harangue on the evils of rule by the "pestilential English," and the "ungodly policy" of General Botha. "King Edward," he said, "promised to protect us, but he failed to do so, and allowed a magistrate to be put over us." But his chief point was that this particular magistrate had fined him five shillings for sjamboking a native, a fact of which he now furiously reminded him. To De Wet that seemed the apotheosis of British statesmanship, and cause enough for putting South Africa through the sufferings of civil war. From many of his former comrades, such as General Smuts, his speech provoked the scornful comment that this was a "five-shilling rebellion." Against this spirit peaceful overtures could do little, but the Government, realising that it was not characteristic of many who might be forced or gulled into aiding De Wet, wisely proclaimed that all rebellious burghers who laid down their arms before November 21st should be left in peace. Many took advantage of this, including two of De Wet's sons.

DE WET STILL ELUSIVE.

After his activities at Heilbron and Vrede, De Wet moved southward, keeping to the east of the main line from Bloemfontein to Pretoria. On October 26th part of his force, under Commandant Wessels, looted Harrismith, near the Natal border and on the main line connecting the Free State with Natal. The rebels damaged the railway and pillaged the shops, but did not attempt to hold the town. De Wet then made his headquarters in the triangle of

country enclosed by the railways connecting Kroonstadt, Bloemfontein, and Bethlehem. He defeated a loyal commando near Winburg, which is in the centre of this district, on November 6th, losing one of his sons, Daniel, in the action. On the 8th, rebel forces of some strength, which had been collecting with a view to attacking Kroonstadt, were dispersed by Colonel Manie Botha. On the 13th, General Botha, having sufficiently broken the forces of Beyers to deal with De Wet, came on the latter, after a forced night march, at Marquard, twenty-four miles east of Winburg. The rebels were engaged over a long front and completely routed. It is probable that De Wet himself would have been captured had not the orders that would have brought forces under Colonel Britz and General Lukin into action gone astray. De Wet then gave an exhibition of the elusive tactics of which he was a master. Moving quickly south-west, east, and finally north, he made a bold bid on November 16th to command the main line of railway north of Virginia, fifty miles south of Kroonstadt. The

forces under General Botha were busy in blocking a minor rebel movement further south, but De Wet was engaged by commandoes sent by train from Kroonstadt. With the aid of two armoured trains they were able to prevent a portion of De Wet's force from crossing the railway and making westward to join the remains of Beyers's men, whose flight southwards had brought them into the Hoopstad region of the Free State. This junction was prevented by a smart attack on Beyers's force, now numbering only about a thousand, on November 15th, near Bultfontein. The enemy were defeated over a seven mile front, and headed off in a rapid chase in a north-easterly direction. De Wet, fleeing westward up the Vet River and hotly pursued,

divided his force near Boshof, and himself made for the Transvaal with twenty-five men.

The circumstances of his ultimate capture were symbolic of the change that had come over methods of warfare, even in the veldt, since his peculiar genius found full play fourteen years before. A saddle, a bridle, a rifle, and a horse could no longer complete the equipment even of the most skilful guerilla fighter. There was the motor car to be reckoned with. De Wet slipped across the Vaal River with his handful of men on the night of November 21st. He was pursued by motor, but managed to join a small commando, chiefly composed of rebels who had escaped from the west of the Free State, that had been secretly forming in the district. With this force he started westward again, passing eighteen miles north of Vryburg on November 25th. From Vryburg the chase was taken up by a motor brigade, under Commandant Britz, and continued relentlessly through heavy, sandy, undulating country, thickly covered by thornbush. On the way



A Native Village in German East Africa.

Britz captured fifty-three of De Wet's men without firing a shot. The following of De Wet's spoor through such country was a notable achievement for the motor, and it played out De Wet's horses by forcing him to make one stretch of fifty miles without unsaddling. The actual capture was made by mounted troops at Waterburg, about one hundred miles due west of Mafeking, where De Wet was run to earth in a farm, with fifty-two rebels. Taken by surprise, he made little attempt to escape, and the whole of his men were made prisoners without a shot being fired. Two days later a Johannesburg crowd hooted De Wet as he drove through the streets, under guard, to the fort, and the greatest menace to the internal peace of South Africa was removed.

THE DEATH OF BEYERS.

Meanwhile, General Botha had effected a great "round-up" of the remaining Free State rebels, who had made extensive preparations for a fight at Reitz. As many as 550 were captured on the first few days of December without any casualties in the Government forces. The same policy of extensive surrounding movements accounted a few days later for Beyers. He had crossed the Vaal River into the Free State with a small force, and was pursued by a commando which was guarding the Transvaal bank. Finding himself hard pressed on the Free State side, he attempted to recross. The river was in flood, and in mid-stream he fell from his horse. When his body was got later on, he was found to have been drowned unwounded. Most of the sixty men who accompanied him were shot, drowned, or captured.

The heart was now quite gone from the rebels. Of the five leaders on whom Maritz counted when he lit the fire of revolt on October 9th, Hertzog had kept the peace, Beyers was dead, De Wet was captured, Kemp had joined the Germans with Maritz himself, and Muller, who had been skirmishing and looting north of Pretoria, was wounded and a prisoner. The final collapse came on December 10th, when the only remaining leaders of note, Wessels and the two Serfonteins, surrendered in the Free State with 1,200 men, the only large body of rebels still in being. In six weeks of swift pursuit and masterly enveloping, Botha had secured the surrender of some 7,000 rebels, with a total Union casualty list of 334, including 78 killed. He was now able to give his attention to renewing the attack on German South-West Africa.

THE OPERATIONS IN EAST AFRICA.

In East Africa the vastness of the lands involved, and the smallness of the forces available to either Power, made effective occupation of territory in the European sense impossible. A railway terminus might be seized, a port on one of the great lakes occupied, or a frontier fort stormed, but in its essence this was to be a prolonged "affair of outposts" on a big scale. All of the few hundreds of Europeans scattered about the East African colonies could not be called up, for enough must be left at their posts to safeguard white dominion over the teeming native races, many of incalculable temper. "It is not the Germans whom we have to protect ourselves against," wrote an Englishwoman living near Nairobi, in September. "There is a fear that the natives, who up to the present have always been very quiet and docile, may take it into their heads to rise, and it is against this preparations are being made. We have concentration camps in different parts of the country, which, at the first sign of any trouble from the natives, we shall all

make for." The fighting, therefore, had to be done by native troops officered by whites, and by such small bodies of white volunteers as could be spared. It was fighting, too, with a curious personal quality rare in the battles of masses in Europe. If the rebellion in South Africa set cousin against cousin, and sometimes father against son, here, on the Anglo German frontiers, men accustomed to foregather at the club and gossip over a "peg" after a hard week's farming, confronted each other through the loopholes of many a frontier post. "The only thing I remember of the fight" wrote an English settler of one border foray, "is that one of their men shot W——. He was lying behind a tuft of short grass, and shot W—— at a loophole. I was at the next loophole, and he was only 250 yards away. He knew he'd got W——, and he deliberately stood up and waved his hand. . . . I shot him . . . clean through the head. I felt rather sick about it afterwards. . . . He was quite a good sort." When it is remembered that these operations were carried out on frontiers hundreds of miles long, by a few thousand native troops and a few hundred white men, in the wildest and most difficult country, and in equatorial heat, it is possible to get some notion of the distinctive character of East African fighting.

IMPORTANCE OF THE LAKES AND RAILWAYS.

German East Africa has an area of about 384,000 square miles. The sea bounds it entirely on the east, with a 620 mile coast line. To the north lie British East Africa and Uganda; on the west, Lake Tanganyika. On the south Rhodesia runs up to meet it, the extreme north of Nyasaland touches it, and Lake Nyasa and Portuguese East Africa complete the frontier. The chief trade of the colony found an outlet at the port of Dar-es-Salam, on the East coast, whence the railway—designed to cross Africa, in time, from sea to sea—runs inland through the heart of the colony to Tabora, one of the stations on the projected Cape to Cairo railway. Over the island of Zanzibar, which lies off its eastern coast, and from whose Sultans both Britain and Germany had leased the lands that founded their colonies, Britain had established a protectorate. Between the German and British colonies on the north, and shared almost equally by them both, lie the waters of Victoria Nyanza, one of the greatest of the African lakes, and an important source of trade communication, with an active fleet of small British and German steamers, and many prosperous little ports on its shores. The shipping and ports on Victoria Nyanza presented the readiest points of attack for either side; the seaport of Dar-es-Salam was clearly an important British objective; and since the railway in British East Africa—which is usually known as the Uganda Railway, though it does not go so far as Uganda, but which links the chief harbour, Mombasa, with the capital, Nairobi, and with Port Florence on Victoria Nyanza—runs parallel with the German frontier, a little north of it, it was clearly worth while for German forces to push northwards.

At the outbreak of war, Germany had a native force officered by whites estimated by an East African observer at 5,000 men, and was able to enrol another 2,000 whites. She also set about arming and drilling more natives, with a haste and recklessness which British missionaries, who knew the native temper and ideas of warfare, considered dangerous. Britain had a battalion of the King's African Rifles, which are native troops, in British East Africa, another in Uganda, some 3,000 native police between the two colonies, and several small bodies



[Exclusive News Agency.
The Victoria Falls : a view of the Gorge and Falls from the north bank.

of white volunteers. These forces, greatly outnumbered on the southern frontier of British East Africa, had a hard time in the early stages of the operations, until the arrival of Indian reinforcements.

Fighting began with an attack, on August 10th, by a British cruiser on the German port, Dar-es-Salam. A German surveying ship and the floating dock there were sunk, and the important wireless station destroyed. The Germans abandoned the port.

NYASALAND ATTACKED.

Two days later, one of the three vessels of the Marine Transport Department of the Nyasaland Protectorate surprised the armed German steamer, Von Wissman, on the eastern shore of Lake Nyasa, and captured and dismantled her. It was September before Germany attempted an effective reprisal in Nyasaland. In the early days of that month, German troops crossed the northern frontier of the colony, and, evading a British force sent to intercept them on September 9th, attacked Karongwa, one of the chief trading ports of the colony on the north of Lake Nyasa. The port was defended only by an officer with fifty African riflemen and native police, and eight civilians. It succeeded, however, in holding out against an enemy numbering some 400 until relieved by a stronger


column, which pursued the Germans northwards towards the frontier. Germany lost more than half of the white officers attached to her force, and the force itself was checked and broken up with a completeness that saved Nyasaland from further attack for some time.

Further to the east of its southern frontier, the German colony pushed a force into the extreme north-east of Rhodesia, and attacked Abercorn, one of the chief settlements in Northern Rhodesia, just south of Lake Tanganyika. A force of the Rhodesian police, natives officered by whites, opposed the enemy, and after silencing a field gun which they possessed by Maxim fire, compelled them to abandon

their position, and, by a forced night march, drove them over the border on September 10th.

The southerly raids from the German colony had, therefore, effected little. Operating northwards, they were able to give us more trouble. A small German force took up in August a strong position near the British post of Taveta, just over the border of British East Africa, at the point where the Uganda Railway and the border are nearest. From this base a force was pushed forward early

in September to try to blow up the railway at Maungu. It was broken up before it could do any damage, and its dynamite and outfit were captured. On September 6th, however, a strong force of the enemy attacked Tsavo, a station on the railway a little further inland than Maungu. It was well equipped with maxim guns, and was opposed by King's African Rifles, assisted by Indian troops. It failed in its object of occupying the railway, but inflicted heavy losses on us, especially on the 29th Punjabi regiment, which had reinforced the Colonial troops, and which made a gallant attempt to rush the maxim guns with a bayonet charge. Thereafter the British force in the Tsavo district remained on the defensive for some weeks, and successfully repelled several attacks on its positions. The officer in command paid high tribute to the conduct of his native




To illustrate the fighting in East Africa.

troops at this time, and said that their example had had the important effect of greatly reassuring the Masai natives of the district.

Meanwhile, at the western end of the border, a German force of some 400 occupied Kisii, a settlement which lies just east of Victoria Nyanza. A small British column which met them was compelled to retire, but the enemy did not consider his position tenable, and retreated to Karungu, on the eastern shores of Lake Victoria. Forces from the settlements of Port Florence and Kisumu, further north on the lake, were at once despatched to dislodge him, but on arrival found Karungu abandoned. A German



[Topical Press.
Troops of the South African Defence Force marching into the Castle at Capetown after mobilisation.




A Detachment of the King's African Rifles on parade at Mombasa.

attempt on the western coast of Lake Victoria fared no better. Throughout October and November these frontier raids continued, notably at Gazi, on the coast, where an enemy force of 500 made a determined attack, but were driven back to the frontier; and in the Tsavo district, where the attack on the railway was more than once renewed without success.

A DISASTROUS EXPEDITION.

Two attempts to carry the war into the enemy's country were made, one of which cost us dear. On November 4th we had so far obtained mastery in the fighting round Tsavo that we were able to push across the boundary to Longido, where the Germans held a strong post. An action lasting for a whole day was fought, in which the Punjabis again distinguished themselves by taking three of the enemy's positions in succession. Shortage of water compelled our retirement for a time, but in the face of a second advance the enemy evacuated the post, which was occupied by our force. On November 4th the most serious of our reverses occurred. Misled by the information that, as the guarded official account put it, "an important German railway terminus" was weakly held, an expedition was sent to occupy it. The force was described as "landing" and afterwards "re-embarking," and the terminus in question was doubtless the port of Tanga, in the north-eastern corner of the German colony, whence a railway, designed to link Germany's Lake Victoria ports with the sea, runs inland, roughly parallel with the border, for over 200 miles. In this attack a battalion and a half of mixed British and Indian troops was used, including men of the 101st Grenadiers, the North Lancashire Regiment, and the Kashmir Rifles. The strength in which the town was held had been greatly under-estimated, and when the force had survived a heavy fire on its left flank, and pushed forward with great gallantry into the town itself, where it crossed bayonets with the enemy, it was met with so devastating a fire from the houses that it could not complete the attack, and was compelled to return to its base by sea. The casualties in this action were 745, including 141 British officers and men.

The upshot, therefore, of the first few months' fighting in East Africa was that all British possessions abutting on German East Africa had repelled the raids from that colony, and had succeeded in keeping their ports and railways intact, while two raids, one successful and one disastrous, had been made on German soil. Our casualties had been heavy. Lord Crewe, in the House of Lords, on November 18th, put them at about 900, and explained them by the fact that "the initial position of the Germans was a stronger one than ours." This superior strength was mainly in artillery, and many of the brief accounts of East African actions, especially in the Tsavo district, made mention of the number of maxim guns possessed by German forces. The arrival of Indian reinforcements in time redressed this inequality, and by the end of November the position at all points seemed satisfactory.



[Exclusive News Agency.
Railway bridge over the Zambesi at Livingstone, Rhodesia.


THE WEST AFRICAN FIGHTING.

In the operations against Germany's other two African colonies, Togoland and Kamerun on the west, British and French naval and land forces co-operated with excellent results. Togoland, lying between the British colony of the Gold Coast and French Dahomey, has a coast line of only about thirty-two miles, on which its chief settlement, Lome, lies. Inland, it widens to three or four times that breadth, and its total area is 33,000 square miles. To push inwards from the sea, subduing the country as they advanced, was

clearly the policy for the Allies, and that policy was immediately begun. A British cruiser secured the surrender of Lome in August without opposition. In doing so, it captured one of the largest wireless-telegraphy stations in the world, for it was with Togoland that, after years of costly experiment, the Telefunken Company established connection from near Berlin, a distance of over 3,000 miles. From there, regular communication was to have been made with German East and South-West Africa. A French force operating from Dahomey, in conjunction with the British naval force, made the subjugation of Togoland secure, and by the 11th of November the Board of Trade were able to state that, in the opinion of the Governor of the Gold Coast and of the Commander of the Forces in Togoland, there



The Harbour at Tanga, German East Africa.



The mail boat leaving the landing stage at Port Florence, on Victoria Nyanza.



An engine taking in fuel from a woodstack on the Uganda Railway.

was no reason why British traders should not extend their operations to that colony.


FRANCE AND KAMERUN.

Operations against Kamerun were attended with much more difficulty, though here again the co-operation of British and French forces was of great value. Kamerun, lying between British Nigeria and the French Congo, has an area of nearly 200,000 square miles, a population of about two and a half millions, including some two thousand white men of military age, and over three thousand native troops, officered by whites. The French attack on the colony was given special point by the fact that the south-eastern extremity of it, which almost severs the French Congo from the French Sudan, had been extorted from France by Germany with the Agadir threat of three years before.

Had the policy followed in Togoland of an advance from the sea been adopted solely in Kamerun, it is probable that the allied arms would have been consistently successful. The first attacks on Kamerun were, however, made from Nigeria, and failed. On August 25th, a detachment of the West African Frontier Force, carrying out a reconnaissance from Yola, in Nigeria, pushed forward to Tepe in Kamerun, and, overcoming the resistance offered there, proceeded to Garua, where it captured the fort. On August 30th, it was very heavily counter-attacked, and forced to retreat to British territory, having suffered considerably. No better fortune attended two other columns that crossed the frontier further south, from Ikom and from Calabar; and the policy of attack

from this side was wisely abandoned until a diversion from the coast should make it more practicable.

Meanwhile, H.M.S. *Cumberland* and *Dwarf* had reconnoitred the mouth of the Kamerun River, and the approaches to Duala, the chief port of the colony, and, at the end of September, a concerted attack was made on the coast of the colony by a French force from Libreville, in the French Congo, and the British warships. On September 27th, Duala and Bonaberi, the important settlements close together at the mouth of the river, surrendered unconditionally after a bombardment. Victoria, further north, the other important harbour of the colony, and the outlet for the administrative capital, Buea, which lies just inland from it, was seized by a force of Royal Marines after bombardment by a French cruiser and the Nigerian Government yacht. With the coast from Victoria to Duala as a base, the Anglo-French forces now advanced inland in a fan-like formation in pursuit of an enemy who had been enabled, by two railways and a river valley, to retreat in three different directions. Buea, at the end of the westernmost stay of the fan, was occupied on November 15th; Majuka, some fifty miles north of Bonaberi, on the railway, had already fallen; Jabassi, straight inland from Bonaberi up the Wuri River, was taken by an allied naval and military force on October 8th; and Edea, an important station on the line that runs southward from Duala, fell to a French force on October 26th. The Allies now held the chief ports and railway termini, together with the hinterland within a fifty miles radius of the Kamerun River, and had gained them at small sacrifice. It remained to be seen how far the fan of their advance could be extended.



The scene of the fighting in West Africa.



The part played by motor transports in the retreat from Antwerp: Cars attached to the Belgian Army and the British Naval Brigade drawn up on the outskirts of the city.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Another view of the British motor transports halted on the retreat from Antwerp.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Watching the bombardment of Antwerp from an armoured car.

[Photopress.]

CHAPTER XXVI.

MOTOR VEHICLES IN THE WAR.

THE FIRST WAR IN WHICH THE MOTOR WAS EXTENSIVELY USED—THE SYSTEM OF SUBVENTIONS AT HOME AND ABROAD—MOTOR SUPPLY COLUMNS—AMBULANCES—THE ARMoured MOTOR.

THE extensive employment of motor vehicles in this war very materially affected its tactics and strategy. Some use was made of motor lorries and tractors in the South African war, and results were sufficiently satisfactory to direct the attention of military authorities throughout Europe towards the rapid development of the motor industry. Mechanical Transport Companies were formed at Aldershot and elsewhere, and it was at first expected that the five-ton steam tractor would prove to be the most serviceable type of machine for military work. The special features in favour of the tractor are its ability to detach itself from its load, and to haul either itself or its trailing vehicles singly out of any difficult position by means of a wire rope gear. The utility of the steam tractor, or, in fact, of any steam-driven vehicle, is circumscribed by its dependence on ample and frequent renewals of fuel and water supplies. In view of this, efforts have been made to encourage the production of reliable internal combustion tractors. The progress of this type of machine has, however, been slow compared with that of the self-contained motor lorry, which can travel with safety at higher speeds, and is a more compact vehicle.


The Governments of the various countries in which motors began to be used extensively for commercial purposes quickly realised that the best way of putting themselves into possession of adequate fleets for mechanical transport

was not any system of direct purchase of tractors or other vehicles in quantity, but rather the adoption of some scheme tending to direct the ordinary civilian demand for heavy motors into suitable channels, and so to make large numbers of lorries available to be requisitioned in emergency. It was clear that ordinary commercial developments might diverge further and further from military requirements, in view of which it became necessary to offer artificial inducements to purchasers of vehicles suitable for army work. Subvention or subsidy schemes were started almost simultaneously in France and Germany. The former decided to encourage principally lorries designed to carry three-ton loads, while the latter preferred to stimulate the demand for larger machines, capable of carrying about four tons, and drawing an additional two tons in a rubber-tired trailer. Probably the French will have proved to have been the wiser as regards the broad principle, since the difficulty of operating motor vehicles over broken roads and across loose and muddy ground and light temporary bridges is, to some degree, proportionate to their size.

Both in France and in Germany traders proved somewhat reluctant to adopt motor transport, and the inducement offered had to be considerable. The French subsidy scheme provided for a payment in respect of each vehicle of a total sum of about £300, spread over a period of three years. German conditions, both as regards the road



The remains of a German motor convoy which was completely destroyed by the French guns. [Topical Press.]



A collection of damaged motors captured from the Germans in France. [Topical Press.]

system and trade, necessitated even larger payments, amounting in the aggregate to about £450, over a period of five years, for each lorry of the approved type. In Great Britain conditions were very different. Traders were adopting motor vans and lorries very freely, and the country was still, when war broke out, the only one in which the available supply of industrial motors was in excess of the military requirement. Consequently, it was not necessary to pay so high a subsidy, and only about £120, spread over three years, was offered. At the same time, the scheme was far more strict than the others as regards the design of the machines enrolled. It served, in fact, to create new types of three-ton lorries, and, to a limited extent, also of lighter vehicles, suitable for carrying about thirty hundredweights. Traders were not quick to adopt the British subvention models, and at the beginning of the war the number available cannot have been more than a few hundred, including all those owned by the War Department. There were, however, available in ample quantities plenty of excellent machines of about the same carrying capacity, but generally fitted with rather smaller wheels, and differing from the approved types in certain minor respects.

Austria was late in putting a subsidy scheme into force; and in spite of a substantial payment of about £360 per car, it is safe to say that the fleet available at the outbreak of war was still far short of requirements. In Russia, the bad quality of the roads and their comparative infrequency has been sufficient in itself to discourage the commercial use of motors which, in any case, would not yet have been justified by trade conditions. Consequently, the Government had to depend on direct purchase in foreign markets. At least 500 lorries were purchased from Germany between the beginning of 1913 and August, 1914. A fair number were obtained from Great Britain, and since the beginning of the war huge contracts have been placed by the Russian Government with British manufacturers. Probably, large fleets would only have been of very limited use in Russia during the first few months of the operations had they been available, but our Allies have looked ahead. It is said that just before leaving Petrograd, the Austrian military attaché expressed surprise at the number of motors which had even then been requisitioned, or purchased, on the ground that they could not be used on Russian roads. The reply in effect was that that was not the purpose for which they had been brought together, and that the roads of Austria and Germany were of quite satisfactory quality.

During its first five years of operation, ending March, 1913, the German subvention scheme produced 625 army motor trains, while about 400 somewhat similar machines were in use in the country. At the outbreak of war, the number of lorries of approved type available in Germany was probably in the neighbourhood of 1,500 to 1,600, and there were, of course, other industrial vehicles to the number of probably about 5,000.

OMNIBUSES AT THE FRONT.

Among the steps taken in common by all the belligerent powers at the commencement of the war were provisions to prevent the export of motor vehicles or their fuel. In France, Russia, Germany, and Austria, probably almost every fit motor vehicle of ordinary type was commandeered. In Great Britain, such a wholesale proceeding was not necessary. Many thousand cars and lorries were, however, promptly requisitioned. The majority were exported from Avonmouth after undergoing a brief inspection, in the course of which a certain number

were refused as unsuitable. Even so, our transport was at first of mixed quality. It included large numbers of admirable cars, and large numbers also of second-hand vehicles which had seen their best days, or had been subjected to rough handling by inexperienced drivers. These fleets were put under the control of men equally hastily collected, and not by any means in every case competent for the work. Together with the transport lorries and staff cars, a large fleet of motor omnibuses, principally taken from London, was sent out. The majority of these have been used mainly for the rapid carriage of men from point to point, but some were converted into lorries and ambulances, and others have been carrying food and other supplies in their original double-decked bodies.

On the whole, 'bus drivers have proved very satisfactory members of the Mechanical Transport Corps, even though the bulk of them are not possessed of that mechanical knowledge which is requisite to effect emergency repairs upon the road.

After the first demand had been met, steps were taken to increase and renew the fleet of transport lorries by the purchase of adequate numbers of new three-ton vehicles of a limited number of accredited makes. Contracts were placed with these manufacturers for the supply of a pre-arranged number of lorries every week, and the result must undoubtedly be that the efficiency of the British supply and transport columns is steadily increasing. While on active service the vehicles are divided into convoys, and it is evidently very much better, when possible, to arrange that all the units of any one convoy shall be of the same make and type, so that the speed of all the cars shall be about the same, and the convoy shall be able to keep together both on hills and on the level. Another advantage of dividing the fleet up in this way is that it reduces very much the quantity of spare parts which have to be carried in support of each convoy.

In France, every sound industrial motor vehicle of suitable capacity was promptly requisitioned, and various motor works were put under military control, with a view to maintaining a subsequent supply. Within a few hours, Paris was entirely denuded of its fleet of upwards of 1,000 motor omnibuses. These vehicles had been designed partly with an eye to possible military use. They are all of the single-deck variety, and the chassis are very strongly and somewhat heavily built. A very little work suffices to turn the Paris omnibus into a useful lorry for the carriage of meat, or alternatively into a capacious ambulance. It is for the former purpose that most of the cars are, in fact, being used, and in this capacity they are giving excellent service, and have shown themselves peculiarly reliable. The French 'bus driver has in his composition a touch of recklessness, which helped to fit him well for his work. It is equally certain that every suitable heavy motor in Germany and Austria has been commandeered, while Russia, as already stated, has had to depend principally on new fleets ordered from Great Britain, large consignments of which were shipped through to Archangel before winter traffic to that port became impossible.

In the early stages of the war there was a serious shortage of motor ambulances, but hundreds—perhaps thousands—of motorists willingly presented their cars to the Red Cross Societies and Ambulance Associations, by whom funds were collected to equip these vehicles with ambulance bodies. The demand on the British Red Cross Society alone must have been in the neighbourhood of 1,000 vehicles, the majority of which are suited to take four stretchers each, though a certain number of smaller



A: convoy of British Red Cross motors drawn up at a French base.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Wounded British troops in a London 'bus which had been converted into a motor ambulance.

[Alfieri Picture Service.]



The interior of a motor ambulance.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

two-stretcher cars have gone out, together with a few waggonettes and other capacious vehicles suitable for carrying men who need not travel in stretchers. In some instances the body design of the ambulances provides for some special means of suspending stretchers through the medium of springs, and so insulating the patients from part of the vibration which passes the car springs. In introducing spring suspension it has been found that great care has to be taken to secure that the stretchers shall not be capable of any rolling or swinging motion relative to the ambulance body while the car is travelling. Difficulties in this respect, and the possibilities of breakages in any unnecessary mechanism, have led to the more usual adoption of a very simple body, in which the stretchers are run in along shelves and securely strapped in position. The bodies themselves consist of sufficiently stout wooden frames covered by waterproof canvas. In very many cases the ambulances are being driven on active service by the motorists who supplied the chassis, and who also gave their own services as volunteers. The work is not without its dangers, for the cars are not infrequently required to run right up to the trenches, and the enemy has not on all occasions shown much respect for the Red Cross.

MOTOR SUPPLY TRANSPORT.

The general system under which the bulk of the ambulances operate will be better understood when a brief description has been given of the system by means of which the motor has revolutionised the transport and supply columns, increased the mobility of huge armies, and, for the first time, enabled large bodies of men in the field to be provided regularly and punctually with fresh meat and bread. The new system has perhaps been worked out to greater perfection in connection with the British army than in the case of any of the other forces engaged. Any description must, of course, refer only to the main scheme, and not to every individual instance, since wide variations are entailed by special circumstances. In general, however, the arrangements which apply not only to the provision of food, but to the bringing forward of ammunition and other warlike stores, are as follows:—

At some safe point along the railways to the rear of the army is the base where supplies are collected, and from which they are forwarded every day up the line to a point known as "railhead"; that is to say, the military terminus for the time being. Railhead is moved in accordance with the movements of the troops, but even when, as in the present instance, fine systems of strategic railways are available, it is not always possible to bring supplies up by rail to the near vicinity of the fighting front. The old scheme for the further transfer of supplies forward from railhead was the provision of a number of *échelons* of horsed waggons. One *échelon* followed a little way behind the troops, and the others completed the chain to railhead at intervals, which would allow of each *échelon* getting into touch once during the day with the one in front of it, and also with the one behind it. In this way, supplies were gradually pushed forward in sections, and if an army was advancing rapidly, or railhead was at a considerable distance from the front, many days elapsed between the time when the supplies left the base and the time when they arrived at the front. A whole series of horsed *échelons* is now replaced by a single column of motor lorries, which, by their speed and carrying capacity, are able to bring the whole of the supplies through direct in one journey to a movable point close behind the troops, called a "refilling point." Here, the goods

are handed over to horsed vehicles for detail distribution, motors not being used systematically further forward, owing to the fact that it cannot safely be assumed that roads will be available on which they can travel. Under this system, animals may perhaps be brought into the slaughter house at the base on Monday evening and the food supplies forwarded the same night by train to railhead. Here they are met in the small hours of Tuesday morning by the motor column, which is then loaded, and goes forward to hand over its supplies to the horsed vehicles at refilling point on Tuesday evening, after which it returns for next day's load. On Tuesday night, the horsed vehicles deliver the food to the travelling kitchens, in which it is cooked during Wednesday's march, providing a hot meal for the men on Wednesday evening. Not only is the delay involved in bringing food forward reduced to a minimum by the use of motors, but the main roads behind the armies are cleared of long and obstructive columns of slow-moving horsed vehicles. The rapidity of a forward movement is not impeded by the necessity of waiting for food supplies, and a retreat is not rendered unnecessarily dangerous by congestion along the main arteries. Without motors the rapid advance of Von Kluck's army in the direction of Paris in the early stages of the war would probably have been impossible, and it is equally probable that without motors the masterly retreat so successfully carried out by the British would have terminated in disaster. Nor, as has been already pointed out, would De Wet have been caught so soon.

The system of dealing with ammunition and warlike supplies is much the same, except that more strict precautions have to be taken to prevent waggons carrying large stores of explosives from coming within range of artillery fire. On occasions, no doubt, any or all of the machines may be required to work right up to the trenches or firing line, but this is certainly no part of the main system.

MOTOR AMBULANCES.

Turning back to the question of ambulance services, it will be seen that the transport motor has made armies more independent of the near support of railways. Consequently, the distances over which wounded men may have to be carried by road are correspondingly increased. In theory, motor ambulances connect the hospitals situated at railhead and along the line in the direction of the base with the dressing stations close behind the scene of action. The pressure on these latter has to be relieved rapidly and regularly to enable them to take in the fresh cases which, according to the main scheme, are brought from the advance dressing stations by military ambulance waggons. The general idea is that wounded men are first carried by regimental stretcher bearers to an aid post, where prompt medical attention can be received, and thence by the bearer sections of the field ambulance to the advance dressing stations. In practice, it is not uncommon for the motor ambulances to work right up to the aid posts, or even to the firing line.

At the beginning of the war, the inevitable effect of the full use of transport motors on the requirement for motor ambulances would seem not to have been fully realised. At any rate, the demand upon the resources of the British Red Cross Society and kindred organisations came somewhat suddenly, and was of unexpected dimensions. Motorists proved very generous in lending or giving their cars and their services, and the public response to an appeal for funds to keep the fleets so formed in being was quick and generous. The difficulties of



Motor cyclist despatch riders attached to the Expeditionary Force awaiting instructions.

[Central News.]



Serving out petrol to the German transport service at a supply depot established at Bruges.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

providing sufficient motor ambulances for the use of the French army have been greater than those experienced with our own, and there is a strong likelihood of the supply of motors and skilled drivers running short, and of Great Britain being called upon to render the assistance which, fortunately, it is in her power to give. It is equally certain that the motor ambulance services of the hostile armies will prove more and more inadequate as time goes on.

One of the surprises of the war has been the very extensive use of the armoured motor car. In this respect, it must be admitted that Germany showed the most foresight. Considerable attention had been given in advance to the construction of motors designed to carry machine guns, and guns specially designed for meeting aeroplane attacks. Krupp's had also equipped heavy motors for the carriage of field artillery. Heavy artillery must, of course, be drawn, and not carried. For this work the British army have used steam lorries and tractors, and it is reported that Germany has employed British-built traction engines for hauling her huge siege guns. The French have for some time past been experimenting in a special type of motor tractor for the haulage of heavy artillery. In this type, the whole weight of the machine is utilised by providing a positive drive from the engine to all four wheels instead of to the rear wheels only.

Reverting to the armoured car, we find that Germany was certainly in possession of a considerable number of these when hostilities opened. The Belgians very promptly followed suit. Ordinary touring cars were hastily protected by steel plates, and in some cases equipped with light machine guns. Next to nothing had been done in this direction in Great Britain prior to the war, and very little in France, but the armoured car is, fortunately, a machine which can be improvised with fair efficiency. Some of those employed in our own service, as, for example, by the Naval Brigade at Antwerp and in the Ostend district, have been London motor omnibus chassis with light steel plate bodies, and similar protection for the driver and the most vulnerable parts of the mechanism.

For high speed work, as, for example, scouting in advance of cavalry, and for supporting the operations of members of the Aero Corps, touring car chassis on pneumatic tyres have been similarly armoured. As a rule, the improvised armoured car cannot provide such complete protection as the vehicle specially constructed for this work. In the latter case, one or two machine guns are generally mounted on a revolving turret centrally situated a little forward of the rear wheels. In some cases, two turrets are provided side by side, supported, together with the gun mountings, on an aluminium or light steel base. Very complete protection has to be provided for the engines generally, and particularly for the radiators. Usually, every precaution is taken to guard against breakdown. For example, two quite separate systems of

ignition are provided, and two separate systems through which the petrol is supplied to the engine. The petrol tank must, of course, be very thoroughly protected. Provision can usually be conveniently made to the rear of the vehicle for the carriage of ammunition. Pneumatic tyres are, of course, open to objections, and sometimes one or other of the types of tyre which are a compromise between the pneumatic and the solid is preferred. For scouting work, and in conjunction with aeroplanes, the armoured cars have been proving themselves invaluable.

Even the lightest type of motor—the motor cycle—has borne its share in the war. Excellent work has been done by motor-cycling scouts and despatch carriers, while motor cyclists who are skilled mechanics accompany the transport columns to help in the event of breakdown, to keep the column together, and to assist in finding the way. The motor car in its normal form is extensively used by Staff Officers, from the Commander-in-Chief downwards. It has, in fact, become an essential, on account of the enormous length of front of the armies in the field.

Generally speaking, the use of the motor vehicle of one kind or another has had such great effects as to revolutionise the art of warfare. Movements of troops and supplies are daily being carried out which without motor transport would be impossible. Information as to the movements of hostile forces is, by the motor and the aeroplane, gathered with such accuracy as to minimise any risk of surprise on a large scale. It is doubtful how far without motors the long siege battles of the war would have been possible. Probably, one or other of the fighting lines would have been broken after a short time as the result of an unknown concentration of opposing forces. Probably, also, many positions would have proved untenable for a long period, owing to the impossibility of supplying the men who occupied them with food and ammunition. It may be a doubtful question whether, in such respects, the motor is proving itself a blessing or a curse, but as to its enormous utility there can be no two opinions, and the mere fact that we have it in our power to maintain the motor services of our own troops and those of our Allies must, as time goes on, give us an enormous advantage over an enemy less favourably situated. Coupled with this consideration is the fact that, thanks to our navy, our supplies of motor fuel are in no imminent risk of running short, whereas Germany must be experiencing increasing difficulty in maintaining her stock of petrol, especially while the supply from the Austrian oil fields in Galicia is cut off as the result of Russian occupation. This is the only supply of any importance possessed by any of the three hostile countries, and the possibility of bringing in the fuel which is now so necessary for operations, both on land and sea, depends almost entirely on the uncertain results of a skilfully organised system of smuggling through neutral countries.

Appendix to Chapter XXIV.

REPORT BY COMMANDER BERTRAM W. L. NICHOLSON, R.N., LATE OF H.M.S. CRESSY.

SIR,—I have the honour to submit the following report in connection with the sinking of H.M.S. *Cressy*, in company with H.M.S. *Aboukir* and *Hogue*, on the morning of the 22nd September, whilst on patrol duty.

The *Aboukir* was struck at about 6-25 a.m. on the starboard beam. The *Hogue* and *Cressy* closed and took up position, the *Hogue* ahead of the *Aboukir* and the *Cressy* about 400 yards on the port beam. As soon as it was seen that the *Aboukir* was in danger of sinking, all boats were sent away from the *Cressy*, and the picket-boat was hoisted out without steam up. When the cutters, full of the *Aboukir's* men, were returning to the *Cressy*, the *Hogue* was struck, apparently under the aft 9-2 magazine, as a very heavy explosion took place immediately after the first explosion.

Almost directly after the *Hogue* was hit we observed a periscope on our port bow, about 300 yards off. Fire was immediately opened and the engines put full speed ahead, with the intention of ramming her down. Our gunner, Mr. Doherty, positively asserts that he hit the periscope, and that the submarine then showed her conning-tower, which he struck, and the submarine sank. An officer standing alongside the gunner thinks that the shell struck only floating timber, of which there was much about, but it was evidently the impression of the men on deck, who cheered and clapped heartily, that the submarine had been hit. This submarine did not fire a torpedo at the *Cressy*.

TORPEDO'S TRACK VISIBLE.

Captain Johnson then manœuvred the ship so as to render assistance to the crews of the *Hogue* and *Aboukir*. About five minutes later another periscope was seen on our starboard quarter, and fire was opened. The track of the torpedo she fired at a range of five or six hundred yards was plainly visible, and it struck us on the starboard side, just before the after bridge. The ship listed about ten degrees to starboard and remained steady; time, 7-15 a.m. All water-tight doors, dead-lights, and scuttles had been securely closed before the torpedo struck the ship. All mess stools and tables, shores, and all available timber below and on deck had been previously got up and thrown over the side for saving life. A second torpedo, fired by the same submarine, missed, and passed about twenty feet astern. About a quarter of an hour after the first torpedo hit, a third torpedo, fired from a submarine just before the starboard beam, hit us in No. 5 boiler room; time, 7-20. The ship then began to heel rapidly, and finally turned keel up, remaining so for about twenty minutes before she finally sank at 7-55 a.m.

A large number of men were saved by the casting adrift of a pattern 3 target. The steam pinnace floated out of her

crutches, but filled and sank. The second torpedo which struck the *Cressy* passed over the sinking hull of the *Aboukir*, narrowly missing it. It is possible that the same submarine fired all three torpedoes at the *Cressy*.

The conduct of the crew was excellent throughout. I have already reported the splendid service rendered by Captain Phillips, master of the trawler *L. T. Coriander*, and his crew, who picked up 156 officers and men.

I have the honour, &c.,

BERTRAM W. L. NICHOLSON,
Commander, late H.M.S. *Cressy*.

REPORT BY COMMANDER REGINALD A. NORTON, R.N., LATE OF H.M.S. HOGUE.

SIR,—I have the honour to report as follows concerning the sinking of H.M. ships *Hogue*, *Aboukir*, and *Cressy* :—

Between 6-15 and 6-30 a.m. H.M.S. *Aboukir* was struck by a torpedo. The *Hogue* closed to the *Aboukir*, and I received orders to hoist out the launch, turn out and prepare all boats, and unleash all timber on the upper deck. The two lifeboats were sent to the *Aboukir*, but before the launch could get away the *Hogue* was struck on the starboard side amidships by two torpedoes, at intervals of ten to twenty seconds. The ship at once began to heel to starboard.

After ordering the men to provide themselves with wood, hammocks, &c., and to get into the boats on the booms and take off their clothes, I went by Captain Nicholson's orders to ascertain the damage in the engine rooms. An artificer engineer informed me that the water was over the engine-room gratings. While endeavouring to return to the bridge the water burst open the starboard entry port doors, and the ship heeled rapidly. I told the men in the port battery to jump overboard, as the launch was close alongside, and soon afterwards the ship lurched heavily to starboard. I clung to a ringbolt for some time, but eventually dropped on to the deck, and a huge wave washed me away. I climbed up the ship's side and was again washed off.

Eventually, after swimming about from various overlaid pieces of wreckage, I was picked up by a cutter from the *Hogue*, Coxswain L. S. Marks, which pulled about for some hours picking up men and discharging them to our picket boat and steam pinnace, and to the Dutch steamers *Flora* and *Titan*, and rescued in this way Commander Sells, Engineer-Commander Stokes, with legs broken, Fleet Paymaster Eldred, and about twenty others. Finally, about 10 a.m., when we could find no more men in the water, we were picked up by H.M.S. *Lucifer*, which proceeded to the *Titan* and took off from her all our men except about twenty, who were too ill to be moved.

"DOING WELL."

A Lowestoft trawler and the two Dutch ships *Flora* and *Titan* were extraordinarily kind, clothing and feeding our men. My boat's crew, consisting mainly of R.N.R. men, pulled and behaved remarkably well. I particularly wish to mention Petty Officer (first-class) Halton, who, by encouraging the men in the water near me, undoubtedly saved many lives. Lieutenant-Commander Phillips-Wolley, after hoisting out the launch, asked me if he should try to hoist out another boat, and endeavoured to do so. The last I saw of him was on the after bridge, doing well. Lieutenant Tillard was picked up by the launch, got up a cutter's crew, and saved many lives, as did Midshipman Cazalet in the *Cressy's* gig. Lieutenant Chichester turned out the whaler very quickly.

A Dutch sailing trawler sailed close by, but went off without rendering any assistance, though we signalled to her from the *Hogue* to close after we were struck. The *Aboukir* appeared to me to take about thirty-five minutes to sink, floating bottom up for about five minutes. The *Hogue* turned turtle very quickly in about five minutes, and floated bottom up for some minutes. A dense black smoke was seen in the starboard battery, whether from coal or torpedo cordite I could not say. The upper deck was not blown up, and only one other small explosion occurred as we heeled over. The *Cressy* I watched heel over from the cruiser. She heeled over to starboard very slowly, a dense black smoke issuing from her, when she attained an angle of about ninety degrees, and she took a long time from this angle till she floated bottom up with the starboard screw slightly out of the water. I consider it was thirty-five to forty-five minutes from the time she was struck till she was bottom up.

GALLANT DEEDS.

All the men in the *Hogue* behaved extraordinarily well, obeying orders even when in the water swimming for their lives, and I witnessed many cases of great self-sacrifice and gallantry. Farmstone, able seaman, R.N.R., H.M.S. *Hogue*, jumped overboard from the launch to make room for others, and would not avail himself of assistance until all men near by were picked up. He was in the water about half an hour. There was no panic of any sort, the men taking of their clothes as ordered and falling in with hammock or wood. Captain Nicholson, in our other cutter, as usual, was perfectly cool, and rescued a large number of men. I last saw him alongside the *Flora*. Engineer-Commander Stokes, I believe, was in the engine-room to the last, and Engineer-Lieutenant-Commander Fendick got up steam on the boat and worked it in five minutes.

I have the honour to submit that I may be appointed to another ship as soon as I can get a kit. I have the honour,

REGINALD A. NORTON, Commander,
late H.M.S. *Hogue*.



A British Air Fleet drawn up for inspection.

[Record Press.]

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE WAR IN THE AIR.


THE AIR-SERVICES OF BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND GERMANY COMPARED—THE MERITS AND DEFECTS OF THE FRENCH SERVICE—THE LOSSES AT RHEIMS—THE OPERATIONS BY AIR AT DUSSELDORF, FRIEDRICHSHAFEN, AND CUXHAVEN—THE VALUE OF THE "FIFTH ARM."

IF for no other reason, the war of 1914 will always be memorable because in it for the first time the opposing armies and navies gave each other battle, not only on the land and by sea, but in the air. Captive balloons had been used for observation purposes as long ago as the war of 1870, and in the South African war man-lifting kites were also employed for the same purpose. It was not, however, until five years ago, when the aeroplane engine became reasonably perfect, and it was possible to move with certainty and in any direction in the air, that aerial warfare became practicable and demanded the attention of the General Staffs. Clearly, the new inventions had great military possibilities, and they were not long in being put to the test. In the Italian war in Tripoli, in the summer of 1911, aeroplanes and dirigible balloons were employed to act with the Italian forces, but as the campaign presented none of the opportunities for reconnaissance which warfare in an enclosed country and against a civilised enemy gives, the aviators had little opportunity of showing what they could do. The war in Tripoli was immediately followed by the Balkan war, and though in this case the campaign was conducted on a scale and over country which gave great opportunity for reconnaissance by aeroplane, the aeronautical services attached to the opposing sides were less highly developed than that of Italy in the preceding war. The Turks had one or two German aeroplanes, and a few officers trained to fly without being trained to use an aeroplane for military purposes. The Servians and the Bulgarians accepted the services of a number of volunteers, who were either flying instructors or civilian aviators in England or France, but they were able to

provide them with only a very poor and miscellaneous collection of machines not suitable for military work, and none of them had the training necessary to make good use of what they saw on the considerable voyages which they made. From time to time Bulgarian aviators made flights over Adrianople, and dropped bombs, though without apparently doing any damage, and the end of the war came without any evidence having been given of the effectiveness of aerial forces as a support to armies in the field. Misled by the apparent ineffectiveness of military aviation in these two wars, many people were inclined to take them as typical of all that the aeroplane could do as a fighting instrument, and to express the belief that there was no use wasting money and burdening further already overburdened army estimates with provision for the new and so-called fifth arm.


THE MERITS AND DEFECTS OF THE FRENCH SERVICE.

This was not, however, the view taken by the military authorities; and while the Balkan States were indulging in their somewhat amateur experiments, the great armies of Europe were each busily engaged in forming flying corps. The French, owing to their lead, which had been definitely established in the whole art of flight, were first in the field, and in the years following the first great flying meeting of 1909 they acquired large quantities of machines, and trained a large number of officers and men as military aviators. Their practice in flying was constant, and they certainly had attained a mastery of cross-country flight long before the aviators of any other nation. The French aviation service had, however, its defects, as



Two Naval Waterplanes in position on H.M.S. Hibernia.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



A Zeppelin flying over its shed on Lake Constance.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

well as its good qualities. The purchase of machines was not always free from a certain amount of favouritism, and even in some cases of corruption, and the knowledge which was present to the mind of every manufacturer that he could always find a market from the Government for whatever machines he built did not tend to encourage improvement in design. Machines of old patterns, and of patterns not suitable for military purposes, were kept on the active list of aeroplanes in large numbers. The desire to spread out contracts over different manufacturers, and the failure to do what was done in England in the way of establishing a Government design, led to the unnecessary accumulation of different types of machines, with all the difficulty which that entailed of providing different kinds of spare parts. The organisation of the service, too, was not particularly efficient, and only a few months before the declaration of war the report of the Committee of the French Senate had vigorously condemned the state of aerial preparation of the Army Service. The French Air Corps had, then, the virtues of courage and a high degree of skill, but it was not so well organised as our own, or as the German. In the first weeks of the war it suffered a further handicap. A raid made upon the different cities of the Rhine proved ineffective, while the scouting service with the army was depleted by the German occupation of Rheims, in which, according to official American reports, which are believed to be accurate, fifty aeroplanes fell into the hands of the enemy. Further, as all the biggest French aeroplane construction works lie in territory which has been occupied since the end of August by the enemy, the air service has naturally been at some difficulty to effect repairs, and to get delivery of new machines.

THE GERMAN AIR SERVICE.


The German army took up aeronautics at a later period than the French, and for long military experts in Germany were inclined to place more reliance on the airship than on the aeroplane, and it was on the airship that their first efforts and expenditure were made. In England we are inclined to associate the German airship service with the Zeppelin and with nothing else, but it is well to remember—especially in the light of what his airships have accomplished in the present war—that Count Zeppelin was for long a hero of the Court and the public rather than of the army, and that it was only on the urgent insistence of the Emperor that the Zeppelins were employed by the military authorities at all. In fact, this reluctance on the part of the military and experts appears to have been justified, at any rate so far as service with the army in the field is concerned. With the main German army in France only two airships, both of them of the older non-rigid type, have been seen by the British Expeditionary Force; and though on many occasions visits of Zeppelins to Antwerp were described in the newspapers, it is now certain that a Zeppelin (it may even have been another kind of airship) appeared there on only one occasion, and that the other attacks were made by aeroplane. Various reports have been published from time to time of the destruction of Zeppelins by the Allied forces; most of them have probably been imaginary, though perhaps five authentic cases exist; but if the casualty list of the Zeppelin were no more in war than it has been in peace, the Allies need have no reason to be dissatisfied. The Zeppelin is ineffective as an adjunct to a field army for any purpose whatever, though it may have advantages of other kinds. That the German Staff themselves take this view is clear from the fact that from the

first moment of the war they made use in the field exclusively of the aeroplane.

High praise must be awarded to the qualities which the German aeroplane service has shown in action. The aeroplanes themselves, though they possess an excellent engine, are inferior in some important flying qualities to our own, and to some of the French. But though they cannot climb as quickly or fly so fast as our own, they have been manned by officers who have completely grasped the fact—forgotten by the French—that the ability to fly an aeroplane is no more in itself a military quality than the ability to ride a horse is, and that to be a military aviator is a highly-skilled and technical thing altogether apart from the main handling of the machine. Without doubt, the German aviators have proved themselves experts in reconnaissance, which has been mainly strategical, and took them in Belgium and France far ahead of the armies to which they were attached, and also in tactical work, particularly in combined action with artillery—a matter in which we ourselves undoubtedly learned a good deal from them in the earlier stages of the war. (The German method of assisting artillery was to fly, very often quite low, along the trench which it was desired to shell, and to drop over it a piece of tinfoil or tinsel paper, which glistened in the sun as it fell, and remained in the air long enough to enable the gunners to get the range.) In other qualities the German aviators have proved inferior; they have almost invariably gone under in any conflict for the mastery of the air in a particular neighbourhood, and in those strange combats in which one aeroplane endeavours to destroy another our own men have been almost invariably the victors. It is becoming apparent also that the German aeroplane service is insufficiently equipped with the means to replace a wastage in material. After the first two months of the war the activity of German aviators slackened, and our own pilots acquired a virtual mastery of the air over the area of the actual fighting.

THE BRITISH AIR SERVICE.

Of the three nations at war in the Western area we in England started latest to set up an air force, and when we did start the Government had to run the gauntlet of a continual and somewhat embittered series of criticisms, which alleged that insufficient encouragement was given to manufacturers; that the design of machine which the Government was making for itself was bad; and that the men—though their bravery and skill were acknowledged—were insufficiently trained, and in insufficient numbers. In fact, the organisation of the Royal Flying Corps, though it was not quite complete at the beginning of the war, has proved itself brilliantly successful. It has proved certainly for its numbers, and for the length of time in its training (and even without these qualifications), the best of all those engaged in the war. Its pilots have flown constantly and in all weathers, and their services in reconnaissance and in other ways have earned them special mention in the despatches of the Commander-in-Chief. Certainly the safety of the British army in the first critical moment is almost entirely due to the reports which the observers were able to bring Sir John French of the enemy's movements. Nothing has been more marked in the efficiency of the Flying Corps at the front than the organisation of their base, with its motor repair shop and assembly of spare parts and spare machines. All the pilots of the squadrons of the Flying Corps now at the front flew from England to their base, and spare



Transporting a new aeroplane by road to the front in France.

[Central News.]



German machine guns mounted for driving off hostile aircraft.

[Photopress.]



[Record Press.]

Airmen in position on a military aeroplane, showing a type of hand bomb which is dropped from the side of the machine.

machines have generally been sent to France in this manner. In all these flights no casualties have been reported, and not more than a dozen members of the Royal Flying Corps have appeared in the list of killed, wounded, and prisoners. One of them, Captain Robin Grey, fell into German hands in Frankfort while he was on a flight to destroy the railway station in the city.

So far we have been dealing with the air service attached to the forces on land, and with that side of their work which has been of the non-combatant character. In fact, however, the most striking achievements in the air during the last five months of war have been those of the British Naval Air Service, and they have been in operations of an offensive character. Alone of all the powers of war we have been fortunate in possessing, owing to the energy and foresight of those at the Admiralty, a Naval Flying Corps, thoroughly organised, equipped, and trained, and possessing the skill and knowledge necessary for the undertaking of serious aerial attacks. Of the side of the Naval Air Service which operates entirely at sea we have still very little information, but on two occasions seaplanes have been picked up far out in the North Sea, where they had come to the surface owing to damage, and these may be taken as indications of the extent to which our system of sea patrols has been indebted to the naval aviators. We have other information of an official character.

"During the course of the war," so runs the official report, "the Royal Naval Air Service (Naval Wing of Royal Flying Corps) has not been idle—airships, aeroplanes, and seaplanes having proved their value in many undertakings.

"While the Expeditionary Force was being moved abroad, a strong patrol to the eastward of the Straits of Dover was undertaken by both seaplanes and airships of the Naval Air Service.

"The airships remained steadily patrolling between the French and English coasts, sometimes for twelve hours on end; while further to the east, with the assistance of the Belgian authorities, a temporary seaplane base was established at Ostend, and a patrol kept up with seaplanes between this place and the English coast opposite.

"By this means it was impossible for the enemy's ships to approach the Straits without being seen for very many miles.

"On one occasion, during one of the airship patrols, it became necessary to change a propeller blade of one of the engines. The Captain feared it would be necessary to descend for this purpose, but two of the crew immediately volunteered to carry out this difficult task in the air, and, climbing out on to the bracket carrying the propeller shafting, they completed the hazardous work of changing the propeller's blade, 2,000 feet above the sea."

THE OPERATIONS BY AIR.

That was remarkable enough, but the Naval Air Service was to distinguish itself later by three achievements more difficult still. On October 9th, the Admiralty reported a successful raid upon the Dusseldorf airship shed, in which at that time one of the latest Zeppelins had just been housed. Three officers were concerned in this feat, and one of them, Lieutenant Marix, who has since been given the D.S.O., succeeded in dropping, from an altitude of no more than five hundred feet, a bomb which went through the roof of the shed and destroyed the airship inside. Flames were observed many hundred feet in the air, and it was clear that the

damage done was complete. Later information showed that Lieutenant Marix's visit threw the town in a state of panic, and that a number of officers who were in the shed at the time were killed. The feat was in every respect remarkable having regard to the distance, over a hundred miles, penetrated into the country held by the enemy, and to the fact that a previous attack put the enemy upon their guard, and enabled them to mount anti-aircraft guns. It was, however, eclipsed six weeks later by a more remarkable achievement still. On the 21st November, a flight of three naval aeroplanes flew from near Belfort to the Zeppelin airship factory at Friederichshafen. The airmen left at ten in the morning,

and made for the Rhine, the course of which they followed. When they reached Lake Constance, the leader—Commander Briggs—was unfortunately shot down through shrapnel bullets striking his petrol tank, but not before he had already dropped some bombs on the Zeppelin station. One of the other aviators, Lieutenant Sippe, succeeded in dropping his upon the gas factory close to the sheds, and, in spite of a heavy fire from all kinds of anti-aircraft guns and from rifles, both succeeded in making their way safely back to France. The amount of damage done was doubtful at the time, but from the official despatch which has since been issued it seems established that an airship was destroyed and the gas factory set

on fire. The German accounts have all concealed the particulars. Finally, on Christmas Day, a squadron of naval seaplanes, escorted by cruisers and submarines, operated over Cuxhaven. All the pilots got away safely; and though it was possible that no particularly serious damage was done, the moral effect of the raid has obviously been serious.

These three exploits, each of which was directed against some point of military importance to the enemy, have been followed by similar feats by French airmen, who have dropped bombs on the railway station at Freiburg and on the station and airship sheds at Metz, but they have not been answered by any carefully thought-out bomb-dropping campaign on the part of the enemy.

German aeroplanes have appeared over Antwerp, Dunkirk, Paris, and most of the towns on the eastern frontier of France, but in all cases bombs have been dropped in what appears to be an entirely haphazard fashion. Many non-combatants have been killed, but no military damage has been done, and the historian of the future will certainly condemn the reckless disregard for the recognised rules of warfare shown in outrages which did nothing to further the success of the army to which those who committed them were attached. In England, though it was widely expected that a raid from German airships and aeroplanes would be one of the earliest episodes in the war, nothing has occurred to disturb our peace.

One German aeroplane did appear for a few minutes over Dover, and another made an unsuccessful attempt to pass over the aerial defences of the Thames towards London. Both, however, were driven off without the slightest difficulty, and in the case of at least one of them the pilot probably never succeeded in regaining his base. None the less, preparations of a very complete character were early made to defend vulnerable positions on the coast, and particularly to prevent an attack by air on London, with its arsenals and public buildings, and its crowded population. Anti-aircraft guns of a very successful type, which had been exhaustively experimented with before the war began, were mounted on all coast defences

and on ships of war, and have since the autumn been placed in convenient positions all over London. A series of searchlight stations have also been set up, and these are manned by a specially constituted corps, who are always on duty day and night. The possibility, therefore, of a successful surprise aeroplane attack is remote. It is all the more remote in the case of an airship, which by night presents a large surface for the beam of a searchlight, and either by day or night is a very vulnerable target to a quick-firing gun. To the difficulties presented by these preparations is to be added the further one caused by the presence, in a convenient position, of a large squadron of aeroplanes, which are always ready to go up and fight or pursue the invader in the air.




A high-angle anti-aircraft gun, mounted on one of the armoured trains used by the Allies in Belgium. [Central News.]

THE VALUE OF THE AERIAL SERVICE.

A final estimate of the values and limitations of the aerial arm is still impossible. As a weapon of reconnaissance it has already proved its value, and should the war be a long one it seems likely that we must put its length, in part at least, down to the aeroplane, and to the perfection to which scouting by aeroplane has been brought. The difficulty which Wellington used to describe as that of knowing what is going on at the other side of the hill is a difficulty no longer. Efficient air service has informed the Commander-in-Chief of each army of the movements of their opponents, and robbed war of that element of surprise which, in one form or another, has been behind all the most striking victories of the past. Now that no column of men can move by day on either road or railway without being observed, and when the practised eye can estimate—even in a rapid flight and from a great altitude—the number of men and guns over a wide area, those sudden movements and surprises which were the means of the triumphs of Napoleon and Moltke are no longer possible. Movement betrays itself, and so armies tend to dig themselves in, and avoid the observation of the aeroplane by not moving at all. As a weapon of offence the aeroplane is undoubtedly less perfect, and in all probability the amount of damage that can be done


by the dropping of explosives has been much exaggerated. In this respect the aeroplane cannot compare with the high-angle shell thrown by a howitzer. All its successes as a weapon of offence in this war have been in cases where its bombs have been dropped on places containing explosive material easily ignited. You can make havoc with gas works or an airship shed which contains an airship already inflated, but you can do little with houses or fortified works. Further, there is the difficulty of aim, though this has been overcome in a remarkable manner by the naval airmen in the enterprises which have been described.

Finally, there is the aeroplane as a weapon against other aeroplanes. In this respect the British forces have been much more successful than those of their opponents, and a considerable number of German machines have been put out of action in direct aerial combat. Such combats, oddly enough, have not always resulted in the killing of those on board the aeroplane which was destroyed, and in several cases German aeroplanes have been brought down by members of the Royal Flying Corps and their occupants made prisoners. Quick-firing guns have been used with success on British aeroplanes, but for the most part the weapon employed is either a revolver of a larger pattern or a service rifle.



[Alferi Picture Service.]

French airmen consulting a map before starting out on a reconnaissance.



THE BATTLE-FRONT IN EASTERN FRANCE.



The Bombardment of Antwerp : The small puffs of smoke are German shells bursting over one of the forts, and the heavy smoke is from some of the burning buildings. [Photopress.]

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE FALL OF ANTWERP.

THE GERMAN POSITIONS ON THE AISNE—THE BOMBARDMENT OF RHEIMS CATHEDRAL—THE ATTACK ON THE MEUSE FORTS—CAPTURE OF ST. MIHIEL—THE FAILURE OF THE FRENCH TURNING MOVEMENT BY PERONNE—THE RAPID RECOVERY OF THE GERMANS—THEIR RESOURCEFULNESS—THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN BELGIUM—THE SIEGE AND FALL OF ANTWERP.

THE campaign in France was left in arrest (page 155) by the heavily fortified positions which the Germans had occupied on the north bank of the Aisne. The British had forced the passage of the river, and in spite of heavy German gunfire and constant attacks succeeded in maintaining their hold on the north bank of the river. But neither east of Soissons, where the British were, nor west, near the angle of the Aisne and the Oise, where the Sixth French Army was, did there appear the smallest prospect of carrying the German positions in front of them, except at a cost of life from which both the Allied commanders recoiled. It became necessary to find a way round. The three days' battle of the Aisne began on September 12th. Already, on the 17th, the Seventh French Army, under General Manoury, which was to the left of the Sixth Army, began to move up the right bank of the Oise, and at the same time General Castelnau, with the Ninth French Army, was concentrating on Amiens. The turning movement against the German positions on the Aisne had begun, and from this time onwards the main front of battle no longer faces north and south, but east and west—the Germans on the east, the French on the west.

But before the narrative leaves the southern front for the west, it is useful to trace the line from Soissons to the Vosges, which the opposing armies were to hold for so long without appreciable change. The Battle of the Aisne was fought on the reverse of the position which the French knew as that of La-Fère. It covers the angle formed by the meeting of the Oise and the Aisne, and is made by rising ground, thickly wooded, which on its western side overlooks Amiens and the valley of the Somme, and on its eastern side forms the so-called Falaise de Champagne. In the angle of the rivers, where the wood is thickest, is the Forêt d' L'Aigle, and from there the German lines ran along the crest of the plateau, on the north bank of the Aisne, to Berru, on the north-east side of Rheims. From the hill at Berru the Germans later bombarded the cathedral of Rheims, on the plea that the French were using the tower as an observation post. The French stoutly denied the charge, but, even if it had been true—and elsewhere, notably at Malines, in Belgium, undoubtedly cathedral towers were so used—a more scrupulous enemy would have hesitated to damage so beautiful a monument. The defence of the Germans that the lives of their soldiers were more to them than any French cathedral had not even the excuse of a coarse



[Newspaper Illustrations.]
The arrival of the British Marines at Antwerp : Carrying ammunition into the trenches.



Belgian troops entrenched on the outskirts of Antwerp : The smoke from buildings set on fire by the bombardment can be seen in the distance. *[Photopress.]*

sincerity, for no commanders have been readier to sacrifice human life for an idea than the German. If life could be sacrificed for the idea of power, why not for that of beauty in stone? From another point of view, also, the destruction of ancient monuments by the Germans was reprehensible, for whereas, by the common teaching of religion, spirit in the human body is indestructible, the soul of a great building perishes with its frame.

East of Berru, the German line descends to the Plain of Champagne, leaves the Aisne, and follows the course of the Suippe, one of its tributaries, to its source in the slopes of the Argonne range. It will be remembered that at the battle of the Marne the effect of the Allies' flank attack was first felt at the western end of the line, and only gradually extended to the east. There was some particularly hard fighting in the marshes of St. Gond, in which the Prussian Guards suffered very heavily. But the eastern end of the French line was never forced back so far as the western end, and the formation of the new Ninth French Army for service in the west, under General Castelnau, seems to have weakened the French attack in the Argonne region. At any rate, whether or not as the result of withdrawals of French troops to the west, in the last week of September the Germans began to gain ground at the eastern end of the line. The details of the fighting in the woods of the Argonne need not detain us here, but one success gained by the Germans on the heights of the Meuse was of great importance, and had a considerable influence on the progress of the campaign. Perhaps the best way of understanding the military events of the last fortnight in September and the first week of October is to think of them as one battle, with two wings and a centre. The centre of the battle lay from Compiègne to Arras, where, as we have seen, General Joffre was just about to begin his attempt to turn the German position at Laon-La Fère. Here the Germans were on the defensive. The right of the battle was on the heights of the Meuse; the left was in the neighbourhood of Antwerp. On these two wings the Germans were the attackers. Between the left wing and the centre there was a great expanse of dead ground, which, though it was later to see some of the heaviest fighting in the war, was at present almost neglected. It was to this ground that Sir John French transferred the British army at the beginning of October, but, except for the British assistance at Antwerp, the battle which began in the third week of September and was waged on three fronts—North Belgium, Mid-France, and the Meuse—

was the first since Mons in which the British had not taken a very prominent part.


THE BATTLE ON THE RIGHT WING.

The Allied advance after the battle of the Marne was oblique, the left being much more forward than the right. Opposite the right—that is on the German left—was the army of the Crown Prince, which, as the French advance gathered momentum, soon began to find itself in serious difficulties. It had to retreat along the slopes of the Argonne, a district with few roads and with a heavy tenacious clay soil, which, with the autumn rains that began soon after the Marne, made travel very difficult. Moreover, its line of retreat north—and at this time no one could foresee that the retreat might not have to be continued—lay past the fortress of Verdun, where a very active field army could have done great mischief to a

column in the disorder of a forced retreat. General Joffre had two alternatives, and the choice between them could not have been easy. He might have thrown his main attack against the Crown Prince in the hope of cutting off his retreat through the north of France and Luxembourg, and turning the German fortifications in the Ardennes from the south. Or he might—as in fact he did—make his main effort against the German right in the hope of intercepting the retreat of the main German army on Belgium. Either plan, had it been successful, would have yielded brilliant results, thoroughly in accord with the high hopes that the victory of the Marne had aroused in the mind of the people both here and in France. He chose the second plan of a movement by the west, perhaps because he was already committed to it before the difficulties of the Crown Prince were so great as they after-

wards became; perhaps also because he hoped if his turning movement by the west succeeded of driving that wing in on the centre and left, and so increasing the confusion of the retirement. It was one of the few moments of the war when even the most prudent might be forgiven indulgence of sanguine hopes.

What saved the German wing under the Crown Prince, apart from the diversion of strength to the west, was the Army of Metz. Very characteristically of German strategy, the moment of peril was chosen to make a direct frontal attack on the line of French forts running south of Verdun, the fear of which had ostensibly at any rate been the cause of the choice of the line of invasion through Belgium. While the Allies were forcing the passage of the Aisne, the Army of Metz, which consisted of Bavarians, descended into the plain of the Woevre and began a series






The remains of several uncontrolled locomotives which were sent dashing in the direction of the German lines during the operations against Antwerp. [Central News.]



Men of the British Naval Brigade drawn up on the outskirts of Antwerp. [News Illustrations.]



The Fortifications and Environs of Antwerp.

of violent attacks on the heights of the Meuse. Their object was to cross the Meuse, to join hands with the retreating German left, now at Varennes, and, if all went well, perhaps to turn the French right and so once more put themselves on the road to Paris; or, failing that, at any rate to create a diversion from which the main German army could not but profit. The Bavarians carried Les Paroches, but failed to maintain themselves there. At Troyon, a fort a little further to the north, both the attack and the defence were desperate. In the course of the second attack all the cannon but four were put out of action. "Orders were accordingly given to the garrison to retreat, but they refused to leave their post of honour, and retired instead into an old cistern of the fort. There were only 450 of them left, with twenty-two more who were cut off from them in the magazine. As there was every chance of its being blown up at any moment, the little detachment tried to join the others in the cistern by a narrow passage joining it to the magazine. Just at that moment the roof of the passage was shattered by a shell, and they were buried under a mass of fallen

stones and earth. A little later the German assault slackened, and the garrison were able to retire at their ease." * (See Map, page 264.)

The Bavarian losses in these attacks were exceedingly heavy, and the forts, when they were won, were worthless to the victors, for they furnished no points at which the Meuse could be crossed. But they won a more solid success at St. Mihiel, a little further to the south. The French, thinking that all danger from the attacks was passed, moved the garrison of St. Mihiel across the Woivre to Nancy, where there was something toward, and the Bavarians, seizing their opportunity, made a rapid march along the south bank of the Rupt de Mad, as far as Thiaucourt, and then crossed the plain to St. Mihiel, which they found unoccupied. The inhabitants fled in panic, and the Germans entrenched themselves in the place. At St. Mihiel the Meuse makes a great loop, in the centre of which is the Camp des Romains. This they

* The *Times* correspondent at Nancy, without whose interesting despatches the operations on this front would not have been intelligible.



[Wm. Dawson and Sons Ltd.
Refugees leaving their homes in Antwerp before the threatened bombardment.



A party of refugees makes ready to depart from Antwerp. [Wm. Dawson and Sons Ltd.

captured early in the last week of September, and its possession gave them the command of a large part of the Woivre plain. On September 26th, a detachment of Germans crossed the Meuse opposite St. Mihiel, and, beating back a Territorial battalion which was opposing their passage, marched east to join with the Germans in the Argonne district. They were defeated by a column from Toul, and the Germans, in spite of many attempts, never made good their footing on the west bank of the Meuse. The capture of St. Mihiel, however, was a very important success. Not only did it give the Germans control of a large part of the Woivre plain, but by keeping ajar a narrow door into the central French plain from the east it forced the French to keep much larger forces engaged in purely defensive work at this point than they otherwise need have done. Moreover, the diversion undoubtedly brought great relief to the Crown Prince's army. Not for many months did the French repair the mischief of St. Mihiel.

THE FIGHTING IN THE CENTRE.

On the right wing, then, in spite of the losses of the Bavarians—heavier perhaps in proportion to the numbers engaged, by reason of the extreme recklessness of their attacks, than in any other engagement of the war—the honours rested with the Germans. How in the meantime was it faring in the centre, where a French turning movement against the German positions on the Aisne was already in progress? A great deal had been sacrificed to the success of this movement, for, as has been seen, General Joffre might perhaps, had he put his strength on the other wing, have crushed the army of the Crown Prince. General Joffre attached the greatest importance to secrecy in executing this turning movement, but it is very doubtful whether the Germans were at any time in ignorance of his dispositions. Aeroplanes have made it almost impossible to conceal the movements of large bodies of troops from an active and intelligent enemy, and the German dispositions show that they suspected quite early what the strategy of General Joffre would probably be. On September 13th—the second day of the battle of the Aisne—the Germans evacuated Amiens, in the valley of the Somme. Clearly, they already apprehended a turning movement by the west, as was indeed only to be expected after the great surprise which the French had sprung on the Germans before the battle of the Marne. On September 18th the French Seventh Army was at Noyon, and two days later at Lassigny. About the same time the Ninth Army, under General Castelnau, was at Amiens, and began to move up the valley of the Somme towards Peronne. On the 21st General Castelnau occupied Peronne, but by that time the Germans had made their preparations. A great army had been assembled at St. Quentin and Tergnier, which, on the 23rd, attacked the French as they debouched from Peronne and drove them back. It was a serious check. So far from taking the Germans by surprise, the French were themselves taken aback by the great strength of the Germans and the fury of their sudden attack. The French prolonged their turning movement to the north, but all chance of a surprise was gone. According to a writer in a monthly review*, the French, having taken great precautions to ensure secrecy, were disposed to blame the newspapers for their failure to effect the surprise, and on September 25th all war correspondents were warned not to come within twenty miles of the fighting line, and

“military experts,” writing for the newspapers, are said by the same authority to have been forbidden to speculate about the movements of the Allies. It would not, however, appear that General von Kluck, or whoever was responsible for the direction of the German movements, had much to learn from the criticism of the newspapers, and aeroplanes are far more likely to have been the source of his information about the enemies' designs than the telegrams of foreign correspondents. (See Map on page 267.)

A tribute of admiration is due to the energy and skill with which the enemy extricated himself from the exceedingly dangerous position in which the defeat on the Marne placed him. He had, it is true, prepared his position on the Aisne beforehand as a safeguard against defeat, but the interval of time between the first arrival on the Aisne and the retreat to it was, after all, only short, and much must necessarily have been left to the extemporisation of the moment. Up to now it had been doubtful whether the very qualities of method and forethought which notoriously distinguished the Germans in their military as in all their other work might not unfit them for success in a sudden emergency. These doubts, unfortunately, were removed by the German conduct of the retreat, which showed far more genuine military ability than anything that had occurred in the advance. The Germans in military matters were not—as some had thought—mere pedants, who worked by rule and precedent. Not only were their tactical dispositions in the retreat extremely clever, but the higher qualities of generalship came out in the skill with which they divined the most likely strategy of their opponents, and the tremendous energy with which they devised their measures to meet it. The army which the Germans managed to concentrate against the well-conceived turning movement by Peronne was collected in extreme haste, and could only have been got by scraping off every ounce of spare flesh from every other German army in the west. That they felt themselves in great danger is evident from the desperate character of the Bavarian attacks on the Meuse forts. They must also have been labouring under a bitter sense of disappointment, for the retreat from the Marne, skilfully as it was managed, meant the collapse of the hopes on which they had built so much. No responsible German could now delude himself into thinking that Paris could be occupied and French resistance crushed in the time before Russian preparations could be completed. The whole character of the war was henceforward changed for him; all hope of an early victory was gone, and instead there opened before him a long and dreary vista of strain and endurance. It was a serious blow to the conceit which is the national vice of Germany, and it says much for the strength of fibre in the German character that the weeks in which these melancholy truths were brought home to those who had eyes to see them should have been those in which the qualities of courage and resolution should have shone out most brightly.

THE LEFT WING IN BELGIUM.

On the right the Germans had won a distinct success by the capture of St. Mihiel. In the centre they had countered the French attempt to turn their positions on the Aisne. But on the left, in Belgium, they had their greatest success in the capture of Antwerp, a deeply-moving story which must be told in greater detail than the events of the rest of the battle-front, which, important as they were, were mainly strategic in their interest.

On the 25th of September, the German offensive against Antwerp began with a strong reply to a forward

* The *Fortnightly Review* for November, 1914.

movement made by the Belgians some days previously along the three main roads from Malines to Louvain and Brussels. Desultory fighting in this area had been fairly constant for two weeks previously, and at one time the Belgians carried their advance nearly to Vilvorde, within a few miles of Brussels. They were unable, however, to hold this position, and fell back first on the villages of Eppegheem, Elewyt, and Weerde, on the 22nd and 23rd, and on the villages of Sempst and Hofstade later. From these, they were driven back on the afternoon of the 25th, after some severe fighting, to positions defending the railway line from Malines to Termonde, which were covered by the gunfire from the forts of Waelhem and Wavre St. Catherine. While making this attack, the German troops under General von Beseler, who conducted the whole of the operations, made some display of force to the south of Termonde; and in view of the possibility of a renewed attempt on the part of the enemy to force the passage of the Scheldt there, reinforcements were hurriedly sent across to aid in holding the river. These came into action on the 26th, and succeeded in driving the enemy back from the villages of Audeghem and Lebbeke for nearly four miles, while at the same time a small force of Belgian troops attacked the Germans on their left flank, and pressed them back on Alost. This slight success, however, was counteracted by a forward movement of the Germans on the east side, where, on the 26th, they completely cleared the wooded country south of Malines of Belgian troops, and won the first pawn in the game—an emplacement for their guns within striking distance of the forts of Waelhem and Wavre St. Catherine. The strength of the besiegers was about 60,000 men.

During those two days the enemy aeroplane service was specially active, Taubes were constantly seen passing

to and fro over the fortified area, and over Antwerp itself; and though these were repeatedly fired at by the Belgian high-elevation guns, they succeeded in observing without mishap the Belgian positions from Malines to the city pontoon bridge over the Scheldt.

THE ATTACK ON THE ANTWERP FORTS BEGINS.

On the 27th the fighting was active on the western side, and the Germans regained much of the ground they had lost to the south of Termonde. Lebbeke and Audeghem were retaken, and the Belgian troops fell back on St. Gilles, the southern suburb of Termonde—which was then in ruins—and on Grembergen, to the north of the river. The attack on this wing was afterwards constant for several days, but the positions remained materially unchanged, the Germans contenting themselves with attempting repeatedly to shell and destroy the bridge over the Scheldt between the advance guard and the Belgian field force. On this day—Sunday, the 27th—it became clear, however, that the main attack on the fortress of Antwerp, apart from any enveloping movement that might follow the crossing of the Scheldt, was to be directed against the south-east side. At about eight o'clock in the morning the Germans began the bombardment of Malines—which had already suffered severely from two bombardments earlier in the campaign—and the first shots were exchanged with the fort of Waelhem. In Malines a number of civilians were killed while returning from church, and buildings in the Place de la Gare, the barracks, and the establishment of the Little Sisters of the Poor were completely wrecked. By shortly after mid-day—following a heavy rain of shells for two hours—the whole of the civil population had fled towards

Antwerp, and the town was left in the hands of the Belgian army. No infantry attack was made, however, on the town



[Wm. Dawson and Sons Ltd.]

Deserted Antwerp: A house burning in the north part of the city.



[Wm. Dawson and Sons Ltd.]

Antwerp: the empty streets in the centre of the city, with the Cathedral in the distance, on Thursday afternoon, October 8th, 1914.



Refugees from Antwerp arrive in Holland.

[Wm. Dawson and Sons Ltd.]

on that day or on the day following. On Monday, the 28th, heavier guns of 28 and 30 cm. were brought into action against the forts, and it became obvious that the Germans, during their operations a month earlier to the south of Malines, must have secured concrete foundations for their guns below the embankment of the railway between Malines and Louvain, which they had obstinately held throughout the time in the face of repeated attack. On this day an infantry attack was pushed forward to the east of Termonde, but was repulsed with some considerable loss.

Tuesday, September 29th, was in many respects the decisive day. The enemy extended his bombardment to the redoubt of Koningshoycht and the fort and town of Lierre, and till 4-30 in the afternoon maintained a continuous bombardment of the forts of Waelhem and Wavre St. Catherine. His infantry occupied the south and east side of the town of Malines, and made a small attack between the forts of Liezel and Breendonck, which was repulsed. This attack and other similar attacks made during the course of the operations were never of a conclusive nature. Their object appeared to be merely to prevent the defending infantry force from concentrating at any one point, and perhaps—as might have been done—fighting forward to the gun positions. On this occasion the attack, however, cost the enemy dearly in men, as the Belgians allowed it to press well forward before sweeping and decimating the ranks with short range artillery and infantry fire.

During the day it became apparent that the guns in the two southerly forts were outclassed by the Austrian siege guns employed against them, and one of the cupolas of Waelhem fort was damaged beyond repair by the enemy's shells. Further, a severe blow was dealt to the city by the damage done to the reservoir, which lies slightly to the north of the fort. Shells were dropped continuously on the reservoir dyke, which at last gave way in part, and was completely ruined on the following day. The water poured out into the infantry trenches, and from that day till the end of the siege the city, though partly supplied by means of artesian wells, was almost


entirely without water, and its health was in consequence gravely endangered.

On the side of Lierre considerable progress was made by the enemy artillery, and the town especially suffered from the bombardment, which was continued throughout the night. The position of the town behind the fort had made bombardment in this case almost inevitable, and many of the civil population left at the commencement of the operations, but over a hundred civilians of all ages were killed during this and the following day, Wednesday, the 30th of September, when the bombardment of all three forts was resumed with renewed vigour. Several infantry attacks were also delivered at different points on the arc of the fortifications between the Scheldt and the Senne, but these were in every case repulsed with considerable loss to the enemy, mainly owing to the elaborate preparations against infantry attack which had been made by the garrison during the preceding month. The enemy also resumed on this day his offensive movement towards Termonde, and the Belgians were forced to retire across the Scheldt, after blowing up the wooden bridge. At Waelhem fort part of the powder magazine was blown up, but whether as the result of an accident or owing to the enemy's fire has not been definitely determined.

RETIREMENT TO THE NETHE.

On the evening of this day a certain amount of unrest and disquiet became apparent among the civil population of Antwerp. Constant processions of wounded had been pouring into the city, and stories spread by soldiers to the effect that the forts could not hold out were more believed than the official communiqués and the unofficial but censored accounts of the operations which appeared in the Press. The citizens had been schooled to believe the fortifications impregnable, and they did not easily abandon their belief. Once, however, a crowd gathered round two soldiers who were spreading alarmist stories, and only their arrest and the statement in the Press next day that they had been severely dealt with prevented a demonstration by at least a small part of the populace.

On Thursday, October 1st, it became clearly apparent that the attacking force had a superiority in weapons,



Belgian refugees on the harbour at Ostend waiting for a boat to take them to England.

[Pictorial Press.]



Belgian refugees at Scheveningen, near the Hague, being taken to the temporary quarters provided for them by the Dutch.

[Wm. Dawson and Sons Ltd.]

which it was useless to hope could be resisted. New emplacements were taken up by the lighter guns, and the forts and redoubts of the whole sector from Waelhem to Lierre were pounded mercilessly. Waelhem and Wavre St. Catherine were silenced by the end of the day, and during the night the whole of the defending force east of the Senne fell back on the Nethe. The resistance of the outer ring of fortifications had lasted only five days.

The position taken up on the Nethe was a strong one if backed by good artillery, but no sooner had the Belgian force entrenched itself than the enemy changed his plan. The first ring of fortifications had been won by the use of heavy artillery on stationary forts. The second ring was the Belgian field army, strongly entrenched. Against this the whole weight of the lighter artillery—some four hundred guns, according to some estimates—was brought to bear, and the army, already fatigued, was subjected to a rain of shrapnel night and day, which gave no respite and little chance of reply.

On this day, the 2nd, an interesting episode occurred. A Taube, flying very high, passed again and again across the city and dropped copies of a proclamation signed by General von Beseler, commander-in-chief of the besieging army, telling the populace that resistance was useless. Their brave army, it read, had done enough. To persist in resistance was only to imperil their own innocent lives to serve the perfidious purpose of England, which was alone responsible for such a cruel and senseless war.

The proclamation in itself had little effect, but by next day, Saturday, the 3rd, it was apparent that there was little hope for the salvation of the city. The fort of Lierre was occupied by the enemy, and two proclamations, one by the Burgomaster, Mons de Vos, giving permission to leave the city, and another by General de Guise, the military governor, calling on the people to preserve their calmness and *sangfroid*, were issued. At one time in the day the hospitals were ordered to be in readiness to leave, and many of the wounded were actually sent away to the coast, while several members of the Diplomatic Corps and of the Ministry left for Ostend. It was well understood, too, that the whole of the Ministry would leave during the evening or next morning, and that the Government would be transferred to Ostend. When all preparations had been made, however, the Government reversed its decision, in consequence of a message from England that reinforcements were already on their way, and that Mr. Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, had left for Antwerp in order to consult on the situation.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE BRITISH MARINES.

On Sunday, October 4th, in confirmation of this message, the first detachment of the British troops—a brigade of Royal Marines—arrived by train at the Waes station, and marched across the pontoon bridge into the city. They were greeted with extraordinary enthusiasm. The despondency of the previous day gave way to the wildest demonstrations of joy, and everywhere that the troops went they were cheered by enormous crowds. When completed next day, these reinforcements consisted of one Marine Brigade and two Naval Brigades, with some heavy naval guns, manned by A.B.'s—in all, 8,000 men—under the command of General Paris, R.M.A. The first detachment to arrive was hurried at once out to the trenches on the Nethe, where they took up a position on the left of the Belgian army and dug themselves in, making trenches in squares, with a good overhead protection.

In the course of the afternoon Mr. Churchill himself arrived, and within an hour also went out to the front

to inspect the position. On this day, and during the three subsequent days which he spent in Antwerp, he was repeatedly under fire. On the day of his arrival he informed the Burgomaster that it was the intention of the English to hold the city at all costs, but after a short inspection it became plainly obvious that the reinforcements had arrived too late. Their composition, and the action and attitude of Mr. Churchill, were subsequently the subject of considerable criticism in a section of the English Press; but adverse comment did not long survive the statement issued by the Admiralty that the Naval Brigades were chosen for the work "because the need for them was urgent and bitter; because mobile troops could not be spared for fortress duties; because they were the nearest, and could be embarked the quickest; and because their training, although incomplete, was as far advanced as that of a large portion not only of the forces defending Antwerp, but of the enemy forces attacking. The Naval Division," the statement added, "was sent to Antwerp not as an isolated incident, but as part of a large operation for the relief of the city. Other and more powerful considerations prevented this from being carried through." (The nature of these operations and the reason for their failure will be discussed in a later chapter.)

Their numbers and inexperience considered, the British acquitted themselves well. The brigade of Royal Marines—which consisted of about 2,000 men—alone was fully trained, experienced, and equipped, but the lads of the Naval Division stood the fierce shrapnel attack of the enemy well, and repulsed repeated attempts to cross the Nethe opposite their section. Four of the six 4.7 naval guns which were brought with the force were mounted on an armoured train, which had been built under the supervision of Lieutenant-Commander Littlejohn, in the yards of the Antwerp Engineering Company, at Hoboken. This train was in action repeatedly, and though the guns were not equivalent in range or calibre to the Austrian siege guns, by reason of their mobility they inflicted considerable damage, while being themselves almost immune from dangerous attack.

THE SECOND LINE OF DEFENCE FORCED.

The passage of the Nethe was resisted throughout Monday, the 5th, in the face of repeated attacks, but on the morning of the 6th the Belgian defence on the right of the Marines was forced back by a heavy attack covered by powerful artillery. It was remarkable that all attempts to pontoon the river on the two previous days had failed, and this final assault was carried out by a force of about 3,000 Germans, who had waded and swum the stream during the night.

In consequence of this reverse the whole of the defence was withdrawn to the inner line of forts, the intervals between which were very strongly fortified, but it was then obvious that the city was doomed. In the evening, General de Guise informed the Government that the position was fast becoming untenable, and acting on this information the capital was transferred to Ostend on Wednesday morning, when the members of the Government and the Diplomatic Corps left by steamer. On the same day Mr. Winston Churchill also left by motor car for the coast, under escort of one of the armoured cars of the Naval Brigade. The British and Russian Ministers left about noon, and the King of the Belgians, who had been present during the whole of the operations, and had exposed himself frequently to fire, left for St. Nicholas.

Till this morning, Wednesday, the 7th, the civil population—buoyed up by the arrival of the British—

was kept in almost complete ignorance of the actual state of affairs. The two Antwerp newspapers, printed in French, the *Matin* and the *Metropole*, published each day official communiqués which categorically denied that any of the forts had been silenced, and declared in positive terms that the enemy was being held all along the line, while the Flemish newspapers were similarly restricted. Although the sound of the guns came nearer and nearer, the populace was therefore comparatively calm, though plainly anxious, till on this morning, after the departure of the Government, proclamations signed by General de Guise were posted up on the streets announcing that the bombardment of the city was imminent. A proclamation issued by the Burgomaster recommended those who desired to leave the city to do so by the north and north-easterly roads to Holland, and those who intended to remain to take shelter in their cellars, covering any apertures with sand bags. The effect of these proclamations was instantaneous. The calm and sangfroid which the citizens had preserved broke down, and thousands left at once by train, by boat, by motor and carriage where possible, and on foot. The majority of these were people of the richer class, and the plight of many was pitiful. Along the western roads, in the Waes region especially, where all means of traffic broke down owing to the congestion of the roads, hundreds of elderly people and children were compelled to spend the night in the open. On this day, too, the lions and other dangerous carnivora in the city's famous Zoo were destroyed, in case any should escape as the result of the bombardment.

Meanwhile, the German artillery was brought into position across the Nethe, and though exposed to a constant fire from the British naval guns and the guns of the inner ring of forts, succeeded in establishing itself. In the evening, several shells were dropped into the suburb of Berchem, and several civilians were killed. For some hours afterwards the fire from the forts was exceedingly active, but towards ten o'clock it ceased.

On the west side, the Germans on this day forced a passage across the Scheldt at Termonde, and also further west at Schoonaerde and Wetteren, in the face of a most determined opposition. Their advance was especially strong at Schoonaerde, where some of the most severe fighting of the whole Belgian campaign took place. The line of the river was, however, too long for the depleted and thoroughly fatigued Belgian troops to hold, and a retirement became necessary towards the line of St. Nicholas, Lokeren, and Ghent. This success of the enemy over the field army completely changed the aspect of affairs for the Antwerp garrison. There appeared the greatest danger of their being completely enveloped, and a retreat was imperative if the garrison was to be saved for further service. It was therefore immediately decided in view of the facts that the city could not be held, and that as the relief operations on the western side had failed, to evacuate Antwerp as soon as could be done. The British General requested that the Marines and Naval Brigades should act as the rearguard, but General de Guise decided to retain this honour for his own troops, who had fought with consistent and admirable pertinacity against very superior odds. Preparations for the retreat were immediately made.

THE BOMBARDMENT OF THE CITY.

During the day the Commander of the attacking force, in accordance with the Hague Convention, sent to the garrison an intimation that it was his intention to bombard the city, to which General de Guise replied that he would take the responsibility for the bombardment. Earlier

than this, General von Beseler had undertaken that, as far as was compatible with the usage of modern weapons of war, the cathedral and other public buildings in the town would be spared.

At midnight precisely the bombardment began, and continued without intermission, but not heavily, till five o'clock in the morning, when it ceased for two hours. Six-inch common shell and incendiary shells were used, and considerable damage was done, especially in the south-east side of the town, and in the suburb of Berchem. In the Rue de Justice, which had already suffered severely from the Zeppelin bomb attack in August, no fewer than six houses were alight at one time, and owing to the scarcity of water no attempt was made to extinguish these or any other fires. Comparatively few civilians were killed during the night, but owing to the enormous exodus of the following day, when hundreds were lost to their friends, it has been difficult to ascertain the exact number.

Throughout the night fierce fighting went on constantly near the inner ring of forts, which were maintained intact till the evening of Thursday, the 8th, when forts 3 and 4 were captured. By this time, however, a large proportion of the Belgian army and the majority of the British force had crossed the Scheldt by the pontoon bridge, and retired towards the coast.

THE FLIGHT OF THE PEOPLE.

The happenings of this day were among the most extraordinary in human history. Alarmed at the stories of German atrocities in other parts of the country, unnerved by the bombardment, and desolated by the suddenness of the defeat which had come upon their strong town, almost the entire population—augmented by refugees from the surrounding villages to nearly half a million people—took to flight. By dawn thousands were collected on the quayside ready to board any and every available craft, and a close procession, which stretched nearly twenty miles to the Dutch frontier, poured out of the town. Every available vehicle was commandeered, and almost every bite of portable food was taken from the city. The streets were absolutely deserted, except for the long train of Belgian artillery and ambulances which stretched along the quay ready to cross the pontoon bridge, which was reserved almost solely for the use of the military and those few civilians—about 900 in all—who remained, and who for the most part secured themselves during the day and the following night, when the bombardment was very heavy, in the cellars of their houses. Early on Thursday morning the Belgian rearguard began to destroy, as far as possible, all military stores and food supplies in the city, and they set fire to the huge petroleum tanks on the west side of the river, in which the whole oil supply of Belgium and the lower Rhine provinces were stored. These burned continuously for nearly thirty-six hours, lighting up the whole city and country during the night, and covering the sky with a great cloud of smoke during the day. Lighters loaded with corn and tinned provisions were sunk in the river; and although it was not possible to complete the work of destruction, only a tithe of the city's huge stores was allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy. The cylinders of thirty-four German steamers detained in the port at the commencement of the war were destroyed.

During the night a stern rearguard action was fought round the inner ring of forts, where some part of the garrison elected to remain. The rest of the army crossed the pontoon bridge before nine o'clock in the morning, and the bridge was then blown up.

One feature of the siege must not be omitted. In Antwerp, whatever may have been the case elsewhere, the enemy was well supplied with information from inside. Spies were known to abound, and though exhaustive search was made and hundreds were arrested they succeeded in sending out information till the last. Two persons wearing the red cross were shot behind the English trenches on the last day, after being detected in signalling to the enemy, and on the retreat two cases of treachery, which almost proved disastrous, were punished with death.

On the day of the evacuation the German enveloping movement to the west of the city was pushed forward rapidly, and continuous fighting occurred on the south of the Belgian line of march. A large part of the retreating army was almost entrapped at Lokeren, where a matter of an hour or two only elapsed between their passing and the entrance of the Germans, while almost the whole force left in the city during the night of Thursday was cut off and forced over the Dutch frontier—among them the greater part of the First Naval Brigade, amounting to nearly 2,000 men. The majority of these crossed the frontier at Hulst, but some were arrested in the Dutch territorial waters of the Scheldt, where they were taken to Bath, disarmed, and interned. Nearly 18,000 Belgian troops crossed the frontier on the same day, and were also interned.

The fall of Antwerp was a terrible blow to Belgium. So long as it was theirs, the Belgians, however grave their sufferings might be, had a noble and historic city to rally their national hopes and to animate their resolution to be free. The difference when Antwerp was lost was between an embodied and disembodied ideal. Its sacredness was not diminished, but all its wealth and circumstance was gone, and nothing remained but the poverty of life eating its bread with tears. Not since


the days of Nebuchadnezzar and the Captivity has a whole nation suffered so much at the hands of another as Belgium. A million people—about a sixth of the entire population of the country—became refugees in the first two months of the war. Of these, about half fled to Holland; a great number, especially from the Ardennes, to France; and more than 100,000 to this country, where those who were not of military age were given shelter and food, and work if it could be found for them. Nor was the plight of the Belgians who remained at home better. Industry and trade, except such as may be stimulated by an army of occupation, was at a standstill, and unemployment was almost general. There was a serious scarcity of food, and had it not been for the Americans, who made arrangements for the distribution of food under a guarantee that it should not be diverted to the use of the army of occupation, famine would have been added to the other tribulations of the country.

The German occupation of Antwerp and of the Belgian coast brought the war nearer to England than anything that had yet happened. There was deep regret that we had been able to do so little to save Antwerp, but, as the next chapter will show, our intentions were much greater than we were able to perform. The attacks on the policy of sending an expedition to the assistance of Antwerp have already been discussed. They were, in fact, made in ignorance of the fine strategic scheme of Sir John French, which was not revealed till later. But, in any case, we could not let Antwerp fall without doing something, whether on the ground of our own interest or of our obligation to Belgium. For the fall of Antwerp, as events were to show, meant the loss of the Belgian coast-line too; and though Antwerp could not—owing to the fact that the entrance to the Scheldt is Dutch territorial waters—be made a naval base, other Belgian ports both could and were.



The last act of a tragedy: A photograph taken on the last boat leaving Ostend for England.

[Central News.]



A stretch of flooded country near Nieuport.

[Central News.]



The ruins of Nieuport Cathedral after the bombardment.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



[Newspaper Illustrations.]

The King of the Belgians at the historic review of French and Belgian troops at Furnes.

CHAPTER XXIX.

FROM THE AISNE TO FLANDERS.

THE NEW BRITISH TURNING MOVEMENT—THE TRANSFERENCE FROM THE AISNE—THE RETREAT FROM ANTWERP—THE GERMAN COAST CAMPAIGN—GERMAN FAILURES ON THE YSER.

IN the three weeks that followed the battle of the Aisne, the war had gone badly for the Allies. In the east, St. Mihiel had been captured; in the centre, the French flanking movement had failed; and in Belgium, Antwerp had fallen. All this time the British army had been entrenched north of the Aisne, successfully resisting the German attacks, but unable to make further progress. At the beginning of October, Sir John French decided that the best chance of success against the Germans lay in bringing the greatest possible force to bear on the northern flank of the French western army, and he proposed to General Joffre that the British army should be withdrawn from the Aisne and begin operations in Flanders. A great flanking movement of this character was naturally dear to the heart of a famous cavalry leader; in spirit it was closely akin to his famous ride round Cronje's positions at Magersfontein to the relief of Kimberley. The strategical idea of placing the whole British army on the German flank in Belgium—where the mythical Russians of English rumours should have been—was finely conceived, and its brilliancy was none the less great because it had already in another form in the earlier stages of the war caught the popular imagination.

The prospects of success would have been much greater if the movement could have been begun a week or ten days earlier, but it is doubtful whether our position on the north bank of the Aisne was sufficiently secure then, and whether there were any troops then available to take their place if they had been withdrawn. Moreover, it was necessary that the French movement to the west should have made progress before it was possible to think of transporting the British army so far north. But even at the beginning of October the prospects of success still seemed good, for though the German movement against Antwerp had begun by then, the number of troops engaged in it was still not large—60,000 is the estimate made in the last chapter in the account of the siege—and at that time the total strength of the German army in Belgium did not in all probability exceed 150,000. It was reasonable, therefore, to hope that the British army of three army corps, with the Indian contingents that were now arriving, and with the prospect of assistance from the Belgian army at Antwerp, which was expected to hold out at any rate for some weeks, would be able to beat back the attack on Antwerp, and to achieve very important results against the main German army.



Soldiers of the Chasseurs d'Afrique advancing over the sand dunes near Nieuport.

[Central News.]

SIR JOHN FRENCH'S PLANS.


At the end of the first week in October the prospects were clouded, for Antwerp was on the point of surrender, and one advantage on which Sir John French had probably counted in his original plans was about to be lost. It was, however, felt to be important that the Belgian army should not be lost with the city, and in addition to the Naval Brigade a division of British troops, under Sir Henry Rawlinson, had been landed to assist in the retirement of the Belgian army. Sir John French, therefore, felt that though Antwerp were lost he might still count on the Belgian army, and on the division under Sir Henry Rawlinson. He, therefore, refused to be discouraged by the German successes at Antwerp, and on October 8th he had an interview with General Foch, who had been placed in command of all the French armies on the west front, and made final arrangements with him. General Foch had two French armies, the Ninth, under General Castelnau, and the Tenth, under General Maudhuy, who were extended on a line reaching from Noyon almost to Lille, and there were besides further north French Territorial troops, who, however, did not prove to be of much assistance. It was arranged at the interview that the road from Bethune to Lille was to be the dividing line between the British and French armies, the French to the south of the line and the British to the north.

The withdrawal of an army in face of an active enemy is always a difficult operation, but it was accomplished successfully. The first to leave was the Second Corps, under General Smith-Dorrien. It left the Aisne on October 3rd, and was due to arrive at Bethune, on the left of the Tenth French Army, on October 11th. After, it left the Third Corps, under General Pulteney, due to arrive at St. Omer on the 12th, and then to take its place on the left of the Second Corps, with cavalry maintaining connection between them. The First Army Corps was not due to leave or arrive for a week later. The movements were all carried out according to scheduled time, and

the places of the British troops were taken as they left the Aisne by French Territorials. The distance between the Aisne and St. Omer is about 100 miles, and the time taken for the transference was roughly about a week. The transport of seven divisions, with all their impedimenta, is a very big operation for a single line of railway, which is all that seems to have been used. The number of trains necessary has been worked out at thirty-eight a day, which is good, but not very good. But the operation was complicated by the fact that it involved a transference of the British lines of communication from St. Nazaire to Boulogne, and that the new lines must have crossed those of the French Western Army under General Foch. When General French calls the operation a "delicate one," the success of which was due in a great measure "to the excellent feeling which exists between the British and French armies," no doubt he was thinking principally of the difficulties that must have been made for the time being by this awkward intersection.

TURNING THE TURNERS.

The diagrams (page 283) illustrate the idea that Sir John French hoped to carry out, and to which he clung in spite of repeated disappointments. He never obtained possession of the two pivots on which he hoped to make his flanking movement turn. The first of these was La Bassée, and the second Menin. As not infrequently happens in war, the army which it was sought to outflank answered by attempting to outflank its enemy. This happened at least twice in the course of the first fortnight of October. As the French army under General Foch extended north, the Germans extended faster, and so ready was the Germans' answer to the Allies when they attempted to turn the enemy's line that there seems room to doubt which was turning which, and whether the Allies were answering the Germans or the Germans the Allies. The German force which attacked Antwerp was the outer circle of a turning movement which had its




BETWEEN THE LYS AND THE SEA.



Belgian troops on the march along the coast near Ostend. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*]



German artillery advancing over the sand dunes. [*Topical War Service.*]



(1) How the British corps were transferred.

(2) The projected British turning movement.
(Shown in dotted lines.)

concentric in an inner circle. On October 8th, the French cavalry on the left of the Tenth Army was in contact with the German north-west of Lille, and a few days before German troops had been reported ascending the south bank of the Lys, crossing near Courtrai, and spreading out over Flanders, through Ypres, and across the French border to Hazebrouk, and even St. Omer. Antwerp and the Belgian coast was the outer circle, and on the shorter radius an inner circle would take Ghent, Courtrai, and Bailleul. This inner circling advance, designed primarily to turn the French, was checked by the arrival of the Second British Corps. The strategic plan of General French, as shown on the diagram, was countered by the German coast movement through Antwerp and Ostend on to the line of the Yser. It is more satisfactory to follow the progress of the British operations separately, and therefore we may conveniently describe first the progress of the German operations by the coast, which were the sequel of the fall of Antwerp. It must, however, be understood that the fighting on the Yser was only the left wing of one great Battle of Flanders that extended from the coast to La Bassée.

Antwerp fell on October 9th, and the Germans lost no time in following up their victory. The retreat of the Belgian army, which followed the line of the coast, was covered by Sir Henry Rawlinson's division, the landing of which has already been mentioned, and it suffered very few losses. On October 12th the Belgian Government was transferred to Havre, on the 14th Ostend was evacuated, four days later the Germans were past Ostend, and on October 21st they delivered their first attack on the line of the Yser. These attacks continued with intervals into December, but the heaviest fighting was at the end of October and the beginning of November. This fighting along the Yser was the left wing of a battle which tended as the month wore on to shift more and

more to the Allies' centre and right. The centre of the battle was at Ypres.

SENSATIONAL, BUT UNSOUND, GERMAN STRATEGY.

The strategy of the German coast campaign has been justly criticised, and it is believed that it was in consequence of his objections to it that Von Moltke resigned his position as Chief of the German General Staff. The Germans gave out that their object was to reach Calais, and that Calais was only a stepping-stone to an attack on England. Heavy as their losses were in this attempt, it was popular in Germany, where feeling against this country was now higher than at any time since the war began. The most eminent military writer in the German newspapers, Major Moraht, of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, declared that the greatest battle of the war was in progress, and that success in it was a matter of life and death for Germany. It is not to be supposed that the directors of German military policy had any serious project in their minds for the invasion of England when they committed themselves to this coast campaign. Their objects in wishing to gain possession of Calais were somewhat more subtle. In the first place, they put their main strength against the Belgian wing because they thought that if they could break down its resistance they would turn the British army and cut off its communications with the sea. In the second place, they hoped that the possession of Calais, and of the Belgian coast which would follow, would put them in a position to dispute our command of the Channel, on which depended our communications with France and our ability to transport the new armies which were forming. They were seriously alarmed at the prospect of heavy British reinforcements in the spring, and they thought that the best way of meeting that danger was to make the Channel unsafe, which they could do from the French ports, but not to any purpose from any port east of the British minefield




The Ruins of Pervyse, which was taken and re-taken several times by the Germans and Allies, being heavily bombarded during each attack.

[Central News.]

in the Straits. Lastly, they saw that it was necessary for the security of their position in Belgium to extend their lines to the sea. These were the motives of the Calais campaign, and they were exceedingly strong ones. To say that political not military reasons dictated the

A glance at the map of Flanders will show why of all possible ways of reaching the French coast from Belgium, the route along the coast is the worst. The whole country between Nieuport and Calais is a maze of ditches and canals. An advancing army can hardly advance for a



[Central News.]

An incident in the seizure of a Belgian town by the British : Troops scouring the streets and searching houses for German stragglers.

course of the campaign is not just without some qualification, for the Germans had the best of military reasons for wishing to obtain possession of French ports on the Channel. What is true is that German hatred and fear of England distorted their judgment on the best way of reaching Calais.

hundred yards at any part of this region without being stopped by a ditch, a dyke, or canal—not serious obstacles in themselves, but all too wide to jump across, and commanded at point-blank range by entrenchments. It had become axiomatic with French military writers that this coast route would never be used by any considerable



Refugees leaving a town near Nieuport.

[Central News.]



A squad of British wounded walking to hospital after the fighting on the dunes. [Central News.]



Germany infantry halted on the road near Dixmude.

[Central News.]

army, and both the French and the Germans neglected it completely during the invasion in August. It must have been mortifying to the Germans in November to reflect that the French coast, for which they were then vainly sacrificing so many thousands of lives, could have been theirs for the asking in August. They did their best to overcome the difficulties of advance in this enclosed country. Their men were provided with what our men called "table tops," wooden boards, which were intended to be thrown across the ditches which crossed their path and used as bridges. "They rush forward under fire, using these things as shelter, and the front ranks having bridged the obstacle, a rush follows, which usually ends in appalling slaughter. Very often they are mowed down in swathes by machine guns at a range of not more than twenty or thirty yards." In such country, moreover, it was not possible for the Germans to use their superiority in numbers. If a place had to be chosen which would give the individual valour and resource of the Belgian soldier the best possible chance of beating the superior numbers and organisation of the Germans, the country between the Yser and Calais would have been the best choice. The Germans who drew up the early plans of the war knew the difficulties of this region, and therefore left it alone. But later the sensationalism of a campaign for the possession of Calais, and the desire to dispose once for all of the Belgian army, seduced them into a plan for which on military grounds there was nothing to be said. The best way to Calais was not along the coast, but up the valley of the Lys, or past La Bassée.

THE BATTLE ON THE YSER.

The position held by the Belgians was the line of the Yser river. At first the main strength of the attack was directed against the end of the line nearest the sea, but here the British Navy was able to give the defence most effective assistance. Five monitors which were building in this country for Brazil were acquired by the Admiralty, and their shallow draught enabled them to go quite close inshore and to rake the positions of the attackers from the flank. Even more valuable was the assistance given by the French. Sir Henry Rawlinson's division, which had covered the Belgian retreat from Antwerp, had now

taken its place in the British line further to the south, and had it not been for the French reinforcements the Belgian army, shaken by its experiences at Antwerp and by a retreat which if it was not harassed by the Germans must have been exceedingly trying to their *moral*, might have been overwhelmed by the German attack before it had time to reorganise. After the failure of their attack near the sea, the Germans attempted to cross the Yser, half way between Nieuport and Dixmude. The critical days were Friday and Saturday, the 23rd and 24th. On the first day the Germans effected a crossing near Ramskapelle, but the Belgians received early information, and were able to concentrate and to drive the enemy back. Next day, however, it seemed that the line of the Yser had been lost, for the Germans crossed the river not at one but at several points. The losses on both sides were very heavy. But it was after the passage that the difficulties of the country began to tell against the Germans. They could gain and even hold positions on the west side of the river, but to debouch from them was they found to be impossible. On the 30th the Belgians dammed the lower reaches of the Yser, and so caused extensive floods, which further restricted the front on which the Germans could advance. Later, they opened the sluices on a very extensive scale, and as the heavy autumn rains had now set in the German positions at the bridge-heads which they held were islands, from which an attack could only be delivered by wading shoulder deep. The Germans persisted in their attacks, and on November 10th they succeeded in carrying Dixmude itself. But it was already evident that even when they succeeded in crossing the river they could not make any use of the points they won on the far bank, and the weight of the attack shifted further inland.

The German attempt to outflank the Allies by the coast had definitely failed, thanks to the heroism of the Belgian army, which never showed to better advantage than in this fighting along the Yser, to the promptness with which the French brought up reinforcements when affairs were critical, and also to the gunnery of the British Navy.

We must now turn to the fortunes of the battle on the centre and right, where the British were engaged.

APPENDIX.

THE COMPOSITION OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

It is now permitted to give the composition of the Expeditionary Force as it was constituted when its landing on French soil was officially announced on August 17th. Since that landing it has, of course, been very strongly reinforced. Our army on the Continent then contained, for example, no Indian corps or Territorial battalions. Some of the units not mentioned in the subsequent list, but the names of which have appeared in the official casualty lists, are added at the end, but it is not professed that this second list is a complete record of additional regiments mentioned in official announcements.

The original Expeditionary Force consisted of:—

Cavalry Division (1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Brigades and divisional troops) and the 5th Cavalry Brigade with attached troops.

1st, 2nd, and 3rd Divisions (1st-9th Infantry Brigades) and 5th Division (13th-15th Infantry Brigades) with Divisional troops.

Five battalions of infantry as line of communication defence troops.

CAVALRY DIVISION.

1ST CAVALRY BRIGADE.—2nd Dragoon Guards, 5th Dragoon Guards, 11th Hussars, and 1st Signal Troop.

2ND CAVALRY BRIGADE.—4th Dragoon Guards, 9th Lancers, 18th Hussars, and 2nd Signal Troop.

3RD CAVALRY BRIGADE.—4th Hussars, 5th Lancers, 16th Lancers, and 3rd Signal Troop.

4TH CAVALRY BRIGADE.—Composite Regiment (Household Cavalry), 6th Dragoon Guards, 3rd Hussars, and 4th Signal Troop.

Cavalry Divisional Troops.

CAVALRY DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY.—III. and VII. Brigade Royal Horse Artillery.

CAVALRY DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS.—1st Field Squadron.

CAVALRY DIVISIONAL SIGNAL SERVICE.—1st Signal Squadron.

CAVALRY DIVISIONAL ARMY SERVICE CORPS.—Headquarters Cavalry Divisional Army Service Corps.

CAVALRY DIVISIONAL MEDICAL UNITS.—1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Cavalry Field Ambulance.

5TH CAVALRY BRIGADE AND ATTACHED TROOPS.—2nd Dragoons, 12th Lancers, 20th Hussars, J. Battery Royal Horse Artillery and Ammunition Column, 4th Field Transport, 5th Signal Troop, and 5th Cavalry Field Ambulance.

FIRST DIVISION.

1ST INFANTRY BRIGADE.—1st Battalion Coldstream Guards, 1st Battalion Scots Guards, 1st Battalion Royal Highlanders, and 2nd Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers.

2ND INFANTRY BRIGADE.—2nd Battalion Royal Sussex Regiment, 1st Battalion Northampton Regiment, 1st Battalion North Lancashire Regiment, and 2nd Battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps.

3RD INFANTRY BRIGADE.—1st Battalion Royal West Surrey Regiment, 1st Battalion South Wales Borderers, 1st Battalion Gloucester Regiment, and 2nd Battalion Welsh Regiment.

Divisional Troops.

DIVISIONAL CAVALRY.—1st Squadron 15th Hussars.

DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY.—XXV., XXVI., and XXXIX. Brigades Royal Field Artillery, XLIII. Brigade Royal Field Artillery (Howitzer), 26th (Heavy) Battery Royal Garrison Artillery and Ammunition Column, and 1st Divisional Ammunition Column.

DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS.—23rd and 26th Field Company Royal Engineers.

DIVISIONAL SIGNAL SERVICE.—1st Signal Company.

DIVISIONAL ARMY SERVICE CORPS.—1st Divisional Train.

DIVISIONAL MEDICAL UNITS.—1st, 2nd, and 3rd Field Ambulance.

SECOND DIVISION.

4TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.—2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards, 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards, 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards, and 1st Battalion Irish Guards.

5TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.—2nd Battalion Worcester Regiment, 2nd Battalion Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, 2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry, and 2nd Battalion Connaught Rangers.

6TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.—1st Battalion Liverpool Regiment, 2nd Battalion South Staffordshire Regiment, 1st Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment, and 1st Battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps.

Divisional Troops.

DIVISIONAL CAVALRY.—1st Squadron 15th Hussars.

DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY.—XXXIV., XXXVI., and XLII. Brigades Royal Field Artillery, XLIV. Brigade Royal Field Artillery (Howitzer), 35th (Heavy) Battery Royal Garrison Artillery and Ammunition Column, and 2nd Divisional Ammunition Column.

DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS.—5th and 11th Field Company Royal Engineers.

DIVISIONAL SIGNAL SERVICE.—2nd Signal Company.

DIVISIONAL ARMY SERVICE CORPS.—2nd Divisional Train.

DIVISIONAL MEDICAL UNITS.—4th, 5th, and 6th Field Ambulance.

THIRD DIVISION.

7TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.—3rd Battalion Worcester Regiment, 2nd Battalion South Lancashire Regiment, 1st Battalion Wiltshire Regiment, and 2nd Battalion Royal Irish Rifles.

8TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.—2nd Battalion Royal Scots, 2nd Battalion Royal Irish Regiment, 4th Battalion Middlesex Regiment, and 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders.

9TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.—1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, 4th Battalion Royal Fusiliers, 1st Battalion Lincolnshire Regiment, and 1st Battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers.

Divisional Troops.

DIVISIONAL CAVALRY.—One Squadron 15th Hussars.

DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY.—XXIII., XL., and XLII. Brigades Royal Field Artillery, XXX. Brigade Royal Field Artillery (Howitzer), 48th (Heavy) Battery Royal Garrison Artillery and Ammunition Column, and 3rd Divisional Ammunition Column.

DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS.—56th and 57th Field Company Royal Engineers.

DIVISIONAL ARMY SERVICE CORPS.—3rd Divisional Train.

DIVISIONAL MEDICAL UNITS.—7th, 8th, and 9th Field Ambulance.

FIFTH DIVISION.

13TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.—2nd Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers, 2nd Battalion West Riding Regiment, 1st Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment, and 2nd Battalion Yorkshire Light Infantry.

14TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.—2nd Battalion Suffolk Regiment, 1st Battalion East Surrey Regiment, 1st Battalion Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, and 2nd Battalion Manchester Regiment.

15TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.—1st Battalion Norfolk Regiment, 1st Battalion Bedfordshire Regiment, 1st Battalion Cheshire Regiment, and 1st Battalion Dorset Regiment.

Divisional Troops.

DIVISIONAL CAVALRY.—One Squadron 19th Hussars.

DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY.—XV., XXVII., and XXVIII. Brigades Royal Field Artillery, VIII. Brigade Royal Field Artillery (Howitzer), 108th (Heavy) Battery Royal Garrison Artillery and Ammunition Column, and 5th Divisional Ammunition Column.

DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS.—17th and 59th Field Company Royal Engineers.

DIVISIONAL SIGNAL SERVICE.—5th Signal Company.

DIVISIONAL ARMY SERVICE CORPS.—5th Divisional Train.

DIVISIONAL MEDICAL UNITS.—13th, 14th, and 15th Field Ambulance.

LINE OF COMMUNICATION DEFENCE TROOPS.

INFANTRY UNITS.—1st Battalion Middlesex Regiment, 2nd Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 2nd Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 1st Battalion Scottish Rifles, and 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment.

OTHER UNITS.

Other units which have been mentioned in despatches or in the casualty lists are given below. It should be noted that in several instances a regiment has been included on the ground that one of its officers has been named in the casualty lists. Such regiments (except in the case of the Indian Corps) are indicated by an asterisk. It is possible, of course, that the officer in question was on special service or was attached temporarily to some other unit.

TERRITORIALS.

Northumberland Yeomanry, Northants Yeomanry, North Somerset Yeomanry, Leicestershire Yeomanry, Oxford Yeomanry, *Bucks Yeomanry, *Derbyshire Yeomanry, London Scottish, *Liverpool Scottish, Queen's Westminster, Hertfordshire Regiment, Honourable Artillery Company, Essex Royal Horse Artillery.

INDIAN ARMY.

2nd Lancers, 11th Lancers, 14th Lancers, 15th Lancers, 18th Lancers, 10th Lancers, 31st Lancers, 21st Cavalry, 22nd Cavalry, 26th Cavalry, 27th Cavalry, 34th Poona Horse, and 39th C. India Horse.
1st Gurkha Rifles, 2nd Gurkhas, 3rd Gurkhas, 8th Gurkhas, 9th Gurkhas, 3rd Brahmans, 9th Bhopal Infantry, 15th Sikhs, 30th Pathans, 35th Sikhs, 47th Sikhs, 57th Wilde's Rifles, 48th Vaughan's Rifles, 50th Scinde Rifles, 41st Dogras, 39th Garhwal Rifles, 127th Baluchi L.I., and 129th Baluchis.
23rd Sikh Pioneers, 34th Sikh Pioneers, 107th Pioneers, Supply Transport Corps, and 3rd Sappers and Miners.

REGULARS.

Border Regiment, *Cambridge Regiment, Durham Light Infantry, Essex Regiment, Lancashire Fusiliers, 1st Royal Dragoons, 1st Dragoon Guards, *3rd Dragoon Guards, 7th Dragoon Guards, 7th Hussars, 10th Hussars, 13th Hussars, *14th Hussars, Hampshire Regiment, East Kent Regiment, Leicestershire Regiment, 21st Lancers, East Lancashire Regiment, K.O. Royal Lancaster Regiment, Rifle Brigade, Somerset Light Infantry, Shropshire Light Infantry, North Staffordshire Regiment, Warwickshire Regiment, York and Lancaster Regiment, Yorkshire Regiment, West Yorkshire Regiment, East Yorkshire Regiment, and Sherwood Foresters.
Cameron Highlanders and Seaforth Highlanders.
Dublin Fusiliers, Inniskilling Fusiliers, Irish Fusiliers, the Irish Regiment, and *North Irish Horse.



A damaged quarter in Lille after the German bombardment.

[Alfieri Picture Service.]

CHAPTER XXX.

THE BATTLE IN FLANDERS.


MARLBOROUGH AND THE PRESENT CAMPAIGN—THE FAILURE OF THE ATTACK ON LILLE—THE IMPORTANCE OF MENIN—FIGHTING FROM YPRES TO LA BASSEE—THE GREAT BATTLE OF OCTOBER 29TH TO 31ST—THE ATTACK OF THE PRUSSIAN GUARDS—DEATH OF LORD ROBERTS.

THE strategic objects of General French in moving his army from the Aisne into Flanders have already (page 280) been discussed. We have seen how the Germans countered the attempts of General Foch to turn their right, and how their concentration at Tergnier against General Foch was the hub of a great wheeling movement, of which the army which besieged and captured Antwerp was the outside rim. We have also seen how the advance of the coast movement was stayed on the banks of the Yser. It remains to follow the course of events between the Yser and the left wing of the French army of the west, under General Foch. Here, the British army was engaged under a strain as intense as Badajoz or Albuera, and far more prolonged. British and German armies strove to turn the wheel in opposite directions, each straining for the leverage of the outside position.

The withdrawal from the Aisne took place in the night. As the French came forward to take their places, the British evacuated their trenches, climbing down the steep, grassy banks to the river, which they crossed by plank roadways of floating or repaired bridges, and made their way to the railway station. As the withdrawal took a fortnight in all, it is most unlikely that the Germans failed to detect it, and the probability is that they divined

the whole movement quite early, and made their preparations to meet it. At any rate, there seems no apparent reason why the British, who had to withdraw from trenches in places not more than 400 yards from those of the enemy, had any better chance of concealing their movements than the French, who, when they began their movement round the German flank in the direction of Peronne, laboured under no such disadvantages. Whether the Germans had early information of the movement, or had themselves conceived the idea of turning the Allies, and begun to execute it before our own movement was under weigh, certain it is that there is nowhere visible in our operations any evidence of our taking the Germans by surprise. As soon as even the first British corps to leave the Aisne had come into contact with the Germans it had strong forces to meet, and the advance had not been pressed very far before they became greatly superior in numbers.

Marlbrough, more than two hundred years before, had fought over the same ground. In 1708, after the Battle of Oudenarde, Marlborough laid siege to Lille, and, having taken it, prepared to invade France. The French General, Marshal Villars, constructed a strong line of entrenchments from Douai, on the Scarpe, to the River Lys, and these entrenchments were known as the lines



THE COUNTRY ROUND YPRES AND LILLE.



British artillery on the march over snow-covered ground in Flanders. [Universal Photo Exchange.]

of La Bassée. Readers of Marlborough's campaigns will remember how Marlborough set out from Lille as though to attack the lines of La Bassée, and ostentatiously sent his heavy artillery to Menin, and how, having deceived the enemy by these preparations, he suddenly turned east and captured Tournai, the garrison of which had been reduced to reinforce Menin, afterwards marching still further east to fight the battle of Malplaquet, near Mons. It is certain that Sir John French, knowing the campaigns of Marlborough in the Low Countries so well, would be influenced by his strategy. His first object was to gain possession of La Bassée and Lille. And towards these points the Second Army Corps, which was the first to leave the Aisne, was directed.

THE POSITION AT LA BASSEE.

On October 11th, the Cavalry, under General Gough, which was on the left of the Second Corps, came into contact with the enemy, who were holding some woods north of the canal from Bethune to Aire. The enemy already overlapped the left of General Foch's army, and had the Second Corps not come up, the French must soon have been in serious difficulties. Evidently, Sir John French had little idea that the enemy were so far forward at this point, for, in his conversation with General Foch only three days before, he had arranged that his army should pivot on the French left and take the enemy in flank. The Germans had forestalled all that, and were already on the French flank. The country, as Marlborough well knew, is extraordinarily difficult. It is like Lancashire in the Fens. Everywhere the soil is damp and clayey, and the countryside is intersected by rivers and canals, all providing opportunities for the defence. In addition, it is littered with works and factories, coal mines and slag heaps. The flatness of the country made it difficult

to find artillery positions, and the one hill in the neighbourhood was at La Bassée, which was held in great strength by the enemy. Marlborough had despaired of carrying the lines of La Bassée from the north side, and two hundred years later they were found as desperate to attack from the south and west. General Smith-Dorrien decided against a frontal attack, and tried to throw his army between La Bassée and Lille, in the direction of Fournes, a suburb of Lille on its south-west side. The right wing of the corps was at Givenchy, on the north bank of the canal, held up in front of the impregnable position on the hill of La Bassée, and General Smith-Dorrien began on the 13th to wheel round his left on the pivot of Givenchy. The fighting was of a most desperate description. On the 13th the Dorsets lost their commanding officer, Major Roper, and had 400 casualties, 130 of them killed, west of the road running south from Estaires. On the next day the Third Division lost its Commander, General Hubert Hamilton, an officer of great ability. As though to avenge the death of their Commander, the Division surpassed itself on the following day, and drove the enemy, disputing the passage of every dyke and every village street, to the east of the Estaires road. The progress was continued for three more days. On the 16th, the left flank was in front of Aubers, and at dark on the 17th the Lincolns and the Royal Fusiliers carried the village of Herlies at the point of the bayonet. Up to now the opposing forces had been fairly equal, though the Germans had the advantage of position and of the defensive; but on the 19th the Germans were very heavily reinforced, and very shortly afterwards they outnumbered the attack by two to one. Against the single British Corps there were now the whole of the Wurtemberg (Fourteenth) Corps, half of the Seventh (Münster) Corps, and a Brigade of the Third (Berlin)



[Exclusive News Agency.]

A general view of Lille—the Manchester of France.

Corps, besides a great numerical superiority in cavalry, which was now beginning to fight dismounted, owing to the broken character of the country. On the 20th, the Royal Irish Regiment, which had carried a village on our left front with great dash on the previous day, was overwhelmed by the German reinforcements, and surrounded. Two days later a violent attack was delivered against the Fifth Division, and Violaines, on our right, and west of the Estaires road, was captured. It was a very critical moment, for had our right been driven in much further, the left—exhausted with continuous fighting and weakened by the losses of the Irish Regiment—would have been in danger of being surrounded. Fortunately, the Worcesters and the Manchesters (Third and Second Battalions respectively) came to the rescue, and the advance of the enemy on our right wing was checked. Even so, General Smith-Dorrien, in view of the enemy's reinforcements and the loss of ground at Violaines, fell back on Neuve Chapelle. The attack on Lille had failed.

GENERAL RAWLINSON AND THE SEVENTH DIVISION.

It is time now to turn to the fortunes of the Third Corps, under General Pulteney. On October 11th, when General Smith-Dorrien came into contact with the Germans north of the Aire Canal, General Pulteney had completed the detainment of his Corps at St. Omer, and two days later began to move on Armentières. The idea was that he should occupy the Ypres road as far as Wytschaete. Between Armentières and the right of General Smith-Dorrien's Army there was a considerable interval, but this was occupied by a French Cavalry Corps, under General Conneau. But on this portion, too, of the line the Germans overlapped. They were in force at Meteren, west of Bailleul, which was on a line with the Estaires road, on which the left of General Smith-Dorrien's army rested. Attacked and beaten, they fell back on the 18th to the south bank of the Lys, and occupied a position running from Radinghem to Werwicq. Sir John French, however, was by this time concerned by the strength of the opposition which General Smith-Dorrien was meeting, and anxious to strengthen his left. Accordingly, he called in General Rawlinson's Division, which, as has already been seen (page 283), had been assisting in the retirement of the Belgian army from Antwerp.

This Seventh Division had such an important part in the strategic scheme that its movements are worth following in some detail. The exact date of its landing in Belgium has not been made public, and indeed the secrecy which was maintained about the expedition, and about the very existence of the force, was very remarkable. But the Third Cavalry Division, under General Byng, which was attached to it, is known to have landed at Zeebrugge on October 6th, and on the 9th it was at Thorout, and the next day moved out in the direction of Bruges.* On the 12th, the Headquarters of the two Divisions (Infantry and Cavalry) were at Roulers. Some French troops were already in the town, having driven out a small garrison of German troops, and they were joined on the next day by the Seventh Division, whose stay, however, was very short, for very early on the 14th it moved out towards Ypres. At this time, it will be seen, the situation was exceedingly promising, for at Roulers the left wing of the Allies was well thrown forward; and had it been in sufficient strength to hold the road and railway from Roulers to Menin, the objects of Sir John French's movement had a good chance of being

achieved. Unfortunately, the Germans were now gathering in strength. On the 16th, Roulers was attacked, a great number of civilians were killed in the bombardment, and two days later the town was re-occupied by the Germans. The French troops (who were, apparently, Territorials) fell back on Ypres. The Seventh Division, with the Cavalry (under General Byng), was now in a position ranging in a semicircle round the front of Ypres—a name to be for ever memorable in the history of the British army. At this time—October 16th—the number of German troops in the direction of Antwerp was still small, and Sir John French's main anxiety was to support his Second Corps, which was engaged in very heavy fighting. Accordingly, he instructed General Pulteney to keep in touch with General Smith-Dorrien, on his right, while placing himself astride the Lys.

Much depended on General Rawlinson at this time. In front of Ypres he overlapped the German line on the north, which was the position in which Sir John French hoped in time to put his whole army. The Commander-in-Chief could not at such a time but think of the campaign of Marlborough after Oudenarde, in which he feinted on Menin and attacked Tournai, much to the surprise of Villars. Menin was now the key of the situation. Not only did it command an important passage over the Lys, but through it passed an important railway connection with Lille, and though the seizure of the line would not have severed the railway communications of Lille with the base, it would have cut direct communications between North-west Belgium and the rest of the German army, and would have impeded the passage of reinforcements which by now had begun to concentrate against the army of General Smith-Dorrien in front of La Bassée. At Ypres General Rawlinson was—geographically at any rate—in a most favourable position to occupy Menin, and, next to the capture of La Bassée, it was the most important success that could have been gained by the Allies at this time. General Rawlinson's force was weak, but he was supported in Ypres by French Territorial troops, which it was hoped might be sufficient to hold the town while the British took Menin. It was most unfortunate that the First Corps had not arrived as yet from the Aisne, for then Sir John French's difficulties might have been solved, and his great flanking movement which up to now had been dogged by ill-luck—the fall of Antwerp had been a great blow to his plans—might have been crowned with success, and Sir John French would have gone down to history as a second Marlborough. Unfortunately, the First Corps did not reach St. Omer till the 18th, two days later. From the 16th, when Sir Henry Rawlinson's Division took up its position before Ypres, to the 19th, the Germans were pouring reinforcements into Belgium. On the 18th, when Sir John French directed General Rawlinson to seize Menin, these reinforcements were gathering strength before the British near La Bassée, and there were reports that the enemy was massing between Ostend and Bruges.


It was a difficult choice for General Rawlinson whether, in view of the menace from the north—which later turned out to be of extreme gravity—he should consolidate his position in front of Ypres, or should take a great risk for the sake of the great gain of Menin. He decided in favour of the first alternative. Sir John French did not blame him for this decision, but he was disappointed. By two days—for on the 19th the First Corps had arrived—he was baulked of a success which might have made the difference between strategic failure and brilliant success. "Sir Henry Rawlinson," he writes, "probably exercised a wise discretion in not committing

* The Seventh Division (Fourth Army Corps) is probably, therefore, shown too far to the east in the diagram on page 283.



The result of the German bombardment of Ypres.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



The Town Hall, Ypres, in flames as the result of the German shell fire.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

his troops to this attack"—that is, on Menin—"in their somewhat weakened condition, but the result was that the enemy's continued possession of the passage at Menin certainly facilitated his rapid reinforcement of his troops, and this rendered any further advance impracticable." On the 19th, when the First Corps arrived, the British advance on the right, near La Bassée and Armentières, was held up, and in the next few days, as we have seen, the Second Corps, so far from being able to advance, was hard put to it to maintain its line from being broken, and had to withdraw from hardly-won positions.

SIR JOHN FRENCH'S DECISION.

As the First Corps, under Sir Douglas Haig, was coming to the front from St. Omer, Sir John French had to make a decision of the greatest moment. He believed that the German reinforcements had gone against our right over the Lys, and he could not be free from anxiety—which the events of the next few days was to deepen—lest our line there might be broken, and once more spill the German invasion over Western France between Paris and the sea. Should he divert the First Army Corps to their relief, and, giving up the ambitious project of turning the German lines, play for safety? A general less bold by temperament would have been tempted to do so. But, after all, was it safe to leave his left unsupported? Might not the Germans, if he left that flank unprotected, leave his reinforced right alone, and transfer their strength to an attack between it and the sea? The Belgian army was still shaken by the retreat from Antwerp, and might not be able, even with such reinforcements as the French could spare, to resist such an attack if made in great force. It is difficult, perhaps, to disentangle Sir John French's account of the arguments which weighed with him from the knowledge acquired later of what the Germans actually did. But it seems clear that he can hardly at this time—at the beginning of the third week in October—have guessed that the Germans would attack in such overwhelming strength as they did. On the whole, it seems likely that he still thought that there was a chance of carrying out his original scheme (see the diagram on page 283), and that Sir Douglas Haig would not be opposed north of Ypres by many more troops than had been engaged in the siege of Antwerp. His decision to persist in his plan was not based on very accurate information of the enemy's strength, and it must have been assisted by the arrival on the 20th October of the First (Lahore) Division of the Indian contingent, which was at once rushed up to the support of General Smith-Dorrien at Neuve Chapelle. But whether all his reasons were sound or not, his decision was wise. The probability is that the Germans reckoned on his diverting all his available force to support his right, and attacked that wing with the more violence in the hope that a way might be left open for them in the north. They did not know their man. "I fully realised the task which lay before us, and the onerous rôle which the British army was called upon to fulfil. . . . No more arduous task has ever been assigned to British soldiers, and in all their splendid history there is no instance of their having answered so magnificently to the desperate calls which of necessity were made upon them." From a man to whom the adjective is as a rule the enemy of the noun, and still more of the verb, this is praise indeed.

On October 19th, then, the advance of Sir Douglas Haig's Army Corps began. His instructions were to advance through Ypres to Thorout, along the roads by which ten days before the Seventh Division had marched, while covering the retreat of the Belgian army

from Antwerp, in the hope of capturing Bruges, and, if possible, of driving the enemy back on Ghent. Should the enemy prove stronger than was expected, he was to decide, after passing Ypres, whether to push on and attack the enemy to the north or to the east.

BREAKDOWN OF THE BRITISH OFFENSIVE.

The enemy was found to be in very great strength. On October 21st, Sir Douglas Haig, who had passed through Ypres, attacked the enemy, who were holding a line through Passchendaele on the road to Roulers. On his left were French Territorials, and on his right the Seventh Division, under General Rawlinson. The Germans were in occupation of the Houthulst Forest, from which they threatened our left flank; but the attack made good progress until the early afternoon, when the French on the left received orders to retire, doubtless because of the threats from the forest. The Seventh Division, on the right, was also in difficulties, and made no progress. As a result our line at the end of the day was convex, curving round through Langhemarcq, with the tips of the curve thrown back at Bixschoote and Zonnebeke. Thus was formed the famous bastion of Ypres, where our line for months retained its semicircular form. These bulging convexities were a familiar feature of the defence lines on both sides. The German positions at La Bassée were another example, and yet others were the Schoorbakke bulge on the Yser, that of Messines and St. Eloi, which was presently to be made between Ypres and Armentières, and, more famous still, that of St. Mihiel in the defence on the Heights of the Meuse. They marked the places where the opposing line had been bent, but not broken.

At the beginning of the last week of October it was obvious that our offensive movement had broken down, and that we should do well to hold our positions. We were heavily outnumbered at every point along our line. In front of La Bassée, on our right, General Smith-Dorrien's Corps had suffered heavy losses, and the Indian troops, which arrived at this time, were used to support our buckled line. The Third Corps, under General Pulteney (in the right centre, astride the Lys), held a weak position, and was dangerously extended. On our left centre the Seventh Division had been hastily organised, and was shaken by its marches. On our left, the First Corps contained some of the finest troops in the British army, but it had been engaged in almost incessant fighting since the beginning of the war, and it had suffered very heavily. Such was the line, strengthened by no natural obstacles, and depending solely on its entrenchments for defence, against which the Germans now concentrated their whole available strength.

THE GERMAN ATTACKS BEGIN.

The German massed attack began first on the extreme right—the loss of the Royal Irish Regiment near La Bassée on the 20th, and the capture of Violaines two days later, was a sign of what was coming—and spread along the line. On the evening of the same day the Cameron Highlanders (Seventh Division) were forced to yield ground, but early next morning a counter-attack was delivered by Major-General Bulfin—a very gallant officer, who had greatly distinguished himself in the fighting near Vendresse, during the battle of the Aisne—and was brilliantly successful. Over 600 German prisoners were taken at the close of the day.

The 23rd was a bad day for the Germans, for their attack on the left of our line also broke down badly, and in the neighbourhood of Langhemarcq they left 1,500

dead, all killed in the one attack. They made five most desperate assaults on our trenches, advancing in bunches and singing "The Watch on the Rhine" as they came on. The Corps that attacked was one of the new formations, and consisted of elderly reservists and very young men, some little more than boys. Their attack was mismanaged, and their leading was repeatedly at fault, but as an example of courage it moved the admiration of their enemies. "Eye-witness," the official correspondent with the British army, wrote of the "almost superhuman bravery that these raw troops displayed." "The spectacle of these devoted men, chanting a national song as they marched on to certain death, was inspiring. It was at the same time pitiable. And if any proof were needed that untrained valour alone cannot gain the day in modern war, the advance of the Twenty-third German Army Corps on October 23rd most assuredly furnished it." It may have been the thought of the untrained troops, so pitifully slaughtered on this and other days during the long succession of assaults on Ypres, that set the face of the War Office so sternly against the despatch of new British recruits before they had completed their training. So far as courage goes, new troops are notoriously as brave as seasoned veterans, but their inexperience inflicts losses which makes their premature employment not only inhumane but frightfully wasteful.

But not all the German troops launched against Ypres were new formations. Every available man that could be spared from the German lines opposite Peronne and along the Aisne were brought up into Flanders. In addition, two Bavarian Corps were brought round, one of them probably from Metz, because of their reputation for reckless gallantry. It was the Bavarians who suffered most heavily at Gravelotte, the most murderous battle of the war of 1870 and when it was necessary in September (page 269) to deliver an attack on the Heights of the Meuse, to relieve the pressure on the Crown Prince's army during the retreat from the Marne, the Bavarians again lived up to their old reputation. Later, the Prussian Guards

themselves were brought up. Military critics in Germany declared that the battle in Flanders was the most decisive in the war, and the Kaiser himself is reported to have said that the success of the attack on Ypres was of vital importance to the successful issue of the war.

Notice has already been taken of the criticisms of the whole policy of the coast campaign. The mere inception of it was an implied censure of the first plans, which left the coast alone when it could have been had for walking to it, and only discovered its supreme importance when there was a powerful army defending it, and its attainment was only to be had, if at all, at a frightful expenditure of human life. Moreover, if it were true—and there was

much to be said in support—that the possession of the straits and of the northern coast of France was of supreme importance to Germany, the attack on the Yser was clearly useless, because it would not have opened up the way to Calais. The way into Calais for one advancing from the north is not by the front door, but round by the back. But these criticisms hardly apply to the attacks on the British line between Ypres and La Bassée. Through Ypres was the nearest road to the coast, avoiding the network of canals and dykes of the coast region. The valley of the Lys also gave a good entrance, and an advance from La Bassée—though Marlborough avoided Villars' lines there when he was desirous of invading France—would, if it could



The Interior of St. Martin's Church, Ypres.

[Exclusive News Agency.]

be brusqued, have turned both the British and French lines—hence Sir John French's constant anxiety for his security at this point. It would have also given the Germans access to just that part of the French coast which would have been most useful to them—if their motive was to establish submarine stations and make the Channel unsafe for the transport of troops. Whatever, therefore, may be said of the attack on the Yser, success in forcing the British lines between Ypres and La Bassée was well worth the efforts that the Germans made to secure it and the British to defeat it.

Soon after his repulse of the attack on the Yser Sir John French made some alterations in the distribution

of his troops. The Seventh Division and the Third Cavalry Corps, which formed the Fourth Corps, were attached to the First Corps, under Sir Douglas Haig, and General Rawlinson returned to England to supervise the mobilisation of his Eighth Division, which was then forming. The Ninth French Army Corps came up on the evening of the 23rd—the first French reinforcements to arrive—and was placed between the First and Second Divisions of General Haig's Corps, and the Second Division, making room for it, moved to the right and so shortened the line to be held by the Seventh Division. Later, the distribution of the troops was again changed; and the Second Division moved to the left of the line, with the First to its right.

INDIAN TROOPS IN THE LINE.

In the popular mind the whole battle of Flanders is conceived as the attack and defence of Ypres, but that is to do great injustice to the troops on the other portions of the front, who had to face attacks equal in fierceness. South of the Lys the attacks were particularly persistent and vicious in the last week of October. On the 24th, there was a succession of heavy attacks in the direction of Neuve Chapelle. The first, the Wiltshires and the West Kents beat off with great gallantry; in another attack the Gordon Highlanders were driven out of their trenches, which were, however, captured by the Middlesex Regiment. On the 27th, the Germans got a footing in Neuve Chapelle, and in spite of the most determined efforts were not dislodged. The fighting for the village was of a most murderous description, and here the enemy were observed throwing the bodies of their killed out of their trenches in order to make cover for them as they advanced to the attack. The Germans constantly returned to the attack with fresh regiments after each defeat; it was the only way in which the violence of the attack could be kept up in the face of enormous losses. At least four regiments were used up successively in this way. The arrival of the Indian troops enabled General Smith-Dorrien to relieve the sorely-tried Second Corps, which was with-

drawn temporarily to reserve. In the renewed fighting about Neuve Chapelle, on the 28th, the new Indian troops behaved with conspicuous dash. In general, however, the Indian troops, especially as the winter came on, showed themselves less adapted for trench fighting than the British, who were less troubled by the cold and damp of the sodden clay.

THE THREE DAYS' BATTLE.

The crisis came in the last three days of the month—Thursday, Friday, and Saturday, October 29th to 31st—the most critical days since the Wednesday after Mons, and if any particular days have an exclusive title these three have the best right to claim the battle of Flanders

as their own. Neither the extreme left of our line, north-east of Ypres, nor the right, south of the Lys, was engaged. The front of the battle ran from Zonnebeke, almost due east of Ypres on the left, through Gheluvelt and Messines to the Lys, and it gradually contracted to the space between Gheluvelt and Messines. This front had been very considerably modified in the week before the great battle. The trenches of the Third Army Corps, which joined on to those of the Second, near Neuve Chapelle, ran north to the Lys, which they crossed above Armentières, and to St. Yves, where its lines ended. There had been fighting on this section on the Monday near the banks of the Lys, in which some of the Leicesters' trenches had



The interior of St. Martin's Church, Ypres, after the roof had been struck by German shells. [Topical Press]

been blown up by shell-fire, and some ground had had to be yielded to the enemy. The losses further north had been more serious.

At St. Yves the First Cavalry Division continued the line to Messines, where, in charge now of the Second Cavalry Division, it bent abruptly to the east and ran parallel with the Lys as far as Houthem, there joining up with the positions of the Seventh Division with the 3rd Cavalry Division on the Zandvoorde Ridge. This easterly bend of the lines had been the object of special attention from the Germans. On the 21st, the Germans had broken the Houthem end of the line, north of Messines, and forced it



Reinforcements for the British firing line passing through a town in Flanders.

[*Newspaper Illustrations.*



Behind the British lines in Flanders: A British field-piece in position, with the Artillerymen wearing their winter coats of sheepskin.

[*Photopress.*

back to Hollebeke; and though the cavalry had been reinforced by part of an Indian brigade, all attempts to restore the original line had failed. This misfortune had the effect of exaggerating the projection of the bastion of our position before Ypres by indenting our lines to the south. In particular, it left the position of the ridge of Zandvoorde very exposed. The German plan in the attack, which began on Thursday, the 29th, was to break through on the southern side of the Ypres bastion, and between it and the Lys. They had massed at least eleven army corps against the British lines, and of these at least three—the Second Bavarian, the Thirteenth and the Fifteenth—and perhaps a fourth—the Nineteenth—were pitted against the comparatively narrow front which they now proposed to pierce. Against these three or four corps—not far from 250,000 men, including the cavalry and artillery—the British had the First Corps, the Seventh Division, three divisions of Cavalry, with a few Indian regiments, a portion of the Fourth Corps, and some French Battalions, perhaps 50,000 or 60,000 men in all.

THURSDAY.

The Germans began by attacking the two ends of our line. Early on Thursday, the 29th, they attacked the corner of the Ypres bastion, at the point east of Gheluvelt, where the Menin and the Becelaere roads cross. Here they began by gaining a considerable success, driving our troops back on to Gheluvelt, but reinforcements were brought up from the left wing and a counter-attack was delivered on the left of the attackers, which rested on a low hill in front of Zandvoorde. This hill was carried at nightfall, and the attack fell back. At the same time the left wing of the Third Corps was attacked north of the Lys. Again there was an initial success, and some of the trenches of the Middlesex Regiment had to be evacuated, until, with the assistance of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, they were recovered a few hours later. The odds at this point of the line were three to one, for twelve German battalions had been concentrated against a single British brigade. The enemy in the trenches were all bayoneted or captured. In addition, over 200 dead were left lying in front of the trenches.

FRIDAY.

On the next day, Friday, the situation became much more serious. Early in the morning a terrific artillery fire was opened on the ridge of Zandvoorde. It was here that the Germans had been checkmated on the previous night, and they had used the interval to bring up their heaviest artillery. The ridge was occupied by a Brigade of the Third Cavalry Division, which held on to its positions until many of the trenches had been completely blown in. It was one of the worst bombardments even in this war, and eventually our men had to retire on the Klein Zillebeke ridge, further to the west. The situation was regarded as "serious" even by Sir Douglas Haig, whose standard of seriousness in military affairs had become exceedingly high in the almost continuous fighting of the last ten weeks. Nor was this the only point at which the enemy gained ground. The attacks developed further to the south, along the lines held by the other two cavalry divisions. The Second Cavalry Division was driven out of Hollebeke, on which a week before it had fallen back from Houthem, and forced to retire on St. Eloi, on the main road due south of Ypres. The First Cavalry Division was in little better case, for after detaching men to the support of St. Eloi, it was itself menaced in Messines by a heavy infantry and artillery attack. This town had been

bombarded all day by the German heavy howitzers, and fired in several places.

"Little damage to us until 2 p.m., when shells started falling all along in front of the trench occupied by our squadron, making the ground rock like an earthquake. At last one fell not five yards from me, but did not hit me owing to a buttress of the trench being in the way.

"I crept round into the crater made by the shell, and found the officer and man next to me buried alive. Saw a tuft of the man's hair sticking out, and cleared the dirt away from his mouth so that he could get his breath. Dug him out, and half dug the officer out, but found he was dead. The man had his leg smashed frightfully. I made a tourniquet of handkerchiefs and bound his leg to a long stick. He has been saved, and my bandages were left on by the doctor, who simply added another splint.

"Shells fell along the trench, burying the whole of the — troop alive. I went to them with a message, and saw it myself. The squadron still hung on, and we prayed for night to come. Every moment we expected to be rushed by German Infantry. The Sergeant-Major was killed. Sergeant F. took over his work and posted me as 'look-out.' I was sick with the horror of it, for the first time in the war. Just on nightfall we were again bombarded, and lost more men. Finally we had to evacuate the trench.

"During this, the Captain told Sergeant F. to send two reliable men, volunteers, to see if the Germans were attempting to come up to the trenches we had left. Sergeant F. said, 'I'll go, sir, and I can answer for — coming with me.' So we went back again, but no sign of the Germans. We then reoccupied the trenches, the bombardment having passed us. I call them trenches, but by this time they were just tumbled heaps and holes.

"At nightfall we were all relieved by the —, also dismounted. This was after 48 hours in the trenches, in six inches of water, without food, in pouring rain, and under constant shell fire. Instead of much-needed rest, we had to man the first barricade in the town all night."*

It was an anxious night for Sir John French. He knew that he must at all costs hold Gheluvelt, especially with the cavalry divisions on his right weakening under the enormous strain that was being put upon them. He deepened his line, placing one of the brigades of the First Division in rear of the other two, posting another battalion in reserve at Hooge, which was half-way between Gheluvelt and Ypres, and borrowing some battalions from the French Ninth Corps away to his extreme left. At the same time, he brought back some battalions of the Second Corps which had been relieved from before La Bassée by the Indian troops, and posted them at Neuve Eglise, between Messines and Bailleul, to support the cavalry, who had been driven back during the day. The London Scottish Territorial Battalion was brigaded with these battalions at the same place.

SATURDAY.

Saturday began badly. The line of the First Division in front of Gheluvelt was broken, and as it fell back it exposed the left flank of the Seventh Division, its neighbour to the right, and it, too, fell back. The Royal Scots Fusiliers, who stayed in their trenches, were cut off and surrounded. Headquarters were shelled, six Staff Officers were killed, and the Commander of the Second Division of the First Corps was stunned into unconsciousness. Such was the situation soon after noon on Saturday. The time has already become legendary, and it is into this hour that a legend gravely chronicled by the *Times* Paris correspondent best fits. General Moussy, of the Ninth French Army Corps, arrived at the critical moment, and sent off to the rear for reinforcements. Every available man was fighting. Finally, General Moussy ordered a

* Letter from a Trooper, published in the *Manchester Guardian*, November 5th.


corporal to bring in any man he could find not actually in the firing line. "The corporal scoured the immediate countryside, and by appealing to every man he met, cooks in the bivouac, Army Service Corps men, hewers of wood and drawers of water, managed to assemble some 250 soldiers of all arms, but mostly without arms, and paraded them before the General. The ground was broken by hedges, by the long lines of pollarded willows and ditches, which are the characteristic features of the Flanders landscape, and which render the ground extremely unsuitable for cavalry operations. The sixty-five men composing the General's escort were dismounted, the cuirassiers, their silver helmets with flowing mane, their steel breastplates, their cavalry boots and sabres, prepared to take part in a bayonet charge in which there were practically no bayonets. They were called upon to deliver no less than a counter-attack upon a German regiment flushed with victory, having already, as it no doubt seemed to them, victory in their grasp, having after infinite struggles, at the cost of tremendous sacrifices, pierced the iron hoop stretched before Ypres." According to the legend, these men charged and checked the German advance. Certain it is that it was checked—by an enfilading fire from the left, General French, more prosaically, says—and that the retreating troops from Gheluvelt rallied on the edge of the wood near Veldhoek, and the German advance along the road was checked.

No less serious was the outlook in the centre. A strong attack had already developed on the right of the Seventh Division, near Hollebeke, and it fell back, thereby exposing the right flank of the brigade which had been posted in rear as reserve to the Gheluvelt defenders. And now an extraordinary thing happened. This brigade fell back to align with the Seventh Division, but as it retired the supports of the Seventh Division came up, and it began to advance again. For some little time was seen the strange sight of an inner brigade falling back, though it was not now menaced, side by side with a brigade on the exposed flank now advancing.

But the fortunes of the day were relieved by the Worcesters, who belonged to the Second Division of the First Corps, which had been stationed on the left, and had not been heavily engaged. As the Germans pressed on through Gheluvelt against the retreating First Division,

the Worcesters attacked on their right flank, and at 2-30 recaptured Gheluvelt by the most timely bayonet charge in British military history. The effect was immediate, and Ypres, which seemed all but lost a couple of hours before, was saved. The Seventh Division came forward to its original line, and in the early evening a French cavalry brigade completed the restoration of our fortunes.

At Messines the restoration was delayed another twenty-four hours. All day on Saturday the pressure on the town continued. Let the trooper whose letter has already been quoted continue his story.



The British line about the 20th.

"Next morning (Saturday) a general bombardment began again. The trenches we were in the night before, now occupied by the —, were first shelled by the Germans, as we had been, and finally carried by an enormous force of infantry. The same trenches were retaken by a savage counter-attack by Indian troops. They charged with the bayonet and retook the position, which had lost all resemblance to a trench. They in turn were driven out with awful losses, under a shower of frightful shells.

"My squadron was retired into the great courtyard of the Monastery. The immense howitzer shells fell here again. A wall collapsed, burying two more men. Our number was now reduced to about 40. We dashed across the courtyard, one at a time, into the street beyond. Here we crouched under the wall, awaiting orders.

"Suddenly, six immense shells fell right in the street at equal intervals and at the same moment. The concussion was awful. The air was filled with red brick-dust, so that you could not see your arm's length in front of you. Walls came crashing down, and I heard most dreadful shouts. Then there was the most awful crash right on my left side, just at my feet it seemed, and I was thrown some yards on to my back. I thought my legs were shot off, but struggled to my feet and hobbled off with my legs almost bent double with the pain. I saw one or two stumble past me, and more shells burst in front and behind me in the street. The dust-cloud was so dense I could not see where

I was going. After a few minutes I came into clearer air, in another street, and a man dragged me into a doorway just as a shell burst overhead. A medical officer was dressing wounded men inside. He had dressed me, when a shell burst in the next house to us, so the doctor told us to clear out, and 'every man for himself.' I took the road into open country, but could hardly crawl along. I heard the shouts of the Germans as they took the last of the barricades, so I put my revolver into my coat pocket, for I was determined not to be captured. I also heard the rattle of a maxim and rifle shots in the gardens on the outskirts of the town, where I heard that Colonel — and a handful of men were still holding out.

"I did not meet a soul, and struggled on for two or three miles, when I met a Battalion of the — and a Battalion of the London Scottish toiling along to relieve the town."

The London Scottish, the first British Territorial regiment to be in an important action in this war (the Northumberland Hussars, a Yeomanry Regiment, had already appeared in casualty lists), had, it will be remembered, been brigaded with some battalions of the Second Corps, and kept in reserve behind Messines. They were now coming up to the assistance of the cavalry. They failed to make headway against the very strong German forces, but they held their ground till night. During the night the Germans captured Wytschaete, and worked their way round both flanks of the London Scottish, but by eleven in the morning our cavalry came up from the now restored left flank, and working in conjunction with the French Sixteenth Army Corps, which had now arrived, drove the Germans out of Wytschaete. Messines, however, they still retained, and it made an indentation in our lines to the south corresponding to the indentation of the bastion of Ypres in the north.


THE GUARDS' ATTACK.

Fighting did not end with the victory of the 31st, but for the first ten days of November it merely reproduced with variations the incidents of October, without their extreme danger. On the 11th, however, a supreme attempt was made. The First and Fourth Brigades of the Prussian Guards were brought up. They delivered their attack early in the morning, on the same road, between Becelaere and Gheluvelt. They suffered heavily before they reached our lines, but such was the momentum of their impact they broke them in three places, and penetrated the woods behind the road. Once again we were saved by enfilading fire of rifles and machine guns.

Under fire from front and flank, the Prussian Guards retired back to the trenches which they had just captured, and our advance expelled them from nearly all of them. A few, be it recorded to the honour of the defeated, they still managed to retain.

The fighting between Ypres and the Lys was the most severe and prolonged fighting that the British army ever had, and though the result was something less than a decisive victory, there are passages in it which will take rank above anything in our military history. The arrival of heavy French reinforcements, whose assistance had been of the greatest value in the closing stages of the struggle, enabled the British troops to take a rest. Richly had they earned it. They had saved Calais and the northern coasts of France, and by securing the safety of the Channel—except for a stray German submarine—they made it possible for the New Army, when it should have received its training, to cross in safety. They had inflicted enormous losses on the German army, and crippled its power to take the offensive in the West. They had saved, with the fine assistance of the French army, the north-western provinces of France from invasion, and established securely the *Ne plus ultra* lines of the Great War.

Two events remain to be chronicled. On November 22nd the Germans began a bombardment of Ypres, which had hitherto escaped fairly lightly, and some of its most beautiful buildings were ruined. And a few days before, on the 14th, there died at St. Omer, while on a visit to his beloved Indian troops, Lord Roberts, the most popular of British Generals in the army, and a genius of the simplicity only found amongst the great. He was the Nelson of the Army.



A detachment of the London Scottish drawn up after the fighting at Messines.

[Central News.




Red Cross officers at dinner in a "dug-out."

[Photopress.



British troops in a water-logged trench.

[Photopress.



"A quiet day": Troops resting in their trenches.

"The Sphere." Copyright.



Behind one of the main trenches, showing the entrance to a "dug-out."

[Photopress.]

CHAPTER XXXI.

THE WAR OF THE TRENCHES.

BEGINNING OF THE SIEGE WARFARE—TRENCHES AT THE AISNE AND IN FLANDERS—METHODS OF ATTACK—CLOSE
QUARTERS AND SHORT-RANGE WEAPONS—LIFE IN THE TRENCHES—THE KING'S VISIT.

THERE have been trenches in all wars in which firearms have been used, and there were trenches right from the beginning of this one. But what we have come to think of as the real war in the trenches—the "war of position," in which such creeping progress is made against works that are really field fortifications of great elaboration and ingenuity—only began about the middle of September, when it became apparent that the Germans had definitely come to stand upon the line running along the Aisne valley. Up to this time the trenches that had been made and held were part of the accepted methods of a "war of movement." Their function was to economise in men at certain points of the line in order that a greater strength might be brought into action at the real striking points; to be an essential part of a rearguard action, as were those which the British troops hastily flung up on the outskirts of Mons and at other places during the great retreat, and the Germans used when they were driven back from the Marne; and, most important of all, to secure the various stages gained in a successful and still vigorous offensive, and to help the attacking troops forward—where little or no natural cover was available—over that last two hundred yards

to the hostile firing line, a gap which, thanks to the perfection of the modern rifle and machine gun, is the most deadly part of the battlefield of to-day. But the danger of too great a reliance upon trenches, and the failure which ultimately awaits the army that makes its field works, however admirably planned, the scene of a purely passive defence, have been recognised by the military authorities of all the countries at war. And a strong caution against the abuse of cover trenches by the advancing troops is to be found in the infantry training manuals of most European countries. In view of their later tactics, the passage from the German manual is particularly interesting:—

"The entrenching tool is only to be used with the greatest circumspection, because of the great difficulty of getting an extended line to go forward under fire when it has expended much effort in digging cover for itself. The construction of trenches must never paralyse the desire for the irresistible advance; and, above all, must not kill the spirit of the offensive."

It would be quite clear from this passage alone that the nature of the German plans was definitely changed by the middle of September. After the retreat from the Marne, there was no more question of the



In one of the French trenches. (Note the coil of barbed wire for erection of entanglements.)

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



French soldiers trench digging: Measuring the width of the trench with a rifle.

[Alfieri Picture Service.]



The entrance to one of the caves near Soissons, which were used as shelters by the French.

[Topical War Service.]

possibility of "paralysing the desire for the irresistible advance." Arrived at the Aisne, they proceeded to dig themselves in with a thoroughness and ability which made it evident not only that they were now standing on the defensive, but also that they were doing so on ground that had been carefully considered and selected long before the war broke out. There can be no irresistible advance, unless it is to certain destruction, against works such as the Germans then began to construct, and the modern weapons with which those works were defended; and so, with the French and English forced to adopt similar tactics in order to attack those works, there began that long period of mole warfare, the difficulties of which have been constantly indicated in the official reports by some such phrase as, "we have advanced a hundred yards in the neighbourhood of —."

THE TRENCHES AT THE AISNE.

The British army's trenches along the Aisne were, on the whole, more comfortable than those which were afterwards dug in Flanders. And from the very beginning of this kind of warfare they were second in excellence to those of no other troops in the field. Many of them were being held long afterwards by the French, into whose keeping they passed when the British troops were withdrawn on the turning movement round to the coast. (In a letter to one of the papers, a British officer spoke very proudly of some main trenches that were held by the British at Soupir, describing them as "amongst the best built by any troops during this campaign," and works of art which were considered impregnable. They were built by the Fourth Guards' Brigade, and afterwards passed to the French, who, in spite of their reputed impregnability in the hands of the British, were driven out of them at one time, though they were recaptured later in a counter-attack.)

The ground along the Aisne valley offered far more and better natural cover than the scene of the fighting in Flanders. Trenches were dug, some of them in tiers, along the numerous quarries that were already hacked out of the hillsides; and in some places, where the natural opportunities offered themselves, the troops returned to the life of the cave-men, and whole battalions bivouacked with really considerable comfort in the caverns that overlook the stream. Others were in less comfortable case even at the Aisne. The Manchesters, for instance, held some trenches on the outskirts of a wood some miles to the east of Soissons in highly unattractive ground. The wood was a swamp, and it was impossible to keep the bottom of the trenches free from water. This was one of the most advanced fire trenches, and in addition to the natural discomforts of their position the men had to put up with perpetual sniping from the German lines, which were never more than two hundred yards distant. As later, during the fighting in Flanders, all sorts of devices were employed by the troops to deal with the problem of water in the trenches. The "dug-outs" which the men hollowed out in the sides of the trenches were raised above the floor level of the trench in order to keep them dry; the actual floor of the trench was constructed on the slope in order to carry off the water; and in some cases a complete roof over the trench served not only to keep off shell splinters and shrapnel balls, but also as a protection from the weather. In cases such as this last, of course, the firing was through conveniently arranged loopholes. It is hardly necessary to go in any detail into the construction of the actual firing trenches, for the

general principle of them is sufficiently obvious, and the illustrations which accompany this chapter make its various applications equally clear. It is worth while pointing out, however, that for a firing position complete overhead cover seems to have been a great deal rarer than perhaps many people at home have thought. "Dug-outs," "funk-holes," and the other subterranean workings of which we have heard so much in this war, were for the men to rest and sleep in—the picturesque sketch plans, which have appeared from time to time, of men firing from almost invulnerably built-over rifle pits, convey an impression which may be accurate enough in some cases, but as far as the customary firing lines go is decidedly misleading. There were, of course, carefully constructed loopholes and look-out places in these front-line trenches, and from them, on the days described in the official bulletins as "uneventful," a dropping fire would be kept steadily up from both sides. As a matter of fact, little overhead cover is needed—with trenches that are at least five feet deep, and with the excavated earth banked up on top for another two and a half feet, the dropping rifle fire is singularly harmless, and it needs very accurately-timed shrapnel, or a very well-placed high explosive bomb, to do much damage. Most of the casualties on "uneventful" days were of men shot clean through the head—the prompt penalty, when the enemy's snipers were only fifty yards or so away, of incautiously exposing oneself above the level of the trench. It might also be mentioned that some considerable variations in design and depth of the trenches, as well as some part of the responsibility for their highly tortuous course which has been so often mentioned in the letters home, was due to the desire to make as full and skilful use as possible of the natural cover which offered itself. One trench, which had been built in a natural hollow, might be fully ten feet deep; while in order to make the most of a ditch which, with just a little deepening, would provide an excellent trench of a more normal depth, the general line may have wound back in what the casual observer would consider a most inexplicable manner.

The front of these firing lines was guarded by every obstacle that military science can devise—*trous-de-loup* and trap holes of a similar kind, coils of wire and loose metal obstructions, and, most frequent of all, elaborate barbed wire entanglements securely staked down at heights varying from eighteen inches to between five and six feet. In the trench fighting in Flanders, where the advance trenches of the Allies and Germans were often well within forty yards of each other, the securing of a newly-held trench by the construction, during the night, of these obstacles and entanglements was a task of the greatest peril; and at these short distances in some cases virtually the whole of the ground between the opposed trenches was taken up with the entanglements which had grown out to meet each other. This was the point of the French soldier's jest when he suggested—seeing that the same obstacles now served the purpose of both trenches equally well, in that they not only protected the builder's own trenches but also hindered him from getting at those of the enemy—that some agreement might be come to whereby only one side need attempt the hazardous work of constructing them. There was, in point of fact, one real advantage in being at such close quarters with the enemy. The artillery of both sides was considerably hampered, where trenches lay so close together, by the fear of hitting its own infantry. The men in such trenches, therefore, were often spared the searching trial of a heavy hostile shell fire.



[Alfieri Picture Service.]

Luxuries in the trenches: A bathroom fitted up behind the French lines.

THE ORDEAL IN FLANDERS.

Before going on to say anything on the subject of the methods and weapons with which these elaborate positions were attacked, it will be well to deal with the special conditions of weather and country which made the fighting in Flanders one of the fiercest trials any army has ever had to face. At the Aisne the trenches were sometimes waterlogged and unwholesome, but the time of the year was then autumn, and the country offered considerable natural facilities for trench warfare. But after the British army had been moved round to the coast, and when that terrible month's fighting which began about the 20th of October—"one of the most glorious chapters in our military history," on the testimony of "Eye-witness"—was at last ending in the exhausted collapse of the German attempt on Calais, it was winter, and a winter of snow and rain in a bleak country made still more desolate by the ravages of war. The horrors of that terrible month, when men went unrelieved for days, lying with their wounded and dead in filthy trenches, and on soaked, rotting straw, and yet holding out successfully against an almost inhumanly desperate offensive from the Germans, cannot be exaggerated, and are better left undwelt on. The end of it found both sides dug in as no army had ever been dug in before, in a country—as far as the part occupied by the British was concerned—of flat, ploughed land and swamp, relieved only by pollard willows and muddy ditches, and deeply pitted with shell craters which soon filled with water. Shattered villages, with their few remaining inhabitants living in misery amid the ruins of their homes, were the only reminders of normal humanity

and civilisation. The mere construction of trenches in this region was a task of the greatest difficulty. The sodden clay clung to the shovels of the men, as it did to their clothes, boots, rifles, and everything about them; and even when some progress had at last been made, the walls of the trenches were often in a state of collapse, and what should have been the parapet of heaped earth above them an almost liquid mass of wet soil, portions of which were sliding down into the trench proper as fast as they were thrown up. "All the soil is clay," wrote an R.A.M.C. officer in a letter home, "stickier and greasier than one could believe possible. It's like almost solid paint, and the least rain makes the side of the trenches slimy, and the bottom a perfect sea of mud—pulls the heels off your boots almost." The French were in no better case than the British, and it was reported that in one action between the French and the Germans the men and their arms were in such a lamentable state that neither side could use their firearms, and a gruesome, hand-to-hand struggle was fought out with pick-axes and shovels, and the butts of the temporarily useless rifles.

THE ATTACK BY SIEGE-CRAFT.

The methods adopted by both sides in the attack upon these elaborate positions were in principle the methods of siege craft as laid down in the military manuals. Frontal charges on the enemy's trenches, across, perhaps, a hundred yards of open ground, were undertaken, but only after the trenches which were to be attacked had been subjected to a prolonged and successful bombardment, until, in the

phrase of "Eye-witness," "trenches, mines, and machine guns are reduced to scrap heaps." This was not a very easy aim to accomplish, for unless the fire was directed with extraordinary accuracy on to the trench itself the wet, clinging soil had the effect of considerably restricting the damage area of the high-explosive shells. At the same time, the moral effect of, say, the shell thrown by the eleven-inch German howitzer—the "Coal Box" of the British soldier—upon troops meeting it for the first time was very great. An English officer has left a vivid description of one of these shells striking a house—a description which helps one to realise what it was like to lie in a sodden trench and hear these monstrous weapons searching about for the exact position of that trench:—

"You can see the great shell—a black streak—just before it strikes; then, before you hear the explosion, the whole house simply lifts up into the air, apparently quite silently; then you hear the roar, and the whole earth shakes. In the place where the house was there is a huge fountain-spout of what looks like pink fluff. It is the pulverised bricks. Then a monstrous shoot of black smoke towering up a hundred feet or more, and, finally, there is a curious willow-like formation, and then—you duck, as huge pieces of shell, and house, and earth, and haystack tumble over your head."

The other method of preparing for the charge on the trenches was by an application of the classical principles of siege-craft—the sapping and mining, and all the long-established procedure of an attack upon a fortified position. The method is interesting, because it completes the explanation of the many references which have been made in messages from the front to the complicated network of firing positions and communication trenches that is characteristic of a position that has been held for some length of time. Supposing that the artillery has been unable to reduce the hostile trenches to a dust heap, or even to subdue their fire, it would be a sheer and useless waste of life to throw an attacking force across some two or three hundred yards of open ground on to the machine guns and rifles that await them. In such circumstances the only way for the attacking force to advance is by the creeping and laborious method of constructing their own cover as they go—that is, by sapping out from their own firing trenches in a line the general direction of which is at right angles to those trenches. The "deep" sap, which seems to have been generally used in this war, is a narrow trench wherein all the cover required by a man standing erect is got below the surface of the ground, and without the aid of a rampart of piled earth, which would make the progress of the sap more easily detected by the enemy; and it is necessary to say that its general line is at right angles to the trench from which it started,


because it actually advances in a series of abrupt zig-zags in order that its length cannot be enfiladed from the enemy's trenches. (A glance at the sketch plan on page 308 will make the principle of the sap quite clear, and the photograph on page 309 gives an excellent idea of the depth and general appearance of a completed section of one of these tortuous "communication trenches.") Several of these saps would be pushed out—the men generally working under cover of darkness—at selected positions down the line of the main trenches—until the "heads" of the various saps were at a sufficient distance from the parent trench for the construction of what, in the terminology of siege-craft, are known as "parallels." Each of these sap-heads would be widened out right and left into a fresh trench facing the enemy's position, thus forming a new and advanced firing line. Once this was securely occupied, fresh saps would be driven out, and, if the ground between these and the hostile trenches was still wide

enough to need them, fresh firing lines constructed—a process which, repeated at any length, soon accounts for the elaborate schemes of firing positions, supporting lines, and communication trenches of which we have heard so much during the mole warfare in Flanders.


TRENCH FIGHTING AT CLOSE QUARTERS.

With two opposed forces both digging out to each others' trenches in this way, it is also apparent how we came to hear of field works that were within forty or fifty yards of each other. At this and shorter distances, the sapping, if persisted in, would change its immediate purpose. The sap would no longer be intended to support another firing line, but to reach out as nearly as possible to the base of the enemy's trenches in order that a portion of their front could be mined and blown in. Thus one of the

advanced trenches held by the British at the beginning of November was eighty feet away from the German lines, and the last sap was pushed out until this space had been reduced to thirteen feet. Naturally, at these close quarters the risk of the detection of open sapping operations was very considerably increased—though one queer result of this subterranean warfare was that a casual observer (supposing one could have existed and looked round him in the bullet-swept death zone between the hostile trenches) would have had very little idea of the maze of workings by which he was encompassed, so little did they alter the general appearance of the country side. But from the loopholes of the trenches they could be detected and raked by bombs and grenades, so that the most advanced saps would have to be "blind" saps, burrowing completely below the ground, or at least roofed in with a splinter-proof covering. Once the mine in which



"The Sphere." Copyright.
Part of a communication trench, showing the angle of approach to the firing position.



["The Sphere." Copyright.

The theory of siege approaches as applied to the trench warfare in Flanders.

they culminated had been successfully exploded and a breach made in the enemy's trench, the attack would begin, the advance guard of the storming party endeavouring to occupy the broken portion of the line—from which they could enfilade the rest of it—and prepare for the attack in force. An attack of this kind resulted in a slight loss of ground for the British on Christmas Eve. It was also the occasion of some considerable casualties for the Germans, for the British guns in the rear got the range of the breach and the occupied trench, so that the storming party found their capture a singularly disadvantageous one.

THE RETURN TO SHORT-RANGE WEAPONS.

These periodical attacks, generally entered on under cover of darkness, and after long intervals of comparatively harmless sniping and preparatory digging, were weirdly impressive and confused affairs where men fought hand to hand in the rambling trenches and by the blaze of suddenly ignited chemical "flares." The difficulty of using field artillery where the opposed trenches lay so close together has already been noted, and the result of this difficulty was the modern application of antiquated, short-range weapons. Just as in the similar but not so prolonged trench fighting in the Russo-Japanese war, grenades—to be flung by hand, or ingeniously adapted so that they could be blown from the muzzle of a rifle—bombs, and trench mortars all reappeared; and even a bomb thrower on the catapult principle seems to have been used by the Germans. The whole method of fighting involved the constant use of high-power explosives at short range. "For the last month we have been dealing with explosives in every imaginable form—hand-grenades, bomb guns, mines, and mortars—and I shall be quite pleased never to see explosives again!" wrote one of the Royal Engineers in a letter home. Queerer methods than these were experimented with; for the Germans, on one occasion, attempted to drive back their opponents by pumping the water from their own trenches into those of the British. And on another, the British—who had silently captured, in darkness and with the bayonet, a trench which it would have been impossible to hold—before withdrawing managed to make it valueless to the Germans by digging through to a near-lying ditch and flooding the trench with water.

It is worth noticing that many of the weapons which came into such frequent use in the fighting about Ypres were weapons perfected, at any rate in principle, when a British army last fought in Flanders in Marlborough's campaigns against the French. Then it was that the principles of siege warfare which we have just described were constantly applied, and the fortresses of Vauban—Lille, Tournai, Mons, and other names that have been on everyone's lips in the great struggle of our own time—fell before "the men who wear the caps and pouches," and flung their newly-invented grenades over into the enemies' works as the storming party advanced. The "pouches"—at any rate in the eighteenth-century sense—have gone, and the "caps" (the tall bearskins, whose shape did not interfere with the swing of the arm that threw the grenade) are seen outside Buckingham Palace, but not at the front. But that the very regiments which were then distinguished by these marks should now, after the lapse of two hundred years, be fighting on the same soil, with the same weapons, is a decidedly interesting historical parallel.

In Marlborough's day, of course, there was still a certain etiquette of war to be reckoned with—an etiquette which had disappeared by the Napoleonic campaigns. Once an effective breach had been made in the defence works, the defenders might—and often did—with perfect propriety surrender without waiting to see whether the attacking forces could really carry the whole position; and, greatest difference of all, at the end of the autumn the campaign automatically ceased, armies retired into winter quarters, and officers would go home on extended leave to pick up the threads of their peace life until the coming of spring. As we have already seen, the armies of to-day began their war of position at the very time when the eighteenth-century army would have been abandoning it, and the immense hardships of a struggle with nature were added to the terrors of a conflict with man. The troops, both French and English, bore those hardships with fortitude and high spirits. The British soldier's genius for creating nicknames asserted itself triumphantly over his discomforts, and a particularly wet trench became "Venice," or "The Grand Canal," while the "minenwerfer," or German bomb thrower, which often enough brought the slippery parapet of the "Canal" down about its builders' ears, burying men and arms underneath a heap of wet clay, was accurately referred to as the "Mechanical Undertaker."

COMFORTS IN THE TRENCHES.

As time went on, and the armies grew accustomed to this unexpected kind of warfare, many little sophistica-

tions, and even comforts, were added to their underground quarters. Charcoal braziers appeared in the "dug-outs" along the walls of the trenches, and field telephones, and occasionally electric light in the officers' shelters. One of the greatest of the men's hardships lay in the fact that a wash was a luxury of extremely difficult acquirement, and a bath an impossibility. At the General Headquarters of the British army a "rest-house," capable of dealing with one thousand men, was accordingly equipped, where the men who returned from their spell in the trenches, suffering from minor ailments due to exposure, could bathe, have their clothes cleaned or destroyed, and rest for a few days. In one way the army had never been better served—the food supply was excellent, and, except for the difficulty of getting it to the men in the advanced firing lines, which could only be approached at night-fall, plentiful. This meant a good deal to the soldier, in spite of the other discomforts which a war of position involved—

old army men openly declared that they preferred even the hardships of the trenches to the endless "foot-slogging" and scanty rations of the South African fighting. The people at home, too, touched as they might well be by the bravery and devotion of the men who were fighting their battles in the bleak Flemish swamps, helped out the official supplies by great quantities of gifts of food-stuffs, as well as of warm clothing and tobacco. On the two days before Christmas over eighty tons of Christmas puddings alone reached the various rail-heads behind the British lines.

COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE OPPOSED LINES.

The close proximity of the hostile trenches had another effect upon the conduct of the war beside that of often putting the long-range artillery out of action. The trenches lay

close enough together for communication to be established between them, and by word of mouth, printed placards raised above the parapet, or written messages thrown from one to another, the men in the trenches were often brought into more or less friendly touch with their enemies. The news of the sinking of the *Emden*, as well as of the destruction of the German squadron in the Pacific, was conveyed to the German trenches in this way—a stone, to which the message had been attached, was flung from the British line by the best thrower of a cricket ball who could be found. Shooting competitions were sometimes arranged, a target being conveniently hoisted above one trench and the hits signalled to the opposing one. It must have been a memory of something of this kind, coupled with that amazing recklessness which seems to have come to some of the men after days of hairbreadth escapes in the trenches, which produced the



"The Sphere." Copyright.
A deep sap built by the British troops (the depth can be judged by the height of the officer standing in it).



A section of a British trench, showing the firing recesses which prevent the men from being enfiladed in case of assault. [F. Kelly, Carlisle.]

extraordinary incident mentioned in an officer's letter home. One of the British soldiers was up a willow tree at the rear of the lines cutting some withes, when a bullet from a German sniper passed him. To continue the tale in the teller's own words, "he signalled a miss, right. Then he signalled a miss, left—and the third took him through the head." The officer who described the incident gave it as an example of the lack of the sporting spirit among the Germans with whom his company were dealing; but the tale really defies comment as completely as does the story in the private's letter of the German who called out a challenge to fight single-handed in the space between the trenches any man among the British except an Irishman. To his ultimate undoing he was obliged by a Gordon Highlander, who slew him—apparently while the rest of the men on both sides looked on—after what the letter appreciatively described as "a good set-to with the bayonet."

On the lighter side of trench intimacies there was the jest played off by the French on the occupants of a German trench, who were near enough for conversation to be carried on. The Germans had confessed that they did not know where their Emperor was, whereupon the French generously informed them that President Poincaré was to visit their trenches about noon the next day. Noon came, and, heralded by the Marseillaise, a top hat on a stick was solemnly paraded down the trench, great care being taken to display glimpses of it above the parapet at frequent intervals. The ammunition which was expended on that top hat must have added quite appreciably to Germany's war bill.

But the nearness of the trenches made for kindlier intimacies than these. Men brought in their enemy's

dead that were lying within the trench entanglements, and buried them as reverently as they did their own fallen comrades. A young British officer records the epitaph, written by "one of the most uncouth looking men in my company," and pinned to the cross which marked the grave of a German sniper brought in and buried by the men whom he had been harassing with great daring. It ran quite simply:—

"Here lies a German,
We don't know his name,
He died bravely fighting
For his Fatherland."

THE CHRISTMAS TRUCE.

The same spirit of mutual respect for foes who were facing bravely the same arduous conditions of war and weather led to the establishment of little sporadic truces between small sections of the opposed lines. For instance, at one part of the front held by the British a tacit understanding was arrived at whereby messengers from both sides made use—unmolested—of the smouldering ruins of a couple of farms—one for the British and the other for the Germans—in order to heat the water for their tea and coffee. Such private understandings reached their strangest and most extensive climax in the "Christmas Truce," which seems to have astonished many of the soldiers who kept it as much as it did the people who read about it at home. It was not a universal truce, and some of the soldiers who wrote home describing it mentioned that, while their own trenches were fraternising freely with the Germans, they could hear at some distance away on either side the guns and rifles of both armies in action. But the truce was kept by British, French, and Germans during all the daylight of Christmas Day

over large portions of the whole of the line. The Germans seem to have been the most anxious to bring it about, and the invitations which they issued by word and gesture at daybreak on Christmas morning were responded to by the British troops with some doubt and hesitation. But once the first messengers from the opposed trenches had met and shaken hands in the open, the truce spread rapidly, and was kept by all ranks on both sides with the greatest honesty and goodwill. Men whose sole business during the past months had been to kill and avoid being killed themselves were seen exchanging gifts of cigars, cigarettes, and chocolate, and posing together for their photographs. Digging was allowed during the truce at some portions of the line, but no improvement was to be made to the wire entanglements; and if by accident a shot was fired, it was agreed that it should not be taken as an act of war provided an apology was at once tendered. "Hardly credible," was the comment of a sergeant-major, who had walked in peace down two miles of the line on the afternoon of Christmas Day. But the incredible had happened, and the simple humanity of brave men in a common and desperate plight had temporarily triumphed over even the greatest war of history.

THE KING'S VISIT.

One other incident which occurred within the period covered by this chapter may well be dealt with here—the visit of the King to his soldiers fighting at the front. It was the first time an English King had seen his troops on active service on the Continent since George II. had commanded them in person at Dettingen, in 1743—notwithstanding the claim of the "First Gentleman in Europe," who by the time that he was George IV. had persuaded himself, if not others, that he was actually

present at the battle of Waterloo. Our own King George, accompanied by the Prince of Wales, who was, of course, already on the Continent, arrived at the General Headquarters of the British army on November 30th, 1914, and spent the next five days in tours of inspection to the various departments of the army which were established in France. Many more or less impromptu parades of the troops were held at the various halting places where it was possible to collect the men, some of whom had the honour of having their recently-won decorations handed to them by their King in person. Among the distinctions conferred by the King during his visit was that of the Order of Merit on Sir John French—a memorable occasion for its bestowal, and a recipient who, in the eyes of everyone, lent additional lustre to the short but brilliant history of that most closely-guarded of English honours. By the men the King and Prince were everywhere received with enthusiasm; and as, on the fourth day of this visit, the King looked down on to the battle-scarred lowlands, and saw the German shells still bursting over the shattered Ypres, which a Kaiser's command and the flower of the German army had not been able to wrest from its defenders, he had the fullest reason to feel proud of their exploits and touched by their loyalty. Dettingen, from which the second of England's Georges had led his men in triumph, was a memorable exploit in the history of British arms; but our own King was surveying a field as greater in glory as it was in extent. In Sir John French's own words:—"No more arduous task has ever been assigned to British soldiers, and in all their splendid history there is no instance of their having answered so magnificently to the desperate calls which of necessity were made upon them."




[Newspaper Illustrations.]

King George, the King of the Belgians, and (behind) the Prince of Wales and Sir Pertab Singh at a review of the Allied troops held on the occasion of the King's visit to the Continent.




A scene on the River San.

[Exclusive News Agency.]



Nowo Georgiewsk seen from across the Vistula, and showing in the right-hand corner the bridge over which the Russians crossed.

[Exclusive News Agency.]



A general view of Warsaw, showing the bridge over the Vistula.

[Exclusive News Agency.]

CHAPTER XXXII.

THE GERMAN ADVANCE TO THE VISTULA.

THE SITUATION AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER, 1914—THE GERMAN ADVANCE TOWARDS WARSAW AND THE VISTULA—THE AUSTRIAN ADVANCE TO THE SAN—THE RUSSIAN RETREAT AND COUNTERSTROKE—THE GERMANS OUTFLANKED—GERMAN RETREAT.


AT the end of September, 1914, Germany was compelled to turn her attention to the main Russian armies. She had had almost two months in which to achieve her purposes in the west. The invasion of East Prussia had been a serious inconvenience to her, but she had thrust it back at the close of August, and the victorious army had spent September in advancing up to the Niemen river. It is questionable whether the adventure was worth the cost. To have crossed the Niemen river and established themselves there would have given the Germans positions from which they might possibly have threatened the Russians later on in the more important contest on the Vistula, but the value of the advantage is disputable, and the cost of failure—if the attempt failed—heavy. In the negotiations before the war, the German Foreign Secretary observed that Germany's advantage lay in speed, Russia's in the numbers of her men. The Germans failed completely in their attack on the line of the Niemen, and even if they lost no more men than their victors—they certainly lost more—they could much less afford to lose them. Whatever their purpose, and it may have been merely to use the threat of a further penetration into Russia as a means of keeping a large Russian army immobile, this first German inroad into Russia did nothing to help the second, which was now about to take place on a most formidable scale.

The signal for the Germans to move was the approach to Cracow of the Russian army, which had captured

Lemberg and invested Przemyśl. Hitherto they had given the Austrians little assistance. They had furnished a small body of troops and some guns to the Austrian army which was defeated in the early days of September to the north of the San river, and they had done something to impede the Russian pursuit after the defeat. But it was only when the arrival of the Russians within a few marches of Cracow appeared to imperil the German province of Silesia that they took command of the campaign, and invaded Poland in force. The Austrian army passed under the control of the German General Staff, on which, no doubt, it was represented—a natural and proper development, not because the Austrian army had already been defeated and some of its Generals consequently dismissed, but because the Austrian forces were now only the right wing of the combined army. Divided control under such circumstances was impossible, and Austrian dissatisfaction, if the reports of it were really accurate, would only have been justified by Germany's improper use of her control in her own interests, not by the existence of the control itself.

THE GERMAN AIMS.

At the end of September the Russian armies were in almost complete possession of Galicia, but were nowhere in strong force west of the Vistula, unless possibly in the neighbourhood of the junction of the Vistula and the San, where they had prepared positions. The Germans had for some time been entrenching themselves along the line



The German attack on the Vistula and the Russian flanking movement.

of the Warta river, not very far from their own frontier in Russian Poland. But this was no more than a precaution in case such defences might be useful to them in some future retreat. It might be compared with the like preparations which they made immediately after their invasion of Belgium. Their plans were not defensive. They aimed in the first place at relieving the pressure on Cracow, and removing the threat to Galicia. This they expected to do by marching across Poland towards the Vistula, a movement which would bring them on to the flank and rear of the Russians now before Cracow, and which was therefore directed rather in a south-easterly than in an easterly direction. At the same time they would be carrying out one of the cardinal maxims of their policy in waging war on their enemy's country, and keeping it out of their own. They had done so in Belgium and France; they were doing so, after unavoidable failure, in East Prussia; they hoped to do so once more against the main Russian attack. There was more even than these two great objects to be achieved. In Poland, west of the Vistula, they could hope to achieve little. The Russians were not there to be struck down, and there was no naturally strong defensive position that offered itself as a permanent barrier against the expected flood of Russian reinforcements. They aimed, therefore, at securing the line of the Vistula itself, and at the same time their Austrian allies—the Russians having been driven back—were to cross the San river and establish themselves on the northern bank, with their right wing resting on Przemyśl, the siege of which was now being pressed by the Russians with great vigour. Once securely settled on the Vistula and the San, the allied armies hoped to

dig themselves in for the winter, to defy all Russian attacks, and to turn back to what still remained the most important part of their task—the definite and decisive defeat of France, England, and Belgium. Complete success on the Vistula, however, meant more than a successful crossing of the river. It meant the investment and ultimate capture of the two great fortresses—Ivangorod, which stands on the right or eastern bank, about midway between Warsaw and the mouth of the San and Nowo Georgiewsk, also on the eastern bank, a few miles below Warsaw. Still more, it meant the possession of Warsaw itself, which, if no longer a first-class fortress, is the capital of Russian Poland, a famous city, whose capture would have made a greater stir throughout the world than that of Antwerp. At these three places, too, are the only bridges in all this region over the Vistula, a river which varies in breadth from two hundred yards to half a mile, and is everywhere too deep to be forded. They are also, especially Warsaw, important as centres of communication. Five railways meet in Warsaw: from the south-west comes the Vienna line; on the north and north-east are the railways to Petrograd and to Lomza (which passes through Nowo Georgiewsk); on the east, the line to Brest Litovsk; on the south, the line to Ivangorod, Lublin, and Kieff. At Ivangorod a branch line from the Brest Litovsk railway meets the line from Kieff. Thus, to secure and hold the Vistula meant the successful seizure of the railway along its eastern bank, and the railheads from which Russia kept herself supplied with men and munitions. It could only be achieved by forcing a crossing in the teeth of the Russian armies, and therefore by inflicting on them a crushing defeat. Its result would have been to fling

them back to the line of the Bug river, which runs roughly parallel with the Vistula in its north and south course, at a distance of some hundred miles farther to the east. It was an ambitious and even grandiose scheme, coupled as it was with the campaigns in France and over the East Prussian border, especially since the Germans would be supported by few good roads and fewer railways as soon as they had crossed their own frontier. It was carried out with great confidence and energy. It failed owing to the excellent strategy of the Russian Commanders and the magnificent courage and spirit of their men.

CHARACTER OF THE LINE AIMED AT.


The line which the Austro-German armies were to seize was almost three hundred miles in length. It stretched from the Vistula, near Warsaw, to the Carpathian lowlands, near Lemberg. Looked at from east to west, it falls into certain clearly-defined areas. On the extreme right wing the Austrians were to issue from the Carpathian passes south and south-east of Przemyśl, attack the Russians at Sambor, and, driving them back, cut the railways from Lemberg which brought to the Russian army in Galicia its supplies from Kieff and Odessa. Simultaneously, Przemyśl was to be relieved. The fortress stands on the Upper San, and the Austrians, with the river already bridged for them, were to cross and attack the Russian positions on the northern side, while lower down the stream other detachments made good their passage at the fords or by pontoon. The purpose of the concerted movement was thus to throw the Russians back on Lemberg and over the northern frontier of Galicia; to push part of their army from their line of supply; and to embarrass and endanger from the south the general Russian position on the Vistula.

While the Austrians were to gain the line of the San and the railway between Przemyśl and Lemberg, the Germans were to secure possession of the Vistula from the San to Warsaw. This was their plan, but events showed that it should have been carried further north and have included the secure control of at least the southern side

of the Vistula up to a point some miles west of Nowo Georgiewsk. The German section of this combined objective separates naturally into two distinct parts. The dividing line between the two was the Pilica river, which runs into the Vistula about midway between Warsaw and Ivangorod. In the northern area, their plan was to advance on the Vistula with their left wing resting on the river where it flows due west, somewhere in the region of its junction with the Bzura, and to force a crossing above Warsaw so as to secure ground for deployment, turn northwards, compel the Russians to evacuate the city, and cut the four railways which run into it on the eastern side. In the area south of the Pilica their strategy was similar. While making a direct demonstration against Ivangorod, their intention was to bridge the river higher

up, put themselves astride the railway running from the south to the fortress, and then, pushing northwards, like their comrades near Warsaw, get behind Ivangorod, cut the line from Brest Litovsk, and so invest the place.

In railway communications — and all wars have become railway wars now a days — the Russians had the advantage over the Germans, who were to advance over a hundred miles into Poland and had the use of the Russian railways (which are different in gauge from the German) only so far as they could re-lay them or adapt their own stock to their use. The Russians, on the other hand, had a railway running behind the whole of their front from Nowo Georgiewsk to a point above Ivangorod; and in Warsaw itself, at




[Exclusive News Agency.
A scene in the gardens of the old palace of the Polish Kings at Warsaw.

the extremity of the contested line, they possessed a concentration centre which would have been a danger signal to an enemy much less alert than the Germans. Events were to show that if the Germans did not avert the danger, they were quick to discern its coming, and to give way in time before it.

THE ADVANCE.

In the last week of September and the first of October the Germans moved forward from the line Thorn-Cracow over the plain lying in the great curve of the



The Russian Advance: Laying down timber over a swamp in order to facilitate the progress of the transports. [Universal Photo Exchange.]




Russian infantrymen and Cossacks halted in a Polish village. [Universal Photo Exchange.]

Vistula; the Austrians pushed north and north-east towards the line of the San, and vigorously attacked the Russian detachments which had made their way over the Carpathians into the Hungarian Plain. The Russians at once began to give ground. Not only were they threatened by the rapid German advance on their right flank, but they had not the numbers which were needed on the Vistula without withdrawing men from Galicia and the Carpathians. Russia has a great superiority in numbers, but it is not a superiority at every point. She has the men, but her difficulty is to concentrate them in time at the decisive point. Her object, therefore, is always to delay the issue—which, thanks to the stubbornness of her admirable soldiers, she can often do—until she can bring up the masses of reserves whom she keeps at more distant central points, or transfer forces from a

of the San river, fell into the hands of the enemy. Throughout the retreat the Austrians claimed no small victories, and no doubt the Russians had the losses which are incidental to all retreats on so large a scale. But nothing more than rearguard actions took place, and the Russian withdrawal was made deliberately and in good order.

Similar engagements took place with the Germans, and no serious attempt was made to dispute their progress until they approached the Vistula itself. There was, apparently, a school of Russian strategists who urged that Warsaw should be evacuated, and that the Germans should be allowed to cross the river in order that their defeat, when accomplished, should be complete and crushing. It was easy, they said, for a German army to cross the Vistula, but Russia would see to it that they had no opportunity of getting back in safety. It is not



The Russian counter-attack from across the Vistula.

less important section of the front. Her early victories in Galicia were won by this method; she suffered heavy punishment before Lublin, while with superior forces she fell upon and defeated the Austrians at Lemberg, and then reinforced her weaker army until it, too, could undertake a victorious offensive. Now, the extended line in Galicia had to be drawn in. The Russians left Hungary and fell back to the foothills of the Carpathians south of the railway from Przemyśl to Lemberg. At Przemyśl itself, where they were making good progress on the north and east, they were compelled to abandon the siege of the southern and western front, and before long Austrian cavalry entered the city. About the same time the Russians withdrew to the northern bank of the San, and Sandomierz, which stands on the Vistula, just to the south

added, however, that this school had any great support. Admirable as is the resolution with which the Russian Commanders permit Russian territory to be overrun in order to give battle under favourable conditions, it was hardly likely that they would submit to the humiliation of surrendering Warsaw, and relieve the Germans of the painful ordeal of forcing a passage in the hope that the enemy would follow them still further into the interior, or, attempting to stand his ground, would crumble away before them. It was decided to let General von Hindenburg, whose victory at the battle of Tannenberg, in East Prussia, had won him supreme command of the Austro-German armies, march his men up to the Vistula, to resist all his attempts to throw men across the river, and then to take the offensive against him from over the



A general view of Warsaw.

[Exclusive News Agency.]

river, while shattering his whole position by a blow against the northern extremity of his line.

ATTEMPTS TO CROSS THE VISTULA.

In the first week of October the Germans south of the Pilica were well up towards the Vistula. The masses of cavalry which the Russians had thrown out from Ivangorod were easily driven in. The forests between Radom and the river were occupied, and the few open spaces which lay between them were prepared for defence in order to obstruct the Russian attack if the attempt to cross the river failed. North of the Pilica the Germans had the double objective of forcing the river and of menacing Warsaw. Against Warsaw they moved from three directions. Almost due west of the city they advanced to Sochaczew, on the River Bzura, and thence to Blonie, which lies only eight miles from the suburbs. Slightly more to the south-west they moved along the line of the railway from Skierniewice and reached Grodzisk, due south of Blonie, and even Pruszkow, a mile or two nearer to Warsaw. Their third line of advance was from Rawa, on the Rawka river, and brought them to Piaseczno, scarcely as many miles south of the city as Blonie is west, and to Gora Kalwarija, on the western bank of the river. They were thus on the outskirts of Warsaw by October 11th, holding all the roads leading to it from the west and south, and preparing, simultaneously with their advance, to cross the river and swing round the city from the east. The point chosen for the attempted crossing was at Gora Kalwarija. In the section south of the Pilica, while they approached so close to Ivangorod as to shell the forts with their heavy guns, they determined to bridge the river near Janowiec (on the eastern side the nearest place is Kazimierz) some twenty miles south of the fortress.

The attempts were made on the 13th and 14th, and failed. It was a remarkable enterprise for this huge army—probably near a million men—which had marched over a hundred miles into hostile territory, with meagre facilities for its supplies, thus to attack the passage of a formidable river defended by a powerful and intact army. The Germans, however, never came near to success. At Janowiec they did succeed for a short time in landing a small force on the eastern bank. Two battalions, it is said, crossed, but only to be annihilated. The rafts and pontoons were destroyed. At Kalwarija the movement which was intended to bring about the fall of Warsaw was even less successful. The pontoons were built, and the first detachments began the attempt to cross, but it was never carried to completion. In both quarters, and at each renewed attempt, the Russian guns obtained the mastery. The Germans might have persisted in their purpose, for it was essential to them that they should cross the river, had they not suddenly received the news that their own position was in danger. At the northern extremity of the German line, where their troops lay due west of Warsaw, the Russians were coming down on them in force. Their flank was being pressed back by an attack from Warsaw itself. It was being turned by large forces emerging from Nowo Georgiewsk, and threatening its rear towards Sochaczew and Lovicz.

THE RUSSIAN FLANKING MOVEMENT.

The German army threatening Warsaw numbered five army corps, and for some time the Russians could put only two against them. But when they brought up their reserves they effected a complete surprise. The Germans had been sending aeroplanes for some days over Warsaw, and the airmen's industry in dropping bombs had resulted

in more than a hundred deaths. But they had apparently obtained no information of the counterstroke which the Russians were preparing. Speed is the essence of success in a flanking movement. An outflanking force which is discovered in good time on its way to the enemy's flank can be countered and thrown back, as the French had found in their attempted manœuvre against the German right flank after the battle of the Aisne. The Russians poured troops through Warsaw and reversed the balance of numbers. Holding the enemy firmly in front, they threw their cavalry against the German flank and rear. This was the decisive action of the battle. The German centre, following the left, began slowly to retire from the river. Then the Russians, to clinch their success, threw infantry across the Vistula to attack the German right, which was resting on the Pilica river. Outflanked on the left, frustrated in the centre, and hard pressed on the right, the Germans retreated throughout the whole section from the Pilica to the northward bend of the Vistula.

The Russian counterstroke might be compared, in the speed and vigour of its execution, with that of General Joffre at the battle of the Marne. It depended for its success on precisely the same qualities of surprise and superior numbers; but whereas in France the Germans were in an increasingly difficult position the nearer they approached to Paris, and were in some measure compelled to risk the sudden appearances of undiscovered forces from the neighbourhood of the city, in Poland they had every reason to anticipate from the first that if the Russians could effect a counterstroke at all, it would be delivered from the direction of Warsaw and Nowo Georgiewsk. At no other point was it easily conceivable that the Russians could obtain a success which would shake the whole German position. At Ivangorod the Germans were in front of the fortress, and were well equipped with heavy artillery, so that the Russians would have had the greatest difficulty in making use of their bridge-heads. At any other point except Warsaw and Nowo Georgiewsk nothing would have been open to them except to force the passage

of the river and break in the German front. At the Warsaw end of the line, on the other hand, they had bridges at their disposal, and, for Russia, a large number of railways by which they could hurry up their reserves from every quarter.

In the circumstances it might have been expected that the Germans, before approaching so close to Warsaw, would have been careful to secure their extreme left flank on the Vistula. They could have prepared positions, exactly as the Russians did at a later date, along the line of the Bzura river; and even if the numbers which the Russians brought to bear had compelled them to yield some ground before Warsaw, they might have offered a stubborn defence from their entrenchments.

The apparent neglect of the German commanders to make preparations against a danger with which the Russian positions on the Vistula clearly threatened them is one of the problems which is likely to be solved only when the war is over. Possibly it may be found that the explanation lies in the inadequacy of the German numbers to hold so enormous a line, and their desire to mass superior forces at the main points from which they were operating against Warsaw and Ivangorod.

SOUTH OF THE PILICA.

The retreat of the Germans throughout the northern section of their line was not immediately followed by a retirement south of the Pilica. Had it not been for the dividing line of the river, the southern German army must soon have joined in the retreat. As it was, there was no immediate danger to the southern army unless the Russians on the northern bank of the Pilica chose to complicate their pursuit of the enemy in front of them by attempting to cross the river and to strike towards the south. The operation, unless they had ample men to spare, would have been dangerous, and in attempting two tasks they might have failed in both. In point of fact, if the German army between the Pilica and the mouth of the San could even now have forced its way over the



An Austrian General and his entire staff captured by the Russians.

[Central News.

Vistula and established itself rapidly on the eastern bank, it might have done something to restore the fortunes of the battle. It might have compelled the Russian forces engaged in the pursuit of the northern German army to fall back towards Warsaw. In the same way, even after the whole of the German army was in retirement, the Austrians persisted in their attempt to secure a footing on the northern side of the San in order to put pressure on the main Russian army and threaten its communications during its pursuit of the Germans towards their own frontier.

The Russians were, however, too strong to permit any further attempt of the Germans south of the Pilica to force the passage of the Vistula. They themselves prepared to throw large bodies of troops across to the western bank. The first of these, a Caucasian division, crossed in boats at Kozienice, a few miles below Ivangorod, and more troops followed from Ivangorod itself, and from Nova Aleksandria, a little further up the river. There is along the bank of the Vistula at this point a narrow

stretch of open ground. In front of it lies large tracks of thick forest, with here and there small open areas among them. It was necessary that the Caucasian troops should hold out at Kozienice until the river could be bridged, in order that when the main army crossed it should have room to deploy for the advance. For three days and nights, accordingly, the Caucasians held their ground against desperate attacks by overwhelming numbers (the proportion is said to have been one to seven), and the exploit is regarded as one of the most remarkable on the Russian side which the war has yet produced. The arrival of reinforcements, marching along the eastern bank from Ivangorod and further south, at length made their position safe. From Kozienice to Nova Aleksandria large forces deployed in the open space along the river bank, and a general offensive was undertaken against the strong German positions between the Vistula and Radom. Some of the fiercest fighting of the war was to take place before the Germans in this quarter finally gave way. The battle with the Austrians was still undecided.



Russian engineers laying a railway track in the rear of their advancing army.

[Record Press.



German prisoners being marched through the streets of Warsaw.

[Topical War Service.]

CHAPTER XXXIII.

THE RETREAT FROM THE VISTULA AND THE SAN.


THE EFFECTS OF THE RUSSIAN FLANKING MOVEMENT—EFFORTS OF THE SOUTHERN GERMAN ARMY—THE PLAN BEHIND THE GERMAN RETREAT—A PROLONGED BATTLE ON THE SAN—AUSTRIAN WITHDRAWAL TO CRACOW AND THE CARPATHIANS.

THE Russian plan, as was shown in the preceding chapter, was to turn the whole Austro-German position from the north. In this they were following the general principle by which they had decided their first Galician campaign. In the series of battles at Lemberg and Lublin they had defeated the entire Austrian army by breaking down its line progressively from the south, each advance threatening the Austrian forces immediately to the north. By the same method they now defeated and drove back from the north first the Germans and then the Austrians, and so brought about the retreat of each successive section of the line to the south. It would seem that this is the most, if not the only, practicable method of forcing the retirement of the prolonged front of great modern armies. The old-fashioned battle (if one may call Sedan old-fashioned) is now likely to be rare. The war provided one instance of it at Tannenberg, where a whole Russian army was enveloped on both flanks. But with the forces deployed on one side extending to one million, or even two million, men, it is unlikely that its opponents will have sufficient numbers seriously to attempt a double flanking movement,

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not to speak of anything that might reasonably be called envelopment. The manœuvre on a single flank was employed by the Germans at Mons, by the French at the Marne and the Aisne, by the Russians in Poland, and later by the Germans in the same quarter. There is, it is true, an alternative method which is strictly practicable, but is attended by considerable danger. To break the centre of a small army and isolate the flanks is one thing, to break through the centre of a line like that of the Germans or Russians in Poland is another. The danger is that the striking force, after breaking through the hostile front, may find that the numbers of the enemy are so great that the line closes again behind it, and that, instead of the hostile front being irreparably broken, it is itself cut off. At a later stage of the Polish campaign this was the misfortune which almost overtook two German corps.

In the first phase of the Vistula campaign the turning movement in the north was the mainspring of the whole Russian plan. Their offensive was directed against other points as well, but always with the intention of pinning the Germans down and of preventing them from



STAGES OF THE AUSTRO-GERMAN RETREAT FROM THE VISTULA AND THE SAN.

taking the initiative on their side and stopping the threat which was proceeding steadily southward. The great length of the country in which operations were being carried on, and the fact that it was broken up into clearly defined areas by the Pilica and the Vistula in its southern course from west to east, made it possible for both the Germans and the Austrians to delay their retreat for some days, and even to attempt an offensive of their own. But unless such an offensive could be pressed to a rapid and decisive success, retreat was ultimately inevitable, and the official reports of the Russian Staff made it quite clear that the retreat of the Southern German army in the Radom region was finally due to the progress of the Russians on the northern bank of the Pilica.

AN ORDERLY RETREAT.

The German army, which had directed its attack against Warsaw and had endeavoured to secure the passage of the river immediately to the south of the city, retreated slowly and in good order. For several days it fought a determined rearguard action while retiring west and south-west along the line Lowicz-Rawa-Nowe Miasto. During its progress it was steadily harassed by Russian cavalry, who, however, at no time succeeded either in cutting its lines of supply nor in driving it so far south-west as to be a danger and embarrassment to the army on its right. Nor is there any evidence that its losses were heavier than was inevitable in such a retreat. The Russians succeeded in taking a considerable number of prisoners, but they captured few guns, and the Germans succeeded in carrying off the greater part of their wounded—a sure sign that the rapidity of their retirement was as much in their hands to settle as in that of the enemy.

To the south of the Pilica the fighting was much more stubborn. The Germans were firmly established in the belt of forest which covers the triangle of which the Pilica and the Vistula are the sides and the road running east and west through Radom the base. The Russians were compelled, advancing from the narrow strip of open ground along the Vistula, to fight their way foot by foot through this difficult region, and their task was all the

harder in that when they emerged from the forest into the few open spaces which exist in the middle of it, they found them also securely held by the Germans, who were posted, as it were, in a fortress with a glacis in front of them, which provided an admirable field of fire. The scale had turned in favour of the Russians on October 20th. In the days immediately following, the Germans resumed the offensive with the greatest vigour more than once. By October 26th the new effort had failed, and the German army was in definite retreat towards Radom, with its left wing withdrawn further to the west than its centre, and its centre, again, lying to the south-west of its right flank, which still rested on the Vistula near the mouth of the Ilzanka. The point of the line nearest to the Vistula was held by Austrian troops, who resisted


all efforts to dislodge them with the utmost tenacity. There was a special reason for the stubbornness of their resistance, in that some hope was still placed in the attempt of the Austrian troops to secure a footing on the northern side of the San river. If at this moment the Austrians between Radom and the Vistula had been forced rapidly to give way and driven southward to the junction of the Vistula and the San, the plans of their main army would have been defeated by the presence of a Russian force on their left rear. From Radom the Germans withdrew towards the upper reaches of the Pilica and Czenstochowa, and the entrenched position which there awaited



[Central News.]
General von Hindenburg (at the left of the bottom row) and his staff at the Eastern Headquarters of the German army.


them. The left of the Austrian army retired on Kielce, and in Russia, at the time, it was alleged that the Germans were leaving their allies in the lurch and imposing on them the brunt of the rearguard fighting with a view to saving their own men. It seems to have been the case that some Austrian cavalry were actually used as a screen for the Germans during their retirement; but inasmuch as the German cavalry was badly needed in the north, and was in any case insufficient in numbers to carry out its task, it was not unnatural that the German Staff should use Austrian cavalry, where cavalry was required, if it had none of its own to dispose of.

The Russians expedited the retreat of the German and Austrian army in the Radom region by yet another



A railway bridge blown up by the Austrians to cover their retreat.

[Central News.]



German pioneers rebuilding one of the bridges in Poland destroyed by their own troops.

[Photopress.]

diversion from the banks of the Vistula. A force of cavalry swam their horses over the river near Josefow, and advanced rapidly in a south-westerly direction. While the main Austrian forces on the left fell back towards Kielce, others held out along the line of the Opatowka river—another of the small tributaries of the Vistula in this region. The decisive operations between the Pilica and Ivangorod had lasted from October 23rd to October 27th; the battle in the southern part of this area—stretching roughly down to the Opatowka—was decided between October 28th and November 3rd. Kielce itself was taken from the Austrians on November 3rd. To the north-east of the town the Austrians had established themselves in a strong position, and lost five maxims and fifteen hundred prisoners in the battle. The Austrian corps here engaged were the First and Second; the German corps, who had held the ground between the Austrian army and the southern side of the Pilica, were the Twentieth, a Guards Reserve Corps, and a Landwehr Corps. The character of the general line of retreat, the German left being always much further to the west than the centre, and the centre than the right, owing to the Russian pressure on the north, is shown in the map. Thus, the line at the end of October ran through Kutno, in a south-easterly direction towards Rawa and the Pilica, and thence to the mouth of the Ilzanka river. By the end of October the Russians were in Petrokow, and by November 2nd in Lodz, and there was little further resistance on the western side of the Vistula, except on the lower Opatowka river and at the important position of Sandomierz, a little way to the south.

RUSSIAN CAVALRY RAID.

It now became evident that the Germans, if they intended to make a stand at all, could not make it east of the line of the Warta river, along which, as was stated earlier, they had prepared an elaborate series of positions before they made their advance—that is to say, on a front stretching through Olkusz (to the north of Cracow) up to Czenstochowa, and then following the line of the river to Sieradz and Kolo, the point at which it bends to the west. It was equally clear that the Russians would aim at pressing their success home by turning the line of the Warta river from the north. This, to some extent, they actually succeeded in doing. They not only handled very severely a German corps at Sieradz, on the middle Warta, but they also seized Kolo, and pressed on to Konin, which is on the south side of the river, half way between Kolo and the German frontier. They crossed the Warta, too, between Sieradz and Kolo, forced back the German left wing in a southerly direction, and even succeeded in crossing the frontier and in raiding the German strategic railway at Pleschen, seven miles on the German side. Farther to the north they carried their pursuit to within a mile or two of the frontier, and on the right bank of the Vistula they appeared close to Nieszawa, not many miles from the German fortress of Thorn. At all these points, however, their troops were only patrols, or raiding parties, which had marched far ahead of the main army.

It is only possible to understand the German retreat clearly in the light of the later movements which they had already decided, as events showed, promptly to carry out. Whether or not their dispositions in the advance had been faulty, there is no doubt that the Russians concentrated superior numbers against the northern point of their line with such rapidity that the Germans were soon conscious that their immediate plans had received

a fatal blow. They were forced to retreat, and they did so; but from the first moment of their retirement they were looking ahead to the fresh stroke which they proposed to deliver in order to keep the war on Russian soil. Their object was to delay the Russian pursuit at all costs for such a time as would allow them to withdraw the bulk of their forces expeditiously from Poland to the German frontiers and concentrate them at a pre-arranged point. This motive explains both the very heavy rearguard fighting which took place for some days north of the Pilica after the retirement from before Warsaw had begun, and also the stubborn efforts made in the region between Radom and the Vistula, where the striking of a heavy blow might be counted on at least to compel the Russians to weaken their pursuit, even if it did not force them to abandon it altogether. To the same motive must be ascribed the energy of destruction with which the German army wrecked all the means of communication as it withdrew through Poland. Bridges were broken, railway tracks torn up, telegraph poles sawn down—even the roads were systematically ploughed up so as to impede the activity and transport of the pursuing army. That the sole motive of this policy was to gain time to reorganise the German forces for a counter-blow is obvious from the reflection that the Germans, if they struck into Poland again without delay, would find themselves hampered in some degree by their own action, for they would have to travel over the country which they had themselves laid waste, and whose railways, bridges, and roads the Russians would have been unable in so short an interval to restore effectually. But at the moment to gain time was a sufficient end to keep in view, and they attained it.

THE STRATEGY OF THE RETREAT.

The conduct of the retreat was marked by great skill from a strategical point of view. As soon as the German commanders became convinced that their original scheme had failed, they decided to regroup their forces on the German frontier, to concentrate at Thorn, and to strike at the Russian right wing. Precisely as the Russians had made the whole German position from north to south untenable by outflanking the left wing, so now the Germans in turn would throw superior forces on the Russian right flank—that which had done the mischief—drive it back on Warsaw, and, as they hoped, bring about a general Russian retreat comparable with their own. Clearly, the more the Russian army could be drawn in a southerly direction during its pursuit, the weaker it would be along the southern bank of the Vistula between Warsaw and Thorn, and the better would be the prospect of the German advance which was preparing in that quarter. It was, in part at least, for this reason that the Germans drew off rather to the south-west than the west; the vigorous pursuit of the Russian cavalry, which drove the Germans away from the northern bend of the Warta and apparently hurried them past their carefully prepared lines, was at the same time providing for the Germans a weak spot in the Russian front at which to aim. If only a weak spot could be found here the Germans might reasonably hope for a substantial success, for it would be the turn of the Russians to operate far from their base, and in a country, moreover, largely deprived by German ingenuity of even its usual meagre supply of the means of communication. To secure time to make fresh dispositions of their forces, and to compel the enemy so to conform to their own movements during this retreat that he would be in the worst possible situation to meet the



Russian cavalry crossing a stream.

[Record Press.]



Russian troops entering a Polish town evacuated by the Germans.

[Universal Photo Exchange.]



Austrian prisoners at Kalisch.

[Central News.]

blow which they were preparing for him, were their two chief aims, which were well conceived and skilfully carried through. In Poland, as in Belgium and France, the German military genius perhaps shone more brightly in the organising capacity and forethought of the retreat than in the qualities of the attack, on which the Germans insist as so congenial to their character.

THE AUSTRIAN FLANK.

Meanwhile, on the right flank of the German-Austrian line the Austrians had, since the middle of October, attempted to carry out their part of the combined plan. Protected by at least two army corps on the left bank of the Vistula, they had moved up to the San and held the southern side of it from the mouth up to the fortresses of Jaroslav and Przemyśl. Southward of the latter place their line curved in a south-westerly direction to Sanok, Lisko, and the Carpathian ridge. Their secondary object was to move forward on the southern extremity of their line from Sanok and Lisko towards Sambor, through the lower slopes of the Carpathians; to cut the railway which was the main line of supply from Lemberg for the Russian army, and, which was just as important to them, to endanger the positions of the Russians facing the two San fortresses, and so to make it easier for the main Austrian army to cross the river and secure its hold on the northern side, which was the chief aim of the Austrian commanders. They held the town of Przemyśl, but the Russians commanded the bridge-head on the far bank of the river. The Austrians held also the fortress of Jaroslav, which lies on the left bank of the river, but not the bridge beyond it. Their intention was to cross at a number of chosen points along the course of the river, and, establishing themselves on the northern side with the Vistula on their left flank, to co-operate with the Germans who, according to the original scheme, would by that time be in possession of Ivangorod, Warsaw, and the eastern bank of the Vistula. The importance of the part which the Austrians were to play in the combined plan of campaign was that a definite hold on the northern side of the San would have given them a base from which

to threaten any new movement which the Russians might make against the main German army. On the other hand, the retreat of the Germans from before Warsaw did not immediately necessitate the abandonment of the Austrian plan. They were served by their own line of supply from Cracow; and so long as they could prevent the Russians from advancing too far south on the other side of the Vistula, they might hope, at the very least, to cause some delay in the Russian advance across Poland.

THE AUSTRIAN ATTACK ON THE SAN.

The Austrian efforts to secure a passage over the San persisted for nearly a week. The peculiarity of the position, as regards the lower reaches of the river, was that both sides were well situated for repelling any attempt on the part of the enemy to secure a crossing. On the northern bank, for nearly half the distance between the mouth of the San and Jaroslav, the forests come down to within a mile or two of the river. On the side held by the Austrians the conditions were, if anything, even more favourable to the defence. In both cases the country provided excellent opportunities for the defenders to entrench themselves, and to plant their guns in strong positions which could be easily concealed from the attack. It was more due to this than to any other reason that the struggle along the river lasted for three weeks before a final decision was reached. In the all-important matter of supply the Austrians had the advantage. The base of the triangle formed by the junction of the Vistula and the San is the railway which runs due east from Cracow to Dembica, Rzeszow, Jaroslav, and Przemyśl. This railway was the main channel of supply and reinforcements for the Austrian army, and alongside of it, through the whole of its length, runs a good road. To this excellent main artery were added railways leading right up to the Austrian front. One of them, springing from Dembica, strikes north towards the Vistula, and follows the right bank up to Sandomierz. Another, starting from the main line at a point farther east, follows the course of the San

river, curves round, and joins the line from Dembica a little south of Sandomierz ; or, the two may be regarded as one line forming the sides of the triangle of which the main railway is the base. The Austrians had thus the benefit of admirable communications. On the Russian side there was neither railway nor road which was as useful as these lines of supply. In the rear of their lines was the railway running from Ivangorod south-eastward to Lublin and away to the east, but this was required in part for the needs of Ivangorod and the army of the Upper Vistula ; and between this railway and the San there are only occasional broken stretches of good road. There is one good road which runs from the railway at Lublin south-east and south, and then has a westerly branch for a short distance, but this by itself was a meagre and inadequate line of supply for the Russians on the middle San. They had, however, the benefit of a loop railway which runs north-west from Lemberg, and curves back again to the main line at Jaroslav, from which supplies could be sent north and south along the rear of the Russian lines.

From the middle of October to the end of the third week the Austrians made every effort to force a passage across the river. A day or two after the failure of the German effort at Kozenice had become definite, it was clear that the Austrians also had made their effort and failed ; they had on at least one occasion succeeded in getting a footing on the northern side, just as the Germans had on one occasion thrown a small force across the Vistula. But in each case the detachment had no sooner secured a position than it was attacked and destroyed. On the 23rd of the month the Russians took up the attack on their side. They crossed first of all at a point opposite Nisko, and a little higher up at Rudnik, these places being on the line of railway which runs along the San. To the north of Nisko they forced a passage also at Rozwadow, and at a fourth point to the south. For some days they found it scarcely easier to hold their ground on the southern bank than the Austrians had found it to secure a footing on the north. For nearly a week heavy fighting went

on along the narrow strip of open ground between the river bank and the wooded country held by the Austrians. By the 26th the Austrian army began to give way along the lower reaches of the river ; but in the closing days of the month, either as a last desperate effort or in order to cover the complete retreat which had now become inevitable, they delivered a vigorous counter-attack along the whole line, so that it was not until November 5th that the Russians could announce a final and complete victory. Their success carried with it the immediate recapture of Jaroslav, with 5,000 prisoners, and the withdrawal of the Austrians from before Przemysl, which was again invested. The retirement had been heralded—even at the time when the counter-attack was being delivered—by the fall of Sandomierz, on the left bank of the Vistula, slightly in the rear of the advanced Austrian positions on the San. The importance of Sandomierz had led the Austrians to defend it with the utmost tenacity. Three lines of entrenchments had been prepared north of the river. After these had been carried by storm, the forces holding Sandomierz re-attacked, and, after a severe repulse, they held the defences of the town until these, too, were carried by assault. The bridge across the river they destroyed, so as to compel the Russians, if they proposed to attack the Austrian army north of the San, to force the passage of the river for themselves.

The whole Austrian army was now in retreat. On the extreme right flank it had been as unsuccessful as elsewhere. The attempt to turn the Russian position at Przemysl and to interrupt its line of supply had failed, but the forces employed in this quarter were, comparatively speaking, small. The most notable incident of the fighting was the destruction of a division of Hungarian Honved, twelve miles south of Sambor, which, as being the junction of several roads, was the objective of the Austrians moving up from the east and south.

THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE.

For a week or ten days after the decision of the battle on the San, the Russians moved steadily towards Cracow.



Russian engineers beginning to "dig themselves in."

[Record Press.]

North of the Vistula they crossed the Nida and Nidzitsa rivers, and occupied Miechow, twenty miles to the north of the fortress. From the Sar they came down on the railway from Cracow, and approached the city from the east. Farther to the south they drove the Austrians back on and through the Carpathian passes. By the middle of November they were within a day's march of both Thorn and Cracow, and faced the German fortified lines of Czenstochawa. They seemed to be in a position to strike a blow at Germany by crossing her frontiers between the Vistula and the Warta, or, more probably, by swinging round Cracow from the south and threatening Silesia. But this was not yet to be. The Germans, aggressive and mobile, were preparing to attack again.

In its general features the advance and retreat on the eastern front has a striking similarity to the German campaign in Belgium and Northern France. The Germans

overran Poland as they did Belgium, and one motive at least in each case was that of fighting at all costs on hostile soil, or at any rate any soil except their own. In both cases the opposing armies were forced to give way before the numbers and impetus of the German onslaught. In both cases the unexpected appearance of new forces at one extremity of the German line—their left wing in Poland, their right in France—brought their plans tumbling to the ground; and in both cases their retreat was followed by a fresh offensive in the hope of retrieving their fortunes. In the Polish campaign the renewed attack was the more successful because the ample spaces involved gave favourable ground, at this time at least, for manœuvring, and the German superiority in means of communication and supply enabled surprise concentrations of troops to be made which were next to impossible in the west.




Russian officers inspecting completed trenches in Poland.

[*Topical Press.*]



A general view of Shabatz on the Save.

[Exclusive News Agency.]



Belgrade, with the Danube in the distance. Notice the broken span of the railway bridge which once connected Austria and Servia.

[Central News.]



A general view of Belgrade, showing the Cathedral.

[Exclusive News Agency.]

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE FIRST AND SECOND INVASIONS OF SERVIA.

THE ALTERNATIVES BEFORE AUSTRIA—SERVIA'S GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION—AUSTRIA'S INITIAL ADVANTAGE—THE PLAN OF INVASION—BATTLE OF THE JADAR—AUSTRIAN DEFEAT—A SECOND ATTEMPT—PARTIAL AUSTRIAN SUCCESS.

AUSTRIA'S "punitive expedition" against Serbia took on a very different complexion when Russia entered the field. Austria's difficulty was that while every consideration of pride and prestige urged her once and for all to make an end of Serbia and the menace of the Pan-Servian propaganda, sound military reasons told her to throw her full strength against Russia. Whatever might be done on the Danube, the fate of Serbia would be settled ultimately by the conflict with Russia. Three possible courses were open to Austria. If she had been able to listen solely to military arguments she would have stood on the defensive along the line of the three rivers which form her frontier against Serbia—the Danube, the Save, and the Drina. With a comparatively small army she could have kept the Servians out of Austria-Hungary. Whatever may be the advantages of Serbia from the defensive point of view, she is not well situated to undertake a serious invasion of Austria. Whatever point she might have chosen for an invasion she was liable to be checked by an Austrian counter-advance against the rear of the invading army; and in any event, the difference between the military strength of the two powers was such that Austria could, by a rapid concentration, have overwhelmed the Servian army after allowing it to advance a suitable distance into her territory.

It would, however, have been almost more than human for Austrian statesmen and soldiers to have taken so cold and detached a view, and it is not astonishing that they allowed themselves to be guided by what are commonly called, and in situations of this kind deprecated, as "political considerations." Political reasons, however, can sometimes only be distinguished with difficulty from those which are military. The Austrian Government had

been sincerely afraid, especially since the Balkan wars, of the consequences of Servian intrigue among the Servian population of the empire, and a statesmanship which was thus, perhaps justly, nervous, might argue that to abstain from punishing Serbia after presenting the ultimatum of July 23rd, and after making Serbia's conduct the ground for the action which had embroiled the whole of Europe, would not only cover the Imperial Government with humiliation, but might set fire to the latent disaffection among the Servians of Austria, on which her enemies certainly were counting as a future reinforcement of their attack.

A SECOND COURSE.

This being so, a second course was possible to Austria. She might have concentrated an army of overwhelming strength, invaded Serbia at many points, driven the Servian army farther and farther to the south, dealt it a series of heavy blows, occupied the country, and then, leaving as strong a garrison as was necessary, turned her whole attention to Russia. This would, in view of the strength of Serbia's defensive position and the ability of her army, have been a venturesome and even hazardous experiment, because it is impossible to say how long an army of even double the size which Austria actually employed would have been tied up in Serbia. At the same time, in view of what actually happened to Austria's enterprise, one cannot say that this might not have been her best policy. She would have done better, as events showed, to have used a larger army in August, even if after inflicting a first defeat on Serbia she had then withdrawn part of her troops to the north.

Austria decided to follow a third and very different plan, which could only have been justified by success,



Nish : Showing the walls, Governor's house, and barracks. [*Exclusive News Agency.*]



The main street of Valjevo. [*Exclusive News Agency.*]



A Scene in Kragujevatz, the seat of the Servian arsenal. [*Exclusive News Agency.*]

and which depended for its success on great skill and generalship in very difficult country. She proposed immediately to take the offensive against Serbia, and to employ the minimum number of troops which she thought would be likely to secure victory, while using her other available resources against Russia in Poland and Galicia. The result was that in invading Serbia at separate points on the frontier, as for geographical reasons she naturally did, and advancing inland over a somewhat wide front, she challenged the Servians to employ against her some old and simple principles of strategy. In a word, she gave the Servians an opportunity, if they were enterprising enough to make use of it, of attacking her armies and dealing with them separately.

GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES.


The configuration of Serbia gives a great initial advantage to Austria. The hardest part of the task of an invading army comes when it has already arrived within the Servian frontiers. The whole of Serbia projects into Austria in the form of a salient in a north-westerly direction. Whatever advantage in theory a salient may confer, in practice when the salient of a weak Power projects into the territory of one that is much stronger, the advantage is on the other side. The northern boundary of Serbia consists (to the east) of the Danube, and (to the west) of the Save after its junction with the Danube. The western frontier, which lies almost at right angles to the northern, is the river Drina, from its junction with the Save. But not only does the whole of Serbia form one great salient, but on its northern front there are two which may be regarded separately. The first is the north-western corner of Serbia. Its shape is roughly that of a cup; the Save forms the eastern and northern sides, the Drina the Western; Austrian territory surrounds all three. It follows not only that the Servian districts which lie inside this cup-like area may be made immediately untenable by an Austrian invasion from over the rivers at points at the base of the salient, but that the farther south the Austrians chose to make their attacks the greater

must be the extent of territory to be abandoned by the Servians, unless they can promptly make head against, and dispose of, one or both of the invading armies. The most appropriate points for invasion are, in point of fact, pretty clearly marked. The land which lies within the northern cup is level ground, and a railway and a road cross it at the base just where the foot-hills of the mountain ranges come down towards the plain. At the eastern side of the railway and road stands Shabatz. At the western extremity is Losnitza, and these are therefore marked out roughly as the points at which the Austrian armies would cross the Save and Drina so as to force the Servians to abandon the plains between the rivers; then the invading forces would join hands at the base of the hills, and so advance by converging roads and the river valleys into the interior of the country.

THE BELGRADE SALIENT.


From Shabatz the Save runs almost due east for about thirty miles and then curves northwards to its junction with the Danube. The united rivers run east again for a few miles and then turn southwards, thus making on a smaller scale a loop somewhat resembling the greater one at Serbia's western extremity. At the curve of this loop, just where the Save and the Danube join, stands the capital, Belgrade. It is fortunate for Serbia that, in view of the obvious weakness of its military position, Belgrade is not so closely bound up with the national life as is the capital

of more highly-developed countries. It has always in history been a point of dispute between contending peoples on the north and the south sides of the Danube. For a numerous and powerful invader looking northward over the river Danube, Belgrade is a useful sally-port into Hungary; for a power whose object it is to invade Serbia, Belgrade is an important point of departure to the south; but for Serbia, circumstanced as she is, Belgrade is a source of weakness. Standing, as it does, at the head of the salient, it could be cut off and then forced to surrender by a converging attack from the east and from the west. This attack, however, would not ordinarily



After the bombardment of Belgrade: Austrian soldiers in a house which had been struck by a shell.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



The Austrian invasion of Serbia in August, 1914.

be directed from the base of the salient in which Belgrade stands, since immediately behind the city, filling up the spaces between the rivers and stretching away to the south, is a mass of easily-defensible mountain country. An invading Austrian army would not only find it difficult to get a footing here on the Servian side of the rivers, but even after having secured its ground would have to fight its way over a series of heights ranging from 300 to 1,500 feet towards the railway which runs southward from Belgrade. The attack upon Belgrade, therefore, is naturally made from points on the Save and the Danube which lie farther to the east and west.

The Servians did not, however, wait for the Austrian attack before withdrawing the administration from Belgrade. If it was unlikely, it was certainly not impossible that the Austrians would attempt to force a crossing of the rivers north and south of the city and capture it at one blow; and although such an attempt would necessarily have been rather costly, it is perhaps surprising that it was not made. Belgrade was not heavily fortified. Its defences had been brought up to date at the middle of the last century, but in recent times it had been recognised that against a really serious attack it could not be defended; and apart, therefore, from light guns, earthworks, and the defences which a field army might throw up along the river banks, it presented no formidable obstacle to attack. The Austrians, however, thought that the project was worth the expense, and confined themselves to a bombardment of the city. The Servian Government had left the capital before the war broke out, and had transferred the administration, with all that belongs to it, to Nish, a small country town

of some 20,000 inhabitants, which lies 130 miles to the south of Belgrade, in the valley of the Upper Morava.

From this far-distant spot, whose population was now suddenly increased to something like 50,000, the Servian Government were able to conduct the war in the knowledge that the Austrian armies could only reach them after traversing country which furnishes as many natural opportunities for a successful defence as any, perhaps, in Europe, except Switzerland. There was, however, one point about half way between Nish and Belgrade which was of prime importance to Servia. This was Kragujevatz, sixty miles south of Belgrade, and the seat of Servia's arsenal. Even with this place in their possession, the Servians were before very long in great straits for sundry munitions of war, and perhaps, therefore, Kragujevatz ought to be taken as the vital point in the Servian defences, and one of the immediate objects of the Austrian invasion, next to the crushing of the Servian field army.

OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN.

The Austrians opened their campaign in earnest towards the end of the second week in August. They crossed the Save from Klenak to Shabatz, on which their left flank rested. On the other side of the salient from Shabatz they crossed the Drina at a number of points from Losnitza, where the road and railway from Shabatz come close to the river, southwards to Liubovia. Their general aim was to advance from the flanks, while holding back their centre, and to swing their wings round from east and west so as to grip the Servian army and cut off its line of retreat on Valjevo. From Valjevo a road runs northward to the Drina which follows the valley of the Jadar river along almost its whole course. It was, roughly, across this

road that the centre of the Servian position lay. From certain not very numerous points on either flank, roads run through the hills into the Jadar valley to join this Valjevo road, and it was along these roads springing from the banks of the Drina and the Save that the Austrians prepared to march in order to come down on the Servian rear.

The main Austrian attack was to be delivered from the side of the Drina. Here there were few roads or river valleys to make the advance easy, and much mountainous country to be overcome. At Losnitza, the northernmost spur of the mountains (the Tser heights) juts out towards the Drina, rising to 2,200 feet. Immediately to its south, between the valleys of the Losnitza and the Jadar, lies the Iverak spur, some 1,200 feet in height. Then comes the Jadar valley, with the road to Valjevo running into it from Losnitza, near the Drina, and throwing off a southern shoot which runs over the hills to Krupanj, at a height of 1,200 to 1,500 feet. South of Losnitza lies a mass of mountainous country, with two roads starting from the Drina near Liubovia, and striking north-west through Krupanj and Petska till they, too, strike the Valjevo road. The Austrian plan was not ill-conceived, provided that in such difficult country they could carry out their enveloping movement with a fair measure of rapidity. The Servians had the advantage of the army which sees the attack unfolding, and can choose the weakest point at which to strike.

The Austrians brought nearly five corps into the field. On the left wing, at Shabatz, they had the Fourth and Ninth, and the Servians, recognising that this was the less formidable part of the attack, were satisfied to counter and contain these corps until they had dealt with the Austrians on the Drina. At Losnitza the Austrians had

the Eighth Corps, which was to advance into the Tser and Iverak mountains. From the region of Losnitza one and a half corps were to march up the Jadar valley. Two smaller forces, one of them a division strong, were to start from a point further south, near Liubovia, and push along the roads towards Krupanj and Petska, whence they would menace the position of the Servian army from the flank and rear. If the Servian army was still in the lower Jadar valley, held fast by the attacks of the corps operating from Losnitza, it might possibly be surrounded altogether.

THE BATTLE.


At first things went well with the Austrians. The Servian army in vain tried to prevent them crossing the river; they established themselves firmly on the right bank, and by the night of August 13th the Servians had fallen back on their prepared positions on the Tser and Iverak hills, and on Jarebitse, in the Jadar valley. On the Tser heights especially the Servians were strongly posted, and well supplied with artillery. By the 15th both sides were bringing up their reserves, and the Servians had determined to strike a blow at the left wing of the enemy from the side of the Tser. There was not much time to spare. On the 16th, the arrival of an Austrian division was announced at Krupanj, whence a road led directly to the rear of the Servian lines at Jarebitse, and another smaller Austrian detachment was on its way towards Petska, south-east of Krupanj, and nearer still to the Servian line of retreat. The Servians, therefore, fell back from Jarebitse to Zavlaka, nine miles further to the south. From Zavlaka they could observe the roads from Krupanj and Petska, but any Austrian movement in force from these directions would soon have compelled a further retirement towards Valjevo.



King Peter of Serbia. [E.N.A.]




The Crown Prince of Serbia. [E.N.A.]



An Austrian pontoon bridge over the Danube.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Austrian pioneers building a bridge to replace the one destroyed by the Servians.

[Central News.]

The Servians were now, however, to make their effort. Their troops in the valley of the Jadar were ordered to hold the Austrians in their positions while an attack was launched against the left wing of the enemy in the region of the Tser. The battle lasted indecisively throughout August 17th and 18th, but by the evening of the latter day it seemed to be turning in favour of the Servians. At dawn, on the 19th, the Austrians made a final effort to carry the Servian positions, which ended in complete failure. Defeated at Tser, they had to give up the ground which they had gained on the Iverak mountains, and the positions on the Jadar and in the hill country to the south of it had also to be abandoned. The defeat, which the Servians ascribed to the dash and superior shooting of their infantry, and to their French guns, became complete and decisive. The pursuit continued for the next two days, and the Austrians were driven back again over the Drina, being unable to maintain themselves anywhere on the right bank.

The Austrian army at Shabatz was now in a hopeless predicament. All its efforts to join hands with the Austrian army to the south had been defeated. It had nearly a corps less than the Drina army, and it was likely to be faced at any moment by vastly superior forces. Making some sharp and costly attacks in order to cover its retreat, it withdrew without undue delay across the Save. The Servians affirmed that the Austrians had lost 10,000 dead — 6,000 on the Tser — 4,500 prisoners, and, in all, 40,000 men and 60 guns.

The Servians took considerable risks in meeting the Austrians so far to the north. They had the advantage of the interior lines and of concentrating their troops on a comparatively narrow front; in order to obtain this advantage they had not offered a stronger opposition to the Austrians along the right bank of the Drina. At the same time they were hazarding a great deal on the success of their strategy, since failure to crush the Austrian wing on the Tser and Iverak heights would have made difficult, if not impracticable, the retreat of their army to Valjevo. The Servian reports published after the battle stated that the Austrians had the advantage of greatly superior numbers—a statement which aroused

some astonishment at the time, since the Servian army available at the opening of the war had been estimated at 250,000 men, and even more. But there were other points on the frontier where strong detachments had to be posted, and there is reason to believe that even thus early the Servian Staff had difficulty in maintaining fully equipped the numbers of trained men who were at its disposal. The victory of the Servians was therefore extremely creditable, both to the soldiers for their courage and endurance and to the Staff for the decision and skill with which they threw their forces against superior numbers.

FOLLOWING UP THE SERVIAN VICTORY.

The Austrian army having been finally driven over the rivers, the Servians had to decide the difficult question of how best to follow up their victory. They might have

crossed the rivers in their turn and attacked the retreating Austrian armies in the hope of dealing them a further blow before they were reinforced. They decided against so bold a scheme of operations, and probably with good reason.

The Austrians, as soon as they were safely across the rivers, could easily have held the passages until they had been strengthened; and for the Servians to have invaded Hungary with a view to marching on Budapest, as some of the forecasts of that time rashly suggested they would do, would have been to play into Austria's hands. For Austria to have massed an overwhelming army for the penetration of Serbia might have been a great embarrassment to her

campaign against Russia; to have concentrated such forces against a Servian army invading Hungary would have been comparatively easy, and might have greatly simplified her double task.

The Servians, however, if they were not disposed to undertake so audacious a programme, by no means intended to remain passively within their own borders. They therefore embarked on an advance into Bosnia, in conjunction with the Montenegrins, who had made common cause with them at the opening of the war. The object of the combined forces was to march on Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, and to raise the Servian population, if possible, against the Austrians. Whether the capture



King Peter and the Servian General Staff.

[Central News.]



A Montenegrin big gun in position.

[Universal Photo Exchange.]



Servian troops in the trenches on the Drina.

[Topical War Service.]

of Sarajevo would have had this effect it is impossible to say, since it was never achieved. But the advance towards it seems to have had little of the effect for which the Servians hoped. The population of Bosnia, whatever its racial sympathies might be, was no doubt indisposed to throw in its lot active'y with its kinsmen until it obtained clearer evidence that they were likely to get the better of their powerful opponents. The invasion of Bosnia involved a dispersion of Serbia's military strength, but it would be unjust to condemn it without qualification on this account unless it was shown that the Servian government was unreasonably confident in its belief that Bosnia might be induced to rise in revolt. The capture of Sarajevo and an insurrection of the Austrian Serbs would, it might perhaps be calculated, so far distract Austrian energies as to increase the general military security of Serbia, and so diminish the threat of a second invasion. This calculation, which was presumably that on which the Servians acted—

and the Austrians certainly did send a few detachments southwards — was open to a counter-argument. The Austrians might decide to tolerate the advance on Sarajevo and to run the risk of insurrection on the part of the Bosnian population, intending at the appropriate moment to invade Serbia again along the same stretch of the Drina where they had crossed before. The result could only be that the Servians would have to beat a retreat from Bosnia and return to the defence of their own country. If, in addition, they had failed to

raise the Bosnian Serbs, then their plans had clearly failed; if, on the other hand, there was an outbreak in Southern Bosnia, the Austrians would have to detach large forces which they might have used much more profitably elsewhere; but in any event, unless the revolt spread to the north of Bosnia (which was unlikely, since a large Austrian army was already in occupation of part of it) they could draw the Servian army of invasion back by a second march towards Valjevo. As it turned out, the Servians gained nothing by their march on Sarajevo, but the question remains what, in the opinion of their critics, they should have done had they kept their army united. It is possible to say that they should have crossed the rivers and pushed northwards with an army of 200,000 men. But such an enterprise, undertaken in obedience to the military principle that one should seek out and destroy the military forces of the enemy, would have assumed a different look had the Austrians suddenly

concentrated and attacked them with half a-million men. On the other hand, but for the Sarajevo expedition, the Servians would have had larger defensive forces with which to meet the second invasion that was now threatening them, and would have disposed of it more completely than they did. Briefly, in the hope of reaping a large advantage in Bosnia, they chose to run the risk of being driven back from the river banks into the hills. In both things fortune was against them.

THE SECOND INVASION.

By the beginning of September the Austrians had re-formed and reinforced their army, and it stood on the left bank of the Drina from Liubovia down to the junction of the Drina and the Save, its numbers, estimated at from 250,000, ready again to force a passage. On this occasion the Austrians hoped to enter Serbia over a continuous front, and to swing their left wing round from the north

across the plain between the rivers, so preventing the Servian army from dealing with their forces in detail, as it had done so successfully in August. From Bossut, which stands on the Save, a few miles north of its junction with the Drina, up to Jania, which is on the right bank of the Drina, opposite the point where the mountain ridges come down to the plains, they massed 90,000 men, and on September 8th began to cross the rivers. During the first part of the day they made good their footing on the Servian side, but were repeatedly attacked by the Servian

infantry, and could not maintain their ground. When night came they withdrew across the Save, under the protection of their guns from the left bank. Their casualties were estimated by the Servians to have been 10,000, but their losses in artillery—only a battery of howitzers and another of field guns, besides some maxims—show that their retreat did not become a rout. The fighting near Racha was more equal than in the stretch of the Drina up to Jania, for here the attack obtained no definite hold on the right bank, and was repulsed with greater ease.

The Austrians fared better in the southern section of the line—that part of the Drina which lies between Losnitza and Liubovia. Here the assailant, if he crosses the river, must at once ascend into the difficult country where defensive positions are plentiful, and adequate communication is difficult between the attacking columns. It was such considerations as these which



A Servian sharpshooter in a rifle pit overlooking the Danube at Belgrade.

[Central News.]



Servian peasant women acting as stretcher bearers.

[Topical War Service.]



Carrying ammunition to the Servian guns at Gutchevo.

[Topical War Service.]

had led the Servians to weaken their forces in this region, and to think that they could afford the luxury of the advance on Sarajevo. The aim of the Austrians was again Valjevo. They advanced into the hills which lie south of Losnitza, between the Drina and the Jadar valley, and pressed over them towards the road to Valjevo. These hills range in height from 2,000 to 3,000 feet, and for some days the Austrians made slow but steady progress. They met at last with a desperate resistance at Rozhan, a height in the Sokolska mountains, which is over 3,000 feet high and dominates the positions which lie between it and Valjevo. Two regiments only defended it, and they were on the point of retreat when, on September 15th, a third regiment came to their rescue. An observer, who had followed this regiment in the war,* says:—

“General Putnik, having summoned the commander of my regiment, explained to him the importance of Rozhan, and the hopes he laid upon his regiment. That morning I saw officers and men entering the fighting lines as if they were joining some merrymaking. A company of the first battalion of the regiment was nearly caught by the retreat of the regiments which defended Rozhan, but other battalions arriving stopped the retreat, and, instilling new courage and fire into their exhausted comrades, attacked the enemy so fearlessly, and beat him so ruthlessly, that the Austro-Hungarian troops fled, vainly seeking a refuge beyond their trenches. From that moment the Austro-Hungarian advance was stopped.”

The example set at Rozhan spread to the other hills, and at most points the Austrians were pressed back to

the Drina. But in the Jagodnia mountains, north-west of Rozhan, they held their ground, and all the efforts of the Servians to dislodge them failed. They thus maintained their footing on the right bank of the Drina, and held a possible starting point for a later and more formidable offensive. This was the penalty which the Servians had to pay for miscalculating the willingness of the Bosnians to rise. They had still, however, some hopes of a diversion from the Bosnian side. They had crossed their frontier at its south-eastern corner into Bosnia and attacked Visegrad; farther to the north they had penetrated by the end of the month to Vlasenitsa, which lies to the south-west of the Austrian positions at Zvornik and Jagodnia, the security of which would have been threatened by a further Servian advance. But the scheme came to nothing, and their little expeditions on the Austrian flank had soon to be abandoned.

In the north, the Servians showed a disposition to follow up their second repulse of the Austrians by an offensive of their own. They crossed the Save at Shabatz, and they occupied Semlin. But it was obvious that, with the enemy actually in occupation of the Servian hills far behind them on the left side of the great salient, an advance into Hungary from the Save and the Danube was impossible. The crossings of the rivers were demonstrations, and were only short-lived. The Austrians soon regained possession of Semlin, and occupied themselves throughout October with fragmentary operations and bombardments of Belgrade until they had gathered another army for a third and, as they hoped, a last attack.

* *Daily Telegraph* correspondent with the Servian army.




A general view of Belgrade from across the Danube.

[Exclusive News Agency.]



Suez : A panorama from the port.

[Exclusive News Agency.]



The Suez Canal : The entrance to the Timsah Lake.

[Exclusive News Agency.]



Reading the Proclamation of the War against Turkey from the steps of the Royal Exchange, London, on November 6th, 1914.

[L.N.A.]

CHAPTER XXXV.

THE DRAGGING IN OF TURKEY.

THE YOUNG TURKISH REVOLUTION—NATIONALIST, NOT LIBERAL, IN CHARACTER—THE PROJECT OF A "MIDDLE EMPIRE" FROM THE BALTIC TO THE PERSIAN GULF—WHY TURKEY CAME INTO THE WAR—THE MILITARY PLANS OF THE GERMANS IN TURKEY—THE FRONTIERS OF EGYPT—THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA.

THE two dividing lines in the history of British relations with Turkey are the Congress of Berlin and the accession to power of the Committee of Union and Progress. Before the Congress of Berlin our Turkish policy was governed entirely by our fear of Russia. The Crimean war was fought in order to save Turkey from what was regarded as the aggression of Russia. It was thought that a strong Turkish Empire was necessary to the security of our position in India, and there were those who, like Stratford Canning, had great hopes that Turkey might yet reform herself, and establish a Government which should be at least tolerable to the subject races. These hopes foundered in the atrocities which followed the rising of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 'seventies, and it was in these years that English party controversy on our relations with Turkey was most bitter. The end of the long duel between Gladstone and Disraeli was that a second war with Russia over Turkey was narrowly averted by the establishment of the European Concert, which, at the Congress of Berlin, sanctioned the liberation of large areas from the Turkish yoke, and made provisions for the better Govern-

ment of disaffected provinces left under Turkish rule. The boundaries in the new map of South-Eastern Europe which the Congress made were drawn under the influence of the fear which Germany shared with England that the liberated provinces would be only nominally independent, and in reality mere creatures of Russia, the liberator—a fear which was presently shown to be quite unfounded. Broadly, however, it is fair to take the date of the Congress as marking the end of the old British policy of bolstering up Turkey in Europe as a buffer against Russia. But the pro-Turkish policy still persisted in Asia. The acquisition of Cyprus was the visible token of a Treaty of Alliance between Britain and Turkey for the protection of her Asiatic provinces. The purchase by Disraeli's Government of the Suez Canal shares gave us a direct interest in Egypt, and this was converted by the Liberal Government of 1880-1885 into a military occupation. The old pro-Turkish policy of Palmerston, driven from Europe, had taken refuge for a time in Asia, but after the Armenian massacres of 1895-96 it ceased to be a dominant motive in this country. Salisbury, who had been Beaconsfield's colleague, now admitted that we had put our money



The Australian troops in Egypt encamped near the Pyramids.

[Record Press.



The arrival of the Indian troops in Egypt: Sikhs marching through Cairo.



Sikhs entrenched in the Egyptian desert.

[American Colony, Jerusalem.

on the wrong horse. The chief support that Turkey had at this time was from Russia and Austria-Hungary.

In 1908 came the revolution of the Young Turks, and later the deposition of the Sultan Abdul Hamid. For some time it was believed to be a genuine Liberal revolution, and there were those who thought that Stratford Canning was to be justified at last by a serious Turkish effort at reform, and wondered whether Gladstone and the English Liberals who had advocated the "bag and baggage" policy with Turkey had not done less than justice to the race which could produce men like Enver and Niazi. That there was a genuine Liberal element in this new movement is not to be denied; and had the British had in Constantinople an Ambassador as forceful as Canning, it might have become dominant. Unfortunately, owing partly to our own mistakes, it fell under the influence of Germany, who was represented at Constantinople by an Ambassador of very great ability, Marshall von Bieberstein.

Germany's contributions to politics have been considerable, but she had nothing of value to teach the Young Turks in dealing with the peculiar problems that their country had so miserably failed to solve. The maladies from which Turkey was suffering were an over-centralised administration, and the concentration of political power in the hands of an alien and unprogressive minority. Provincial autonomy and a frank recognition of the rights of non-Turkish nationalities, such as would have come naturally to the liberalising Western nations, might have saved the Empire. But in German political ideas there was nothing that was applicable to the condition of Turkey. Except for Poland, where she had failed signally to secure the attachment of the people, Germany has a homogeneous population, and her achievement has been in impressing upon her people a uniform political stamp. That was obviously impossible in Turkey, and the more vigorously the policy was pursued the surer it was to lead to disaster.

The very energy and ability of the Young Turks made matters worse. Under a lax tyranny there is room for a great deal of personal liberty, and Abdul Hamid knew how to play off one subject nationality against another. He was always, for example, careful to leave the Albanians a licensed privilege which separated them from the other races of European Turkey, and kept them as the garrison of the Government's interests. But the dominant idea of the Young Turks was the hammering out on the anvil of the army of a united Ottoman nation. They had no strong virile nation to serve as the nucleus of the state, such as the makers of modern Germany had in Prussia, for the Turkish people are indolent and fatalistic by temperament, and all the

progressive elements in the Ottoman Empire are supplied by the non-Turkish races. The Young Turks were thus like a Prussian army clique without a Prussia behind them. The absence of a strong, concentrated Turkish nationality should have inclined them to schemes of provincial autonomy in which the loyalty of the non-Turkish populations was secured by liberty, but that solution must have appeared hard and unattractive to men who knew that under such a system the Turks, unintelligent and unprogressive, would usually, in Europe at any rate, be hopelessly out-voted, and always beaten in the political game. It is not, therefore, surprising that they should have turned with more hope to German models, and sought to make good the absence of an intelligent Turkish population by the organisation of a secret and powerful Committee. But the plan was fatal. The tyranny of Abdul Hamid was tolerable by comparison because it was obviously so decadent that it could not last

for long. But the Young Turkish organisation, bent on Ottomanising all the races of the Empire, and showing all the external signs of an efficiency hitherto unknown in Turkey, was soon recognised as a serious danger. It led to the formation of the Balkan League of Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and Bulgaria, and to the disastrous Turkish defeats in the Balkan War. Had the policy of the Young Turks been more Liberal, it is conceivable that Turkey might herself have been a member of the League, and that the solution of the Balkan troubles might ultimately have been some sort of loose federation of the Balkan peoples which would have been strong enough to secure their national and racial liberties against all comers. As it was, the Young Turks, whose movement had come into existence through resentment at the

succession of bitter humiliations which the inept tyranny of Abdul Hamid had brought upon the nation, had to face the far greater humiliations of the Balkan War, and a loss of territory galling to their national pride. Grievous as were the mistakes made by the Young Turks, it is impossible to withhold all sympathy with them in a failure so mortifying.

GERMANY'S AMBITIONS IN TURKEY.

It suited Germany's policy to encourage the Young Turks in their political vices; indeed, their German advisers may not have recognised them as vices. A great deal had happened since Bismarck had declared that the Balkans were not worth the bones of a single Prussian Grenadier. Germany was bent on acquiring an overseas Empire, and of all the possible fields for colonial expansion the Turkish Empire seemed by far the most promising. America could not be touched without coming into collision



Prince Hussein Kamel Pasha, the new Sultan of Egypt.

[Stanley's Press Agency.]



The Turkish Empire.

with the Monroe Doctrine; the best parts of Africa had already been appropriated by others; and in Asia, China, India, and the vast possessions of Russia, were none of them to be encroached upon without the risk of a first-class war. Only Turkey remained. Before the Balkan War it joined on to Austria-Hungary, and the absorption of the Turkish Empire into the Germanic state-system would have made a continuous Middle Empire stretching from the Baltic to the Persian Gulf. The expropriation of the Turks from the sovereignty of these territories was at no time part of Germany's plans. It could not be done without war, in which Russia, and probably also Britain and France, would be involved. What she aimed at was the establishment of such close relations with the new régime in Turkey as would put her in the position formerly held by England of privileged political friend, and the "economic penetration" of the country. It was a rational plan, and not

more cynical or unscrupulous than that followed by France in Morocco and by England in the extension of her empire. If Germany was ever to have important possessions outside her own frontiers, Turkey was without doubt the most likely area. The results of the Balkan War were a great blow to her, for a strong and enlarged Serbia, no longer under the control of Austria, broke the continuity of the new Middle Empire which she hoped to see established some day. Serbia was only tolerable to her as a state under the protection, more or less disguised, of Austria. To admit Russia's claim to act as the tutelary state of Serbia was to admit Russia as a barrier to the realisation of what had become her dearest political ambitions abroad.

Nor is it so surprising as it appears at first sight that the new régime in Turkey after the Balkan War should have decided to throw in its lot still more unreservedly

with Germany. The loss of Macedonia and Albania was felt by the Turkish Nationalists as a bitter humiliation, and their recovery became the first objects of Turkish policy. The Young Turks knew that the objects of German policy were purely selfish, but they found no essential conflict between their own and Germany's interests. Germany was wise enough to prefer the reality of power in Turkey to the insignia and the legal title. Provided Turkey was closely allied, and an economic dependency, the name of Protectorate mattered nothing at all; and it might even have suited Germany's purpose to leave Turkey's nominal sovereignty everywhere intact, and possibly, in the event of success, to extend the area of Turkish rule. Turkey must be economically subject to some one, and it made no difference to her whether she was subject to Germany or to any other Power. But it mattered a great deal to the Turkish Nationalists that she should suffer no further diminution of territory, and that she should be protected against encroachments on the side of Russia, the traditional enemy. They looked forward to a future in which Turkey should be a member of a new Triple Alliance extending from the Baltic to the Gulf. No doubt a price would have to be paid, but it was such as they were willing to pay. There was a chance, through Germany, of recovering their lost provinces in Europe, and perhaps also of regaining Egypt. It was a chance such as no other alliance could offer her; no other friendship could promise her more than the retention of what she already had.

THE GERMANS FORCE TURKEY'S HAND.

Such were the thoughts working in the minds of the Committee of Union and Progress in Turkey when the European War broke out. The Government had certainly not resolved on taking part in the war, but its views mattered comparatively little, for the real masters in Turkey were the Committee, and it was probably, if not already determined on war, at any rate in the mood for it. Germany, provident about so many less important matters, is not likely to have neglected any opportunity of discussing plans with the Committee and of putting the arguments for intervention in the war as strongly as possible. Two things happened at the beginning of the war which made the German task of persuading Turkey easier. On August 3rd, the Government took over two Turkish battleships building on the Tyne, a necessary measure of precaution, which, however, gave great offence in Turkey, not removed by a somewhat remarkable message from King George to the Sultan, conveyed by Sir Edward Grey later in the month. Still

more decisive in settling the policy of Turkey was the escape of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* to Constantinople (page 72). The main immediate importance of these ships was that their guns commanded Constantinople, and prevented any open resistance to the plans of the war-party. To the demands of Sir Edward Grey that the ships should be dismantled, and their German crews taken off, Turkey replied that she had bought the vessels. The crews were not taken off; on the contrary, the trains into Constantinople were constantly bringing in German soldiers and sailors. Nor were these the only warlike acts of Turkey. The Dardanelles were sown with mines. Camels belonging to Egyptians were seized at Gaza. The Damascus and Mosul Army Corps were despatched south, as though in preparation for an invasion of Egypt. On September 23rd, Sir Edward Grey warned the Grand

Vizier and his supporters that "unless they soon succeeded in getting the situation in hand, and bringing it within the limits of neutrality, it will become clear that Constantinople is no longer under Turkish but German control, and that open hostility will be forced on us by Germany." The Grand Vizier continued to deny that Turkey had any hostile intentions, and as long ago as August 13th Sir Edward Grey had given a promise—renewed later—that France, Russia, and Great Britain would guarantee the independence and integrity of Turkey if she remained neutral. The promise, however, did not meet the wishes of the Committee, which wanted not the integrity of the existing empire but the restoration of the old empire as it was before the Balkan War. The Germans and the Committee between them overbore the opposition of the peace party in the Government, and on Thursday, October 29th, the *Goeben* and *Breslau* began the war by bombarding

Odessa and Theodosia. The British Government, after waiting a few days on the chance that the peace party might be able to assert itself, declared war on November 5th.

GERMAN'S MILITARY PLANS IN THE EAST.

Germany's main object in dragging Turkey into the war was to create diversions on the Russian and Egyptian frontiers with Turkey which would prevent concentration in Europe, and so relieve the pressure upon herself and on Austria. The European frontiers of Turkey were believed to be fairly secure. After the second Balkan war, Bulgaria—disastrously defeated by Serbia and Greece—had cultivated closer relations with Austria and Turkey, and it was thought that they could rely at the least upon her neutrality, and perhaps on something



[Central News.]

General Liman von Sanders Pasha, the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish army.



Port Said : The Boat Quay, showing the Rue du Commerce. [Exclusive News Agency.]



The jetty at Ismailia.

[Exclusive News Agency.]

more. Nor was the intervention of Greece to be feared, at any rate immediately, for it was not very obvious what she could hope to gain in territory. Her main interest was in Southern Albania, which was no longer a part of Turkey. For some time, therefore, Turkey had her hands free in Europe, and could devote all her energies to the campaign in Asia against Egypt. Germany had hopes that Turkey might provoke a rising among the Mohammedan subjects of Russia and England, and she attached especial importance to the campaign against Egypt, because she knew that England could not afford to lose possession of the Suez Canal, and that if there were any danger of that, even the campaign in Flanders might have to take a second place in the minds of the British people, and to some extent even in the military preparations of the Government.

THE FRONTIERS OF EGYPT.

Egypt lends itself readily to attack by a Power which commands the sea, but her frontiers are strong against an attack by land. She has two lines of defence: an advance line which runs from Rafa, on the Mediterranean, to Tabah, at the head of the Gulf of Akabah, and coincides roughly with her political frontier, and the line of the Suez Canal west of the Sinai Peninsula. It seems probable that our first intention was to hold the advance line of defence. That, at any rate, seems the explanation of the naval operations against Akabah with which our campaign against Turkey opened; their natural complement would have been the occupation of El Arish, at the Mediterranean end of the frontier. For sufficient reasons, no doubt, this plan of campaign was changed, and it was decided to fall back on the Suez Canal. Doubtless it was felt to be a mistake to commit ourselves to operations near the Turkish side of a waterless desert, and that the sound policy was to let the Turks cross the desert to meet us, and then, when their attack was in difficulties, to use our sea power to raid their communications. This policy, too, had the effect of gaining time for the consolidation of our system of defence along the Canal and for the strengthening of the army of occupation. Nothing was more certain than that the Turks could not rush the passage of the Sinai desert. For three months after the declaration of war, nothing more serious happened on the Egyptian frontiers than an occasional brush between our patrols and the Bedouin irregular cavalry, which the Turks had raised in very large numbers.

There are only two practicable routes for an army invading Egypt from the east: the Mediterranean coast route, which is exposed to the fire of a hostile fleet from the frontier as far as El Arish, where it gains the shelter of the Lake Sirbon and reaches the Canal at El Kantara. The other route starts from the head of the Gulf of Akabah, where it is in touch with the Turkish railway through Ma'an, and crosses the desert to Suez. Between these two main routes there is an intermediate caravan route starting from Beersheba, in the south of Palestine, and crossing the Maghara hills to Ismailia. The whole of the district traversed by this route is quite waterless. On the other two routes there are wells, but they are not sufficient to supply large armies. The best way of conquering a desert is the construction of railways, but for this plan there was no time, even if Turkey had had the resources in material.

The Canal frontier is 100 miles in length, from Port Said to Suez. For the first twenty-seven miles from the Mediterranean the Canal runs along the eastern edge of Lake Menzaleh. Before the war the land on the east of

the Canal over which Lake Menzaleh used to extend had been drained; but when the decision was taken not to attempt to hold the advanced line beyond the desert, the waters were again let on to the land, and the stretch immediately south of Port Said was effectually protected by the floods. At El Kantara (see map, p. 351) there is an isthmus of land over which the road from El Arish passes into the Nile Delta between Menzaleh and Lake Ballah, and between the south end of Ballah and Ismailia are the hills of El Gisir, the "Embankment," which cross the Canal. Through these hills runs the principal cutting of the Canal, which emerges from it on to Ismailia. South of Ismailia is Lake Timsah, with an isthmus between it and the Bitter Lakes, and another isthmus between these and Suez. Three-fourths of the whole length of the Canal is protected by the lakes, and its assailable passages are in the sections between the lakes, and cover a front probably not wider than twenty-five miles in all. A railway runs from Port Said to Suez, enabling the defending army to concentrate rapidly at a threatened point. Along this strong frontier the army of defence entrenched itself and waited the attack. In addition to the British regiments of the line, and the native Egyptian army, there were in Egypt the East Lancashire Division of the Territorials, by this time—for they were sent early in the war to Egypt—seasoned troops, the Australian contingents, and some Indian troops. On December 17th, the Khedive, Abbas Hilmi, who was in Constantinople when the war broke out, and was reasonably suspected of being implicated in the Turkish designs against England in Egypt, was deposed, and his uncle, Prince Hussein Kamel Pasha, eldest living prince of the family of Mehemet Ali, the greatest of modern Egyptians, was appointed in his place, with the title of Sultan. Turkish suzerainty was declared to be abolished, and Egypt became a British Protectorate. At the same time the style of the principal representative of the British Government in Egypt was altered from Consul-General to High Commissioner. Cyprus had already been annexed as soon as war was declared.

THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA.


But the British plans against Turkey were not by any means restricted to a passive defence. Although it had been decided for strategical reasons to defend Egypt from behind the shelter of the desert, a vigorous offensive campaign was begun from the head of the Persian Gulf against the Turks in the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates. On November 8th, Fao, a fortified post on the right bank of the Shat-el-Arab (the stream formed by the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates), was seized by a military force from India, under the command of Brigadier-General Delamain, covered by H.M.S. *Odin* and a boat from the battleship *Ocean*. Four days later the Turks made a determined attack on our outposts, but were driven off with loss; and on the 14th, fresh Indian troops, which had embarked at Bombay on the day after the declaration of war, were landed in the river above Fao, near Abbadan, the headquarters of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The whole of the Indian forces were now under the command of General Sir Arthur Barrett, who had served under Lord Roberts in Afghanistan, and it soon became apparent that something more important was afoot than the occupation of the head of the Gulf. One object of the expedition was to protect the oil works; another was to attract the Turkish forces and to hinder the concentration against Egypt by drawing off the army corps stationed at Mosul. It may be that the expedition also hoped to



The Turkish mobilisation : Troops drilling at Jerusalem. [*American Colony, Jerusalem.*]



The raw material for the Turkish army : Recruits leaving the steamer at Stamboul. [*Topical War Service.*]



The eastern frontier of Egypt.

peg out the British claims in the future partition of Turkey. Mr. Asquith had already—in a speech at the Guildhall—bettered the “bag and baggage” policy of Mr. Gladstone. Gladstone had wanted no more than to clear the Turks out of Europe. Mr. Asquith declared that the Turkish Empire must cease in Asia as well as in Europe. “It is they, and not we, who have rung the death-knell of the Ottoman Empire, not only in Europe but in Asia. Nothing is further from our thoughts than to initiate or to encourage a crusade against their creed . . . But the Turkish Empire has committed suicide, and dug with its own hands its grave.” It may well be that when the Persian Gulf expedition was planned, its authors had in mind the establishment at the end of the war of a new British Protectorate in Mesopotamia, hoping perhaps to revive the ancient glories of this region.

On November 17th, General Barrett advanced up the river and dislodged a force of some 4,500 Turks entrenched in a strong position with artillery. After a stiff engagement the position was carried, with about 150 casualties on our side, and heavy Turkish losses, including two guns and the transport. The effects of this success were greater than were expected. The Arabs deserted, and the Turks fell back on Basrah, which they presently decided to evacuate. On November 23rd, the Indian troops made a ceremonial entry into Basrah. On December 5th, a reconnaissance revealed the enemy in strength at Kurnah, where the Tigris and Euphrates join. Three days later the position was carried after a smart action, and more than 1,000 unwounded Turkish prisoners were taken. The occupation of Kurnah gave the British complete control of the Delta.

Even more important were the operations on the Caucasian frontiers, the scene of so many encounters between the Russians and the Turks. The narrative of this campaign belongs to a later chapter. It is enough

here to note that the Russian hopes of “rushing” the Turks by a rapid advance on Erzeroum were not fulfilled, and that the Turkish counter-attack, in the vigour of its conception and the courage and endurance by which it was supported under circumstances of extraordinary difficulty, showed how formidable the combination of German strategy and Turkish valour could be.

WERE THE YOUNG TURKS HONEST?

The adhesion of Turkey to Germany was a matter for deep regret among many Englishmen, and the contrast between the early hopes formed of the Young Turkish movement and the beginning of Turkey's participation in the war was sufficiently tragic. It caused a great deal of military inconvenience both to England and Russia, and it is always sad to see a nation, however great its political vices may have been, deliberately committing suicide as Turkey did. Yet, on a long view, it was probably best for the world that she acted as she did. Had the Young Turks been genuinely Liberal there might have been a great political future for their country. But when once they had rejected the Liberal solution of her troubles, and committed themselves to a policy of Ottomanisation, there was no hope for her, and no permanent peace for Europe except in the overthrow of her empire.


Turkey has brought little but sorrow to the human race; and some of the responsibility even for the calamity of the present war must be laid to her charge. Her maladies invited the cupidity of her neighbours, and kept Europe in a permanent state of unrest, and the occasion perhaps the principal cause of the war was the rivalry of the German and the Slav for the control of the political and economic future of the territories which she had so long misgoverned. It is commonly said that the motives which actuated the Young Turks in throwing in their lot with Germany were unworthy and even corrupt. Of that

there is little direct evidence. Corruption there was in plenty, especially of the newspaper press ; but, misguided as the Young Turks may have been, there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of their patriotism, or the purity of their motives. They were Nationalists pure and simple. Having decided to adopt German political ideals for the future of their country, it was not unnatural that they

should see in the war their only chance for the future. It was a gamble ; and they knew the risks they were running from Germany even in the event of success in the war. Yet they were undoubtedly right in thinking that the political ideals for which they stood had some prospect of achievement if Germany won, and none at all if the Allies won.



A view of the Tigris and Euphrates, from Basra.



The interior of a German airship shed.

[Record Press.]

CHAPTER XXXVI.

THE EAST COAST RAIDS.

THE RAID ON YARMOUTH—THE PLANS FOR THE SCARBOROUGH RAID—THE DISAPPOINTMENT OF THE BRITISH FLEET—INVASION AND THE DUTY OF THE CIVIL POPULATION—THE AIRSHIP RAID ON NORFOLK.

SOME mention has already been made (page 229) of the bombardment of Scarborough, Whitby, and Hartlepool, in December, but the visits of war to our coasts have happily been so rare that the story of the naval raid, and of the airship raid on the coast towns of Norfolk which came later, deserves a fuller allowance of space, even in a concise history of the war, than their military or naval unimportance could justify. To the student of naval warfare, the bombardment of Hartlepool and the Yorkshire watering places is important only as illustrating the extent to which the submarine, by making a close blockade of the enemy's ports impossible, has diminished the security of our coast towns. But to the average Englishman the fact that the raids were made on shores which he had been brought up to consider inviolable is enough in itself to give their incidents a saliency above other happenings in the war.

There had been a rehearsal of the raid on the Yorkshire coast in the attempt on Yarmouth at the beginning of November, which was fortunately prevented from serious consequence by the removal of the buoys, which, by misleading the enemy as to his exact position, caused his shells to fall short. In December, the enemy, baffled in his effort to obtain possession of the Dover straits, and tempted by the far northerly station of our battle fleet, made his naval raid on the Yorkshire coast. His military objects were two-fold. He desired most of all to create such an alarm among the population of the


East Coast as would hinder the transport to the Continent of the New Army that was in training, and force the Government to keep it at home to meet an invasion should it be attempted. With this same object he had already, when the fighting round Ypres was at its hottest, spread rumours of a projected descent on the British coasts and of fleets of merchantmen collected for the purpose of transporting the invading army. His other object was, if possible, to induce the Admiralty to alter the disposition of its fleets so as to make evasion easier from the North Sea into the Atlantic round the north of Scotland. Neither object would have been served by an attack on a fortified place, which could have put up a strong resistance, and perhaps inflicted damage on his battle-cruisers. It was of the essence of the enemy's plan that the place to be attacked should not be fortified, and that the incidents should strike such terror in the mind of the civil population as to lead to an agitation that would injuriously affect our military and naval dispositions. A letter published in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, from one who took part in the raid, says that each of the ships in the expedition had its assigned task. "They were ordered simultaneously to bombard the three great English ports of Hartlepool, Scarborough, and Whitby, in order to destroy the signal stations, harbour works, and land batteries situated at these points." These three places were selected for precisely the opposite reasons that they were not great ports, and that their defensive works were negligible. At no other three points on the East Coast




The naval raid on the East Coast: The café attached to the Grand Hotel, Scarborough, which was struck by shells from the German cruisers. [*"Manchester Guardian."* Copyright.]



The interior of the Grand Hotel, showing the damage done by the bombardment. [L.N.A.]



The Coast near Hartlepool.



The Scarborough Bays.

was it possible to do so much damage and make so great a sensation at so little risk.

THE BOMBARDMENT OF SCARBOROUGH AND HARTLEPOOL.

The German fleet left its port, probably Wilhelmshaven, at nightfall on Tuesday, December 16th. It consisted of three battle cruisers, the *Derfflinger*, the *Moltke*, and the *Seydlitz*, with one or more smaller ships. They arrived off Redcar early next morning, spread out fanwise, and attacked all three ports about breakfast time. At Scarborough two German ships appeared, coming from the north, steamed into the South Bay round the Castle Hill, went south towards Cayton, then turned round and steamed north again. They fired all the time, except when they were turning, so that the town was raked from end to end twice, and the bombardment lasted about half-an-hour. In that time perhaps a hundred shells were fired. It was a misty morning, but the Germans stood quite close inshore—closer, it is said, than our own warships were in the habit of coming—and, though the shooting was somewhat random, the handling and navigation of the ships was very good. Some of the shots were aimed at the wireless station and the gasworks, neither of which was damaged, and the chief destruction was done on the sea-front. The old barracks on Castle Hill, fortunately unoccupied, were razed; four churches were more or less seriously damaged, and most of the hotels on the front of the South Bay were struck. Shells also fell in the main streets, severing the cables, and a great many private houses were wrecked. Seventeen people were killed and some seventy injured. One man who had just shown two frightened ladies the way from the street to the shelter of the cellar was, with his wife, killed as he came up the cellar steps. A shell fell on a postman and a servant, as he was delivering her a letter at the door, and killed them both. Another servant girl was killed as she was making the morning fire. Four people were killed in one house by a shell aimed at the railway goods yards. Most of the shells tore great rents in the masonry of the buildings which they hit, but in one case a shell bored a clean hole seven inches in diameter

in the window of a hotel, and, failing to explode, fell harmlessly in an inner room.

From Scarborough the German fleet went a few miles north to Whitby. The town is sheltered from the sea by the high East Cliff, on which the Abbey stands, with a coast-guard station near The guns were given a high elevation to reach the top of the Cliff. Most of the shells went too high, and fell harmlessly into the harbour and the river. One dropped at Ruswarp, a village a mile and a half upstream. Three or four shells, however, struck the ruins of the Abbey, and damaged the west wall. The loss of life was much smaller than at Scarborough, only two people being killed, and the bombardment lasted no more than ten minutes; but at Hartlepool it was far greater. Here, no fewer than 106 people were killed and died of their wounds, and more than 250 injured. The ships that bombarded Hartlepool were not the same that attacked Scarborough and Whitby, and the bombardment of Hartlepool began about half-an-hour after that of Scarborough. The course of the German cruisers was northerly, and most of the shells were fired from the north side of the peninsula on which Old Hartlepool stands, and fell on the houses between it and West Hartlepool, where the docks and the shipbuilding yards are. There is a small battery at the end of the peninsula, near the Heugh Lighthouse, and when the bombardment began it returned the enemy's fire and made a few hits, though none of them was serious. Nor was the battery itself much damaged by the enemy. One shot hit the gas-holder and set the gas on fire, and a few shells dropped among the shipping. But the whole violence of the bombardment fell on the houses in Old Hartlepool and its residential suburbs. It was all over in fifteen minutes.

THE BRITISH FLEET.

There is some reason to believe, though no evidence in support has yet been published, that our fleet had early information that the German squadron had left its ports, and had made preparations for intercepting it. Possibly, the Tyne was thought to be the most likely place for a German raid. In a statement issued at 11-30 on the morning of the raid the Admiralty, after stating



The naval raid on the East Coast: Wrecked houses at West Hartlepool.

[*Universal.*



Four unexploded German shells discovered after the bombardment on the outskirts of West Hartlepool.

[*Central News.*

that our flotillas—presumably destroyers—had been engaged at various points, concluded with the words, "The situation is developing," which was generally interpreted to mean that our battle-cruisers were expected to arrive in time to engage the raiders. If that was the official expectation, it was disappointed, for the Germans disappeared in the mist as soon as they were sighted. Their escape is generally believed to have been even narrower than the brief official statements would suggest, but no detailed account has ever been published by the Admiralty of the movements of the fleet, nor is one likely to be published until after the end of the war. The statement issued on the night of the raid ended with these words :—


"The Admiralty take this opportunity of pointing out that demonstrations of this character against unfortified towns or commercial ports, though not difficult to accomplish provided that a certain amount of risk is accepted, are devoid of military significance.

"They may cause some loss of life among the civil population, and some damage to private property, which is much to be regretted, but they must not under any circumstances be allowed to modify the general naval policy which is being pursued."

The unanimity with which the people of England grasped the significance of the closing words was one of

THE FEARS OF INVASION.

In November and December there was much discussion of the possibility of an invasion or raid by the enemy's land forces. By a "raid" was meant the landing of a force sufficiently large to do local damage, and not so large that the loss of it, which with a huge army training in England was to be accounted almost certain, would be a very real military blow. By "invasion" was understood the landing of a force capable of occupying a district, and forcing us to undertake operations of such magnitude for its expulsion as would distract our attention from the war on the Continent, and prevent us from sending reinforcements there. The risk of a raid was taken seriously by the Government, and—especially along the East Coast—the most elaborate military precautions were taken against surprise. Neither invasion nor raid in the eastern counties had the smallest chance of success, and there was, therefore, a certain amount of unreality in the County Committees which were formed for arranging a policy of common action on the part of the civil population in the case of invasion. The main justification for the work that was done lay in the danger that in the case of a landing patriotic civilians outside the trained forces of the Crown might, by unauthorised acts of hostility, bring down punishment on their fellow-citizens. There was at this time some wild talk indulged in by those who were disqualified by



The Coast between Yarmouth and King's Lynn.

the most remarkable things in the war, and showed them to be the coolest and the best-disciplined of all the peoples engaged in the war. The raid has been wittily called "a runaway knock," but none the less it needed much self-control, and not a little imagination, for a people used to think of its mastery of the seas as a thing above question, to see this violation of its coasts in its true perspective. Yet there was little grumbling, and no recrimination. The narrow failure of our fleet to intercept the enemy showed clearly that if its station had been a little less far to the north the raid might have been immediately punished. But no one suggested that its dispositions should be changed, and every one saw that, even with a fleet of overwhelming superiority, the general safety of the realm might require dispositions which might expose some stretches of our East Coast to risks. It says much for the diffusion of sound naval instinct among the masses of the English people. And inasmuch as the bombardment of Scarborough, Whitby, and Hartlepool was to be regarded as in the nature of a fine for dispositions necessary for the general safety, the Government wisely decided to make these losses a charge on the State revenues.

age or other reasons for service in the army of the deeds of valour they proposed to do on their own responsibility in the event of a landing. There is no clear agreement amongst lawyers about what is permissible to the civil population of a district against an invader before he is in occupation. One view—it is put forward in a former chapter of this history in defence of acts of irregular war of which the Belgians were guilty—is that until a district is in the enemy's occupation the invader has no right to complain of any acts of war, and that everyone is a lawful combatant provided he does not violate the laws and customs of war, and carries his arms openly (page 35). Most lawyers, however, would probably be disinclined to go so far. Dr. Pearce Higgins, for example, writes :—

"This question is by no means settled. One fact, however, is clear: the belligerent character only attaches where the rising is one of considerable dimensions. Cases of isolated defence by individuals of their homes are left outside these regulations. The citizen who committed acts of hostility without belonging to a force complying with the requirements of the Hague Regulations would find himself dealt with as severely as was Mr. Browne in *An Englishman's Home*, who, for defending his house against the invaders of the 'Nearland'



The air raid on the East Coast: Damage done at Yarmouth by one of the German bombs.

[Central News.]



The air raid on the East Coast: A wrecked house at King's Lynn.

[Topical Press.]

Army, was taken and put to death before it. Men and squads of men not under strict discipline, not forming part of the army or of a levy *en masse*, at the approach of the invaders, who commit hostile acts with intermitting returns to their homes and vocations, divesting themselves of the character or appearance of soldiers, have no cause for complaint of an infringement of the laws of war if when they are caught they are denied belligerent rights, and put to death.*

But whatever be the sound rule of law, there is no doubt whatever that a German invader would not only have denied belligerent rights to other than members of the recognised military forces, but would have inflicted collective punishment on the whole district in which acts of irregular warfare had taken place. It was therefore wise that a common policy should be thought out in advance, though it would have had a greater educative effect if the results of the Committees' deliberations had been made public, so that people could have familiarised themselves with their duties in the event of a landing.

Far more serious in its effects on the strategy of the war would have been a landing on our west coasts or in Ireland. Such an enterprise, if it could have been successfully launched, would have forced us to fight on two fronts, one facing east and the other west. An expedition to Ireland to deal with an invading force which had landed there would have been a very serious distraction from our Continental campaign; and had the invaders obtained possession of a naval station on our west coasts, it would have been a most inconvenient embarrassment to our naval strategy, which depended entirely for its efficiency on concentration in the North Sea. It was because of these dangers that our main battle-fleet was normally stationed in those parts of the North Sea from which the exits into the Atlantic could be most certainly commanded. In the defence of the East Coast the responsibility was divided between the Admiralty and the War Office. The security of our west coasts depended entirely on the success with which the navy could guard the exits from the North Sea into the Atlantic. To any appearance of hostile craft on our western shores the Admiralty always showed itself extremely sensitive.

THE AIR RAID ON NORFOLK.

On January 19th there was an airship raid on the coast towns of Norfolk. Two, and possibly three, airships took part in it, and the results of the expedition, though they created alarm locally and did damage to private property, confirmed the low estimate that had been formed in this country of the military usefulness of this craft. The first airship visited Yarmouth about 8-30 in the evening, and dropped eight bombs two feet long, forty inches round the base, and about sixty pounds in weight. Two people were killed—an old woman and a cobbler working at his last—and a soldier wounded. About the same time an airship appeared over Cromer, which is thirty miles from Yarmouth. At 8-45 one was seen at Sheringham, five miles west of Cromer. At ten o'clock, thirty miles west, Hunstanton was visited, and three-quarters of an hour later, King's Lynn. Here, two people


were killed, thirty or forty slightly injured, several houses were completely demolished, and about 140 were damaged. On the way from Hunstanton to King's Lynn the airship passed over Sandringham, which the King and Queen had left in the morning, but the bomb dropped there did no damage.

The aerial raid on Norfolk, like the naval raid on Scarborough, was condemned both in England and in neutral countries as contrary to the usages of civilised war. At Hartlepool there was a battery, which was sufficient to justify the bombardment, but neither Scarborough nor Whitby was defended. The Coroner's jury at Scarborough wished very naturally to bring in a verdict of wilful murder, and were only prevented from doing so by the technical objections of the Coroner. A formal verdict of murder would perhaps have been more impressive than Mr. Churchill's gibe against the raiders as "baby-killers," or even than the denunciations of the newspapers. The German plea that Scarborough was defended because there was a battery of artillery stationed in the neighbourhood, and Whitby because there was a wireless station there, persuaded no one that the bombardment was a normal operation of war, but did suggest the need of a more precise definition of what a defended place is. In the German War-book an instance is given from the war of 1870, in which the French bombarded the open town of Kehl. The Germans protested against the bombardment at the time, but, in the opinion of the War-book, improperly. "The only criterion," says the War-book, "is the value which the place possesses for the enemy in the existing situation,"* and it adduces reasons for thinking that, though it was an open town, had its buildings been left untouched they might have covered the enemy's attack. No such reason could be urged in excuse of the attack on Scarborough. Such troops as were in the town could not have exercised any influence on naval operations. Tried by the criterion of the German War-book, even the battery at Hartlepool was no justification for an attack in which hundreds of civilians were killed and wounded. The case would have been different had the Germans been attempting a landing there, for then it might have been important to destroy the fort and other buildings in the town which might have served as cover for troops resisting it. None of these coast towns had any military value to the enemy or to us, and they should, therefore, have been immune.

In the case of the air raid on the Norfolk coast, the enemy's excuse was somewhat different. After putting forward the plea that King's Lynn and Yarmouth were fortified towns, he argued that the airships had been fired on from other places which were not fortified, and that, therefore, the people there were punished as *franc-tireurs* by having bombs thrown upon them. It seems fairly clear that both in the naval and the aerial raid the hope was not to inflict damage on fortified places, but to create a panic among the people which should have an effect on our politics, and perhaps on our naval and military dispositions.

* Oxford Pamphlets: "Non-Combatants and the War," p. 9.

* "The German War-book," translated by Prof. J. H. Morgan, p. 82.



Barges, which have been converted into hospitals, lying moored in the Seine at Paris, in readiness to be towed to points where they can be used as "field" hospitals. [Central News.



The interior of a hospital barge.

[Central News.



Enthusiastic French conscripts, called up since the beginning of the war, about to leave for their training quarters.

[L.N.A.]

CHAPTER XXXVII.

FRANCE IN WAR TIME.


THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR IN FRANCE—THE CONTRAST WITH 1870—THE MURDER OF M. JAURÈS—PARIS AND THE MOBILISATION—THE STREETS IN WAR TIME—THE CENSORSHIP—THE ECONOMIC STRAIN OF THE WAR.

NOBODY who was in Paris during the last days of July, 1914, can ever forget that week of anguish and tension. The public in general, as was natural, had not at once grasped the danger of the situation created by the Austrian manifesto to Serbia. There was a general tendency to believe that the matter would be arranged, as similar incidents so often had been, and, if the suggestion was made that France might be dragged into a war by the dispute between Austria and Serbia, it was at once scouted as too monstrous to be credible. On Saturday, July 25th, the *Echo de Paris* announced that the German Ambassador in Paris, Baron von Schön, had on the previous day called at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and communicated a Note from his Government, of which the most important paragraphs were as follows:—


"The German Government considers that the present question is a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that the Powers have the greatest interest in restricting it to the two interested parties. The German Government ardently desires the localisation of the conflict, since, by the natural play of alliances, any intervention by another Power would have incalculable consequences."

The *Echo de Paris* commented on this incident in a leading article—with the title, "A German Menace"—which caused some sensation, but was to some extent discounted by the well-known chauvinist tendencies of the paper. It was on the following day, Sunday, July 26th, when France heard that Austria had refused to accept the Servian reply to her manifesto, and that diplomatic relations between the two countries were broken off, that the gravity of the situation became universally recognised.

When it was recognised, public feeling in Paris spontaneously manifested a vehement opposition to war. On the evening of Sunday, July 26th, there was a huge demonstration against war on the Grand Boulevard and in the principal streets of the centre of Paris. It had not been organised except by announcements in the Socialist and Trade Union papers of that morning, and by posters put up during the day itself. The persons who took part in it, either as active demonstrators or passive but sympathetic onlookers, numbered hundreds of thousands. The sight was unforgettable. The Grand Boulevard, which is three miles long, was thronged throughout almost its entire length; all traffic was



Trophies of war : Captured German guns on view at the Invalides, Paris. [Central News.]



A Taube aeroplane, captured from the Germans, being erected for exhibition in Paris. [Sport and General.]

impossible, and it was difficult for foot-passengers to move. The actual demonstrators filled the roadway, and the broad pavements were packed with dense crowds. From time to time went up an immense shout of "*A bas la guerre*," which drowned the cries of "*Vive l'armée*" from a few small bands of Royalists, mostly youths of the *bourgeoisie*, who attempted a counter-demonstration. That the sympathies of the crowds on the pavements were with the demonstration against war was very evident. Demonstrations in the streets are not allowed in Paris, and there was a large force of cavalry and police, who did their best to make the demonstrators move on, but abstained from any violence. After having effected their object of giving public expression to the feeling of the people of Paris, the demonstrators quietly dispersed.

That this demonstration did express the feeling of the people of Paris at that time there can be no doubt. Up to July 31st, the eve of the general mobilisation, the people refused to believe it possible that France could be dragged into war for such a cause. It was, of course, known that France had an alliance with Russia, but nobody knew what were the terms of the alliance, and there was a general disposition to think it impossible that they could be such as to oblige France to join Russia, if the latter went to war with Austria about Servia. France had not intervened in the war between Russia and Japan, and many supposed that she could be obliged to do so only if Russia were attacked by two Powers. There was only the one opinion among small tradesmen, clerks, shop employés, and workmen: that, if Austria and Russia chose to quarrel about Servia, they should be left to fight it out alone. At about 5 p.m. on Thursday, July 30th, the Government issued a rather optimistic note to the Press, but the hopes raised by it were dashed on the following day, when the *Agence Havas* announced that the German Government had decreed a "state of preparation for war," a step preliminary to a general mobilisation. They did not then know in Paris that Russia had (without consulting the French Government, or informing it of her intention) issued a general mobilisation order the evening before, and the action of Germany seemed to be a gratuitous act of provocation, probably aimed at France. It was known that the German troops were massed on the eastern frontier of France, and it was reported that small detachments had even crossed the frontier in one or two places. There was, therefore, a general impression that Germany was going to attack France, which brought about a complete change in the attitude of the people. France did not want war, but, if she were attacked, she must defend herself: on that point there were no two opinions.

THE MURDER OF M. JAURÈS.

Soon after nine o'clock on the evening of July 31st the news of the assassination of Jaurès spread through Paris, and was received with horror and stupefaction. It was felt at once that Jaurès could have been murdered only by a member of the war party, who wished to get out of the way the chief apostle of peace, the only man who might possibly prevent war. But for the belief that Germany contemplated an attack on France, the assassination of Jaurès would have caused an uprising of the people of Paris. For more than a year his life had been threatened by Royalists and militarists, and a fortnight before his murder two papers had said that he ought to be shot on the day of a general mobilisation. As it was, a vast crowd marched down from the great working-class quarter of Belleville to the Place de la République, calling for vengeance on

the author of the crime and those who had instigated him to it. The Government was seriously alarmed, and the Garde Républicaine was called out, but there was no disturbance. Next morning Paris was placarded with a proclamation of M. Viviani, the Prime Minister, denouncing the murder of Jaurès as a crime against France, and appealing to the people to keep calm. The Socialist leaders, a word from whom would have led to a rising, also appealed to their followers to put their patriotism before their natural indignation, and they were listened to. The confidence of the people in Jaurès was touching; it was said over and over again: "If Jaurès had not been killed, there would have been no war." That is not true, though it is at least possible that, had he lived, he might have made one more effort for peace at the eleventh hour.

Thus it came about that when, on Saturday, August 1st, the order for general mobilisation was issued, it found the French people united as one man to resist what they believed to be the unprovoked aggression of Germany. Had they believed that France was merely being dragged into war by the terms of the Russian alliance, they would not have been unanimous, but their belief was that it was France that Germany was attacking, and that they had no choice in the matter. It was a question, they thought, of resisting invasion or submitting to it, and, between two such alternatives, there could be no hesitation. The mobilisation order was received without enthusiasm, but with the calm and stoic fortitude of a people who regarded war as a hateful necessity thrust upon them against their will by an aggressive Imperialism. There was a certain sense of relief that the tension was over and the worst was known, such as is inevitable after any period of anguish and uncertainty; but there was no exultation at the possibility of recovering the lost provinces, or of avenging the defeat of 1870. Not that the French people had no desire to recover Alsace-Lorraine, but they realised that even that was not worth a war. The atmosphere of Paris on August 1st was poignant; there was an almost unearthly stillness, and one read on every face the consciousness of an appalling calamity and of a stern duty to be fulfilled. As one passed along the streets one saw little groups gathered in front of the mobilisation orders posted up on the public buildings. After reading the notice they turned away in silence; hardly a woman had dry eyes.

When it became known that Germany had declared war on Russia in the evening of August 1st, there was general surprise, and people asked what it meant. Had Austria declared war on Russia, or Germany on France, nobody would have been surprised; but the German Ambassador remained in Paris, and showed no sign of going. The situation then was that Austria was at war with Servia, and Germany with Russia, but Austria was still at peace with Russia, and Germany with Servia. In these circumstances it was asked whether Austria would be obliged to join with Germany, and whether France would be obliged to join with Russia, and there was a faint hope that perhaps, after all, Germany did not want war with France. It was only a faint hope, which was soon dashed by official announcements that the German troops were violating French territory, and finally disappeared when, on the evening of August 3rd, Germany declared war on France.

The whole French people, without distinction of creed or politics, rallied to what they believed to be a purely defensive war. They felt, too, that they were defending not only France, but also the cause of democracy. So



A French family living in a cellar at Soissons, during the German bombardment. [Universal.



The Customs Room at the Gare du Nord, Paris, which has been turned into a relief station for French refugees.

[Topical Press.

evidently was the spirit in which the French people entered reluctantly into the war a revival of the spirit in which their ancestors defended the First Republic against foreign aggression that even papers hostile to the spirit of the Revolution were obliged to use its very phrases, and declare the war to be one for the defence of liberty and democracy against militarism. Nothing was more remarkable than the way in which the anti-militarists came forward to defend the country of the Revolution—not because they had abandoned their principles, but because they still held to them. Believing, as they did, that Germany was guilty of just such an act of aggression as they had often condemned on the part of their own Government, Socialists, Syndicalists, and Revolutionaries united with the rest of their fellow-countrymen to resist the invader. They were bitterly disappointed at the acquiescence of the German Socialists in the policy of the German Government, which they regarded as treachery to the cause of Internationalism. It was known by French Socialists before war broke out that the German Socialists could not be counted on, for that had been made plain at the International Conference of Socialist Delegates held at Brussels on Tuesday, July 28th. This knowledge was undoubtedly an important factor in determining the attitude of the French Socialists on August 1st. The violation by Germany of Belgian neutrality, which aroused profound indignation, also helped to unite the French people.

1870 AND 1914—A CONTRAST.

The courage and resolution with which the war was accepted by a nation which had been for many years the most pacific in the world were, then, due to no miraculous change in the French character, but were the natural consequences of the belief of the French people as to the nature of the war. Those who were surprised at the attitude of the French people simply showed that they did not understand them. That attitude proved that those in France and elsewhere who had said that the French were degenerate and demoralised were wrong. A great trial or a sudden emergency cannot—and does not—change the character of an individual or a people; it merely brings out that character as it really is. The French acted as they did because they were what they had become during the last forty years. The contrast between the France of 1914 and the France of 1870 was startling to a superficial observer, but it caused no surprise to anyone who realised what a change has come over France under the Third Republic—a change which has made the French the most serious people in the world. In the early afternoon of August 1st, the day of the general mobilisation, one of the most eminent of living Frenchmen, who fought as a volunteer in the war of 1870, and well remembered the scene in Paris in that year when war was declared, came into Paris by road from Versailles. The tram-cars were being taken home, and it was evident that a general mobilisation had been ordered. He was asked if the scene at all resembled that of 1870. "It would be impossible," he replied, "to imagine a more complete contrast." Then he told how in 1870 crowds had marched through the streets, yelling, waving flags, and shouting "*A Berlin*" till they were hoarse. The soldiers went off half drunk, boasting that they would be in Berlin in a fortnight. The mobilisation of 1870 was an orgy; that of 1914 was almost religious in its solemnity.

The courage and resolution of the French people were all the more admirable since, in Paris at any rate, public opinion was inclined to be pessimistic as to the probable


result of the war. The memory of the defeat of 1870 had never been effaced, and the French are naturally self-critical and intensely conscious of their own weaknesses and failings, sometimes too much so. They knew that the Germans outnumbered them; they did not know, when war broke out, whether France would have the aid of England, and did not suppose that, in any case, England would be able to give any effective aid on land. The most that was hoped was that she might keep about 100,000 men at the front, chiefly for the sake of the moral effect of co-operation between the French and English armies. During the first four days of August everyone asked whether England was coming in; and Englishmen resident in France said yes, more because it was their hope than because they were quite certain. When the news came that England had declared war on Germany, the general feeling of relief was intense. What England has since done has amazed the French people, and won from them a gratitude that is sometimes expressed in exaggerated terms. Again and again people have said to Englishmen in France: "We should have been beaten but for the English." Yet, great as have been the services rendered by the British army, it occupies only a small portion of the immense front that stretches from the coast of Belgium to Alsace-Lorraine, and the officers and men of the British army would be the first to disclaim the exclusive credit that the generous-hearted Parisian people attributes to them.

Strange as it may seem, the pessimistic tendency of the Parisians seemed to have rather a bracing effect on them. Their reason told them that they might be beaten, but that made them only the more determined not to be beaten if they could help it. There was a very strong and general feeling against boasting or over-confidence. Now and then a few exuberant youths cried "*A Berlin*," and it was amusing to see how promptly they were suppressed by the public. There seemed to be a general and spontaneous agreement that nothing should be done as it was in 1870. The public would not even cheer the soldiers who were going off to the front; they took off their hats and called out "Good-bye," "Good luck to you," "Come back soon." Now and then there were cries of "Bring back William's head," for, although there was no bitterness against the German people at the beginning of the war, the German Emperor was held to be personally responsible, and the feeling against him was very strong. The spirit of the army was perfect. At the beginning of August, near the Opera, a company went by on its way to the railway station. The captain drew up his horse to speak to a little group of friends. He spoke of the wife and children that he was leaving behind, and, as he went off, he said: "We hope to beat this time; at any rate, we shall do our best." It was said with perfect simplicity, and it was typical of the general temper of the French army.

THE EFFECT OF MOBILISATION.

The mobilisation of a nation is a tremendous business, and its effects are proportionately great. This was the first time that there had been a general mobilisation in France. In 1870 universal military service did not exist, and the army consisted of about 350,000 men. In 1914 the army consisted of all the able-bodied men in the country from twenty to forty-eight years of age.* All the men under forty had joined the colours in the first fortnight of August. They had to go off at a few days or, in

* Since the beginning of the war the boys of 18 and 19 have also been called out.



A peaceful interlude: French soldiers fishing at a village just behind the firing line.

[News Illustrations.]



An unusual sight in Paris: Conducting a funeral service according to Mohammedan rites over the coffin of an Algerian sharp-shooter who had died in Paris.

[Topical Press.]

some cases, a few hours' notice, leaving behind them their business or profession. Perhaps one has to see it to realise fully what that means. Paris became a different place. Nearly all the big shops were closed, except those that sell provisions; many of the small ones, that could be run by the women of the family without outside assistance, remained open. The places of amusement were all closed after August 2nd by order of the military authorities, for Paris was placed at once in a "state of siege." On August 4th an order was issued closing the cafés at 8 p.m. and the restaurants at nine o'clock. Most of the big hotels closed soon after the beginning of the war, and many of them were turned into military hospitals. All this was inevitable, for it would have been impossible to find enough employés to keep everything open.

The means of communication became very limited. All the motor-buses were at once commandeered for the army; several of the tramways and underground railway lines ceased running, and, on those that continued to run, the service was much reduced. Moreover, all the trams and motors stopped at eight o'clock in the first few weeks of the war. One result of this state of things was that large numbers of people took to riding bicycles. In time of peace it requires courage to ride a bicycle in the crowded streets of Paris, but now the bicyclists shared the roadways with a few stray cabs. Private motor cars had almost entirely disappeared, most of them having been commandeered for the army, as well as a large number of the motor cabs. Most of the motor cars about were driven by soldiers, who at first took advantage of the emptiness of the streets to drive at such a furious pace that there were more accidents than when the streets were crowded; their exuberance was soon curbed by the authorities. Some owners of commandeered motor cars were not a little annoyed to meet their cars in the occupation of two or three attractive young ladies driven by a happy, though mobilised, young man, who was no doubt combining pleasure with some military duty. This, too, was speedily suppressed. It was at night that Paris was most strange. The Rue Royale at midnight, which, in ordinary times, is one of the liveliest hours of the twenty-four, when the theatres and music-halls are emptying and the supper-restaurants and cafés are filling up, was now deserted except for two or three foot passengers, and there was rarely a vehicle in the street. The Place Pigalle and the neighbouring streets—the district which is known to foreigners as Montmartre, although it is only a very small part of that famous quarter—were absolutely deserted. The supper-restaurants, usually open all night, were closed, and the celebrated Abbaye de Thélème had become in the day time a workshop, where unemployed women and girls made dolls and other toys. If Paris was abnormal in the day time, at night it was unrecognisable.

PARIS IN SEPTEMBER.

It was in September that Paris became really delightful. It was as quiet as the sleepest of small country towns. When it became known that the Germans were threatening Paris, and the Government went to Bordeaux, there was a tremendous exodus. The population of the "entrenched camp" (Paris and its suburbs) was reduced by nearly one-half. For several days the railway stations were glutted, and the sight at any one of them was extraordinary. People waited for hours, sometimes all day, for permission to get tickets, which were issued in rotation, and the crowds were immense. Outside the Gare d'Orsay the would-be passengers covered the whole

of the *quai* between the station and the river, and the precincts of the Gare de Lyon, in particular, were filled with a seething mass of humanity. People who had travelled first-class all their lives were glad to get accommodation in a cattle-truck, where they often spent forty-eight hours or more before they arrived at their destination. On September 3rd a party left the Gare du Montparnasse for the Vendée at eight o'clock in the morning and reached Chartres (about fifty miles from Paris) at seven o'clock in the evening; they took seven hours to get to Versailles. Those who stayed behind had Paris to themselves, and felt that they had the best of it. The Grand Boulevard was as peaceful as a country lane. All the motor-cabs had been commandeered for the use of the Paris army, and there was no traffic at all, save a few horse-cabs and a *char-à-banc*, which took the place of the motor-bus from the Madeleine to the Place de la République. As Paris was then being visited by the German aeroplanes, it was almost in darkness at night, and in many quarters there was no artificial light at all. The weather was superb, and the beauty of Paris in the moonlight was indescribable. To cross the Pont Royal in full moon at the beginning of September between nine and ten o'clock, the Louvre on one side, the *quai* and the Institute on the other, and to look up the river to Notre Dame and the Sainte Chapelle, with the other buildings on the island of the city, all bathed in moonlight, marred by no gas or electricity, or to walk up the Champs Elysées, past the Arc de Triomphe and up the Avenue du Bois, with no other light than that of the moon, was an unique experience to be remembered for a lifetime.

In those early days of September the daily pastime of Parisians was the German aeroplane, which arrived almost regularly at about the same time, near six o'clock. It must be admitted that they were imprudent. No sooner did the aeroplane appear on the sky than the Parisians rushed with one accord into the street, and gazed at it with field-glasses, telescopes, or the naked eye, heedless of bombs and, what were even more dangerous, the descending bullets that had been aimed at the aeroplane. As many people, it is believed, were killed by the bullets as by the bombs. Apart from aeroplanes, the only amusement was to walk in the Bois de Boulogne and look at the herds of cattle gathered there in anticipation of a possible siege. All the gates of Paris were barricaded, and trenches were dug outside these. Unhappily, large numbers of fine trees had to be sacrificed.

It was a strange experience to sit on the terrace of a café on the Grand Boulevard and think that the Germans were only about twenty miles from Paris. Every moment one expected to hear the guns, and one Sunday morning Paris did hear them for several hours. Then people heard that General von Kluck's army had moved away to the Marne, and Paris was saved. Later on, when the Government came back from Bordeaux, Paris resumed something more like its normal aspect, at least in the day time. Although the wealthy quarters were still half empty, the town filled up; more shops were opened; the motor-cabs came back, and there was more traffic in the streets; all the metro lines and nearly all the tramways ran once more up to 9-30 p.m. (and, after the beginning of February, to 11 p.m.). In December the military authorities gave permission to places of amusement to re-open, but only a few theatres and music halls availed themselves of the permission. The men of the theatrical profession were at the front like the others, and there was no public for many theatres and music halls. Most people



The Italian veteran, General Ricciotti Garibaldi, at a review of French recruits in Paris.

[Topical Press.]



Madame Poincaré and the American Ambassador at Paris distributing the Christmas toys sent over for French children by United States citizens.

[Wyndham, Paris (C.N.)]

had neither the money nor the inclination to go to them. The cinemas, on the other hand, all re-opened, and soon began to be well attended. It is impossible that life in Paris can become really normal until the war is over; even in February it was a very different place from the Paris that the English tourist knows. The fact of the war was brought home to one as it can be only in a country which is actually invaded.

HOPES AND FEARS.

During those anxious days in August and September people of all classes were brought into close touch with one another. Under the influence of a common danger all became friends, and everyone spoke to everyone else without waiting for an introduction. Parisians became one huge family. Englishmen in the city got to know the people as they had never known them before; class distinctions were broken down, as well as conventions. The poor people were splendid. The well-to-do classes were less admirable. It would be unjust to blame them for leaving Paris at the beginning of September; from the military point of view it was desirable that as few people as possible should remain in Paris, and those who could afford to leave naturally left. But it cannot be said that the wealthy classes did all they should or could do for the others. Too many of them started workshops, soup kitchens, and other relief works (and they were badly needed), and went off, leaving them to take care of themselves, without even providing the money for others to carry them on. Many of the ladies of the *Croix Rouge*, too, acted in a way which caused a good deal of feeling against them. They seemed more concerned about the costume than anything else, and, in August, some of them used to drive in the Bois in white silk uniforms. On the whole, too, the people seemed to be more reasonable than their "betters." It is true that a very bitter feeling was excited against the Germans as a nation by the sufferings of Belgium, and of the invaded territory of France, and by the reports of German atrocities—a feeling that did not exist at the beginning of the war. But Academicians and other dignified persons, who ought to have known better, were far more bloodthirsty than the people.

During the last fortnight of August Paris became very nervous and irritable, chiefly on account of the unfortunate policy that was then adopted (it has since been abandoned) of suppressing or distorting the facts in the official news of the war. The advance into Alsace-Lorraine early in the war had given rise to an excessive optimism, owing to the exaggerated official reports. When the arrival of Italian papers made it known that the French army in Alsace-Lorraine had been repulsed with heavy loss—a fact which had been suppressed by the French authorities—there was a reaction to excessive pessimism. People ceased to believe any official information, and believed, instead, any depressing rumour. This feeling was intensified by the discovery that the defeat of Charleroi had been much minimised, and by the ignorance in which the public was kept about the retreat of the Allies. The public thought that the Germans were still somewhere near the frontier, when, suddenly, one day it was announced that the line of the Allies "stretched from the Somme to the Vosges," a statement which meant that they had been driven back to within sixty or seventy miles of Paris. This bolt from the blue had a deplorable effect, and for a short time there was something like a panic. Then the authorities, happily, took the public into their confidence and told the truth, and the French people

showed that the confidence was justified. From the moment that they knew the worst, the people of Paris again became calm and courageous. During that fortnight of anguish when Paris was expecting attack, the attitude and spirit of the people were beyond praise.

The unfortunate manner in which the departure of the Government was arranged also had a bad effect. The papers were forbidden to say beforehand that the Government might be obliged to leave Paris, and the President and the Ministers went off in the night, leaving behind them a proclamation which did not even say where they had gone. The lengthy stay of the Government at Bordeaux caused a great deal of grumbling, and the Parisians gave them the nickname of "Les Bordelais." It is to be feared that the authority of the Government did not gain by what happened.

The battle of the Marne naturally raised the spirits of Parisians, as of the whole French people, but they did not give way to any excessive optimism. Popular comments on the victory were studiously moderate; "*Ca va bien à présent*," or "*Espérons que cela va continuer*," were the sort of remarks to be heard. In October, however, a crop of optimistic rumours grew up, it is impossible to say how. It was reported that the Germans would soon be driven out of France, that a great victory was imminent, and that it was only a question of days. In spite of rather half-hearted official discouragement, these rumours persisted and were generally credited. As it became evident that the trench war continued, and was likely to continue for a long time, a certain feeling of lassitude became evident. It is difficult to say what is exactly the feeling of the French people, for there is no real public opinion. The absence of the greater part of the male population partly accounts for this, but it is also partly due to the excessive severity of the censorship of the Press, which extends to the expression of opinion. Parliament, too, has become little more than a machine for ratifying ministerial decrees. The result is that public opinion is deprived of its natural means of expression, and is driven below the surface.


THE SUFFERINGS OF FRANCE.

There is, however, every reason to believe that the great majority of the French people are determined to continue the war until France and Belgium are free from the invader. They would not hear of any peace that left Germany in possession of an inch of French or Belgian territory. At the same time, it cannot be denied that the possibility of a long war is regarded with great apprehension, and that, while the French people are profoundly grateful to England, there is a certain fear—the grounds for which are difficult to precise—that England, suffering as she does so much less than France from the war, may be disposed to carry it on for a longer period than would seem absolutely necessary to the French. This is intelligible when one reflects on the economic consequences of the war to France. The withdrawal of so large a proportion of the male population from civil occupations had thrown out of work most of those who remained behind. There were not enough men left to make it worth while to keep factories and workshops open. The women, too, are out of work, the trades in which they are employed having suffered more than any. Production, except that of food and war material, has almost ceased, and trade and industry are at a standstill. Every trade and profession is affected. The Law Courts in war time are an extraordinary sight. Case after case has to be postponed,



The return of the French Government to Paris: State documents being taken into the offices of the Minister of Finance.

[Photopress.]



The decoration of a French army officer in the market square of a French town.

[Sport and General.]

because the parties and their counsel are all mobilised. The legal moratorium has now been withdrawn, but it is almost impossible to proceed with any legal business. The financial moratorium still continues, and must continue as long as the war lasts. It is impossible to call on men at the front to pay their bills of exchange or their business debts, and, that being so, it becomes practically impossible to call on anyone else to do so. Creditors can make debtors who are not mobilised pay if they can prove that they are in a position to do so, and that is the most that is possible. Large numbers of men, even among those who are not mobilised, are ruined by the war.

France is at present living on her capital, and the greater part of the population is living on the Government allowance to the families of men at the front and to persons out of work. That allowance is a shilling a day, with an additional fivepence a day for every child under sixteen. It is not given to the families of all men at the front—only to those which are necessitous. This allowance is just enough to keep body and soul together, and that is all. It is obvious that, if this state of things continued for, say, two years, the economic condition of France would be very grave. As it is, the financial settlement after the war will be an almost insoluble problem. It will be impossible to call on all the men at the front, or even the others, to pay up their arrears of rent and their debts; they will be even less able to do so than ever. The payment of rent has been suspended for the families of all men at the front, and for everyone else in certain districts, including Paris, unless he can be shown to be in a position to pay.

The condition of the invaded districts is, of course, far worse than that of Paris. The inhabitants have been reduced to beggary, and the destruction has been appalling. The Germans have destroyed factories, wrecked mines

and machinery, and carried off all the stock that they could find. They themselves estimate the value of their booty at an enormous sum. Sugar refineries have suffered particularly, and it is said that there is no cloth left in France outside the stock in shops. The invaded territory is the most important industrial district in France, and the effect on the country is much the same as would be the effect on England of an invasion of Lancashire and Yorkshire. Great as have been the courage and patience of the French people, they would not be human if they were not influenced by the sufferings that the war has brought upon them. Two years of a war like this would have consequences from which France might not recover for several generations, if she recovered at all. Even worse than the economic results would be those of the loss of so many of the able-bodied young men of the nation, a loss particularly serious to a thinly-populated country like France. Modern warfare, by sacrificing the physically best of a nation's youth, involves what men of science call "inversed selection." The "fittest," who survive because they are useless for fighting, are the old or the weak. Michelet held that the wars of Napoleon permanently and considerably reduced the average height of Frenchmen, and Professor Karl Pearson's researches strengthen that opinion.* These considerations must be taken into account when we are estimating the attitude of the French people towards the war. Every country engaged will suffer terribly, but a long war, which England might be able to support, although not without serious injury, might be death to France as well as to Germany. It is important that English people should realise how much more serious the war is, and in all likelihood will be, for France than for England.

* See an interesting article on "The Largest Price of War," published by *The New Statesman* of September 12th, 1914.



An afternoon promenade of convalescent French soldiers in the Champs Élysées, Paris.

[Wyndham, Paris (C.N.)]



A general view of Berlin, showing the Cathedral.

[Record Press.]



The memorial to William I. at Berlin.

[Donald McLeish.]



On the eve of war: Reading the "Zustand drohender Kriegsgefahr," or proclamation of a state of imminent danger of war, in front of the Berlin Arsenal, on Friday, July 31st, 1914.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

GERMANY DURING THE WAR.

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR—PROPAGANDA ABROAD—THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS ENGLAND—THE SOCIAL DEMOCRAT PARTY AND THE WAR—THE "BURGFRIEDE"—DISLOCATION OF TRADE—THE QUESTION OF FOODSTUFFS—AFTER THE NEW YEAR.

OF all the nations engaged in the present war, Germany, it would seem, was the best prepared. Thinking of the efficiency of her military arrangements, of the economic organisation which enabled her to dispense with a moratorium, one cannot help concluding that the Government knew very well what it had to expect. At the same time it would be wrong to presume that the people at large, for all the Bernhardt they are supposed to have read, expected war either so soon or against such great odds. The rapidity with which events moved, the tremendousness of the issues involved, produced a state of high tension, and under this tension, momentarily at least, German morale broke down. Particularly brutal treatment, for instance, was meted out, not only to the citizens of hostile states, but also to those representatives for whose safety the country, by all the rules of international courtesy, was responsible. The officials of the Russian Embassy were insulted and molested as they were leaving Berlin; while at the British Embassy, on the eve of hostilities between England and Germany, an infuriated crowd assembled and smashed all the windows in the building. The point to be noted is that the members of this crowd were not ordinary hooligans, but sober and well-to-do citizens of a state which had hitherto been considered one of the most orderly in the world. As a matter of fact, the Germans are neither by temper or tradition fitted to endure crises such as the one that came upon them in


July of last year. A people intensely emotional, they lack the salt that regulates and refines emotion. Humour has never been their characteristic, and, what is perhaps more important, they are lamentably deficient in those forms of inexpressive chivalry so dear to both English and French. Moreover, it is their misfortune that their political training has been shorter than that of England and France. The chaos of feudal Germany was replaced by Frederick's principle of subordination of the individual to the State—a principle which informs almost all German thought, from Kant and Hegel down to the present day, and even appears in the fine arts. Too little is known in England of Hebbel's plays, but there German political thought may be seen on its way to becoming mysticism—*Staatsmystik*, to use a word coined by a German critic of his own race. Hence, to a large extent, that peculiar mixture of docility, narrow-mindedness, arrogance, and hardness, which are the qualities of a mystic, and characterise the Germans not only as a political group, but even, in the majority of cases, as individuals. It is useful, perhaps necessary, to understand the psychology of the average German if one wishes to grasp his attitude during the present war.

For the majority, of course, it was primarily a war of self-defence, of self-defence against Russia, who had treacherously, so they thought, mobilised her forces, at the very moment when the Tsar was discussing the basis of a settlement with the Kaiser. They knew that France,



Landsturm troops passing through Berlin on their way to the front.

[*Newspaper Illustrations.*



Calling up the German reserves : Instructing the recruits, who began their training after the outbreak of war, in the use of the rifle.

[*Central News.*

as Russia's ally, would have to join in ; but they welcomed the opportunity of dealing once and for all with what they regarded as the aggressive and despotic ideas of the one, and the fatally vain *Revanche* ideas of the other. Only when these were vanquished could the German people pursue their path of commercial and cultural development. Together with this defensive attitude, however, went a vague consciousness that this was the time to gain fresh territories for their civilisation, and set their seal upon the world in the years that followed : that this was their destiny, and that they were fortunate to be able to share in its fulfilment.

PROPAGANDA ABROAD.

One manifestation of this spirit was the number of volunteers who offered themselves for service—a number which was computed in Germany to be somewhere near two millions, but which, of course, included a large number of the Landsturm who wished to enter upon active service at once. Another, and less agreeable, manifestation was the propaganda begun at once in neutral countries, especially in those which were considered to be of Germanic race, such as Holland, or sympathetic with Germany, such as the United States. Professors, business men, and officials vied with each other in pleading the German cause ; and, as a rule, it was the professors who were responsible for the grossest exaggerations and the most signal pieces of tactlessness. One might mention here Professor Ostwald, who claimed, among other things, that "Germany had reached a higher state of civilisation than other nations," and prophesied that the result of the war would be the organisation of Europe under German leadership ; Professor Haeckel, who called for the division of Belgium between Holland and Germany, and the annexation of the Congo, the North-East of France, Poland, the Russian Baltic provinces, and the majority of the British colonies ; finally Professor Lasson, who, declaring that everyone not with Germany was against Germany, insulted the Dutch with a thoroughness really amazing. Propaganda of this kind, however, evoked considerable protest within Germany itself, and diminished gradually both in violence and volume. The case of Professor Lasson is interesting, because it is characteristic of the almost snobbish impatience of the German towards the smaller nations ; and it may explain to a certain extent why the invasion of Belgium was regarded, on the whole, so callously by the German people. For, even on the plea of necessity—which most Germans at first held to be a sufficient excuse—one would have expected a little more charity in their treatment of the people, and in their references to them. The ground had, as a matter of fact, been prepared by the papers before war had actually begun ; reports appeared of outrages committed upon German travellers and German residents in Belgium, and comparisons were often made with the Congo atrocities. And then came the exaggerated stories of *franc-tireur* warfare, and different kinds of treachery and mutilation : these, though later combated in the Socialist papers, were believed by a considerable proportion of the people, and served to still qualms of conscience, till the discovery of an Anglo-Belgian alleged military convention persuaded them that the neutrality of Belgium, far from being violated by them, had been bartered away years ago to their enemies.

THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS ENGLAND.


It was about the time of the publication of the documents on the Anglo-Belgian military conversations

(page 101) that the hatred of England began to grow so bitter. It is interesting to notice the stages through which it passed. At first all the blame was attached to Russia ; and it was against Russia that all animosity was directed. France was pitied—indeed loved ; the papers presented a romantic picture of her, deluded by the Allies into a distasteful war : people looked to an alliance between France and Germany as the unique hope for Europe, and the nearer the German outposts came to Paris the more virtue did they find in her civilisation. As for England, the general opinion at first was that it had been forced into the war against its will, by a short-sighted minority. Some speeches by Mr. Ramsay Macdonald and Mr. Keir Hardie, the resignation of Lord Morley and Mr. John Burns from the Cabinet, the manifesto of a number of English scholars, were used to colour this view ; and, impossible though it may seem in the light of recent events, so distinguished an authority as Count von Monts declared that, without exaggeration, ninety out of every hundred Englishmen were opposed to the war—a fact which further encouraged him to make the statement that "in spite of the pain caused to us by official England, we shall never forget how closely connected we are in culture with our English cousin."

The change was not very long in making itself felt. Contrary to their expectation, people saw that England was not content with waging the war at half pressure. The navy, though it did not attack as rashly as the Germans professed to hope, nevertheless proved a factor of the greatest importance ; a large army was being organised, and the Expeditionary Force, though driven back in the first instance, had yet succeeded in checking an advance which seemed irresistible. England became hated, because she was feared. The wave of passion, it should be noticed, rose to its highest about the time when the Germans were thrown back from the Marne on to the Aisne. It was then that Herr Ernst Lissauer, a poet of hitherto quite mediocre inspiration, published his now famous hymn of hate, which won him a decoration from the Kaiser, and is at present, according to all report, the best-known poem throughout the German Empire.

Hate by water and hate by land,
Hate of the head and hate of the hand,
Hate of the hammer and hate of the crown,
Hate of seventy millions, choking down,
We love as one, we hate as one,
We have one foe, and one foe alone—
ENGLAND !

Most of all, however, it was the open declaration of the English Government, that it would carry on an economic warfare, which roused the fury of the Germans. They protested against measures such as the confiscation of patents ; they called out against the stoppage of contraband, and looked with undisguised scorn upon the attempts made in England to capture German markets for English trade. The conviction grew that England was waging the war out of a sordid commercial jealousy, and that, being of itself too weak to overcome its rival, it had systematically and cynically set about inciting its neighbours : France and Russia, Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro, and worst of all, since it meant the involving of a yellow race in a white man's struggle, Japan. This change in opinion is very clearly reflected in the speech of the Imperial Chancellor before the Reichstag on December 4th. Formerly he had stressed the responsibility of Russia ; in the meanwhile the semi-official *Norddeutsche Zeitung* had published documents, which originated, it was claimed, from the archives of the General Staff in Brussels, and reported



A view of the famous Krupp armament factory at Essen.

[Cribb, Southsea.]



A view of the residential part of Essen, where the employees at Krupp's works are housed.

[Cribb, Southsea.]

conversations between Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, the English military attaché, and the chief of the Belgian General Staff, respecting the landing of English troops in Belgium in case of a Franco-German war; further, a report of the Belgian Ambassador in Berlin, Baron Greindl, discussing English and French intentions, and even hinting at a meditated violation of Dutch neutrality. These documents contained no proofs of a compromising nature, but they created a deep impression in Germany, and confirmed the belief, already strong, that the violation of Belgian neutrality was a mere pretext for the English Government, who had for a long time been resolved to attack Germany, and would not have held aloof from the struggle in any case. In the words of the Chancellor, "Outwardly it is the Russian Government which is responsible for this most grievous of all wars, since it ordered and carried out the mobilisation of the whole Russian army. The inner responsibility, however, lies with England." English Imperialism, and not Russian Tsarism, was decided to be the chief enemy of Germany.

take place on account of the declaration of martial law and the restrictions imposed on public meetings as a consequence. At the same time there was no sign of decision behind their efforts, and they probably became conscious at the last moment of the fact that, as a writer in the *Berliner Tageblatt* wrote: "German Social Democracy is not half as international as it had thought itself, and even has a great deal in common with what our opponents call Prussian militarism." There is something almost pathetic about the declaration of the party on the eve of war: "The international proletariat has done its duty till the last minute, both here and abroad, and has strained every nerve to maintain peace, to make war impossible. If our grave protests, if our repeated efforts have proved without avail, if the conditions under which we live have once more proved stronger than the will of our brother-workers and ourselves, we must face unflinchingly what the future holds in store for us." The policy of the party, as laid down by its leaders in the Reichstag, was to support the war till such time as the security of German territory



German boys below military age collecting gifts of warm clothing in Berlin, for the use of troops at the front.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

THE SOCIAL DEMOCRAT PARTY AND THE WAR.

The views of the Chancellor are shared probably by the majority of the German people; but it should be remarked that in the Socialist press there has never been much sign of animosity against England—one wonders whether the Social Democrat party could not have adopted a more vigorous attitude in face of the German military clique, if England and France alone had been concerned. Obviously it was fear of Russia, and the worst sides of Russia—the despotism, the oppression of minorities, the officialdom—which made possible that scene in the Reichstag on August 4th, when the Socialist party assented to the war credits with an enthusiasm which provoked from the Kaiser the saying: "I no longer know parties, I know only Germans." The whole attitude of the Social Democrat party is not simple. They certainly at first strove to avert a war. On the 28th of July they held mass meetings throughout Berlin in favour of peace, and planned further demonstrations for the 31st of July, and even for the 4th of August. These naturally could not

should be reasonably guaranteed; and though it is probable that there are many shades of opinion among the members of the party, from Dr. Liebknecht, who voted against the war-credits on December 4th, to those who are more orthodox in their views, this attitude seems generally subscribed to. "No people," said the well-known Social Democrat, Eduard Bernstein, in discussing England's attitude at the beginning of the war, "no people is free in its action during a war. Once war is a fact, the people, whether it approves or not, has too much to fear from an unfavourable result to be able to resist the decrees of the persons entrusted with the conduct of the war." Herr Bernstein's remark might apply with equal force to the position of the Social Democrat party in Germany. Some such line of reasoning as he suggests, together with a mistrust of the strength of their "comrades" abroad, may explain not only the united front shown by the Socialists on the outbreak of war, but also the zeal with which so many of them volunteered for active service. The case of Dr. Ludwig Franck, Deputy for Baden, attracted



A parade of new recruits through the streets of Berlin. [Newspaper Illustrations.]



British residents in Germany on their way to a concentration camp.

[Alfieri Picture Service.]

attention in particular. A noted Francophil, he had done his best to avert a quarrel between the two neighbouring countries. On the outbreak of war, however, he had asked to be transferred from the Landsturm into the active army, had gone out, and, by one of those almost artistic ironies, fallen in the first fight, the victim of a French bullet. His death proved the occasion for a remarkable demonstration of sympathy on the part of the whole country, and Social Democracy, now that the slur of unpatriotism was done away with, found its position considerably strengthened in Germany, and could look forward to the reaction which it apprehended after the war, in the hope that it would be able to combat it successfully, and march further along the path of reform which it had always followed.

THE "BURGFRIEDE."

Actually, political controversy was supposed to be at an end with war. The solidarity of all the States in the Empire, the unanimity of all parties in the face of the common foe, led to the observance of what was called *Burgfriede*—peace within the frontiers. For many Germans this putting away of sectarian differences has been one of the most encouraging results of the war. The Imperial Chancellor mentioned it especially in his speech on December 4th, and expressed the hope that its effect might be prolonged even after the war was over. Several political organisations suspended their activity for the duration of the war; some, like the Anti-Semitic societies, for ever. At the same time there were signs, beneath the surface, of the old quarrels; and it is interesting to notice that when the censorship suppressed or confiscated a paper for the breaking of the *Burgfriede*, it was generally a Socialist organ which suffered—now for directly saying the war was a capitalists' war; now again, for some criticism which it was considered would fan class hatred. For, as the war progressed, and economic pressure became severer, it became all the more necessary to watch over the interests of the poorer classes. Not only did the Social Democrats assist in the relief of distress, by interesting themselves in the needy families of soldiers, by organising sickness and maternity funds, and by supporting other such measures: they adopted an attitude of courageous criticism towards the policy of the Government. They branded extortionate landlords, attacked speculators and those employers who took advantage of the new circumstances to exploit their workmen, and, finally, protested against the complacent reactionism which could not help asserting itself from time to time in the various journals of the Conservative press. In this work the *Vorwärts* distinguished itself by its courage.

THE DISLOCATION OF TRADE.

That the economic pressure on Germany was felt from the beginning is obvious. It is hard to obtain comprehensive statistics about unemployment, but there have been several admissions in the German press that the overseas trade was practically at a standstill, and what figures were published about the labour market went to show that the position was extremely unsatisfactory during the earlier months of the war, though it improved subsequently. In Hamburg, on September 16th, a census of unemployed was taken, and showed the considerable figures of 25,434 for men, and 3,276 for women. The situation would probably have been worse if simultaneously vacancies had not been created by the calling up of men to the colours. Towards the end of September things had

become more normal, and the improvement maintained itself in October. A report of the Imperial Statistics Bureau, based on an enquiry made in November from 414 firms, declared that the number of men employed was only a quarter less than what it had been in the corresponding month of the previous year. In Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden—that is, the districts in which there were not so many war industries—the situation appears to have been less favourable than elsewhere. Those industries, indeed, which wished to continue had to turn to the production of articles necessary for the war. An incandescent lamp factory began to manufacture cartridge cases; a machine factory produced field kitchens; even the toy trade, the grand piano industry, and the perambulator business managed in some degree to adapt themselves to the new demands. Naturally, there was a scarcity of certain raw materials, and chemical ingenuity was set the task of devising substitutes for these. Later, some of these raw materials were procured from the conquered districts, notably Belgium, where the goods in the warehouses were requisitioned by the authorities and despatched to Germany.

In spite of all this, the loss of the overseas trade struck Germany hard, and people had to console themselves by saying that the other belligerents were not able to do much trade either, on account of the diminished buying power of the neutral countries.

In considering the state of German industry during the war, the dislocation of certain industries on account of the lack of skilled workmen should not be overlooked. Soon after the outbreak of war regulations were made allowing indispensable men in service in the inland to return to their business on leave; but this was a half measure, and in the eastern parts of Germany the ship-building and machine industries appear to have suffered considerably. At a public meeting of the Erfurt Chamber of Commerce in January, a special request was made that the War Ministry should be approached with the object of obtaining exemption from military service for skilled tradesmen: the smaller concerns in particular were stated to be suffering under the conditions. The extent to which German exports had fallen soon became obvious, for without exception the exchanges between Berlin and neutral countries moved steadily against the former, in spite of the fact that the Reichsbank sent gold to Holland and the Scandinavian countries to redeem German obligations there. Nevertheless, the people in general were never in doubt as to their economic strength, which, they claimed, was proved in a striking manner by the success of their War Loan. For this, about forty-five million pounds was contributed by the savings banks and their depositors; about 900,000 subscriptions for small amounts were sent in; and of the rest, the majority came from public bodies and large firms, who invested money which they owed abroad. The *Darlehnkassen*—the war loan banks specially instituted to facilitate the subscription by making advances on imperishable securities—did not play as important a part as had been expected in financial circles. However, they issued special notes of all denominations down to one, two, and three marks, and thus drew into the Reichsbank gold and other coin. In the first days of the war there had been a run on the banks for gold, and the Reichsbank reserves had been considerably depleted. This led to a press and pulpit campaign, and towards the end of the year the gold in the hands of the Reichsbank had increased from £68,000,000 to over £100,000,000. A second war credit was voted by the Reichstag on December 4th, and the

second war loan was generally believed to be due in March, 1915. This expenditure, of course, is quite distinct from the various credits voted by the Diets of the various German states—the Prussian Diet, for instance, raising £75,000,000, which was destined, among other things, for relief in East Prussia, and for the special preparation of potatoes and beetroot as bread substitutes.

One of the effects of the blockade of Germany was a shortage in copper and other materials necessary for the manufacture of ammunition and explosives. Germany's requirements for the war are far from covered by the 25,000 tons of copper which she produces under normal conditions, and it very soon became evident that the reserves in the country itself would have to be utilised. As it was estimated that during the last five years at least 200,000 tons more copper were imported than exported, public opinion did not become agitated; but the strictest economy had to be observed. Special rewards were offered for spent ammunition; household utensils in copper were used; and when the supplies of metal in the conquered districts are absorbed, too, it is proposed that the overhead wires of electric lines which are not running should be requisitioned. Similarly, there was a shortage of nitrogenous salts.

THE QUESTION OF FOODSTUFFS.

Of greater importance than this was the shortage in the supply of foodstuffs. Naturally, with the outbreak of war, the usual import of grain from Russia had ceased, and only the most meagre supplies came through neutral countries. Moreover, the invasion of East Prussia by the Russians, and of Alsace by the French, had led to a considerable loss of the 1914 harvest, a harvest which under any circumstances was not exceptionally brilliant. According to the official German estimates, this harvest covered the demand for rye, oats, and potatoes, while there was a shortage of about 2,000,000 tons of wheat and 3,000,000 tons of barley. It was recognised that economy was necessary, but no one doubted that Germany would be able to hold out till the next year's harvest.

Naturally, prices rose at once with the outbreak of war, and matters were not improved by the selfish action of speculators. For a considerable time, however, the Government did not intervene to any appreciable extent. On August 22nd, a number of experts were invited by the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior to discuss the advisability of maximum prices, but were informed that the authorities had decided to abstain from such action for the time being. A limited liability company was ultimately formed to buy up supplies of corn and hold them over until later in the year; but this was far from being a remedy, and the Socialist press, in particular, demanded a thorough State regulation of foodstuffs. When maximum prices came, they proved to be a fiasco. A large amount of grain was further wasted as fodder. Warnings to be economical now began to appear, obviously inspired by official quarters. The bakers were compelled to provide a "mixed" bread, and it became permissible to put twenty per cent, or even more, of potato into bread. The war bread, or *K-Brot*, was used by the Emperor himself; but the exhortations to economy increasing in vigour, it was obvious that soon drastic measures would have to be taken by the Government. "England's plan to starve us out," it was said, "is doomed to failure—but only if we are sensible and economise." Shortly after a last appeal by the Minister of the Interior, Dr. Loebell, the Federal Council, on January 25th, announced that it had decided on a seizure of stocks from February 1st. This

measure was looked upon in Germany as a precaution, rather than a definite sign of weakness; but however that may be—and one cannot tell till the official figures are given for the stocks in hand—the Decree marks a definite stage in the history of Germany during the war.

It should be noted that for a large section of the people even this measure was not considered adequate. The foodstuffs, according to the Federal Council's regulations, were to be distributed to the local administrations, and the local administrations made responsible for supplying the bakeries and retail dealers. But that, it was argued, did not necessarily mean that the consumption was regulated. The Decree, as a matter of fact, left it open to the local administrations to adopt necessary measures like the institution of a uniform loaf, or the distribution of bread tickets; but it neither enforced such measures itself, nor did it oblige the local administrations to enforce them.

Simultaneously with the rise in the price of grain, other articles had increased in price. From the very first there had been a scarcity of petroleum, which affected not only the owners of automobiles, but also the very considerable class of people who use petroleum for lighting. Butter, too, became dearer as time went on, as well as lard, eggs, rice, peas, and different kinds of meat. This rise in the cost of living, which generally went hand-in-hand with a reduction in wages, conspired to make things difficult for the poorer classes, and in many instances their rent was left unpaid. To meet this distress, special funds were instituted in certain communities. Altogether it may be said that relief had been administered on a very liberal scale in Germany. In December, Berlin alone was spending £175,000 a month on the families of soldiers, while in Charlottenburg over £100,000 was distributed up to the end of the year; besides which, school children and adults were fed every day, and a special municipal bank lent money to shopkeepers and householders.

AFTER THE NEW YEAR.

How far the Germans still believe in victory it is not easy to tell. Certainly, since the beginning of the new year there was none of the immoderate confidence which expressed itself in the earlier weeks. The watchword changed from *Feste druff an-*—hit hard, to *Durchhalten*—hold out. In the German press of the first weeks of the New Year several leading politicians discussed peace—as well as the possibility of discussing peace—and a wide gulf showed itself to exist between the Social Democrats and the other parties, the former demanding a cessation of hostilities as soon as the safety of German territory was assured for a reasonable period, the latter insisting that the gains of Germany must be commensurate with her enormous sacrifices. Matters reached a head at the opening of the Prussian Diet, when, after the Socialist speaker, Herr Hirsch, had expressed his confidence that the voices of peace would find their way to authoritative quarters, Herr Heydebrand, the Conservative leader, demanded that the unity of the entire people with regard to the war should be expressed, adding: "The people expect that we are prepared, in view of the present situation, to make all sacrifices." This evoked from Dr. Liebknecht the retort: "You have no right to speak in the name of the people." A commotion ensued, and Herr Liebknecht had to resume his seat amid cries of "shame." That Herr Liebknecht does not speak in the name of the people either cannot, unfortunately, be doubted; but he probably has a larger following than is supposed, and in Württemberg a vote of appreciation

of his protests has been followed by a split in the party organisation there. Naturally, the realisation of the effects of the blockade did not tend to make England any the more popular in Germany. The airship and naval raids on the East Coast were welcomed with a fierce joy out of all proportion with the military success. Though General von Falkenhayn had declared Germany's readiness to endure a war of any length, most people looked forward to the submarines and Zeppelins to retaliate on England, and bring about sensational developments with the spring.

The physiognomy of daily life appears to have changed less than might have been imagined. Berlin continues its life much as before, a little soberer perhaps, but not disconsolate. The theatres are open, and besides giving Shakespeare—that was inevitable—present a number of light musical pieces dealing in their own way with the war. The cafés continue to be frequented. Wounded may be seen, but the authorities try to keep them out of the

way as far as possible. From time to time casualty lists are issued by the Ministries of the various States, but no declaration of total losses has yet been made officially. Foreign estimates reach a figure of well over two millions, and these do not seem extravagant when one remembers that up to January of this year the Prussian list alone contained some 900,000 names. The German papers naturally strive to minimise their losses, and the public at large prefers to think of other aspects of the war. The women avoid dressing in black for fear of the effect it would produce on others, and, it is said, content themselves with wearing as a sign of their loss a brooch with the legend: "Proudly I gave a dear one to the Fatherland." One may refuse to see in this anything beyond a certain lack of emotional reticence—but, however that may be, the stoicism of the German woman remains not the least striking of the phenomena of the present war.



The Cannon Hall of the Krupp Works at Essen.

[Record Press.]

A RETROSPECT.

VERY early in the war it became evident that the Germans were unlikely to win. They had staked their hopes of victory on the chance of defeating France before the Russians could concentrate their millions against the eastern frontiers. For this chance they paid an enormously heavy price. It cost their cause the moral damage—the magnitude of which it is impossible to over-estimate—of the invasion of Belgium. It further made the intervention of England, up to that time very problematical quite certain. Against these tremendous debits they had nothing to set on the other side of the account. They started well. Contrary to the popular opinion, the resistance of Belgium did not seriously delay the German advance into Northern France. The German armies were able to inflict heavy defeats on the French in Lorraine and at Charleroi, and their attack against the left wing of the Allies at Mons took the British completely by surprise. In the week of the retreat from Mons it looked as though every calculation of the German General Staff was to be completely fulfilled. The battle of the Marne disappointed their hopes; and although the actual losses in material to the Germans were comparatively small, strategically it was one of the decisive battles in the world's history. It threw the Germans, temporarily at any rate, back on to the defensive. It baulked them of all the advantages which they had hoped to gain by the violation of Belgium's neutrality, and by the concentration of their attack upon France, which brought England into the field against them. It put a conclusion of final victory for them almost past hope.

The honour of this decisive victory rests not with one of the Allies, but is to be divided amongst them all. Belgium contributed to it by detaining some German troops. Russia contributed very materially, for her invasion of Eastern Prussia—a chivalrously rash enterprise, which was punished by the sensational defeats in the Masurian Lakes—drew off German corps at a critical moment in the advance on Paris. France, too, must share in the honours, by the obstinate defence of Maubeuge, and her brilliant operations round Verdun, by the vigour of General Foch on the Allied left, and by the skill with which General Joffre timed the bringing up of his reserves into action. When all the other Allies have received their share, enough remains over to make the retreat from Mons and the battle of the Marne two of the finest chapters in the history of the British army.

Immediately after the Marne, there were extravagant expectations of triumph which were to be bitterly disappointed; the four months of the war which followed the first two, though on the whole less anxious, were far more trying to the troops. The Germans, who had made a fetish of the offensive in their strategy and their tactics, and for its sake had ruined their moral case before the world and incurred the hostility of England, were to exhibit a skill and a resource in the defence with which few had credited them. Their defence of the positions along the Aisne showed what splendid opportunities for

defence had been neglected by the Allies in the north of France, and how unwise was the military policy which, as in France before the war began, merely copied the ideas of another Power, and made no attempt to develop a strategy along genuinely national lines. The battle of the Marne redeemed the originally faulty dispositions and preparations of the French from disaster, but did not make good all the mischief done by them. The French, however, were embarrassed by the fact that no military alliance existed between them and the Belgians; their plans faced towards the eastern frontier, whereas it had been obvious for years that the likeliest quarter from which danger would come was the north. If Belgium had allowed France to violate her neutrality, as the Germans falsely charged against her, the course of the war would have been very different. The French plans for defending her northern frontiers would have linked in naturally with the Belgians' ideas of defending Antwerp, and the joint Franco-Belgian line might well have followed the same positions held so long by the Germans. The strategy of Marshal Villars against Marlborough might have been repeated, with La Bassée as the centre of the Allies *Ne plus ultra* lines. Paris would never have been in danger, and Mons and Charleroi, instead of being disastrous defeats, might have been a repetition of Malplaquet. The French, moreover, would never have wasted their strength in Alsace and Lorraine, and the armies uselessly employed there might have been on the left of the Allied line, leaving the British Expeditionary Force free to operate against the German right flank—its natural rôle—and to anticipate the operations in Flanders which Sir John French afterwards undertook under circumstances much less favourable to success.

The early popular expectations of what the Russians would be able to do on the eastern frontier were falsified, and, indeed, were never very reasonable. They greatly underestimated the military value of the Austrian alliance to Germany. The tradition of defeat is almost unbroken in Austria. Her armies have never been able to put forth that last strain of energy and endurance which makes the difference between victory and defeat. But no armies have better stood defeat than the Austrian, and this characteristic they exhibited in a very remarkable degree in this war. Austria's reserves of men, moreover, are very great. But of even greater value to Germany than these reserves was the strategic utility of Austria's help. By her geographical position, Austria protected the vulnerable flank of Germany's defences on her eastern frontier by way of Cracow and Silesia; and forced Russia to fight with Germany on the enormous salient of Poland, the most disadvantageous in the military sense of all possible configurations of a frontier. In their attempts to approach Berlin by the direct route through Posen, Russian armies were outflanked from the start. Further, in her system of strategic railways following the curve of Poland's frontier, Germany had improved this natural advantage, and the frequent Russian retreats in Poland

are all to be explained by the skilful use made by Germany of her railways round the salient of Poland, and as the resultant of sudden concentrations made by the Germans now against this, now against another section of the Russian advance. When the Russians pressed forward in the centre, the Germans concentrated against their flanks; and if the Russian advance was concave, with the tips of the curve thrown forward, the Germans replied by menacing Warsaw. The strategic railway connecting East Prussia through Thorn, Graudenz, and Posen to Cracow, was worth a million men to the Germans. Whereas people had expected that the advance of the Russians would force them to transfer the bulk of their army from France to the eastern front, in fact Germany, with the help of the Austrians, managed to maintain an advanced line well within Poland with half the number of men that she was using in France.

The most exciting moment of the war, after the memorable first month, was when Sir John French's movement from the Aisne to Flanders was gathering impetus. Had an army been able to force the Germans back from the coast, and to recover Bruges and Ghent, and had Antwerp never fallen, there would have been no deadlock on the west front, and the whole course of the war would have been different. The fall of Antwerp was followed by the magnificent defence of Ypres, and the failure of the British turning movement by the failure of the Germans' efforts to win through to the Straits. Once again the honours of the fighting rested with the British army; but the results were, and remained, negative. The superiority of the individual British soldier over the German was not enough to turn the scale against the German advantages and to secure a decisive victory. These advantages were greater mobility, due to the better railway communications behind the German defence, and the greater rapidity with which Germany was able to mobilise her reserves.

Towards the end of the year the deadlock in both east and west seemed at last complete, and people began to resign themselves with all the patience that they could command until new forces could be brought into the field in the spring. The chief of these was the new British army, which had been enlisted from August onwards, and was expected to be ready to take the field after six months'

training. It was, however, doubtful how far it would suffice to turn the balance, for Germany, too, had been training new levies, and it seemed probable that she would be able to use numbers at least equal to our own against our new army wherever it might be employed. The failures of the Germans had shown that to guarantee success in attack a very large superiority in numbers was necessary, and no one could feel very confident of a triumphant offensive at any point along the German lines from Flanders to Switzerland. Russia, too, had inexhaustible reserves of men, but the difficulty in her case was to train and still more to equip them. The entry of Turkey into the war was a serious blow to Russia, for by closing the Dardanelles it cut her off from her Allies, and in winter, when Archangel was closed to traffic by the ice, subjected her to a blockade even more complete than our blockade of Germany. Turkey, moreover, kept both British and Russian troops employed that might have been used with effect elsewhere.

As the winter wore on, men's minds began to turn to the chances of extending the front of battle. On the east and west the utmost extension had been reached. Moreover the British fleet had driven the German merchant shipping from the seas, and of the German navy only the submarines dared to venture out for more than a few hours. Germany must be feeling the effects of this slow strangulation. It would soon have ended the war if Wilhelmshaven and the other German ports could have been besieged from the sea, and a British fleet could have appeared in the Baltic with transports for Russian troops. German armies would then have had to face north, as well as east and west. Unfortunately, the German battle fleet in being, the immensely strong fortifications of the naval bases, and, above all, the submarines, seemed to secure this flank. Wilhelmshaven and the naval bases, it seemed, could only be attacked from the sea when the German front in Belgium had been turned and an army was ready to co-operate from the land side. For the present, then, this northern front was secure.

On the south, there was more to be hoped for. Austria, or rather Hungary, had many enemies on her southern front, and if Roumania could be brought into the war, Hungary might fall to a resolute and continued attack, and it was then possible that Italy might be induced to take up arms.

Appendix.

THE FIGHTING IN LORRAINE.

The following letter from Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett, correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* and *Daily Telegraph*, throws new light on the early stages of the French campaign and on the French defeat in Lorraine. The defeat has been assigned its due importance in the History (p. 117), but so far no details have appeared in English or French, and as the fighting belongs very definitely to the early stages of the war, the letter is given here for the sake of completeness. On many points it will be found to confirm views of the early strategy of the war already taken in the body of this History.

During the days of the retreat from Mons the question was continually being asked, "Where is the bulk of the French army?" "Why have they not been sent to the north?" It was perfectly well known when the Germans violated the neutrality of Belgium that they intended to invade France by the unfortified northern frontier. Since those critical days the veil has in part been lifted, and we have been allowed to visit ground in Lorraine over which the finest of the French armies were engaged in a desperate struggle for existence during the whole of this period when the British army was retreating from Mons until after the conclusion of the battle of the Marne.

Now we know for certain that the bulk of the French armies ready to take the field at the beginning of the war were concentrated on the frontiers of Alsace and Lorraine, and that a vigorous offensive was begun in the opening days of the war which led to a French invasion of the lost provinces.

The main French movement was directed not against the Germans in Alsace, but against the troops in Lorraine. It is with the fortunes and misfortunes of General Castlenau's army concentrated round Nancy and Lunéville that I deal in this description of the campaign. The pick of the French army corps were concentrated under Castlenau's command. His army consisted of five army corps—the Ninth, Eleventh, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Twentieth, with some reserve divisions, and the Second Independent Cavalry Division.

It would seem as if the French campaign in Lorraine was started with no definite strategical objective in mind, except to obtain some great initial success in the lost provinces which would arouse the latter to intense enthusiasm for the French cause. On certain points there is now no manner of doubt—viz., the French entirely miscalculated the strength of the armies which the Germans could throw into the North of France whilst keeping at the same time a sufficient strength in Lorraine to defeat any attempt at a French invasion; also, at this early stage, the French Generals were all for attack, and had not grasped the great lesson of the war that the attainment of victory by an attacking force is almost impossible under modern conditions unless you have an enormous superiority in numbers and an open flank against which you can utilise your superiority.

Had these two facts been understood as they are now understood, there can be little doubt but that the French would never have attempted the invasion of Alsace and Lorraine. They would have acted strictly on the defence along the line of their strategical frontier represented by Belfort-Epinal-Toul-Verdun, with a sufficient force to hold the Trouée de Mirecourt, that open stretch of unfortified but extremely difficult country between Epinal and Toul, which is the only road for an invasion of French territory along the eastern frontier through which a large army can pass without first investing the frontier fortresses. They would then have had their army free to meet the menace from the north, and a decisive battle would probably have been fought on the line of the Meuse and the Sambre, instead of on the Marne.

When General Castlenau commenced his forward movement towards the Seille on August 14th—the day mobilisation was

completed—he does not seem to have obtained any real and reliable information as to the position and strength of the German armies. Lorraine is a very difficult country for the handling and the deployment of large armies. It is hilly and densely wooded. It does not seem likely that General Castlenau assumed the offensive with the strategic object of reaching the Rhine and invading Germany. It would appear as if his object was to carry the fight to the enemy's soil, and thus save French Lorraine from invasion, and also, perhaps, to arouse an insurrection amongst the French population of the lost province. This historic battleground, over which both armies were about to contend for the next four weeks, abounds with strong natural positions which can be rendered almost impregnable by the assistance of the spade, and at the end of this period both armies were to learn by bitter experience that their original ambitious plans of campaign were to be brought to naught.

However, it would appear as if the French mobilisation in Lorraine was finished two days before the Germans were ready to strike, and that the initiative in the first place thus passed from the Crown Prince of Bavaria into the hands of General Castlenau. The success of his offensive up to August 17th encouraged a further advance, and on August 18th General Castlenau divided his army into two main groups, the right wing advancing towards Sarrebourg—evidently with the intention of masking any attempt at a sortie from Strasburg,—whilst the left wing, stronger in numbers, pushed on towards Chateau Salin and Mohange. The position between Chateau Salin and Mohange is an ideal one for defence, and was held in force by the main Bavarian armies, supported by an immense mass of heavy artillery brought out from Metz.

Nevertheless, on August 19th the French made some progress, and established their battle-front, but on the 20th, when they attempted to carry this line forward, they were repulsed with terrible losses. The French artillery, although it inflicted tremendous losses on the enemy's infantry, could make no impression on the heavy field batteries placed in commanding positions. There can be no doubt that the French had fallen into a trap carefully prepared for them. The right wing, which had pushed on towards Sarrebourg, was also held up and defeated.

The men were everywhere exhausted by the heat and long marches. There was, therefore, no alternative but to retreat if a disaster was to be avoided. To the Twentieth Corps was assigned the rôle of acting as rearguard. This corps, perhaps the finest in the French army, sacrificed itself to save the others. It covered the retreat by holding on to its positions, but suffered enormous losses, amounting, it is said, to 20,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners. It also suffered a great loss of artillery, but this mattered but little, as the guns were immediately replaced.

On August 21st the Germans allowed the French no rest. They pressed forward vigorously, and drove back the exhausted corps to that splendid position known as the Grand Couronne de Nancy. General Castlenau saw that at all costs he must hold the Grand Couronne, and prevent the Germans

from entering Nancy—otherwise his army would be driven back into Toul and would run the risk of being invested if the enemy forced the Trouée de Mirecourt.

On August 23rd and 24th General Joffre evidently became seriously alarmed at the progress of the Bavarian army towards the Moselle. He told Castlenau that at all costs he must hold the Grand Couronne against a frontal attack, and that at the same time he must endeavour by every means in his power to stop the enemy's advance towards the Moselle. Castlenau replied that he and his army had sworn that not a single German soldier should ever set foot on the Grand Couronne. This promise they kept, and their achievement saved France, and made the victory of the Marne possible.

August 2nd was the critical day of the campaign for both the French and German armies. The Germans, considering themselves victorious, were pushing forward, had crossed the Meurthe and the Montagne, and their advanced posts were within a few miles of the Moselle. The Bavarian Crown Prince and his Staff, early on the 25th, undoubtedly considered that their plans had succeeded, and that only a continuation of their vigorous offensive was required to drive the French armies back on Toul. But General Castlenau now had the truer knowledge of the strength and disposition of the enemy, and fully realised the risk which the Germans were taking in separating their armies by a flank march across his front.

A great opportunity had arrived, and he did not let it slip. His army was concentrated, whilst the Germans were divided by a long stretch of difficult country. Every mile they moved further towards the Moselle increased the danger. Therefore, on August 25th, the French Commander issued orders for his counter-stroke. Along his whole front, both north and south of Nancy, orders were given for a general attack against the depleted forces in front of his positions, which, however, were thought sufficient by the Bavarian commander to check any advance of the French after the reverse suffered before Chateau Salins and Mohange.

The French troops advanced to the attack with the utmost vigour. In the immediate front of the Grand Couronne they descended into the valley of the Seille, penetrated the forest of Champenoux, and drove the Germans right back—but not without desperate fighting—across the Seille into their own territory. By the night of August 26th, General Castlenau's strategic objective had been achieved. He had checked the enemy's advance towards the Moselle. The French corps which, advancing from the Grand Couronne on the 25th, had driven the Germans right back across the Seille, were still full of fight and anxious to continue their victorious advance towards Chateau Salins-Mohange, the scene of the reverse of August 20th.

Castlenau consulted Joffre, who decided that a further advance was too risky, taking into consideration the critical state of the operations on the Marne. General Joffre was, in fact, perfectly satisfied with the successes already gained in checking the German advance towards the Marne. He ordered Castlenau to withdraw his troops from the Seille and the Forest of Champenoux, and to fall back once again on the impregnable Grand Couronne. South of Nancy he was to establish his new line, and to endeavour to hold it at all costs.

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